IBN RUSHD, FASL AL-MAQĀL
AND
THE THEORY OF DOUBLE TRUTH *

Dr. FehruIIah TERKAN*

he who does not understand the art
does not understand the product of art,
and he who does not understand the product of art
does not understand the Artisan.

Ibn Rushd

In the aftermath of the translation activities in the 9th and 10th century, the Muslim East and the West witnessed a great deal of intellectual efforts on the part of the Muslim philosophers to harmonize the religious teaching and the newfangled line of thinking. There is no doubt that the transmission of Greek thought brought along certain metaphysical speculations that were apparently viewed to be at odds with Islamic revelation, which presented its own system of thought on many intellectual issues. At such an intersection of religious and philosophical thought begins the struggle of the philosopher in the Muslim community. And the outcome of this struggle was the considerable high volume of writings on the part of the philosophically minded in an effort to create a room for philosophical endeavor in view of the manner in which people perceived it. Though I do not at all suggest that reconciliatory efforts be viewed in the Straussian sense, but historical facts and the fact that works produced to

---

* This article is based on my paper presented at the Medieval Congress in Kalamazoo, MI, ABD in 1999.

* Ankara University Faculty of Divinity

1 For a general knowledge of such harmonization efforts in Andalus, see A. 'Abd al-Maqāīd, al-Tawfīq bayn al-Dīn wa al-Falsafah 'inda Falāṣīfa al-Islām fi al-Andalus (Cairo, 1993).

2 According to Strauss, in the Muslim world in general, and also in the Jewish world for that matter, there was no harmony between philosophy and society. (L. Strauss, Persecution and the art of Writing (Glencoe, 1952), 18). People’s understanding of revelation was very influential on the mode of the acceptance and adjustment of philosophy in the Islamic community and the degree of difficulty for the philosophers to assimilate philosophy in their society. Christian and Islamic-Jewish acceptance and adjustment of philosophy in the community took place in accordance with their understanding of revelation. That is to say, while for Christians the understanding of Revelation was dominated by a character of faith,
that effect in fact indicate that there was a tension between those who are into philosophy and those who are in the receiving position, which was sometimes conveyed through the titles of their books.  

When we come to the period in which Ibn Rushd experienced his own difficulty, and although Ibn Rushd’s predecessors had worked on the harmonization of philosophy and religion in the Muslim East, this did not help him very much in the 12th century due to the debacle of the philosophical tradition and the intensive orthodox texture of the Muslim community in Andalus in particular. Despite all this, one cannot ignore the very existence of Muslim philosophers that emerged under such unfavorable circumstances. So even though the recognition and the legitimacy of philosophy by the community always raised a problem, this fact only confined the philosophers to intellectual circles and royal patronage.

for Islamic and Jewish thinkers, it was of character of law (Torah, Shari'ah) (Ibid, 9-10). It is also thought that due to the lack of social recognition of philosophy, the Muslim philosophers sometimes had to disguise their philosophical conclusions in an Islamic garment, which is why they tried to avoid exposing their application of philosophy to the tradition or revelation. On this, Strauss builds his argument of esoteric and exoteric writings of the philosophers. He thinks that because of potential danger the philosophers employed an exoteric writings in their works, where they planted their original views that oppose to religious teachings esoterically (Strauss, 36, 110), which was “the form in which philosophy became visible to the political community” (Strauss, 18). It was an armor by which philosophers guarded themselves against the dangers they were in. That is also why, the falâsifah, according to J. Kraemer, when they were trying to bring philosophy into the Islamic city, employed “rhetorical accommodations” to the Islamic lexicon by means of a hermeneutic reinterpretation of the root concepts, while diverging radically from the Islamic doctrine on substantive questions regarding the nature of the best policy (“The Jihad of the Falasifa,” JSAI, v.10 (1987), 291). Especially Ernest Renan suggested that Ibn Rushd hid his real views in his writings in fear of danger (Renan, Averroës et L’Averroïsme, Paris, 1861).

For W. M. Watt, it is possible to discover how far certain philosophical doctrines of the philosophers such as Ibn Rushd reflect the social structure of his time in al-Andalus (“Philosophy and Social Structure in Almohad Spain” Islamic Quarterly, v.8, no.1-2 (1964), 46, 50). For example, Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy b. Yaqzân reflects an accord with Almohad rational theology, while before that, Ibn Bâjah had turned away from active political life and sought solitary life (Watt, 48). We can add to that Ibn Rushd’s evaluation of some Almoravid rulers as falling from timocracy into hedonism in his Commentary on Plato’s Republic (trans. R. Lerner (Ithaca, 1974), 125. Cf. G.F. Hourani’s view especially on Fasl al-Maqâl: the content shows the prevailing unpopularity of philosophy at the time. See his “Introduction” to his translation of Fasl al-Maqâl in Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (London, 1978), 17. Also see Strauss, 30.

3 For W. M. Watt, it is possible to discover how far certain philosophical doctrines of the philosophers such as Ibn Rushd reflect the social structure of his time in al-Andalus (“Philosophy and Social Structure in Almohad Spain” Islamic Quarterly, v.8, no.1-2 (1964), 46, 50). For example, Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy b. Yaqzân reflects an accord with Almohad rational theology, while before that, Ibn Bâjah had turned away from active political life and sought solitary life (Watt, 48). We can add to that Ibn Rushd’s evaluation of some Almoravid rulers as falling from timocracy into hedonism in his Commentary on Plato’s Republic (trans. R. Lerner (Ithaca, 1974), 125. Cf. G.F. Hourani’s view especially on Fasl al-Maqâl: the content shows the prevailing unpopularity of philosophy at the time. See his “Introduction” to his translation of Fasl al-Maqâl in Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy (London, 1978), 17. Also see Strauss, 30.

4 Especially for the negative approach of the Malikite jurists; see ’Abd al-Maqîd, 33.

İstanbul Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi Sayı: 13, Yıl: 2006
Ibn Rushd, *Fasl al-Maqāl* and the Theory of Double Truth

Ibn Rushd (520/1126-595/1198), or Averroes, lived under the Almohad (al-Muwahhidûn) dynasty in Andalus in the 6th/12th century. He was appointed a few times as a judge and could not escape the intellectual conflict in the community. There seem to have been two intellectual trends in his time: a small number of people represented the supporters of the fundamentally rationalistic doctrinal system advocated by Ibn Tūmart, the founder of the Almohad movement. The other trend was represented to a lesser degree by theologians but mainly by the Muslim orthodox jurists who were following the Malikite School of jurisprudence, and who were very influential on the public. One might say that the local settings in general contained a noticeable intellectual climate, but it was generally unfavorable to philosophy, except for the efforts and encouragement of especially two successive Almohad rulers, Abū Ya’qūb Yûsuf (r.1163-84) and Abû Yûsuf Ya’qūb (al-Mansûr) (r.1184-99). As a result of this predominantly Malikite intellectual environment and the tension between the jurists and the philosophers in addition to the adverse circumstances, not

---


7. Hourani, “Introduction,” 13, 17. In an account related in A. al-Marrākhîf al-Al-Mu’jib fi Talkhîs Akhbâr al-Maghrib (Eds. M. S. al-‘Ayân & M.A. al-‘Alamî. (Cairo, 1949), 242-3), Ibn Rushd narrates his first meeting with the ruler Abū Ya’qūb Yûsuf, which was arranged by Ibn Tufayl. According to this story, when they meet, the ruler asks Ibn Rushd about the opinion of the philosophers on the heavens whether they are created or eternal. Ibn Rushd first fears and hesitates to speak, but when the ruler begins discussing the matter with Ibn Tufayl in front of him, Ibn Rushd gradually enters the discussion. This story too bears an indication for the fear of philosophers to reveal their association with philosophy. (The whole narrative is cited in Hourani, “Introduction,” 13-14).

8. Cf. Hourani, “Introduction,” 6. It is possible that they had a personal intellectual attachment to philosophy and/or they may have employed philosophical method against the Malikite jurist in order to improve their rational perspective in religious matters. MacClintock speculates that Ibn Rushd’s appointments as judge may have been for the purpose of sustaining scholarship for philosophical studies (“Averroes” *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (NY, 1972), 220). For the influence of Almohad doctrines on Ibn Rushd, see D. Urvoy, “La Pensée Almohade dans L’œuvre d’Averroës” in *Multiple Averroës* (Paris, 1978), 45-53.
only was Averroes banished and his doctrine pronounced heretical, but also edicts ordering that philosophical works be burned and forbidding these studies were issued since they were considered dangerous to religion.9

Ibn Rushd wrote a treatise entitled "Fasl al-Maqâl,"10 from whose title and content, it is possible to deduce some insights into what kind of a book it is, and in what kind of cultural context Ibn Rushd wrote it. Modern scholars have different comments on the nature of the treatise and the arguments Ibn Rushd used in it. From the arguments of the book that was presumably written in an attempt to reconcile philosophy and religion, it was alleged, emerged the so-called theory of "double truth" in the Averroistic school of Paris in the 13th century. In this article, I shall first summarize how contemporary scholars view the content of Fasl al-Maqâl, and then examine what Ibn Rushd in fact does in that work, and finally to argue, following certain scholars, against the alleged connection of the theory of double truth with Ibn Rushd.

To what end was Fasl al-Maqâl composed?

First of all, it is certain that the author starts with the divine law to infer the legal status of philosophy.11 That is, the question is formulated as one of Islamic law. Alain de Libera rightly insists that Ibn Rushd's announcement of purpose clearly indicates the juridical nature of the text.12 Even the title of the
treatise proves that it is not a philosophical work, nor is it theological. For what the title suggests is that the connection between philosophy and religion is sought. However, for Libera, a connection is not accord, nor harmony, nor reconciliation. Libera thus claims it to be a fatwā, a legal opinion, formulated in a religious jurisdiction, given by Ibn Rushd as a qādī in response to the condemnation of philosophy through persuasion by legal arguments. It is not, therefore, a proclamation of rationalism; it is not an academic work either, for Libera. It is only a text addressed to the public, that is the people educated in the Malikite juridical tradition. Libera rejects the idea of reconciliation as the purpose of the treatise, on the ground that its aim was not to ‘harmonize’ religion with philosophy (neither visa versa), but to ‘legalize’ philosophy by determining the connection of the two on juridical grounds. However, it is clear that the legalization of philosophy does not preclude its harmonization with religion.

Nevertheless, one should not overlook the fact that in Fasl al-Maqāl, Ibn Rushd, apart from the juridical instruments, utilizes certain philosophical methods rather than the Islamic juridical methods. It appears that as master in both philosophy and law, Ibn Rushd mixed both characters in the Fasl so that he would satisfy the jurist as much as he could; and further, now that Ghażâlî had already divulged philosophical methods to the public (FM, 61-2), he could introduce to them a taste of philosophical approach as well. Yet this does not make the work a philosophical one. It stands to reason that Ibn Rushd simply took advantage of his authority as a skillful and preeminent jurist to show how close philosophical approach and religious teachings can get through proper ta‘wil (allegorical interpretation) in terms of providing an explanation for everything in a reduced level.

---

13 Libera, 10.
15 Libera, 11 ff, and 67.
16 Libera, 67.
17 Ibn Rushd in Fasl al-Maqāl accuses al-Ghażâlî, ironically, of disclosing the philosophical discussions to the public, which was supposed to be protected from the dangerous method. It seems that after this exposition, Ibn Rushd feels obliged to bridge philosophical and religious teachings, a task that he would not have carried out, if it had not been for this mistake al-Ghażâlî. One may also think that the disclosure of philosophical speculation played a provoking role in his decision to write the treatise.
18 Cf. Urvoy, 76.
It may be legitimate to ask whether Ibn Rushd’s intention was to conciliate the two perspectives, religious and philosophical, or just to ease up the public rage and ignorance by giving a few examples of non-contradictory, or reconcilable, explanations from both sides. On this point, M. Watt is certain that the whole thing was a reconciliatory effort. *Fasl al-Maqāl*, for him, was a *fait accompli* and the intellectual reconciliation of the two sides, which was practiced in his own life as a judge and as a philosopher.\(^{19}\) T.J. de Boer and T.B. Irving agree that Ibn Rushd harmonized philosophy and religion, but they thought he did that by completely separating the two as distinct ways to the truth. De Boer believes that Ibn Rushd actually saw an agreement between religion and philosophy “precisely because they are not seeking the same thing.”\(^{20}\) This perspective, that views philosophy and religion as two separate domains, considering the explicit statements in *Fasl al-Maqāl* that the two ways lead to the same truth (*FM*, first chapter), fails to grasp the main argument of *Fasl al-Maqāl*, and resolves the conflict into the theory of Double truth of the Latin Averroists, whom we shall touch upon later.

Furthermore, M. Mahdi considers the treatise a work with a character of between legal and demonstrative on the ground that “statuses regarding interpretation in the divine Law” do not appear to be exclusively legal statuses.\(^{21}\) Mahdi is right in claiming that these statuses “in the divine Law” are not exclusively legal. However, the legality and the methodology of *fiqh* are not always inferred from the divine Law and not always absolutely agreed upon so as to strip Ibn Rushd’s arguments off its juridical feature. For it is a fact that in *fiqh*, there are some principles and methods that are not “legal” in the strict sense of ‘legality’ “in the divine Law.” Some legal principles are inferred or just invented by the Muslim jurists, such as the use of *qiyās*, and *ijmā‘*. The fact of the matter, as far as I can see, is that what Ibn Rushd employs in his expositions is exactly the legal traditions and principles that are in *use* and *accepted* by the contemporary jurists. This is in accord with his method of accommodating the techniques of the *fuqahā‘*.

If we accept that his intention was to reconcile philosophy and religion, then there is still another set of questions to be answered that are crucial with regard to reconciliation: are the philosophical and religious approaches

---

21 Mahdi, 189.

*Istanbul Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* Sayı: 13, Yıl: 2006
essentially reconcilable? In the treatise, when Ibn Rushd was trying to do the task, did he believe that religion and philosophy both really have a character that would produce such a harmony? Or was he abusing his authority as a judge to impose on people a far-fetched reconcilability of them, believing in private that they are virtually irreconcilable? These questions also lead one to the point whether Ibn Rushd was a sincere Muslim, and as Strauss suspects, whether his works really reflects his original views; or as in Renan's representation of Averroes, whether he was really hiding behind the religious veil while holding views opposing religious teachings. A close examination of Fasl al-Maqāl reveals in a fairly clear fashion, if not explicit, that Ibn Rushd as a philosopher and a jurist, did not see or admit any opposition between religious teachings and philosophical conclusions. He believed in a possible harmony, and also there is nothing in Fasl al-Maqāl to raise a doubt about his religiosity. His commitment to the Qur'ān and the unity of truth is now appreciated by the scholars after Renan's implication that he was opposed to religion. It is also clear to me that he preferred demonstrative knowledge for a belief in God. That does not mean that he dismissed religion. Rather he saw Scripture embracing all kinds of natural capacities of people. Feeling very confident about his position, Ibn Rushd only wanted to prove his point to the jurist and the theologians by utilizing their scriptural and intellectual means. Hence he began with ascertaining the connection he foresaw, which he suggests at the beginning.

From the purpose of Ibn Rushd stated in Fasl al-Maqāl, it is clear that he initially tries to establish a connection between religion and philosophy. The inquiry is into finding an answer whether the Shari‘ah allows the study of philosophy. The treatise appears to be a book intended to persuade the audience that there was no real contradiction, or opposition, between philosophical conclusion and religious teachings. Ibn Rushd utilizes the methods of fiqh together with certain philosophical methods to accomplish this. The problem is indeed reduced to a juridical issue, probably because the audience consisted of mainly orthodox jurists, and the public under their influence. However, it is hard to describe Fasl al-Maqāl as a product of a totally juridical process. Nor was it a result of Ibn Rushd's own concern over whether religion agrees with

22 Renan, especially 292 ff.
23 Cf. Majid Fakhry, “Philosophy and Scripture in the Theology of Averroes,” in his Philosophy, Dogma and the Impact of Greek Thought in Islam (Voriorum, 1994), article no. XVI, 80; Strauss, 27. About the debate on Ibn Rushd's being a sincere Muslim, see M. Arkoun “Actualité d'Ibn Rushd Musulman” (55-56) and Hourani “Averroès Musulman” (21-30) both articles in Multiple Averroès (Paris, 1978).
philosophy. Rather, it seems that relying on the different capacities of people, he believed that religious explanations could be demonstrated philosophically. Since philosophy does not bear such a purpose as to address all people, only a small number of people with some certain natural virtues can study it. Furthermore they are the ones who are allowed to interpret the verses to discover the real connection (ittisāl) of religion with hikmah. Incompetent people should not attempt to do it. Firstly because, the masses would not understand it; secondly, if the dialectical class attempt, even they would not understand the demonstrative method; they would, and did, confuse people’s mind. Thirdly, and as a result, those people, since they are not qualified for this job, makes religion look incompatible with philosophical conclusions, even though they are milk sisters (FM, 70). Therefore, being competent in this realm, Ibn Rushd felt the necessity to establish such a connection so that people could change their attitude toward philosophy.

And why would Ibn Rushd bother to make such a connection? The whole effort that culminated in the treatise, it seems to me, was not made just to make a mere connection. It was a preliminary stage for a larger plan. It can be a methodological treatise for those who made their aim to reconcile the assertions of religion and intellect (FM, 51). It could be a reconciliatory effort with an additional purpose in mind, which was expressed in the observation of M. Fakhry, which I believe put succinctly the real rationale behind Ibn Rushd’s undertaking this task: “[t]he rehabilitation of philosophy, he felt, could be achieved only if it can be demonstrated that no genuine conflict between philosophy and religion could arise, and that Scripture properly interpreted (italics mine) is in complete harmony with philosophy properly understood.”

**IBN RUSHD, FASL AL-MAQĀL, AND HIS AIM THEREIN**

Considering the above-mentioned circumstances under which Ibn Rushd wrote his theologico-philosophical works, it is relatively easy to understand what he had in mind. Ibn Rushd was an Aristotelian philosopher, and at the same time a Muslim, who was aware of the seeming contradictions or oppositions the fuqahā’ saw between revelation and philosophy. Fasl al-Maqāl clearly shows that the intended audience of the work was the fuqahā’ who,

---

24 Arnaldez, 913.
25 Fakhry, 85.
together with the theologians to some extent, refused philosophical interpretation of Scripture as heretical. Under the influence of these orthodox teachings of the fiqahā', the public, according to some historical narratives, also appears hostile to philosophy. With the meticulousness of Ibn Rushd about the secrecy of philosophical discussions and from his explicit statements regarding this point (FM, 62), it is evident that Fasl al-Maqāl was not intended to be secret; and it is not a theological or philosophical treatise per se.

In Fasl al-Maqāl, Ibn Rushd follows certain major steps: a) argument for the legitimacy of philosophical studies; b) the necessity of intellectual reasoning; c) recourse to the distinction between the muhkam (clear) and mutashābih (equivocal/ambiguous) verses in the Qur’an, which will give rise to the idea of ta’wil (allegorical interpretation); and based on this, d) argument for the reconcilability of religious and philosophical teachings; and finally e) classification of people according to their capacity to assent (tasdiq). In the first part of Fasl al-Maqāl, in which Ibn Rushd tries to prove his thesis of obligation for philosophical studies, he starts to develop his argument in a methodological sequence.

Ibn Rushd first expresses his intention in the book as follows:

The purpose of this treatise is to examine from the standpoint of the study of the Law, whether the study of philosophy falsafah and logic is allowed by the Law, or prohibited, or commanded—either by way of recommendation or as obligatory. (FM, 44)

Ibn Rushd expects at the outset a positive answer to his inquiry, without giving chance to the prohibition of philosophical study, due to the clarity in his mind that the Law does permit such a study, even commands it. So he goes on to determine what kind of command this is: it might be a recommendation (mandūb), or an obligation (wājib).

After framing the purpose of the book, he first presents a definition of “the activity of philosophy” in a simple reasoning, which constitutes his first premise: if the activity of philosophy is nothing more than study of existing beings and reflection on them as indications of the Artisan (FM, 44). This premise contains the same hypothetical definition of philosophy as the “study of existing things and reflection on them.” In the second premise: if the Law commands such a study, then the Law commands philosophy (FM, 44). The “study” in the antecedent means the examination of existing things in such a
way to find out their being the signs of the existence of God. So through the second premise, Ibn Rushd links the first premise directly with the Qur’ān. For it is clear that, in accordance with his task, he uses certain Qur’ānic verses which read explicitly that every existing thing indicates the Creator, which is the stipulation of his definition of philosophy. Since God commands this kind of study, he concludes that the Law commands philosophy.

Ibn Rushd’s next move is to show why we should make use of qiyās, rational reasoning (qiyās ‘aqlī). This was the conclusion of his first argument, claiming that the Law commands philosophical study. He cites five Qur’ānic verses among others and deems these citations sufficient for the conclusion that “the Law rendered obligatory the study of beings.” He refines this premise: since reflection is nothing more than inference and drawing out the unknown from the known, and since this is reasoning or at any rate done by reasoning, therefore we are under an obligation to carry on our study of beings by intellectual reasoning. (FM, 45)

Without further discussing the obligation of such study, he proceeds to argue as to how this study should be carried out. The method he proposes is called “qiyās” (syllogism or reasoning), which was used by the fuqahā’. Ibn Rushd mentions certain classes of reasoning apparently derived from Aristotle’s Organon. The classification includes demonstrative (burhānī), dialectical (jadālī), rhetorical (khitābī), and finally fallacious (or sophistical = mughalītī) reasoning, which is not even considered as such. To him, the perfect kind of

---

26 The verses are: 3/191; 6/75; 7/174; 49/2; 88/16.

27 Fast al-Maqāl, 45: the verses 59/3, 8/185, 7/75, 88/17-18, 3/191. Ibn Rushd also claims in Manāhij al-Adilla that the whole Qur’ān summons to theoretical study, see Hourani, Harmony, 85, n.20.

28 Fast al-Maqāl, 45. Ibn Rushd can be critiqued in terms of his conclusion that the study of philosophy is commanded as an obligation. For the verses he used are not favorable for such a conclusion. His inference of wājib (obligatory) rather than mandāb (recommended) is hard to understand. It is possible that he went for maximum impact. However, an obligatory command would require everybody to do such a study, yet it would not make sense in his view because he himself asserts that those who are capable of understanding philosophy are only a small group. Nevertheless, he as a judge may have had in mind the kind of obligation that is considered fulfilled even if only one part of the community carries it out.

“qiyās” is the demonstrative one. This kind differs from the others in terms of the characteristics of its premises. Moreover, since the demonstrative kind of knowledge is the one that is urged by the Law, one must learn what this reasoning is (FM, 45). Based on all the above, he concludes that he who believes in the Law and obeys its command to study beings should gain knowledge of these kinds of reasoning prior to this study.

In what appears to be an attempt to make a transition from qiyās shar‘ī or fiqhi to qiyās ‘aqlī (intellectual reasoning), Ibn Rushd next creates another strategic argument out of the practices of the fuqahā. He analogizes his syllogism for the study of logic and philosophy to the jurists’ own legal syllogisms (qiyās fiqhi) in terms of both the legitimacy and the application of it in the Islamic law, which is a firm base in the process vis-a-vis the jurists. For they utilize “qiyās” to infer a new judgment about something on which the Law is silent from something similar about which the Law contains a prescription. This is a legal methodological practice that, as Ibn Rushd points out, did not exist among the first generation of the Muslim community, and it was not considered to be a heretical innovation by the jurists (FM, 46). This particular point is very important in the philosopher’s argument. That is to say, since reasoning was widely used by the fuqahā, except for a small group of ‘literalists’ (al-hashwiyya, FM, 46), then they must have had a legitimate ground to practice it. Since there is nothing explicit about the use of such a method in the Law, then they must have inferred it. Ibn Rushd accepts the validity of this inference for practicing qiyās, because he himself resorts to the same logic to prove the legitimacy of his inference that to study existing things indicating God rationally is urged by the Law. As a result, he confidently claims that acquisition of legal reasoning cannot be objected to on religious grounds (FM, 46), since he used the same ground as the one the jurists did. Having thus rested his position on a firm ground, he proceeds to make a new claim, which is the step toward his main purpose: if it is fitting for the jurists, he proceeds, to use reasoning based on opinion (qiyās zannī) to infer simple legal matters, then it is more fitting for one who would know God demonstratively to infer from it the obligation to acquire a knowledge of intellectual reasoning (FM, 46). In other words, compared to simple conclusions of legal syllogisms, the ta‘wil and syllogism of the philosopher are more strongly entitled to legitimacy, for it produces an agreement between a text and a certain syllogism (qiyās yaqīnī). This procedure establishes the connection between reason and tradition (al-
ma’qūl and al-manqūl). With this simple reasoning, he seeks to gain his demonstrative syllogism legitimacy.

Ibn Rushd then seeks to legitimize studying Greek logic. Having established the legitimacy of rational speculation, even the obligatory nature of studying philosophy and intellectual reasoning and its necessity, he proceeds to claim that “if none of our predecessors had formerly examined logic, we ought to undertake this task from the beginning. Furthermore, each scholar should use the knowledge of his predecessor in order to complete the study, which cannot be done by one person. At this point, Ibn Rushd makes a smooth transition from this conclusion to why the Muslims should study Greek philosophy: “if someone other than ourselves has already examined that subject,” from the argument above it is clear that “we ought to seek help towards our goal from ... such a predecessor” (FM, 46-7) regardless of his religion. To be persuaded about the truth of this statement, we are given a loose analogy:

For when a valid sacrifice is performed with a certain instrument, no account is taken, in judging the validity of the sacrifice, of whether the instrument belongs to one who shares our religion or to one who does not, so long as it fulfills the conditions for validity. (FM, 47)

By those who do not share his religion, he means the Greek philosophers who studied these matters before Islam. He just makes an analogy between an instrument of slaughtering a sacrificial animal and an instrument to study philosophy, i.e. logic invented by the Greek philosophers. So if this is the case, he infers, then “we ought to lay hands on their books in order to study” (FM, 47) the subject, with the proviso that if there is anything incorrect in it, it should be brought to the attention of the readers.

Ibn Rushd next runs the same logic for the philosophical matters specified in his definition of philosophy to illustrate that the Muslims should reflect “on beings and the indications of art in them.” For “he who does not understand the art does not understand the product of art, and he who does not understand the product of art does not understand the Artisan” (FM, 47). After all this, it becomes clear that the Muslims should study beings in a manner of demonstrative syllogism, which should be done in a chain of research by the demonstrative class. The study of the books of the ancients is thus also rendered obligatory for those who combine two qualities: natural intelligence, and

---

30 Amaldez, 912.

*İstanbul Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* Sayı: 13, Yıl: 2006
religious integrity and moral virtue. Furthermore, Ibn Rushd does not accept the prohibition of philosophy on the ground that the scholars make mistakes in the process. That is not a sufficient reason, because the harm that might arise from it is only accidental, not essential. This case would be analogous to the case where a man prevents a thirsty person from drinking water just because some people have choked on it in the past. Here, likewise, “death from water by choking is an accidental matter, but death from thirst is essential and necessary” (*FM*, 49).

His next argument is built to seek the conclusion that religion does not and cannot conflict with philosophical conclusions. This stage is significant in terms of the possible interpretation of it as the theory of double truth, which we shall examine later. He declares that:

> Since this religion is true, and summons to the study which leads to knowledge of the Truth we ... know definitely that demonstrative study does not lead to [conclusions] conflicting with what Scripture has given us. (*FM*, 50).

By introducing a new and significant premise in this reasoning, namely “truth does not oppose truth but accords with it and bears witness to it” (*FM*, 50), he concludes that the demonstrative science does not lead to conclusions conflicting with that which Scripture teaches. He follows these steps:

a) truth does not contradict truth, then  
b) truth attained by demonstration cannot contradict the truth that Scripture gives us;  
c) therefore, any contradiction between them must be in appearance.  

Ibn Rushd is aware that there are contradictions between what he achieved through demonstration and what he reads in the Qur’ān. However, he asserts that whenever a statement in Scripture conflicts in its apparent meaning with a conclusion of demonstration, if Scripture is read carefully and interpreted as a whole, we will find something that can remove this conflict or alleviate it (*FM*, 51). So relying on the conclusion he inferred above, he sets out to show

---

the reader that these contradictions are only on the surface and can be eliminated. To do this, Ibn Rushd runs another argument (FM, 50 ff.):

Take any piece of philosophical knowledge =X:

1. X is either mentioned in the Law or not mentioned.
2. If Scripture does not talk about X, then there is no problem or contradiction. In this case a jurist would infer it by reasoning.
3. If Scripture has a statement 'p' on the subject X, then
   3-a) the apparent meaning (zāhîr) of the statement 'p' either accords with a demonstrative statement 'q' or
   3-b) 'p' conflicts with the conclusions of demonstration 'q' about X.

Now, we have two alternatives:

i) If 'p' does not conflict with 'q,' but conforms to it, then we have a perfect agreement.

ii) If 'p' conflicts with 'q,' which results in the conjunction of p&q, an equivalent of p& -p, then there is a call for allegorical interpretation of 'p,' which is called "ta'wil." (FM, 51)

Clearly, it all comes down to saying that if the apparent meaning conflicts with demonstration, the zāhîr meaning has to be interpreted metaphorically. In other words, the zāhîr of 'p' should be interpreted so that it conforms to the philosophical statement 'q' in order to remove the contradiction. The standpoint of Ibn Rushd is clearly philosophy and demonstrative knowledge, while scriptural teachings remain variable and subject to interpretation. They are variable and subject to interpretation because some parts of Scripture contain both inner and apparent meanings, which is the result of the fact that people have different levels of understanding (FM, 51). This dichotomy is employed to create a ground to claim the necessity of interpreting the verses that can be interpreted philosophically.

It is obvious that Ibn Rushd wants to place philosophy right here in the inner meanings of the verses, and looks for a way of connection there. This is clear because of two things: a) once it is established that some verses in the Qur’ān have esoteric meanings, he can easily move to the necessity of ta’wil, which gives him an opportunity to interpret a verse of a speculative content in accordance with philosophical conclusions. So the connection that the title of the book suggests lies in this domain. Secondly, Ibn Rushd prohibits both the
teaching of the philosophical conclusions and the esoteric meanings of the verses to the public for the same reason, namely, the fear that it would destroy the belief of ordinary people. This view could be rendered as establishing a parallelism between the content of interpretation and that of philosophical conclusions. This indicates his attempts to search for philosophical explanations of the revelation in the verses that allow such explanations through *ta’wil*, which is defined as “extension of the significance of an expression from real to metaphorical significance, without forsaking therein the standard metaphorical practices of Arabic ...” (*FM*, 50). So the interpretation must observe certain rules of practicing metaphorical interpretation in the Arabic language. This limit is to prevent any far-fetched interpretation at the expense of limiting the interpreter, which indicates that Ibn Rushd was totally dependent upon the scriptural text.\(^{32}\) This dependence is crucial because it prevents the philosopher from introducing a new doctrine; so it could go against Ibn Rushd’s philosophical method of *ta’wil*. Moreover, *ta’wil* and the inner meaning should only be taught to those who are well grounded in science (*FM*, 50-1, 63 ff.), and should be done only by those who are well versed in this art. They are the ones, according to Ibn Rushd, who are alluded to in the Qur’ān 3:7 by the term *al-rāsikhūn*. This verse is the one that Ibn Rushd invokes to make room for philosophers and demonstrative knowledge. The last part of the verse can bear two different meanings depending on how you read it. The first part of the verse has no problem in terms of interpretation:

> It is He who revealed upon you the Book, where there are univocal verses (*mu’kamat*), which are the mother of the Book, and the others equivocal verses (*mutashābihat*). Those whose hearts incline toward error follow what is equivocal, desiring dissension by desiring its interpretation.

The second part can be read in two ways:

A. **Traditional reading:** “But no one knows its interpretation except God. Those who are firmly grounded in knowledge say: we believe in it (or Him), it all comes from our Lord. But only those who have intelligence would know it.”

B. **Alternate reading:** “But no one knows its interpretation except God and those who are firmly grounded in knowledge. They say: we

\(^{32}\) Fakhry, 85.

*İstanbul Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* Sayı: 13, Yıl: 2006
believe in it (or Him), it all comes from our Lord. But only those who have intelligence would know it."

Of course he takes the alternate reading of the verse because of the conjectural convenience of the *mutashābihahā* and the word *rāsikhūn* in a way pointing to philosophy and demonstration. So even though there are no indications in the Qur'ān that it is demonstrative knowledge that the *rāsikhūn* are said to have, Ibn Rushd perhaps intentionally assumes that in this verse philosophers and those who have demonstrative knowledge are alluded to. What is more, in so doing, Ibn Rushd equalizes divine knowledge to the knowledge acquired by demonstration since the alternate reading of the verse recognizes that God as well as the *rāsikhūn* know the interpretation of the *mutashābihahā*.

Ibn Rushd still needs to clear the way toward the end. He knows that in the *fiqh* tradition there is a major principle invented by the *fiqahā’* based on a prophetic *ḥadīth*, which is called *ījmā’*, or consensus, which is used to solve some disputed religious matters by reaching a consensus in the community. Since the practice of *ījmā’* is capable of blocking the way to *ta’wil*, Ibn Rushd dismisses this principle of. So to determine what should be interpreted and what should be understood literally, Averroes does not have recourse to consensus (*ījmā’*), on the ground that with the scholars in disagreement, the unanimity on theoretical matters is never determined with certainty (*FM*, 52-3).

Then Ibn Rushd’s classification of people takes stage. On his view, the existence of inner meaning and hence the necessity of *ta’wil* are in accordance with “the diversity of people’s natural capacities and the difference of their innate dispositions with regard to assent,” or *tasdīq*(*FM*, 51). This step has a strategic importance in the general composition of *Fast al-Maqāl*. In this step, Ibn Rushd presents his idea of “the cognitive classification of minds and the correlative distinctions of the methods” to explain the difference between the “innate dispositions” and the “mental foundations” of the recipients of the revelation. His reasoning goes as follows: the purpose of Scripture is “to teach true science and right practice”(*FM*, 63). Moreover, since Scripture must

---


35 Libera, 24.

address all kinds of people and summon them to the happiness that consists in
the knowledge of God, this happiness is made attainable for every Muslim by
the method of assent that his temperament and nature require. For the natures of
men are on different levels with respect to their ways to assent. Thus addressing
all human beings, Scripture must have all the methods that would fit in their
natural capacity to understand things in the world. In fact those methods can be
found in the Qur’ān according to Ibn Rushd: “... if the Precious Book is
inspected, there will be found in it three methods that are available for all
people.” (FM, 69)

Ibn Rushd proposes three grades of intellect corresponding to the
methods people use according to their natural capacity. These methods are:
demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical, which are all taken from Aristotle’s
Organon, rational demonstration, dialectical reasoning, and rhetorical argument.
36 According to this scheme, the masses are capable of understanding rhetorical
arguments, while the dialectical level requires a power of theoretical
understanding such as the interpretations of the Ash’arite and Mu’tazilites, the
Mutakallimūn, or the dialectical theologians. Due to its content, the scriptural
text contains mostly these two kinds of arguments. Ibn Rushd explains the
predominantly rhetorical and dialectical character of Scripture by the idea that
its purpose simply is to teach all people. Here the conclusion Ibn Rushd reaches
in effect serves to make understandable the position of Scripture versus
philosophy:

Therefore, since the primary purpose of Scripture is to take care of the
majority (without neglecting to arouse the elite), the prevailing methods
of expressions in religion are the common methods by which the majority
comes to form concepts and judgments.” (FM, 64)

As for the demonstrative method, it is peculiar to a smaller number of
people. Although, as has been pointed out, for Ibn Rushd, the best kind of
argument, or method, is demonstrative one, it is obvious that not everyone is
able to comprehend demonstration, or even dialectical arguments. He believes
that it is God’s grace to His servants who have no access to demonstration due
to their natures, habit, and lack of education that God has coined for them
images and likeness of the things and summoned them to assent to them, which

36 According to Arnaldez (p. 913), this shows Ibn Rushd’s employment of technical vocabulary
and his skillful manipulation of his ideas within a logical framework borrowed from the
Greeks.
denotes the level that contains dialectical and rhetorical indications. It is these kinds of people to whom the inner meaning of scripture and ta'wil that cannot be understood by them should not be exposed, because it could destroy their assent that they reached through their own ways (FM, 65-6). This kind of interpretation should not be expressed even in rhetorical and dialectical books.

Accordingly, in the end, people in relation to Scripture fall into three classes (FM, 65): a) Rhetorical class: those who are not people of interpretation at all; b) Dialectical class: those who are the people of dialectical method and interpretation; c) Demonstrative class: those who are the people of certain interpretation, who are the rāsikhūn, including philosophers. Every class has their own methods, and all methods eventually end up in one truth: true knowledge of God. Although in the Qur’an there are all three methods, the variety of the methods does not constitute separate truths. In other words, the agreement of the ma'qūl and the manqūl rather means that different types of mind can arrive at the same truth; it is the practical agreement of two methods in order to arrive at a single practical conclusion. For that reason, for example, the prophet Muhammad accordingly affirmed the faith of a woman who, when asked, said that God is in the sky. That was because she was not a demonstrative class, and her assent only comes through the imagination, which is the trait of rhetorical class of people (FM, 60). On the other hand, one can find no verses stating that the heavens were created ex nihilo. The theologians, however, using common knowledge, also interpret some verses in accordance with the consensus and the beliefs of the community, that is creation ex nihilo. But it is not stated in the scripture that God was existing with absolutely nothing else; so the verses in question could very well be interpreted by the demonstrative class in accordance with philosophical conclusions about the world and God (FM, 57).

AVERROES, AVERROISM, AND THE DOUBLE TRUTH THEORY

The so-called theory of double truth was conceived of as the proclamation that the same proposition could have different truth-values in philosophy and theology and that there was an irreconcilable inconsistency between philosophy and religious teaching, a theory that was ultimately

---

57 According to Watt, this threefold scheme enabled Ibn Rushd to bring philosophical religion in relation with popular religion. ("Structure," 50).

38 Arnaldez, 912.
attributed to Ibn Rushd. In fact this theory has been accepted to be a principle of Latin Averroism of 13th century. However, modern scholarship argues against this idea.

Averroism\(^{39}\) is a 19th century term\(^{40}\) and is thought to have arisen with Latin Averroism in the Latin world of the 13th century, which, according to the recent researches, was born in Paris with Jean of Jandun (d.1328) at the beginning of the same century.\(^{41}\) Like Jean of Jandun, most of the thinkers referred to by this term were professors of Arts at the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris.\(^{42}\) They studied and taught Aristotelian philosophy through the translated commentaries of Ibn Rushd on Aristotle’s works. Because of his powerful commentaries on Aristotle’s works he came to be known as “the Commentator” \textit{par excellence}. Through Ibn Rushd’s commentaries, a new set of ideas was introduced to the Christian Latin circles. Those ideas, which gave rise to conflict between philosophy and the theological propositions include the eternity of the world, the negation of individual immortality, which was later formulated by Leibniz as the theory of Monopsychism, and the psychological

\(^{39}\) According to S. MacClintock, as a term designating a philosophical type or method of philosophizing, Averroism is difficult to make precise, despite its assured connection with Latin Aristotelianism (“Averroism,” in \textit{The Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, 225). Arnaldez claims that the idea that Averroes revealed in Aristotle a rationalist method and doctrine, and those doctrines were opposed to religious dogmas is a misconception of Renan and the followers of Averroes in the middle ages (“Ibn Rushd,” 911).

\(^{40}\) According to S. Ebbesen, it was introduced in the 19th century based on Raymond Lull’s use of the term Averroist to describe philosophers (who we now call Latin Averroists), because he saw them as continuators of the ideas condemned by E. Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, in 1270 and 1277; (“Averroism” \textit{The Routledge Encyclopedia of Islam}, 595). Cf. MacClintock, “Averroes,” in \textit{The Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, 220.

\(^{41}\) F. van Steenberghen, “L’Averroïsme Latin au XIlle Siècle” in \textit{Multiple Averroès}, 285. Also for Jean of Jandun and his Averroism, see MacClintock’s book, \textit{Perversity and Error} (Bloomington, 1956). Until recent scholarly researches, it used to be thought that the prominent representative and the leader of the Averroist school was Siger of Brabant. Especially see P. Mandonnet, \textit{Siger de Brabant et L’Averroïsme Latin au XIIIme Siècle} (Louvain, 1911). Cf. Ebbesen, 595, also Steenberghen, 283; MacClintock, \textit{Perversity}, 72, where the latter two argue against the idea that Siger was an Averroist and holding the idea of the truth of two contrary propositions. Also, for a well-discussed argument against the Averroism of Siger, see Gilson’s article “La Doctrine de la Double Vérité” in his \textit{Études de Philosophie Médievale} (Strasbourg, 1921), 51-75. According to this article, Siger was labeled as Averroist by his adversaries, however, Gilson is not sure if Siger was sincere or dissimulating (p. 62).

\(^{42}\) Cf. Gilson, 55.
determinism. These ideas were very appealing to the thinkers in Paris, and later certain Christian disciples of Averroes of 13th and 14th centuries who maintained the fundamental principles of Ibn Rushd came to be called the Averroists.

However, whether the Averroists held such a theory as the double truth is subject of controversy. Due to the lack of clarity whether any philosophers in the 13th century explicitly held such a theory, some scholars tend to exonerate them from this charge, while at the same time would like to preserve the possibility of both their maintaining the theory and dissimulation about their real beliefs. In fact the idea that these masters were holding the double truth theory was first suggested by St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas, affirming the impossibility for God to reconcile simultaneously two contradictories, mentions the Double Truth, attributing it to the Averroists. However, according to MacClintock, this does not reflect the truth; because they only hold that the realm of philosophy and its method and that of faith are to be distinguished as in the case of Jandun’s attitude toward reason and faith, which is the separation of their domains because of their conflict.

43 For further explanation of the major tenets of Averroes that gave rise to Averroism, cf. Ebbesen, 596; also Encyclopedia Britannica, “Averroism,” 891-892. Cf. Steenbergen, who claims that one can find an Averroist in the 13th century with respect to the partisan of the idea of Monopsychism (284-5); and Libera, 59. Also, for insights into the development of Averroism, see Libera, 30, 56.
44 Cf. MacClintock, “Averroism,” 223; Ebbesen, 595. Cf. Libera, 30. According to Ebbesen, the term was originally a term of opprobrium, a derogatory word used to describe the adherents of the doctrine of Monopsychism. No one called himself Averroist until Jean of Jandun, followed by Urban of Bologna (1334), and Paul of Venice (d.1429), p. 595.
46 Libera, 60-61: According to Aquinas, the Averroists cannot hold p against ~p without declaring the falsity of faith, or ~p against p without renouncing their own thesis. The only solution is to sustain p&~p, which is impossible according to the principle of contradiction. So they end up saying that “by reason I conclude of necessity that intellect is numerically one, but I hold firmly the contrary by faith, which is a logical trap, from which one cannot come out once he has entered. Therefore they negate faith and hide themselves behind a concession on the surface.
47 MacClintock, Perversity, 101.
48 MacClintock, Perversity, 90-92. Also Gilson, 63 ff.
Although the professors of arts represent Latin Aristotelianism that is said to have included systematic autonomy of natural philosophy, modern scholarship emphasizes their strong beliefs in Christian faith. They were aware that Aristotelian philosophy would not fulfill the requirements of Christian doctrines and that philosophy would have to be transformed to harmonize with the traditional teachings. In other words, these Averroists maintained the possibility of a purely rational speculation, yet they believed or at least pretended to believe in the insufficiency of rational speculation to judge of its own truth. In any case, it was difficult for them to articulate whether it is true or not because its truth was in the hands of the Church. The thinkers were teaching alien Aristotelian philosophy in a Christian society, so they were caught in the contradiction between reason and faith. After their analysis to solve the problem where they provided a philosophical solution, they arrived at conclusions inconsistent with dogma; then they added another truth according to the truth of faith. They thus introduced the commonplace "secundum fidem et veritatem," yet credited Christian faith alone with truth to avoid the charge of "double truth." Hence these Averroist philosophers, while proclaiming the logical and precise validity of Aristotelian arguments, conceded the final determination to the Christian faith.

This whole development is blamed on the official condemnations of "unorthodox" doctrines at the University of Paris in 1270 and 1277, executed by E. Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, including specific injunctions against two standards of truth. Thus the double truth theory is explained as if it were a

---

50 MacClintock, Perversity, 72.
51 Gilson, 68.
52 Gilson, 55.
53 Ebbesen, 597.
54 MacClintock, Perversity, 79-80.
55 Cf. MacClintock, "Averroes," 220: Before the 1277 condemnation, Arabic commentary was forbidden in 1210 and 1215, permitting with censoring in 1231 at the University of Paris. Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, and Bernier of Nivelles were all named in the condemnation of 1270s (p. 223). Cf. Libera, 30: in 1277, when Tempier condemned as many as 219 thesis, he introduced the formulation of two contrary verities, which the next centuries hardened it into the "affirmation of the existence of two contrary truths," which eventually
consequence of an unintended attitude, by which the masters of Arts expressed themselves *vis-a-vis* the Church. That is to say, what gave rise to the theory lies in the fact that the philosophers embraced the philosophical conclusions, while the same masters, who were believers of Christianity, could not simply reject Church doctrine, although they saw the conflict.\(^{56}\) They believed in at least the "inadequacy"\(^ {57}\) of philosophical conclusions and they held in this manner that both philosophical conclusions and the teachings of faith are true, probably in order to avoid having to choose between them. Latin Averroism actually stands for a declaration of crisis, Gilson claims, yet it failed to bring solution at the end.\(^ {58}\) In any case, as a consequence of Ibn Rushd's association with the process, as Libera observes, Ibn Rushd was made "the spokesman of a heretical doctrine under the mask of the double truth."\(^ {59}\)

Did Ibn Rushd really hold such a theory as the double truth?

Scholars' approaches to whether or not he held this theory vary. Some of them attempted to distinguish between two statements: "there are two truths contradicting each other, philosophical and religious," and "the same truth could be presented in various forms." The latter is said to be what Ibn Rushd meant to say, while the former is the notorious interpretation by the Latin Averroists of what Ibn Rushd really believed.

The theory of double truth, as presented in the Latin Averroistic form, would look in a formula like this: We have three propositions:

- Proposition A: a philosophical conclusion \(P\) is true,
- Proposition B: a religious doctrine \(Q\) is true,
- Proposition C: \(P\) and \(Q\) contradict each other.

\(^{56}\) Ebbesen, 597.


\(^{58}\) Gilson, 68.

\(^{59}\) Libera, 57. According to MacClintock, the dilemma in the Christian speculation was never resolved by the masters in a proclamation of a logical contradiction between the two domains but by an absolute accession of truth to faith ("Averroism," 223).
First, let us disregard Proposition C. Proposition A and Proposition B seem to exist separately without having any truth-value relations whatsoever. However, when Proposition C, which was introduced by the Church, makes its appearance to declare that Propositions A and B contradict each other, then the real problem emerges. Due to this contradiction, one of the Propositions A and B has to be true and the other false. For it is impossible to maintain P as true and Q as true at the same time. Because if Q, for example, is contrary to P, then P is equal to -P, which is other than P, namely \((Q \neq -P)\). That is to say, one excludes the other in terms of truth-value. Hence if you hold both P and Q as true, then it amounts to the conjunction \((P \& -P)\), and this is logically impossible according to the law of contradiction. Therefore, this conjunction cannot be maintained. On the other hand, if you maintain that both religious and philosophical conclusions P and Q are true without the intervention of Proposition C, then their conjunction \((P \& Q)\) seems plausible provided that you give each of them its own realm, in which each of them is held true in and of itself. This is the solution, as we alluded to earlier, that some Averroists came up with, by giving them separate domains.\(^60\)

However, when we examine *Fasl al-Maqāl* carefully, nowhere can we find this logical construction. A careful analysis of this treatise creates for us a firm ground on the basis of the following reasons to claim that the theory in question cannot be linked with Ibn Rushd views:

a) First of all, *Fasl al-Maqāl* was not available to the Medieval Latin scholastics, which excludes the possibility of direct influence.\(^61\)

b) No passage in the treatise affirms the impossibility of that which is true according to faith.\(^62\)

c) Ibn Rushd did not affirm the existence of two contraries.

d) Ibn Rushd never thought that the truths attained by religious and philosophical methods contradict; on the contrary, he explicitly said that they agree with each other,

e) Ibn Rushd did not attempt to reconcile between the philosophical and religious teachings. He does not even call them two truths in *Fasl al-

---

\(^60\) This solution, according to Urvoy, was also that of Ibn Rushd to the problem (*Ibn Rushd*, 79).

\(^61\) MacClintock, "Averroism," 223. Also see Libera, 63.

\(^62\) Libera, 63.
Maqal; rather he talks about two different methods of assent (tasdiq\textsuperscript{63}) to attain the same truth.

f) The doctrine of alternative modes of access to truth is nothing similar to the idea of two incompatible truths in disparate domains.\textsuperscript{64}

g) The formulation of Double Truth is even incompatible with the objective of Fasl al-Maqal.\textsuperscript{65}

Therefore, the attribution of double truth to Ibn Rushd cannot be sustained by any explanations of Ibn Rushd in Fasl al-Maqal. For Ibn Rushd there is therefore only one truth, the accentuation of which, according to

\textsuperscript{63} This term makes the ground for Wolfson's interesting approach to the theory of double truth. Analyzing Ibn Rushd's idea of \textit{tasdiq} or assent in an Aristotelian sense, he urges that the "double truth" theory be distinguished from the "double faith" theory, which represents the real position of Ibn Rushd. According to Wolfson, the theory has its basis on the Aristotelian epistemological conception of faith. In Aristotle, the term faith is used as a judgment of the truth of either immediately known primary premises or of conclusions derived by demonstration from those premises. So it is important whether faith is used in the religious sense or in the sense that Aristotle used. Wolfson proposes three possibilities: a) faith with reference to what is immediately known as true by revelation without any demonstration, b) faith with reference to something derivatively known by demonstration, i.e., opinion and scientific knowledge, and c) faith with reference to the idea that the teachings of revelation could also be demonstrated by reason. So faith can mean a) acceptance of the scriptural teachings only as a demonstrated truth, which he calls the single faith of rationalist type represented by the Mutazilites, or b) acceptance of them only as a self evident truth, which he calls the single faith of authoritarian type represented by the Ash'arites, or c) the acceptance of teachings of Scripture (i) as a self evident truth and (ii) as a demonstrated truth, which he calls the double faith theory represented by Ibn Rushd. Therefore, it is imperative that we distinguish the 'double faith' theory from the 'double truth' theory. In the end there is only one truth underlying both forms of faith, according to Wolfson, which is the truth of Islamic revelation. The only difference is the method by which different believers reaches that truth, a conclusion that is in agreement with Ibn Rushd's expositions. Wolfson's approach is another subject to be studied, but this paper is not concerned with the term "\textit{tasdiq}" used by Ibn Rushd. However, "\textit{tasdiq}" had hitherto been used by the jurists and the theologians. It always appeared in the definition of "\textit{îmân}" in the early kalam tradition. So, it is not clear whether Ibn Rushd used the term "\textit{tasdiq}" in the traditional sense or he made an undisclosed connection with the Aristotelian sense of it. In any case, it seems possible that Ibn Rushd discerned the link between the two senses and employed the term easily since it was already very conveniently in use at the time. See R. Wolfson "The Double Faith Theory in Clement, Saadia, Averroes and St. Thomas" Jewish Quarterly Review, 33 (1942-3), 245.

\textsuperscript{64} MacClintock, "Averroism," 223.

\textsuperscript{65} Libera, 65. According to Watt, the double truth theory is a consequence of the distortion of Averroes' teachings by the Latin Averroists (Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Edinburgh: University Press, 1985, 119).
Arnaldez, is his original contribution along with the importance of adherence to the truth. The unity of truth is essential part of Ibn Rushd’s philosophy, and so his main effort in Fasl al-Maqāl was to establish that there is but one truth, and to this truth there are several modes of access through a variety of tasdiq. At any rate, it appears that no solid connection between the double truth theory and Ibn Rushd can be established directly, and together with some other philosophers, Averroes himself seems to be the “victim” of the tendency labeled ‘Averroism.’ Perhaps it is best to let Libera make the final remark: “Averroes is not Averroist in the Latin sense of the term.”

---

66 Arnaldez, 912. According to Hourani, the problem arises because of Ibn Rushd’s unitary view of truth; so there would have been no problem if Ibn Rushd had held such a theory as was imputed to him in Latin circles in the 13th century. He suggests that the Latin Averroistic idea of separate realms would be a solution, and no contradiction would have arisen between them (“Introduction,” 22-23). Cf. Fakhry, 80: Ibn Rushd tacitly recognized the parity of philosophy and religion.


68 Libera, 64.