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A Critical Discussion on Turkish Students' Thoughts about Syrians over Nation-State Teachings

Ulus-Devlet Öğretileri üzerinden Türk Öğrencilerin Suriyeli Göçmenler Hakkındaki Düşünceleri Üzerine Eleştirel bir Tartışma

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ABSTRACT

This study is mainly based on *chats* with secondary and high school students. The implicit points in their daily complaints about their Syrian peers in neighborhoods were turned into a problematic for a qualitative survey. The students living in the regions in which generally Syrian immigrants are located account for the research group. The results were based on the analysis of the students' letters they wrote to their Syrian peers in the spring of 2018: 150 letters saluting the young Syrians with "Dear my Syrian Friend" are exposed to a discourse analysis. The theoretical structure drawing classical and contemporary Marxist approaches together argues that the relationship between nation-state ideology and education creates a kind of political socialization in response to the ideal value of "fully-democratic education". The salutations and nationalist statements that the students wrote reveal that not any mechanism of acceptance works. The students accuse the Syrians, particularly young men, of being unfaithful to their own country foremost, and of weakening the economy of the country where they took refuge by being a cheap labor force, behaving inappropriately towards the traditional and moral values, becoming a threat to Turkish language, having high fertility, taking over common spaces and behaving loosely.

Keywords: International migration, Syrian Immigrants, education, nation-state

ÖZ

Bu çalışma, ilk olarak, ortaokul ve lise öğrencileri ile yapılan *muhabetlerden* ibaretti. Mahallelerdeki Suriyeliler hakkındaki günlük şikâyetlerinin altındaki örtük noktalar bir kalitatif araştırma sorusuna dönüştü. Genellikle Suriyeli göçmenlerin yerleşmiş olduğu bölgelerde

yaşayan öğrenciler, araştırma grubunu oluşturmaktadırlar. Sonuçlar, 2018 Bahar aylarında, öğrencilerin Suriyeli akranlarına yazdıkları mektupların analizine dayanmaktadır. Genç Suriyelileri "Sevgili Suriyeli arkadaşım" şeklinde selamlayan 150 mektup, söylem analizine tabi tutulmuştur. Klasik ve çağdaş Marksist yaklaşımları birlikte dikkate alan teorik yapı, ulus-devlet ideolojisi ve eğitim arasındaki ilişkinin, "tam-demokratik eğitim" idealine karşılık, nasıl bir çeşit politik sosyalleşme yarattığını tartışmaktadır. Öğrencilerin yazdıkları selamlamalar ve milliyetçi ifadeler herhangi bir kabul mekanizmasının işlemediğini gösteriyorlar. Öğrenciler, Suriyelileri, özellikle genç erkekleri, en başta kendi ülkelerine sadakatsizlikle, sonra sığındıkları ülkenin ekonomisini ucuz iş gücü ile zayıflatmak, Türk geleneksel ve ahlaki değerlerine uygunsuz davranışlarda bulunmak, Türk diline tehdit oluşturmak, yüksek doğurganlığa sahip olmak, ortak yaşam alanlarını ele geçirmek ve rahat davranmakla suçlamaktadırlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası göç, Suriyeli göçmenler, eğitim, ulus-devlet

1. Introduction

The civil war in Syria began in 2011 and the open-door policy triggering the “protective” and “defensive” nationalist feelings among Turkish people was put into practice right after the Turkish government recognized the Syrian National Council as a political power in Syria. Then, “temporary protection regulation” ensuring non-refoulement became the second official policy (Kirişçi, 2014). Since the year the war began, all Syrian asylum-seekers have continued to benefit from special opportunities like free healthcare and education. The authorities of Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority inform that they *house 233,400 Syrian nationals in 21 temporary housing facilities equipped with schools, hospitals and athletic facilities*¹. The UNHCR reports the number of registered Syrian Refugees in Turkey is about 3.639.284² at present, about 659 thousand of this population are teenagers that are between 10-18 years old³. Of these, 381 thousand young Syrians are registered in state schools. Besides, Syrian refugees in Istanbul make up 16 percent of the total Syrian population in the country⁴ and approximately 86 percent of this population has been delivered to five districts: Sultangazi, Küçükçekmece, Bağcılar, Fatih and Esenyurt.

Considering the statistical indicators mentioned above, this study develops a political and pedagogical review on the components of constructing *nationalized minds* by means of a qualitative field study focusing on 13-17 year-old Turkish students. Also, based on a *dyadic* pre-acceptation, developing a concordant theoretical framework is taken as a goal: Firstly, observability of the hegemonic motivations derived from a scheduled collaboration between politics and pedagogy in nation-states; secondly, visibility of the point where the implicit reflections of psychological basis of ideology meet some spatial and social modes of relationship, which both arrange the students’ attitudes towards the Syrians. So, theoretical explanations and practical reflections regarding why and how heartened teenage-students develop attitudes that can be engaged to local, global inequalities and intolerance is the main question of this study.

In the spring of 2018, High Schools in Sultangazi, Küçükçekmece -the districts with the largest number of Syrians - and, in Avcılar –the district with the least number were visited: Imam Hatip schools offering secondary and high school degrees and İnon-İman schools just offering high school degrees. A total of 250 Turkish students were asked to write letters to their Syrian peers that they had seen around almost every day and the Turkish students were not given any leading subject.

All the letters were asked to begin with “Dear My Syrian Friend” preferably, to see how many students would follow the instruction and embrace a constructive approach instead of not filling the page wholly with complaints, critics, accusations, etc. However, in the selected well-written 150 letters, the findings did not give what was expected. The practical phase puts forward a narrative discourse analysis whose results are conglutinated with critical political, pedagogical and sociological perspectives, the effort that is principally demonstrating that the intellectual heritage

1 <https://www.afad.gov.tr/en/2601/Turkey-Response-to-Syria-Crisis>, Last update: August 2017. Visited: 27 October, 2018.

2 UNHCR <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113> Last update: 25 Jul, 2019. Visited: 14. Aug, 2019.

3 Mülteciler Derneği (Refugees Association), The Official Web Site <http://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/> Last update Aug, 2019. Visited: 15 Aug. 2019.

4 *Nearly 538,000 Syrians live in Istanbul, a metropolis with a population of almost 15 million, according to an analysis of data from the Interior Ministry’s Migration Management Directorate.* <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/life/istanbul-home-to-largest-number-of-syrians-in-turkey/1033675>. Visited: 27 October, 2018.

of the Frankfurt School is in charge: The first part develops a theoretical argument which problematizes the strength of nation-state politics –the power in charge- on the pedagogical functioning and its reverberation through the letters. The second part clarifies the key codes⁵ proving the role of *common* pedagogic action in the creation of the “*common sense*” which pushes the intellectuals to think about how ‘good’ would be the quality of the relationship between the thought of “*the State exercises hegemony through schooling*” (Gibson, 1986, p.53) and the unpredictably rising visits of the “strangers”, the immigrants in Turkey.

2. Methodology

The first interest started with observing Turkish teenagers’ behaviors towards their Syrian peers and making short conversations in front of the schools and in schoolyards in Avcılar. In time, this situation led to the longer, more well-considered and structured talks which were concentrated on the overemphasized remarks about risk of witnessing broken national values, with reference to historical victories of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Turkish soldiers.

The longer talks were generally done in the schoolyards, giving opportunity of talking to their class advisor-teachers sometimes. Thus, a qualitative study was designed to reach a larger number of students in which Syrians are most populated and based on collecting letters written to the Syrian peers. 120 letters collected from two Imam Hatip Anatolian high schools and 130 from two Anatolian high schools in the five districts, which all were saluting the person who was written to “Dear my Syrian Friend”. However, just eight letters completely did justice to such a sincere greeting and very shortly, all were students from Imam Hatip Anatolian high schools and, six of them female students. 100 letters were eliminated because they were scribbled, full of swear-words, too short to analyze, etc.

The analyzed ones consist of 77 letters from Imam Hatip Anatolian high schools and 73 from Anatolian high schools. By sex, 83 were male students and 67 female students. They are minimum full-page and providing various ideas and determinations expressed corresponding to language-rules and apprehension. 42 percent of the young participants come from low-income families (subsistence wage and below), the rest can be called middle-income households, but the most are a bit higher than the subsistence wage. Educational levels of their parents are mostly secondary education.

One teacher for each school served as a guide to conduct the research healthily. No one refused to participate in the research. The teachers put their thoughts about the possible reasons for the students’ manners into words sometimes, and some are mentioned in this article.

3. Theoretical Perspective

Before touching on critical pedagogical perceptions, comprehending that nationalism can have possible multiple origins and the discourse of national identity rests on *articulation* is crucial. The social field includes various voices coming from differences; meanings, ideas, identities and practices and, the interactions are not independent from the discourse—*all identity is relational and active*; the steps of *performance*, *connections* and *transformation* attributes to a process of creating new political approaches, claims and demands, which also aims at melting antagonism and reaching the more objective outcome. This is how *hegemony is constituted*, but it should be

⁵ the narratives.

remembered that it is not stable, but *dynamic*⁶ (Laclau, 1985, 2006, 2014; Snir, 2017). Laclau and Mouffe (Thomassen, 2016) has also taken psychoanalysis into consideration as a significant category of the hegemony approach besides linguistics and rhetoric⁷ thus, their ultimate goal is to describe a well-thought-of radical democracy aiming at associating the principle of democratic equality with a pluralist one. Such an impression idealizes to stay in a fully-democratic manner for different identities under the roof of a State. Therefore some of the popular-ideological principles-like nationalism, fascism, leftism- competently articulated in different discursive formations as part of the action of taking away antagonism by the political power in charge in different time-periods as Laclau and Mouffe suggest. Individual or collective subjects take part in such a political articulation, but this is not a coalition or class including any original identity or unification which forces to leave the former identities; the process just creates a hegemonic framework in which the identity of each subject is redesigned and in fact, this approach is associated with the concept of the *constitutional citizenship* idea, referring to protecting citizenship rights, projecting an articulating principle for recognition of group rights (İnce, 2012:193-194). By force of such an object, catching a fully-democratic educational approach at schools will be a political necessity because ideology is generally formed in conscious, where also the harbor of peculiar cultural and historical images and then, one way or the other, they are connected with the common-sense (Hall, 2002, 2008). In other words, the common pedagogic orientation at schools will assist to achieve official ideological goals as accepted in the Althusarian methodology. In view of that, Turkish political systems are historically too far from the mentioned democratic achievement because each has been a representer of a nation-state ideology embracing a monolithic citizenship identity. For instance, the Kemalist political approach has been in favor of an education system training students by religion-free curricula, thus, free-thinking Turkish citizens will be legally or procedurally eligible to advocate civilizational modernity, social homogeneity, solidarity and cultural commonality and a secular Turkish nation-state. Then, the JDP first coming to power in 2002, rushed to question the laicism defined by the constitution, focusing particularly on headscarves and worshipping banned in the schools. The main purpose was announced as growing “religious youth”, and they gave religion a place back in the curriculum of Imam Hatip High Schools, increased the schools’ numbers, then, revised other schools’ curriculums in order to break their secularistic structure (Çakmak, 2009, pp. 826-38). However, when nationalism is the topic, the Constitution provisions unalterably designate the understanding of encouraging minority members to associate with the strength and values of the *universalistic core ethnîe* (Smith, 1986, p.136, Smith, 1991), the best descriptor of *civic* behaviors and relations as well. However, the difference of what the Justice and Development party-JDP has done is to give a more determinative power to Islam, driving forward *both* historical and cultural elements like Ottomanism, Turkish heroism, moral values and traditions in the political, social, communicational and educational fields. In other words, the ‘conservative democracy’⁸ utilizes the thought of revealing antagonism for achieving the “common will” that is perfectly speaking “*the language of common sense or*

6 Thus, one can see that hegemony is a multifaceted practice in which all parties keep renewing themselves under the fluctuating effects of socio-political agenda and, whatever the ideological outcomes especially anticipated by the power in charge, it is unquestionably the voice of *common good* and *common willpower* (Snir, 2017, p. 353).

7 Laclau tried to connect politics/hegemony, psychoanalysis and rhetoric by formalising the categories of each of these fields and exploring the homologies between them. The aim was to show that all aspects of society — language, the psyche and politics— could be understood through a general theory of society. In addition to several pieces engaging with rhetoric (Thomassen, 2016, p.163).

8 The leadership of the Party has titled discourse ‘conservative democracy’.

national will, inhaling the history and culture'. In accordance with this system, each single person in the society will be an unquestioning, conformist citizen who raises the value of the limits of civil life as they are their normal responsibilities, as in Gramsci's literature (Hall, 2002, p.6). In such a case, Laclau (1992) puts forward that the individual is confused and in chaos: Various discourses force individuals to find out the most appropriate places for themselves within those discursive formations, which also are conditional and including chaotic type of relations among the subject positions. So, it is hard to find a logical base for the identity formation. However, for Smith (1991), the logic is built upon the point where the objective elements of social identity like language, religion, ethnicity, borders, common history, symbols, social values, traditions and subjective elements implying the level of internalization, thus, the emergence of a national identity is linked to a strong subjective consciousness and awareness. Here, the crucial point is that, which one, the individual who is a member of a *die-hard* national identity or the one living in a country embracing and experiencing the pluralist, more democratic approach is less in chaos? One letter says that "I don't know how to think about you or, behave you (an immigrant), you came from a war zone, took refuge in my country, so sad! But, what I feel is just risk, not liking... I will pray for you to go back in the earliest time" (Age: 15, Sultangazi) may offer a clue for the possible answer.

As in all nation-state contexts in the world, from birth onwards, Turkish citizens have no chance to avoid the politically approved- regular means of nation-state ideology bodily and mentally. Family is always the strongest one; however, the Turkish students whose families are forced-migrants seem more vulnerable to be influenced about protecting the unity of the motherland and language: "I migrated from Bulgaria; my parents are Turks who value their own identity above everything. We are Turkish citizens. My family members have never stolen, hit on women they look around, and never been granted any privilege. You are pacing around with tons of hair gel on your head, smoking expensive cigarettes, hubble-bubbles left and right! Hello? Your country is in a war! On the other hand, if you are rich, why don't you help your Syrian sisters and brothers begging for money!" (Zeynep, 16, Avcılar).

Even if the process is interrupted in any ethnic family, like speaking Arabic or Kurdish in the family, the pedagogic techniques at schools getting the students to comprehend social constituents of "being Turk"⁹ will be uninterruptedly available to create the *nationalized minds*. Surely, each student will build up his/her own ideological perspective in time by articulating national fundamentals of the identity with other available popular-ideological principles (like Islamism, leftism, Kemalism, politico-religious etc.). The point is, clearly, the process cannot be associated with a class; it is just about achieving a collective subject for an ideal transformation. That is how the logic of hegemony is constituted in which also politics and economy are shaped, the issue that Gramsci warned humanity about: there is both *domination and consent* (1978). As for the logic of the neoliberal age hegemony, there is not an alternative ideology or counter-culture capable of exerting sufficient attraction on people's minds and spirits to overthrow the neoliberal hegemony (Dardot, 2015)¹⁰, just like what countries like Turkey have experienced. For 16 years, the *not –pluralist-enough* common willpower has been active in Turkey with a dreadfully operating neoliberalism. The ideological interventions are also in every sphere of social, institutional and domestic life. Officially and pro-

9 till 7 years old, the age of beginning primary school.

10 Hegemony and Neoliberalism by Pierre Dardot , 15 Nov 12 , Posted under: Contemporary Capitalism. <https://www.transform-network.net/en/publications/yearbook/overview/article/journal-112012/hegemony-and-neoliberalism/>

foundly the most transformed social institution is education “*as an area of political intervention... as an area of compulsion and inspection... as an ethical position*”. It arranges “*three aspects of experience -truth, power, ethics- and they are very evident in relation to schooling and to the learner,... as a subject of pedagogy in relation to the norm*. Their organization within pedagogical area determines *forms of relations to oneself and to others*. Accordingly, a teacher can come out as a class model for instance, and Foucault thinks that school appears as an ordinary area of being *divided up, distributed and fixed... comparison and identification* (Ball, 2013, pp. 52-62). Similarly, Gramsci puts forward that education is the central point for the intellectual development leading to the creation of hegemony in comparison with Laclau and Mouffe.

Gramsci’s words, “*every relationship of hegemony is necessarily a pedagogical relationship*”, implies an education system grounded on mediocre teaching, the representers of outdated hegemonic set of arrangements, residuals of a *neutral* region, maintainer of the status quo; in short; a droning, in and out-system of the “*organic intellectuals*”¹¹ (Gramsci, 1977, 1978). As a reaction formation, this view can be linked up with Henry L. Giroux’s ‘public pedagogy’ concept targeting to pass beyond the limitations of schooling (Giroux, 1999, 2011). As opposed to Laclau, Gramsci considers that ideological discourses reflect some class character; particular ideological elements are embraced, announced and articulated in their “class” discourses, however, closing the doors entirely to the concept of articulation is surely not possible. An organic ideology is the product of “organic intellectuals” through an “articulating principle” which, upon combining the various ideological elements from the discourses of subordinated groups/classes and bringing into being a unified ideological system. Formal education, on the one hand, is the authority of teaching joint ideological ethics and codes (nationalism, fascism, socialism, religion and the like), assuredly in a way that the political power prescribed. On the other hand, schools, manufacturing yards of such an organic ideology, tacitly or overtly, cannot save themselves from facing the students coming from the groups belonging to different class ideologies affiliated to some idiocratical articulations, also what Laclau calls hegemonic fronts (Laclau, Mouffe, 1985, Laclau, Worsham, Olson, 1999, Laclau, 2006, 2014). One historical truth regarding the Turkish-nation state-type of hegemony is that this type has never been set as a good example for democratic empathies demolishing the inequalities and subordination. Correspondingly, the schools became the minor but vital agents of “*the system producing the producers, which is itself constituted by the relationship between the educational system and the family*” (Bourdieu, 1990). Moreover, in line with Foucault, “*schooling as a process is rendered into an input-output calculation*” (2013, p.62). Therefore, this study, besides the family which is one of the perfect ideological instruments, strongly accepts that education as the agent of official pedagogy is the realm of grasping challenges in civil society and everyday life (customs, traditions, religious approaches, the way of acting towards one another etc., may be with cultural or artistic actions) as well as political struggles. Such rationality, for instance, has made the Turkish schoolyards the primary places keeping the hegemonic principles alive and where the identities become more visible: the meanings and differences are noticed; the stigma is born; the discursively desirable consciousness is fashioned as Gramsci puts forward. To put it more explicitly, the schoolyard becomes a setting where ethnic individuals or “non-Muslims” must come to terms with their ethnic identity (Civelek, 2015, p. 155). In

11 In addition to the concept of organic intellectuals, Gramsci defines a category of “traditional intellectuals” who contribute to organic intellectuals’ efforts to maintain capitalist relations, not only with ideological expectations but also with the purpose of using cultural, social and economic tools of the system successfully. In time one from ulema (category of traditional intellectuals) can switch to category of organic intellectuals (Gramsci 1977, 1978).

writings of both Edwards (1997) and Verkuyten (2005), the psychological evaluations on loneliness, anxiety, and depression of ethnic children are suggested not to be argued independent from the child's social experiences and discourse. However, this study takes notice of the local teenagers' psychological states, which also cannot be considered independent from the correlation between *know-hows* and the discourse. So, there is a war, but not in the battleground or parliament, but rather in civil society and everyday life, waging over historical heroism, cultural values, traditions, religious values and beliefs, artistic creations, even just words, thus, the educational dimension takes charge with a comprehensive struggle over consciousness (Gramsci, 2000; Giroux, 1999 cited in Snir, 2017, p. 335). How is it possible one cannot see the extensive pedagogical operation that the human bodies are exposed to as the *objects of desire* of politics and representation, just like a *good artwork*?

The analysis of 150 teenagers'/students' letters shows that in Turkey, the large background knowledge that is full of some historical, moral and respectable codes *to save and to defend* generates the national stereotypes or the prospective organic intellectuals that are potentially dedicated and, ready to render service to the ontological issues regarding the *motherland*. Such obsessive patriotists who have *biased* perceptions have no chance to be the *graduates* of a democratic education removing the tension between the nation-state and migrant cultures, between identities and differences (Snir, 2017). Mottola- Poole (2007), in her study on learning about Native Americans in the US, advocates that educators must consider developing his or her knowledge store. At the start, they must go beyond the limits and make their students comprehend the apparatuses of the social relationships creating stereotypes, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings. Erneling (2010) also recommends, 'children can learn by participating in social world, by engaging in discursive activities, because background knowledge, norms and standards of rationality and other norms of intellectual achievement exist in the social world...There are two problems of learning -productivity and the framework- which can be approached and solved without resorting to the troubling assumptions of individualism, mentalism, biologism, and universalism. This is what the socio—cultural or discursive approach does' (p.166). The first problem will end when the learning exceeds the amount of knowledge thought and taught, by noticing and analyzing the different situations, environments, identities; the second one is the historical derivative, which she called *meno* problem: "if the background knowledge includes too much, what we learn repeats what we already know; however, if the background knowledge includes too little, we cannot comprehend anything beyond what we already know" (pp.73-94). The letters honestly conceal the feeling that just like what Wheelis mentioned in 1950s 'full of the unity and wholeness which is based on the harmonization of the behavior, actions and the value judgements of the people' (1958, p.27) and thus, having a strength used for transforming other identities. In other words, the background knowledge so much embraces the conceptualization of nation-state that 'knowledge of power' can simply re-embody itself over ego¹², then, infiltrate into households and social relations. Family and education as the first social institutions where the official ideology is nourished, where the country identity or social identity –mostly ethnic and religious characteristics predominated—are shaped, can come out as the source of judgements against the other. The approaches of the Turkish students to the Syrians, for instance, show that the reciprocal interaction among identity groups is generally based on discovering negative and positive characteristics, however, when it comes to

12 Look: Ericson, E.H. 1967. The Problem of Ego Identity. In *Identity and Anxiety*. ed. M. R. Stein, New York: The Free Press.

national values and a life style in convenient with those, having a common-religion is not enough to live in peace. If one examines the books and/or the curriculums the answer to the question “how do you behave towards a foreigner, a person not being part of your society?” s/he cannot find a lot of room. İstanbul is hosting about 550 thousand ¹³Syrians today and, most of the students *remember* and *reference* how Syria historically betrayed the Ottoman Empire, and just based on this knowledge, they believe that they are so unreliable and dishonorable that if Turkey were to experience exactly the same war, Syria would never open its national borders to the Turkish people, and they add that “Turkish people never escape from a war and leave their lands though.”

Laclau and Mouffe reject every practice feeding inequality and subordination and, therefore they advise articulation of plurality of differences which is expected to make them clearer: *For democratic education to take place, students must perform their discursive identities and... actively engage the question “what does it mean to be me?”*, and improve the most possible linguistic form which is applicable to their social positions and their multifaceted relations with other social positions (Snir, 2017, pp. 358-359). Such a self-discovery action, if the articulation is performed successfully enough, is going to provide to see the discursive identities and show the students a mirror connecting all other faces in one reflection. Therefore, Gramsci attached importance to the relationship between education and articulation, because *self-recognition* means recognizing social identities, capabilities, familiarities, realities, lots of oppression and oppressed (Enstwistle, 1979; Allman, 1988). In other words, it points out the student’s political position and psychological length of belonging and, becoming an agent or small-individual part of an ideological instrument, but the significant fact here is to catch the *public dimension* of articulation, incorporating various discourses to eradicate antagonism, *not* a conventional dimension which is discursively desirable and doing the opposite.

If some words are necessary for teachers, they need to be aware of the difference between oppressors and oppressed, all democratic expectations that can be articulated in order to reach the ideal connections and transformation, which s/he must have politically transformed in advance before supporting the students to be interested in articulation.

4. Narrative Discourse Analysis: The Letters

Ernest Gellner (1964) and Benedict Anderson (1991) point out that there are forms of nationalism changing by countries¹⁴. Turkish nationalism can be related to *Type II*: more aggressive and antagonistic towards the external forces perceiving *a real or imagined threat*, a crisis approaching day by day. Nevertheless, a sneaky but observable rage signifying an imagined threat has taken precedence over the strong nationalist physical attacks. In fact, even if some intellectuals think that it is globalization’s effect on the Muslim world creating hostility against the West and, the prophets of a multicultural life positively claim that the West faces miscegenation produced by the identities stemmed from different civilizations; lots of people are afraid of racial and/or religious conflicts between locals and ‘migrants’ sourced by any nationalist approach. It is possible to observe that members from the dominant cultures try to teach a culturally and ethnically approved citizenship to migrants to get them nationalized (Hutchinson, 2008, pp. 92-93). Turkish locals’

¹³ <https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/> (<https://multeciler.org.tr/eng/>)

¹⁴ There is also Type I, referring to a nationalism focused on building up a strong nation state devoted to a specific idea of nation. However, it has not been not expounded clearly. Moreover, such a classification raises complications in their works. In her large literature, for instance, Anderson puts forward another forms of nationalism, like ethnic nationalism, religious nationalism, Asian form of nationalism and the like.

performances should not be perceived differently, the rage and the effort that is 'normally' included by the process is the same. The letters manifest that this rage would be minimized either by organizing and Turkifying these immigrants as soon as possible or, by putting them into a clearly defined, controllable area, then, in due time send them back to their country. In view of the fact that such demands are reflected by a teenage community, one can feel obliged to seek out a psychological cause in relation to the socialization process, more particularly to *politically-approved* pedagogical instruments.

For Gellner, a national education system refers to a pyramid whose base consists of primary schools and, where the worthwhile political unit is located on the top. To be more exact, education imposes students to the values of the society and nation along with the idea that this is the only world/country you can live in with your identity. (Gellner, 1983, pp.34-36). In addition, Freire (1998, p.4) puts forward that education has been utilized by everyone; parents, business world and society, as an instrument of imposing beliefs and values, so, no one can say it is totally objective and not political. For instance, the official curriculum offered by the Anatolian high schools in Turkey includes *common courses* like Turkish language and literature, religious culture and moral knowledge, history, revolution history and Kemalism, which reflects 152 credit hours towards graduating. The *elective* courses are diction and elocution, Ottoman Turkish, Turkish culture and civilization, history of Islamic culture and civilization, modern history of Turks and the world, elective history, elective Turkish language and literature, and each can have 2 credits minimum, or 4 maximum. However, Democracy and Human Rights is an elective course and the credits provided for it is just four, for the entire high school education. These courses' credits are less in the fine arts high school and social sciences high school (Head Council of Education and Morality, MoE, 2018)¹⁵.

Frisby, in his book "Meeting the Psychoeducational Needs of Minority Students" (2013) touches important points: School psychologists and/or advisory teachers should evaluate their own cultural biases in order to comprehend the interaction between culturally different students (families) and local students, so, change the misperceptions and misbehaviors. No doubt, this point is also related with all the policy makers, who need to see that they create committed believers who believe that they are fighting for national values and symbols.

An acting manager working in an Anatolian high school in Avcılar mentions that:

Code Teacher 1. "Yes, we offer elective courses like democracy and human rights, international relations... I also believe these courses can teach our students how to understand and live with "others", you cannot achieve this goal just with the religion lessons... However, most of the elective courses are thought as drudgery and, actually in many high schools, finding a teacher whose profession refers to these subjects is hard... sometimes gym teacher, sometimes science teacher, whoever is available, is charged with teaching them. Mostly, they do their job involuntarily. I admit that we are wrong ...but conditions are not suitable to make an inversion (Philosophy group teacher, acting manager, 46, Avcılar).

Meanwhile, the "Education of Democratic citizenship and Human Rights Project", financially supported by the European Union (EU) between 2011-2014, setting side on developing sustainable democratic school environments in both primary and secondary educations and procuring all the academic materials to teach the related courses effectively (Gökçe, 2013, p.260, Council of

15 This course captures 80 credits of the total per education period, 32,32, 8 hours per graduate respectively. https://ttkb.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2018_02/21173451_ort_ogrtm_hdc_2018.pdf

Europe, 2014¹⁶) was held. This project involved parents, too. However, the new education perspective embracing global objectives instead of national ones has never achieved the expected goals. A history teacher indicates that

Code Teacher 2. The biggest problem in the history curriculums in secondary and high school education, they have just been dedicated to teach Turkish history.... from Turkic tribes and acceptance of Islam to the last sultan of the Ottoman Empire.... Turks challenging their enemies, which means the rest of the world... So, what the students always remember the Turks and the achieved victories over betrayals of the other states” (History teacher, 37, Imam Hatip Anatolian High School, Sultangazi)

İnal (2008) puts forward that, curriculums, with all knowledge and values –*ideological expectations* should also be added- they include, are political instruments and cannot be opened to changeable, rational and dialectic challenges. On the contrary, they are predetermined and dominant. So, the so-called globally arranged curriculums are overall reflecting a kind of manipulation that is beneficial to keep “others” out of a real dialogue. Because foreigners, like ethnics or immigrants, happen to become the cause of instability. In fact, there is a fear of loss. That fear includes losing culture and identity. Under such conditions, the intended curriculum divides the school environment into two groups: oppressors who says “we are not the same!” and oppressed.

Freire adds one of the basic elements in the relationship between oppressors and oppressed is prescription. Every prescription points out the truth that one individual’s choice is imposed by another individual, thus, one’s conscious that is prescribed, starts to get adapted to the prescriber. Thus, the performances of individuals who are oppressed and subordinated are actually prescribed, and determined by the oppressor’s principles (Freire, 1970, p.27). The letters implicitly notify a *fear of freedom* of the major (oppressing) groups, in such an immigration case, fear of culture, fear of identity, fear of language and the like and, surely submit a prescription telling the Syrian immigrants how to live with Turks in Turkey, which are specified below:

The belief that each Turk is endowed with a military essence and bravery is generally based on ‘becoming a society having lots of ancestors making history’. The most mentioned charismatic leader on the letters is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938) with his two well-known statements: ‘Motherland is chastity and honor!’ and “If the matter is motherland, the rest is just details”.

Code. 1. “90 years ago Mustafa Kemal established a new state. We have never given up protecting it. In the past, while we were just 9-10 persons, we stood up to and protected our motherland... You escaped from your county during a war... how unacceptable! If the matter is motherland, the rest is just details!” (Ayça, 16, Küçükçekmece)

Code. 2. “Dear my Syrian friend, I never call “nation” the one consisting of the people not knowing to fight for their motherland. A nation without a motherland? ...not possible. Motherland is chastity and honor! We cannot understand those who left their integrity behind and escaped. So, you are not one of us!” (Servet, 16, Sultangazi)

Code.3. “Dear Syrian friend, we are sorry for the terrible events in your country. Your land belonged to our ancestors and it had been commended to you. But you couldn’t protect it really well. Moreover, you abandoned it.” (Ahmet,15, Sultangazi)

16 Council of Europe, Democracy page. Turkey. Demokratik Vatandaşlık ve İnsan Hakları Eğitimi http://www.edchreturkey-eu.coe.int/Description_TU.asp

Landwehr is crucial; territorial integrity of the state depends on the number of citizens showing loyalty to it. The immigrants officially accepted into the Turkish Republic are expected to assimilate and be absorbed into the Turkish culture at the earliest, however, in today's context, the "disorganized mobilization of the immigrants" is sooner or later a threat to the existing balance of social structure -remarkably, the students prefer to say 'social structure' instead of 'social life'. Moreover, the continuity of an uncontrollable dispersion of the immigrants is the focus to blame governmental authorities.

Code. 4. "If you look at the history, these people had betrayed the Ottoman Empire. Now, your people are everywhere; in parks, cafes, bus stations... They do not look like they ran-away from a war, they feel really comfortable around, as if this country belonged to them forever. I don't want them to be exonerated of taxes or any payment. Remember you are just guests in this country..." (Erdoğan, 17, Avcılar)

Code.5. "As a result of incorrect political implementations, Syrians came and settled in our lands, now we are experiencing the results: I feel upset and annoyed that they walk around freely as a Turkish young man. Our ancestors made history! They changed a nation's life; they changed the world, moved heaven and earth! Our ancestors and every legendary step they took have been discussed in schools, universities during the classes. What are these people doing here and, they are too disorganized! If this is a way of governing a society, so risky for the social structure and balance! Some Turkish people will marry Syrian women and we will turn into Arabian people! (Ahmet, 17, Küçükçekmece)

The letters remark three main factors jeopardizing the social structure: a) higher fertility rates of Syrian women b) their neglectful behaviors 'as if their country was not a war zone' and expansionist manners c) increasing number of people speaking and/or using Arabic language for 'running business':

Code.6. "Syrians left their country and took refuge in ours. That must not be happening like that. All the Syrians are here in Turkey, not in Syria. They are everywhere. We cannot walk safely on the streets, because there are a lot of Syrian thieves around and, also there are adult beggars who force the little children to beg on the streets and at the metrobus stations. How dare you give them Turkish citizenship?! The government must do something showing that it thinks of its own citizens' benefit and safety more than everything!" (Fatma, 15, Avcılar).

Code.7. "Look around, no security! Actually this indignation is not against you, it is against the government that has not succeeded in organizing the migration flows from Syria. We cannot find any answers for our questions, so, we keep questioning you. You cannot perpetuate your own traditions in Turkey. Your clothes, behaviors, manners... all must be in accordance with Turkish traditions. I am sorry; I don't like you (Batu, 16, Sultangazi)

Code. 8. How stupid to consider giving them Turkish identity cards! Why? They need to return to their country after the civil war, but all the government considers is its own future... because they need votes! Our ancestors fought for years and became martyr or veterans; they risked death for these lands! (Mustafa, 17, Sultangazi)

The president brought you to the country and is not interested in whatever you have done to the country. They have been given you various rights that we don't have ... We should be equal; they must pay taxes and have the same educational opportunities as us. Look at that, they made us refugees in our own country. Stop the proliferation of Arabic! If they commit an offense, they are forgiven, whereas they should be deported or imprisoned. Every government has the rise time and the fall time... So, this situation is an emotional investment for the future (Süleyman, 15, Sultangazi).

The key solution for ‘improper activities’ of the Syrians is to teach them moral living arrangements, however, they have to keep in mind that they are a ‘long-term but temporal... so, not real’ part of Turkish social structure.

Code.9. “This is not the way of living in our country. You must embrace our traditions or you must revise yours to make them more similar to ours. Otherwise, if you and your people keep not obeying our rules, the security problem will arise more and more” (Ali, 17, Küçükçekmece).

Code. 10. “We understand you, it is not easy to leave a whole life behind and going to another country. But see the uneasiness, unemployment, robbery, the begging! ... Instead of escaping, you should have protected your country. But you fouled it. Now you are fouling Turkey. Either the Syrians learn about our traditions or they will go back to their own country. (Sedat, 15, Küçükçekmece)

Code. 11 “In fact the situation is related to the government giving Syrians the right to Turkish citizenship. Syrians live together in the suburbs and this makes it hard for them to adapt earlier. Your people keep causing security problems. Moreover, most of them are poor, uneducated or less educated. Some go and do illegal jobs and cause other security problems” (Kübra, 14, Sultangazi).

Code. 12. Even I call you “guests”, our government is not acting you like you are guests, that’s why you think that we need to keep in step with you. You absolutely damage our culture. You escaped from a war and I really understand that, but I cannot toss out how you damage our economy; rents are now higher, unemployment is getting higher... We are fighting for you there, so, not laughing at you my brother! You must be assimilated, you should learn how to live in conformity with the Turkish culture (Hasan, 17, Küçükçekmece).

Language is considered to be a benchmark of national identity: Turkish schools predominantly teach Turkish to maintain the Turkish identity and culture, so, everyone who wants to live in Turkey has to make an effort to learn the language and find a place in the culture.

Code.13. You have to protect your people, the Syrian women in this foreign country, instead of doing bad things. We need to see that we are all human before race, ethnicity and denomination. What Atatürk said: How happy is s/he who can say I am a Turk. If you see yourself as a Turk, if you love this country as much as you love yours, if you accept our Islamic values and traditions and can speak our language, you are Turkish hereafter. This is the only way to be loved in my country (Dilek, 15, Sultangazi).

Code.14. You should not be unconcerned with the subsidies and tolerance to me. It seems like peace is a lost concept... We will prove together that it is not lost my friend. I know you are learning my language slowly, that means we can talk about all this stuff in the future (Ayşe, 16, Avclar).

Besides fertility behavior of Syrian women, the risk of ‘turning into Arabic people’ has another dimension: The Arabic nameplates on the shops. They also make the students ask questions about the Kurdish people living in Turkey who, for centuries, have limited rights about using their mother tongue. Then, the African-black people living in Istanbul for years, their adaptive behaviors are *praiseworthy!*

Code. 15. Those who lose their language will lose their country in the foreseeable future... There are Arabic name plates on the shops and stores –which, by the way, they open them without paying taxes-and everywhere. This is unfair to our Kurdish people who have lived in this coun-

try for all eternity, and they have no right to use Kurdish nameplates. I don't understand if they are refugees or us!" (Sultan, 16, Sultangazi)

Code. 16. It is totally wrong to let them hang on Arabic nameplates; letting the Arabic nameplates become widespread. Our culture and traditions will be under risk. If they want to live in this country, they can live like the black people, some of them are students, some are buying watches and all are really well-behaved, honest and respectful, which is so praiseworthy" (Osman, 16, Küçükçekmece).

Code. 17. Even our Kurdish citizens speak Turkish and do not use Kurdish nameplates on their shops. It is unacceptable for me to see Arabic nameplates on the shops belonging to the Syrian migrants. If they want to live in my country -I will never accept to cohabit with them by the way- they have to show respect to the language I speak and the culture I was born in. I don't want to live within an Arabic culture which is gradually becoming widespread (Harun, 16, Sultangazi)

Jacob and Luedtke (2018, p.ix) suggest that while a 'foreign other' is perceived as a threat towards the integrity, sovereignty, and economy of the nation state', the locals first feel the risks of losing their jobs, breaking down of living quarters, daily routines and the peace they are accustomed to.

Code.16. There are Turkish people unemployed because of cheap Syrian labor force. The financial and emotional damage they cause is unmeasurable. (Hüseyin, 17, Sultangazi)

The Syrian peers are reprimanded about the Turkish soldiers fighting in the Afrin military operation, and the democratic stand of the Turkish people during 15 July Coup Attempt on all occasions:

Code.17. I admit that you are our guests and my people have never turned away from people who are in need. But no one says that my country is a strong or developed country neither economically nor politically. Yes, you are our guests but you make my country face unemployment and expensiveness. There are Turkish soldiers who are martyred in your lands, Afrin, you owe them a prayer at least. Besides, we, Turks, give our lives to our homeland; this is what we did during the Independence War. Maybe you should think of going and fighting for your homeland" (Ayşe, 16, Avcılar).

Code.18. I think that the Turkish government bestows a privilege on Syrian people, more than its own citizens. My country always have had unemployment problems, it is a crisis actually...now you Syrians are getting employed instead of the Turkish individuals who graduated from high schools or universities. I never say that you have to starve, but after the war, you must go back to your country and the government should clean up this country of the Syrians!" (Orhan, 16, Küçükçekmece).

On the other hand, the students believe that their Syrian peers have too many privileges when it comes to education, too. Although also for the Syrian young immigrants, getting in the University Entrance Exam for Foreign Students arranged by the Council of Higher Education is obligatory, what the students claim is they have been effortlessly accepted to the Turkish universities.

Code.19. We have been studying 12 years in order to get in a university, but somebody like you, one who is completely a stranger to my culture and educational system, comes and gets into the universities in my country easily! This is plagiarism! (Zübeyde, 17, Küçükçekmece)

Code. 20. I don't like Syrians, honestly. Since you arrived in my country, our soldiers have been

fighting in Afrin, in your country! In addition, while you are not studying so hard, our young people are not allowed to enter the exam, just because s/he is late just a minute. How unreasonable and redundant! (Hale, 15, Sultangazi)

Code. 21. *The rights given to you are too many and unnecessary. I am in 11th grade now and will enter the university exam next year, maybe I will be accepted by an undistinguished university while a Syrian-Arab will be getting trained as a full scholarship student in a better university; this is clearly not fair! (Veli, 16, Küçükçekmece)*

Code. 22. *We are trying hard to have a profession but you are having it without exams or you know, effortlessly... I hope, you would go back to your country in peace. (Kübra, 17, Avclar)*

The letters, including the ones coming from Imam Hatip Anatolian High Schools, commonly account almost all the historical periods; Cengiz Khan, Seljuks, Ottoman sultans, Ataturk and the Independence War besides the holiness of Anatolian lands and being Turk. The pedagogic construction of a nation-state ideology is apparent but, as Arslan states, it is possible in reading Islamic components over the moral anticipations and activities. Although Islam has been measured as a national characteristic and offering a form of life making no sharp differences between people from different ethnic origins or religions, the student letters pay no attention to a *religious fellowship* because these *Muslim foreigners* are so disrespectful to the Turkish national and cultural values (2017, pp. 334-36). The students indicate that they find them ‘different’ because ‘they did not risk death for Syria and behave so unconcernedly that the Syrian boys put so much hair-jells, entertain on the beaches and parks, smoke hubble-bubbles around, irritating Turkish girls by their looks etc. Some are asking “how can someone whose country is under fire do all this?” ; some are comparing their behaviors to *other localized foreign people’s* attitudes for overrating the condemnation; some try to stay moderate but keep mentioning similar problems they see. So, the query policy of all the critics is full of the traces of nation-state teachings, not totally of being Muslim.

Code. 24. *First of all I have not behaved so bad with the Syrians my friend but I don't like them. We share the same religion but I cannot see if there is a remarkable religious fellowship between us. You are not like us, we would die for our motherland, but your people escaped! Remember 15th July! We fought for our freedom, for a democratic regime! I reject the idea that I am a racist, I am not a racist. There are lots of foreign people living in Istanbul for years and they are from different countries. There are Africans, Europeans, the people who belong to different religions, there are atheists, I never have bad thoughts about them. You, Arabs, even if you are Muslims, are different... different and behave unacceptably comfortable! (Ali, 16, Küçükçekmece).*

Code. 23. *You take refuge in our motherland but you have to remember that you are also Muslim, and this means you cannot betray us. You have to love and save our country, too. (Ayşe, 14, Sultangazi)*

Code. 25. *I am questioning our religious fellowship. Read the Turkish history and learn about the fighting solders and Turkish people for their freedom bravely. What are you and your young relatives doing here? There are young Syrian men everywhere. I don't understand why they left their own country behind... why are they in my country? (Fidan, 16, Avclar)*

Code. 26. *There is nothing like Turks, Syrians or whatever. We are like sisters and brothers who have gathered under the sacred flag of Islam... We have to protect each other. The rents are higher, everywhere is crowded, unemployment is too high, whatever... and everyone can see why we don't want your people in this country... some world affairs. If we keep doing this, it is clear what will happen to us after death! (Ayşe, 16, Avclar).*

The necessity of showing 'empathy' towards the Syrian immigrants is mentioned in all the letters; *it is essential, but hard!* So, the question is what makes it hard? The letters actually draw attention to three determinants: the news disseminated by Turkish media, the parents' attitudes and social circles. Here the point is Turkish media has not been successful in shaping neither the teenagers' nor their parents' understandings of the problems such as being a refugee, international or forced migration. Whereas, political decision-making processes, migrants' locations, social needs must be told by the media tools, the construction of the language must be sensitive and explanatory and, even the images must be chosen cautiously.

Code. 27. I don't understand why my people are making life so hard for you...They are angry with you because of the bad political regime and because you left your country during the war. They say "this is absolutely not what Turks do when a war is a topic!" They always mention how Turkish people are great, while they need to develop empathy...Yes, it is really hard to get used to your existence in this country; Different culture, different denomination, different language, etc.. But there are different ethnic groups living in Turkey; Jews, Armenians, Hindus... they can, always...But everybody must be equal, never one group is given more rights than the other groups.. right? (Nergis, 15, Küçükçekmece).

Code 28. First, Selamünaleykum¹⁷ to you all. You have escaped from a terrible war, lost your fathers, mothers, sisters, sons, some other relatives. They bomb your houses while you are at home, the fireballs passed over your heads... So, we received you with open arms and hospitably...We meet almost everywhere and we never have a conversation. I witnessed some conflicts between my Turkish friends and the Syrians on the street, but ok., it's over... Honestly, I don't like Syrians but I have to be respectful. Some of you are cold in these bad weather conditions, feel desperate and poor. May be someday we would experience such things and call you for help. Showing empathy towards you is important. (Hatice, 16, Avclar)

Code.29. Feeling empathy towards Syrians is too hard for me but I have to appreciate my country's effort which is aiming to help them. On the other hand, what we need to see is thankfulness; but these people are dragging us towards a chaos. Although we give them a chance for a new life, they make our lives more difficult. You are our guests but, why do you make uncomfortable my people, who embrace you perfectly? You get our blood up! If I were you, I would put my heart and soul into fighting the enemies. I see you are settled in this country, you opened some shops, bought cars, houses... Look at the situation: as if we were guests, and you were not! (İhsan, 17, Sultangazi).

Code.30. There is lot of words to say actually, this page is not enough... The fact remains that if we left you, the Syrian people, out, how are the next generations going to act towards strangers; what if they would naturalize such a behavior not contending pity or empathy? (Ali, 17, Sultan-gazi)

Laqueur's study perfectly summarizes these findings: *'The existence of a relatively homogeneous, self-reproducing group routed in shared values, with the sense of its own uniqueness and importance that are worth preserving, with a history, sense of shared fate, elements of shared culture, and a territorial referent that figures in its identity and history-these broadly describe what citizenry of a state "should" be'*. (Keely, 1996, p.1050). The analysis of a certain ideological context is associated with a nation, common identity, language, consciousness and a political

17 "peace be upon you" in Arabic

program or project; also by taking inspiration from Smith's understanding of *nationalism* (1991). The teenagers' responses to the flow of refugees confirm that they lean towards a nation-state ideology or, an *organic ideology* as Gramsci foresees. When the results of any international migration facts are argued, even if it is a matter of displacement, the immigrants are expected to assimilate, that is to say, to 'normalize' or 'naturalize'.

5. In Lieu of Conclusion

Bourdieu (1984) puts forward "*The relative weight of home background and of formal education (the effectiveness and duration of which are closely dependent on social origin) varies according to the extent to which the different cultural practices are recognized and taught by the educational system, and the influence of social origin is strongest — other things being equal — in 'extra-curricular' and avant-garde culture.*" (Bourdieu as cited in Olivier, 2017, p.3). While Ranci re thinks over Bourdieu's and Passeron's concepts, and suggests that one should accept the formative power of culture, feel the weight of types of socialization and habitus, see the schools as the forms of reproducing inequality, not democracy surely (Raci re; 2007, pp.62-64). Gibson claims that no state —irrespective of economic organization, capitalist or socialist- intends to establish schools which subvert its purposes, values, ideals. Schools are consciously set up and funded in the belief that they will support and maintain the state's aims and beliefs, thus, the rules of the pedagogic system and curriculums are written for only the *insiders* (1986, p.49). Schwarz, by mentioning the code defining the best insiders in the National Education Policy Review of the Turkish Ministry of Education "*Atat rk's nationalism defined in the Constitution...who adopt, protect and develop the national, ethical, spiritual, historical and cultural values of the Turkish nation, who love and elevate their families, homeland and nation, who are aware of their duties and responsibilities to the Republic of Turkey... and who behave accordingly*" (June 2005, p. 4-5) suggests that even "*the establishment of independent schools offering a different curriculum and pedagogical program has not been possible in Turkey ...integration of concepts of alternative education into the national predefined schooling system is difficult*" (2011, p.8) . According to Freire, *the word is the essence of dialog and has two dimensions: reflection and action*. These two generate praxis. If one neglects action and gives priority to reflection, this produces only "grumble", if one neglects reflection but just embraces action, this makes *dialogue* impossible and serves to create virtual ways of thinking. So, nobody can speak about "transforming the world". *Dialogue* in this setting means "confronting people" and during this confrontation, if some people do not violate other people's rights, the dialogue is real. In short, the curriculums and programs included by national pedagogy should avoid to radicalize the masses. Here, in this article, the main assertion, *highly centralized Turkish education system can produce unpermissiveness towards 'outsiders'*, has been supported by the most prominent details in the student's statements: a) All Turkish students do a comparative analysis of national histories and, a final result is that Syrians do not have a history of glorious victories, not as brave as Turks because they run away instead of defending their motherland, they flee their country during a war. b) The Syrian immigrants are immediately obliged to learn and speak Turkish and to give up speaking Arabic and/or using Arabic nameplates on the stores or shops they have opened, otherwise the risk of proliferation of Arabic is possible c) They have to remember that there is a due-date, they will return someday. Behaving "too comfortable" and disrespectful creates an insecure environment for Turkish people d) Turkish traditions and social structure are exposed to risk of breaking down as well as the Turkish language e) The government is responsible for granting privileges to facilitate

adult-Syrians' economic and social lives and Syrian students' educational lives. The policy-makers cannot organize the immigrants well and do not watch the socio-economic consequences of their existence. Arslan (2017, pp. 334-36) asserts that recently and widely Islam has been dis-coursed in association with state, land and history and, most of the evaluations on Islam include ideas on re-producing Ottoman traditional life. Even the Ottomans' approach does not target an authoritarian manner, a society constructed on a racial base and monolithic approach, the indigen-ousness has begun to argue over Islam for over ten years and, the central state confers the responsibility of bringing in a *desired* moralism and an *understanding of indigen-ousness* to the education system, in which the moralism already represents Islam. The student letters clearly show that cultural, economic and social orders are the consequences of such a knowledge con-structing autonomy in association with the historical context that fashioned itself, Gramsci's lit-erature says the same thing. Then it seems it is '*capable of providing a summarized understanding and explanation for the contradictory and complex historical movement of its time*' (1999, p. 141 as cited in Ferreira Jr. & Bittar, 2008, p.3). That means any interference, in the Turkish case, the locals who have *biophilia* that the knowledge intrinsically bestows face with the Syrian immi-grants, is carefully filtered by a set of ideological-natural surroundings.

Nationalism can generate a particular pattern of behavior which basically provokes an an-ti-immigrant feeling (Kellas, 1991, p.29). The analysis of the letters lays bare that in composition of the returns of historical, cultural, ideological and neoliberal processes, the widespread peda-gogic practice takes place as a result of socialization –or psychologically, learning experience– which does not let young Turkish minds develop positive perceptions towards the Syrian immi-grants. The system does not seem so close to the articulation method needed for a fully democrat-ic education, but good enough for generating antagonism.

Smith explains nationalism as 'a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize its national will' (Smith, 1991, p.72). Clearly, the Turkish training system is in charge of being part of such a movement for reproducing the national identity with the patriotism to death and loyalty to the history and socio-cultural symbols especially like traditions, customs, language and ethnicity, which brings about a fear of loss inwardly and ethnocentrism to a certain extent.

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