ABSTRACT

After the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917, a Soviet state was established on the site of the former Empire. What was the attitude of the new Soviet state to the neighboring countries? While addressing the 8th Congress of the All-Russian Soviets, Lenin called the Kemalists “Turkish Octobrists.” Moscow waffled: who was to be chosen - Mustafa Kemal, Enver, or “leftist” Enverists (Russian State Archive of Social-Political History (hereafter referred to as RSASPH), May 23, 1923, p. 6, fund (f.) 82, record (r.) 2, vol. 262: Mirsaid Sultan-Galiyev, “Who Am I?: Autobiographical Notes,” letter to members of the CC RCP (B)) Nevertheless, treaties concluded by Soviet Russia in 1921 with Iran and Turkey put an end to the revolutionary intent not only of Moscow but of the newly established Soviet republics of the South Caucasus in their relations with neighboring eastern countries. At a conference in Kars in September–October 1921, representatives of the South Caucasian republics signed the first international document ever. Baku, Tiflis, and Erivan signed a treaty with Turkey, which had a positive effect on their international authority. By signing the Kars Treaty, the Armenian republics had thus recognized the Moscow Treaty concluded between Soviet Russia and Turkey. Inclusion of a special item about Nakchivian remaining a protectorate of Azerbaijan in the Moscow and Kars Treaties proved to be an important result of the geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus. The established relations between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey in the early 1920s on the basis of the Moscow and Kars treaties continued until the end of the Second World War.

Keywords: Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, Soviet Russia, Azerbaijan, Caucasus
While political figures of old Turkey sought salvation from Russia, patriots of new Turkey stirred up action against the Entente and were ready to collaborate with Russia at the expense of the Caucasus republics. On the eve of the offensive on Baku, Orjonikidze reported to Lenin and Chicherin that “the leader of the national movement in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, demands that Azerbaijan let the Soviet troops into the borders with Turkey to protect them against the British attacks.” (RSASPH, April 23, 1920, p. 1, f.85, r.13, vol.6, Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Chicherin on situation in Baku). As early as the autumn of 1919 the Turkish emissaries in Azerbaijan, headed by Khalil Kut Pasha, aimed “to draw the Soviet influence nearer to the Turkish borders” by the spring of 1920 (Sorgun, 2010, p. 324).

Simultaneously, Turkish Communists provided the central Bolshevik press with materials of the alleged Communist nature of the national movement in Anatolia. On April 1920 the newspaper Izvestiia published a report from Vladikavkaz entitled “Turkish Revolutionaries Stand Up for Soviet Russia.” It noted that a revolutionary committee had been established at the conference of Anatolian provinces to liberate Turkey. A resolution of the conference declared that Soviet Russia was the exclusive savior of the peoples of the East (Izvestiia, April 16, 1920).

Following numerous anxious reports from the command of the Eastern Army and Turkish Communists of the Caucasus about the possibility of making an agreement with the Bolsheviks and the British, a newly formed Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) decided to collaborate with Russia. On April 26, 1920, Kazım Karabekir Pasha was informed about the GNAT’s consent to act jointly with the Bolsheviks. With that end in view, he was empowered to organize, instruct, and send a special mission to Baku. At the same time, a letter written by Mustafa Kemal Pasha on behalf of the GNAT was sent to the Soviet government via Novorossiisk: “First, we assume the responsibility to unite our work and all our military operations with Russian Bolsheviks aiming to combat imperialistic governments and liberate all the oppressed. Second, if the Soviets intend to launch military operations against Georgia or make Georgia join the alliance diplomatically and then oust the British from the Caucasus, the Turkish government undertakes to start combat operations against imperialistic Armenia and assumes the responsibility to compel the Azerbaijan Republic to join the Soviet republics. Third, in order to oust the imperialist forces occupying our lands, populated by our people, and to strengthen our internal resources for continuation of our common struggle against imperialism, we ask Soviet Russia to grant us 5 million Turkish liras in gold, arms, and ammunition, as well as the needed military-technical means and foodstuffs for our army, which is to be used in the East, as the Soviet authorities demand.” (Foreign Policy Archive of
Though an April 26 letter from Mustafa Kemal Pasha addressed to the Soviet government was accompanied by a great deal of talk, in reality this letter played no great role in the Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan. The letter reached Moscow on June 3, long after the occupation of Azerbaijan by the Russian troops. Nevertheless, the message from the Turkish revolutionary government was heartily welcomed in Moscow. As soon as the letter was received, Chicherin immediately informed Lenin about it. A reply was prepared the same day, and on June 4 a message written by Chicherin was sent to Ankara (Dokumenty vneshei politiki SSSR, 1958, p. 555, vol.2). During this same time, the Soviet leadership received information about the Anatolian movement from the first Turkish representatives who arrived in Moscow. Following the completion of their mission to the April occupation, Khalil Pasha, and one of the prominent representatives of the Turkish Communist Party (TCP), Dr. Fuad Sabit bey, left for Moscow at the end of April 1920. On April 30 members of the Russian Telegraph Agency (RTA) reported from Piatigorsk that they were heading for Moscow to negotiate the instructions of the Anatolian government of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. During a conversation with the RTA members, correspondent Khalil Pasha pointed out that Turkey was hard pressed. From now on the allies, primarily the British, were running the show in Istanbul. The entire Asian part of Turkey was divided among the conquerors. Greece captured the whole seacoast in the environs of Izmir (Smyrna): France seized Syria. In Khalil Pasha’s words, for some time the 10 million people of Asia Minor had leaned toward adopting the Soviet political system. On his behalf, the RTA informed Moscow that “the Soviet system of country administration is regarded by the Turks of Asia Minor as good enough.... The new government is lacking arms and ammunition. That’s why Khalil Pasha and his assistant, Dr. Fuad Sabit bey, left for Moscow. They intended to get ammunition from Soviet Russia and establish a defensive alliance against the Entente.” (FPARF, May 3, 1920, p. 2, f. 04, r. 51, fol. 321a, vol. 54868, Message from Russian Telegraph Agency)

In mid-May Khalil Pasha and Dr. Fuad Sabit bey arrived in the Russian capital. On May 15 the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party (RCP) discussed the question “On Khalil Pasha” and approved Chicherin’s proposals on talks to be held the next day. The Politburo passed a decision to learn Orjonikidze’s opinion on the subject and, if Chicherin considered it necessary, to arrange a meeting between Khalil Pasha and Lenin (RSASPH, CC RCP (B), May 15, 1920: 2, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 78, Extract from minutes no. 10 of the meeting of the Politburo).
On May 16 Turkish delegates met with Chicherin. The talks lasted for more than three hours. Touching upon the results of the talks, Chicherin wrote to Lenin: “We should not concentrate on our imaginary perspectives and plunge into adventure; yet I must say that the development of ties with the Turkish National Center (TNC) may appreciably contribute to strengthening our policy in the East. The National Center has not yet split into various parties, and no domestic policy program has been developed so far. At any rate, the point is about the republic. They explained that the Turkish masses are primarily made up of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. They are oppressed by bureaucracy, senior Pashas, and profiteers; they dispose of Western capitalists; the upper bourgeoisie are Armenian and Greek. Large-scale farming in Asia Minor was destroyed in the time of Mahmud II; since then it has partly been restored. However, the number of these landlords is insignificant, and they are probably being driven out. No grounds for communism are available; however, Bolshevism is utterly popular; hatred against the Western capitalists and domestic oppressors is enormous. Having clarified our stance on the subject, Khalil Pasha is going to return to Sivas and then visit us again. He asks us to send our representatives together with him as well as Armenian comrades, due to strained relations with Armenia. He insists that we open our permanent office in their country together with printing houses, libraries, books, and magazines. They also ask us to include both Muslims and indigenous Russians in our office. In so doing, we will have full freedom of propaganda. It is possible to establish a Soviet Republic there, but this will not be our Sovietism, for all peasants are fond of their own land plots, so Communism has to be popularized in the country gradually, step by step. I personally see no benefit from such a fake Sovietism, which will only create confusion. Militarily, Khalil asks for ammunition and money. They recognize the self-determination of all nationalities and are ready for separation and autonomy. Khalil’s program is a sort of Monroe Doctrine for Asia, a struggle of all Asian peoples against European imperialism. He considers Russia to be the sole friend of the Asian peoples, who realize that they are sure to perish without us.” (FPARF, May 16, 1920, f. 04, r. 51, fol. 321a, vol. 54868, pp. 3–4, Report from Chicherin to Lenin about talks with Khalil Pasha) In his report to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (CC RCP) on June 22, 1920, Chicherin noted: “We must finally speed up implementation of our plans in Turkey.”(Archive of Political Documents of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan (hereafter referred to as APDPARA), June 22, 1920, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 2a, p. 9, Message from Chicherin to CC RCP (B))

In the summer of 1920, the former Minister of War, Enver Pasha went to Moscow. Meanwhile Jemal Pasha, together with several members of the Party of Union and Progress
(İttihat ve Terakki), arrived in Russia from Berlin. What did Moscow want from him? First, Enver Pasha had closely scrutinized developments in Anatolia and during his Moscow meetings did not conceal that the Russian government was ready to fight if the Ankara government took any steps, such as a transfer of Izmir to the Greeks, in accordance with the Treaty of Sèvres. If the allies succeeded in bribing Turkey and using it against Moscow, the Russians, backed by Enver Pasha, were ready to rout the new Turkey. Hence Enver Pasha was very valuable for Russian foreign policy. He was exploited by Moscow as an effective instrument for turning the Kemalists into allies of the Bolsheviks. Russian diplomacy intended to set Turkey, in the person of Enver Pasha and Young Turks, against the Entente. The Bolshevik leaders believed that they would be able to maneuver between the green Islamic banner and the Red Turkish banner. This would resemble the bitter lot of “someone fallen and unaccommodating in search of a guardian in an absolutely alien milieu.”(Aydemir, 2006, p. 192)

Enver Pasha was cordially welcomed in Moscow by the Bolshevik leaders. Earlier, in June 1920 the Bolshevik leaders had given their answer to the letter of April 26 from Mustafa Kemal Pasha. A message of June 4 signed by Chicherin said that Mustafa Kemal’s letter, in which he offered to become involved in the struggle against the foreign imperialism threatening the two countries, provided the main principles of foreign policy of the new Turkish government. First, a declaration of Turkey’s independence. Second, an inclusion of undeniably Turkish territories in the Turkish state. Third, a proclamation of Arabia and Syria as independent states. Fourth, a decision by the Grand National Assembly to empower Turkish Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan, the Batum region, Eastern Thrace, and territories with a mixed Turkish-Arab population independently to decide on their own destiny. A free referendum would be held in these areas with active participation by refugees and emigrants forced to leave their motherland for reasons beyond their control. Fifth, a declaration by the Grand National Assembly granting all rights to national minorities within the framework of the new Turkish state as set forth for national minorities of Europe. Sixth, a submission of the question of the straits to the consideration of states contiguous to the Black Sea. Seventh, an elimination of the capitulations and foreign economic control. Eighth, an annulment of influence areas of any sort. Finally, the Russian foreign commissar suggested establishing diplomatic and consular offices to maintain friendly relations between Turkey and Russia (FPARF, June 4, 1920, f. 04, r. 51, fol. 321a, vol. 54868, pp. 5–6, Letter from Chicherin to Mustafa Kemal Pasha).

Without waiting for an answer from Turkey, Soviet Russia appointed its diplomatic representative to Ankara on June 8, 1920. The Politburo decided to consider a request from the Foreign Commissariat on sending comrade Eliava as a diplomatic and military representative
of the Turkish national government of Kemal Pasha (RSASPH, June 8, 1920, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 86, p. 4, Extract from minutes no. 18 of the meeting of Politburo, CC RCP (B)). On June 28 Chicherin told the Politburo that the aid to the government of Kemal Atatürk, the dispatching of an ambassador to Turkey. Chicherin added: “Turkey should immediately be armed, for delaying this initiative will make Mustafa Kemal regard us as empty talkers, and the worst of it is that revolutionary Turkey risks being crushed; in the meantime, even our insignificant aid could be of great practical and moral importance. However, despite the Politburo’s decisions, we cannot get arms. We are discredited and our prestige in the East is undermined when a political entity says one thing today and does another tomorrow, promises aid today but declines to give it tomorrow.” (RSASPH, June 28, 1920, f. 5, r. 2, vol. 314, p. 12, Message from Chicherin to the Politburo, CC RCP (B)).

Following the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, the return of Russians to the Caucasus became a reality. For this reason the new Ankara government decided at its first meeting on May 5, 1920, to send a delegation to Moscow to hold official talks with the Bolsheviks. The delegation was headed by foreign minister Bekir Sami bey Kunduh of the new government. Yusuf Kemal bey Tengirşenk (the minister of the economy) and Osman bey Özgen (a deputy from Lazistan) were also delegation members, while Dr. Ibrahim Tali bey Öngören and Seyfi bey Dü zgören joined them in Erzurum as military experts at the suggestion of Kazım Karabekir Pasha (Öztürk, 2015, p. 103). On May 11, the day the Sami bey delegation departed from Ankara, Lloyd George submitted a draft of the Treaty of Sèvres to the government of the Ottoman Porte in Istanbul. The draft provided for the “liberation of all non-Turkic peoples from the power of the Turks.” (Öztürk, 2015, p. 103)

A mission led by Bekir Sami bey set out across the Black Sea on July 11, 1920, and arrived in Moscow on July 19. Except for brief unofficial meetings with Karakhan on July 24 and August 4, no Soviet officials received the Turkish delegation (not even Dr. Fuad Sabit bey, the representative of the Communists) until mid-August. On the one hand, Soviet Russia did not want to negotiate with the Turks officially until a complete clarification of relations with Armenia (Qafarov, 2011, p. 373). On the other hand, Bolshevik leaders were waiting to see what Turkey would be faced with after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres earlier in August and the response of the new Turkish government. On August 10, 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, and Turkey lost 80 percent of the territories previously owned by the Ottoman Empire (Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol.2, 1958, p. 555). The Ankara government led by Mustafa Kemal rejected the crushing terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, however, and a new stage of struggle against the Entente, particularly the British and Greeks, began in the country.
After signing a peace treaty with Dashnak Armenia on August 10, 1920, Soviet Russia succeeded in safeguarding Armenia against the claims of victorious powers. On the same day these powers signed a treaty with the Ottoman Porte, which provided for the creation of the Armenian state upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire (Respublika Armeniia v 1918–1920 gg. (Politicheskaia istoriia): Sbornik dokumentov i materialov. Yerevan: Gutitiun, 2000: 248–49; Hasanli, 2018, pp. 177-178). On August 13, 1920, the first official meeting with the Turkish delegation was held in Moscow. The Turks learned about the signing of a peace treaty between Dashnak Armenia and Soviet Russia. Chicherin came forward in defense of the Armenians. He tried to reanimate the privileges as set forth in the Treaty of Sèvres and then suggested discussing the question of ceding the Turkish vilayets Van, Mush, and Bitlis to the Armenians. He added that Turkey would be aided subject to this proviso and that this plan had already been accepted by Khalil Pasha and Jemal Pasha. The Turkish delegation raised a vigorous protest, however, saying that such a political course was in effect identical to the Entente’s plans to break up Turkey. Aside from this, Khalil Pasha and Jemal Pasha had no right to negotiate on behalf of Turkey. It was Chicherin’s claims that complicated the situation and endangered the further course of negotiations. On August 14 the Turkish delegation met with Lenin, who admitted “making an error when we signed this treaty. If we fail to fix it, you do it (Türkiyе Büyük Millet Meclisinin Gizli Celese Zabıtları, 1985, Circuit I, vol. 2, p. 166).”

On August 17, 1920, Russian diplomats Evgenii Adamov and Andrei Sabanin, following talks with the Turkish delegation, drafted a Russian-Turkish treaty of eight items as an initial step. However, Chicherin’s demands to grant east Anatolian lands to Armenians suspended the talks (Tengirşenk, 1967, pp. 178-180). Chicherin’s pro-Armenian position endangered Turkish-Russian relations. The Soviet foreign commissar was carried away by Armenophilia to a degree even greater than that of the Entente representatives who signed the Treaty of Sèvres. Chicherin became the main exponent of claims to “Great Armenia” drawn up by the Dashnaks and Armenians in the Kremlin. These actions exasperated some authoritative Bolshevik leaders, who, unlike Chicherin, knew the Caucasus sufficiently well. Thus, when Stalin learned about an impasse with the Turks due to the territorial claims of Chicherin in favor of the Armenians, he indignantly wrote to Lenin: “Comrade Lenin, yesterday I learned that Chicherin lodged an idiotic and provocative claim to the Turks about ceding Van, Mush, and Bitlis, Turkish provinces with an overwhelming majority of Turks. This pro-Armenian imperialist decision cannot be accepted as our choice. Chicherin should be forbidden to send notes to the Turks dictated by nationalist-minded Armenians.”(RSASPH, November 12, 1920, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 388, p. 4, Note from Stalin to Lenin).
It has to be kept in mind that Chicherin kept pursuing a protectionist policy in respect to the Armenians. On September 15, 1920, he sent a letter to Soviet representatives in Turkey, Armenia, and Georgia. The letter raises the question of granting independence to Turkish Armenians as a principal aspect of Soviet-Turkish relations (FPARF, September 15, 1920, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 82987, p. 35, Letter from Chicherin to Eliava, Stark, and Legrand). On September 24 the Armenians began implementing their plans and started military operations in eastern vilayets of Turkey. On September 28 the Turkish army led by Karabekir Pasha forced the Armenians out of Sarykamysh and Merdenek. However, wary of complications, the Turkish government suddenly suspended any further advance. On September 30 the Turks fortified themselves along the Sarykamysh-Laloghlu line. This wait-and-see policy was attributable to the Turkish government’s desire to clarify the response of Soviet Russia, Georgia, and the Entente to the developments (Sürmeli, 2001, p. 571).

After Sarykamysh, the Turks liberated Ardahan and thus put Armenia in great danger. Soviet Russia kept using all means to halt the Turkish offensive. On October 19, 1920, Chicherin instructed Orjonikidze: “The continuation of the Turkish offensive is utterly undesirable. Try to dissuade them from doing it because they are provoking the Entente’s interference. It is reported that the Entente is seeking to set Georgia and Armenia against us due to the offensive on Baku. The Turks’ advance deep inside Armenia gives us cause to protect Armenians, so the landing troops are likely to be popular in the West, even among leftists.” (RSASPH, October 19, 1920, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 15, p. 5, Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze)

Despite desperate Armenian resistance, the Turks occupied Kars on October 30; hence the Armenians had to fall back to Gumru. The liberation of Kars by the Turks pushed Armenia to agree with Russia’s mediation. However, their claims were directed at returning territories lost in the course of battle diplomatically through the “friendly mediation” of Russia. On November 2 the Turkish army command suggested that Armenia conclude an armistice. Understanding that it was not possible to stop the Turkish army from attacking Gumru, the Armenians agreed to halt war operations on November 6. The Turks had already reached Gumru on that day. The armistice terms were accepted on November 8, as proposed by Armenian foreign Minister Hamo Ohanjanian (RSASPH, November 19, 1920, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, p. 4, Telegram from Legrand to Chicherin).

Concerned over the Turks entering Gumru, Orjonikidze started realizing his long-standing concept of ceding Zangezur to Armenia in order to strengthen the positions of Armenian Communists on the one hand and to break the direct land link between Turkey and Azerbaijan on the other. The triumph of Karabekir Pasha on the Turkish-Armenian front made the
Bolsheviks fear recurrence of the events of September 1918 when the Caucasus Islamic army led by Nuri Pasha Killigil entered Baku. In a telegram on November 15 addressing Lenin, Stalin noted that Baku was endangered: “The enemy would invade Elizavetpol [Ganja] at the very first attack, which would enable it to establish a bourgeois-national government of Azerbaijan based on the 1918 example and make it easier to occupy Baku.” (RSASPH, November 15, 1920, f.558, r. 1, vol. 1999, p.1, Telegram from Stalin to Lenin). In such conditions, Sergo Orjonikidze proposed to Stalin (who had arrived in Baku to discuss the critical situation in the South Caucasus) the transfer of Zangezur to Armenia, which would end Turkey’s direct access to Azerbaijan. To pretend that Bolshevik Russia had no preconceptions Orjonikidze suggested offering a Zangezur-related initiative on behalf of the leader of Sovietized Azerbaijan: Narimanov, chair of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee.

In returning from Baku, Stalin was also greatly concerned over this circumstance. Staying in Vladikavkaz on November 16, he telegraphed Lenin: Baku may be endangered from three sides. First: danger may stem from the south from Britain if Enzeli and Resht are passed to the shah’s government [that is, Britain], which now represents the only real power in Persia. Second: danger may arise from Turkey if Turkey is strengthened in Armenia and receives a common border with Azerbaijan. To prevent this danger, it is essential to use the existing situation to Sovietize Armenia, to drive an Armenian Soviet wedge between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Third: danger arises from Georgia [that is, from the Entente]. In fact the territory between Tiflis and Elizavetpol is quite defenseless against a strike from the west. At the very first attack, the enemy may take over Elizavetpol (Ganja – J.H.), where it undoubtedly will establish a bourgeois Azerbaijani government (RSASPH, November 16, 1920, f. 558, r. 1, vol. 1999, p. 3, Telegram from Stalin to Lenin).

Turkish troops with direct access to the borders of Azerbaijan strengthened Stalin’s suspicions. Having interrupted his conversation with Orjonikidze, he telephoned Lenin to report directly to him about the established situation. On November 23, in a telephone conversation with Lenin, Stalin expressed his concern: “Information obtained from Mdivani from Erivan indicates that the Armenians no longer have troops, so the Turks may occupy the whole of Armenia easily, if they desire. Kemal’s representative in Tiflis, Kazım Dirik, behaves more than suspiciously; moreover, Mdivani thinks that the occupation of Armenia has become possible due to a certain accord between the Kemalists and Georgia with the knowledge, and perhaps consent, of the Entente... As a practical step, Orjonikidze now suggests driving a wedge between Turkey and Azerbaijan.”( FPARF, November 23, 1920, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52987, p. 47, Recording of conversation of Stalin with Lenin).
To take the initiative at the talks, Soviet delegates hurried to arrive in Gumru. The Turks, who had defeated the Armenians, tried to avoid the intermediary services of Russians, while the Dashnaks, who desired to stay in power, were eager to conclude an independent treaty with the Turks. The Dashnaks’ stance was explainable by the Turks’ humanistic attitude toward the Armenian population. On November 24, 1920, Soviet representative Budu Mdivani arrived in Gumru, where he met later the same day with Karabekir Pasha, who told him that the Armenians had approved all the terms and that the government of Ankara regarded Soviet Russia’s mediation as unnecessary. Karabekir added that he had been instructed by Ankara to hold talks only with the Armenians. At the same time, apart from the Armenian-Turkish talks without Russians, Karabekir Pasha did not rule out Russian-Turkish talks as “friends striving for the same aim” without Armenians. At these talks Karabekir reiterated that Moscow had promised the Turkish command that the Soviet army in Azerbaijan would start attacking Armenia at the same time as the Turks do so. Unfortunately, this did not happen (RSASPH, November 24, 1920, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 17, p. 24, Radiogram from Legrand to Chicherin and Stalin ). The Soviet representatives tried to identify the terms on which the Turks and Armenians were planning to conclude a peace treaty. The Russians did not want to be detached onlookers as the Turks took over Armenia.

Peace talks were to start in Gumru on November 28. After a new government was formed, a peace delegation with the appropriate powers arrived in Gumru. It included Alexander Khatisian (former head of the government and MP); Abraham Gulkhandanian (former minister of finance and MP); and Stepan Korganian (deputy internal minister)(Hovannisian, 1978, pp. 380-408). Representatives of Turkey at the Gumru talks were Karabekir Pasha; Hamid bey Kapanci, the governor of Erzurum; and Suleyman Nejati bey, a member of the GNAT from Erzurum (Yılmaz, 2001, pp. 84-91). However, the fate of Armenia was sealed not only in Gumru but in Dilijan and the Gazakh uyezd of Azerbaijan as well. On instructions of the Soviet Russian leaders, Armenian Communists were urgently mobilized and sent to Gazakh and from there to Dilijan to proclaim Soviet power in the region. Two revolutionary committees were set up in Armenia later in November. One of them was formed by the Turks, composed of Armenians willing to collaborate with them; another committee was formed in Gazakh by Russians, composed of Armenian Communists. The struggle for Armenia entered into its final stage.

By the beginning of the talks Mdivani, Shahtakhtinskii, and Korkmazov had arrived in Gumru as representatives of Soviet Russia but were not allowed to attend the talks. On the opening day of the talks, November 28, Karabekir Pasha met separately with representatives of
Soviet Russia. After long talks about tsarist Russia and the Entente’s policy of dismembering Turkey and the Bolshevik revolution and the political results that it caused, Karabekir told the representatives of Soviet Russia: “The Turks, having decided to support Soviet Russia with all their forces, however, are not at all inclined to establish a Soviet system immediately in their country. This does not mean at all that Communist ideals are alien to us. The Turks are currently experiencing a period when they can successfully be pushed toward a national-revolutionary movement; furthermore, there is nothing to arouse the interest of the Turkish peasantry due to the lack of an agrarian question, while we don’t have any working army due to the lack of trade and industrial entities. Every Turk perfectly realizes that several sensitive strikes on the Entente would make the proletariat of the West take up power to establish the Soviet system there. If the Soviet system is established in Europe, it will become unnecessary to speak about the rest of the countries, for the Soviet system will be established in these countries by itself. A politically mature person cannot think differently; hence our sincerity should be unquestionable to Soviet Russia. The latter is well aware that it was the Turks who first responded to the Russian revolution and bolstered the coup in Azerbaijan in the hope that Russia would establish ties with revolutionary Turkey via Azerbaijan. However, Russia did nothing to establish any ties with Turkey.” (RSASPH, November 28, 1920, f. 85, r. c/Turkey/, vol. 31, pp. 3–4, Karabekir quoted in letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Orjonikidze).

The Bolsheviks were angry that their mediation services at the Gumru talks had been turned down, as was evident from the instructions of Soviet representative in Armenia Legrand to Mdivani on November 29. Legrand harshly criticized Mdivani for having given the initiative to the Turks (RSASPH, November 29, 1920, f. 64, r. 1, vol. 21, p. 259, Telegram from Legrand to Mdivani). On November 28 the revolutionary committee established by the Turks had announced the establishment of Soviet power in Gumru. A revolutionary committee established in Gazakh did the same a day later. Though the revolutionary committee’s declaration read “Dilijan” in order to attach legitimacy to the new power and neutralize the Turks’ resistance, Soviet power was in fact declared in Gazakh. A day later, on November 30, the revolutionary committee arrived in Dilijan (RSASPH, November 30, 1920, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 37, p. 1, Conversation of Orjonikidze and Nazaretian by direct wire).

The two revolutionary committees fiercely competed for the right to enter Erivan, to be recognized on an Armenia-wide scale, and to seize power in the country. On November 30 Narimanov as chair of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee and Huseinov as people’s commissar of foreign affairs sent a congratulatory telegram to the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia in Dilijan on instructions from Moscow, which was actually behind the creation
of this Revkom in Dilijan. The purpose of this telegram was to attach importance to the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia and facilitate its formal takeover of Erivan. As soon as a telegram from Gazakh was received, confirming the proclamation of victory of the Armenian Soviet power in Dilijan, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (CC CPA) Politburo and Orgburo met on November 30 to discuss this question. The meeting was attended by Orjonikidze, Sarkis, Stasova, Kaminskii, Narimanov, Garayev, Huseinov, and others, who made the following decision: no borders would henceforth exist between Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Armenia. It was reported that Zangezur and Nakhchivan had become part of Armenia (APDPARA, November 30, 1920, f. 1, r. 1, vol. 24, pp. 51–52, Minutes of the meeting of Politburo and Orgburo, CC CPA (B)).

At a solemn meeting of the Baku Council on December 1 Narimanov as chair of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee made an extensive report regarding the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia. The council announced: “In an attempt to assist the fraternal Armenian working people in struggling against the power of the Dashnaks who shed and are shedding innocent blood of our best Communist comrades within the bounds of Armenia and Zangezur, Soviet Azerbaijan declares that from now on no territorial questions may be a reason for mutual bloodshed of the two neighboring peoples — Armenians and Muslims; the territory of Zangezur and Nakhchivan uyezds is an integral part of Soviet Armenia.” (Kommunist, December 2, 1920). While at Gumru Shahtakhtinskii testified that this unexpected step of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee caused deep regret on the part of Armenia’s victor, Karabekir Pasha. In a conversation with Shahtakhtinskii in those days he said: “For tactical reasons the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee should not have hurried to settle this matter, at least until the end of the conference, for this act is ascribed to Russia’s influence.” (RSASPH, November, 1920, f. 85, r. c/Turkey, vol. 31, pp. 1–2, Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Orjonikidze).

In the early days of December the Dilijan-based revolutionary committee was not planning to move toward Erivan until the results of the Gumru peace talks were declared. Despite the breakdown of Armenian governmental structures, the Revolutionary Committee, though formal, preferred to restrain itself to waiting tactics. Being in possession of certain armed forces, Dro considered it appropriate for the revolutionary committee to appear in Erivan on December 3, because the Gumru peace treaty was likely to be signed on December 2. Before the terms of the treaty were announced, Legrand hurried to declare recognition of Soviet Armenia on behalf of Soviet Russia. The territory of Armenia recognized by Russia included the Erivan province, a part of the Gazakh province (as specified by a treaty of August
10), and a part of the Tiflis province that Armenia had seized before the Turkish assault. On December 2, 1920, Orjonikidze reported to Lenin and Stalin that Soviet power had already been proclaimed in Erivan, that the old government had been abandoned, and that all power had been transferred to a Dro-led military command until the arrival of the revolutionary committee. The army was commanded to take the side of the revolutionary committee that had stayed in Dilijan and was expected to arrive in Erivan the next day. The revolutionary committee had already received congratulations from Karabekir Pasha and was on its way to Erivan. “A comrade who arrived from Alexandropol today reports that the Kemalist troops have extremely friendly feelings for us; the troops wear red badges and consider themselves Red Army soldiers. Yet yesterday Azerbaijan declared the transfer of Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Mountainous Karabagh to Soviet Armenia.” (RSASPH, December 2, 1920, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 33, p. 20, Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin and Stalin). Stalin published that exact statement, falsified by Orjonikidze, in the newspaper Pravda. The same issue of Pravda contained a long article by Stalin about the victory of Soviet power in Armenia (Pravda, December 4, 1920).

A peace treaty between Armenia and Turkey was signed in Gumru on December 2, 1920. To avoid misunderstanding, on the same day Karabekir Pasha asked Mdivani that Russian military units located nearby in Nakhchivan not cross a frontline between St. Arax (where Turkish units were deployed) and Mount Alagez before the treaty was concluded (RSASPH, December 3, 1920, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 50, p. 1, Telegram from Mdivani). Thus the Turks signed the Treaty of Alexandropol in a quiet atmosphere. Despite numerous disputes over territorial questions, the Turks did not give up their initial demands. Thus Armenia officially recognized the transfer of the Kars region, the Artvin district, and the Surmali uyezd of the former Erivan province to Turkey (National Archives and Records Administration USA, (hereafter referred to as NARA), January 1952, NARA, CIA-RDP 79, p. 8, The Boundary between Turkey and the USSR, CIA/RR M-17, Secret). The greatest diplomatic and political success of Turkey pertaining to the Treaty of Alexandropol was that the government of Armenia openly annulled the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres (Yılmaz, 2001, p. 111). The signing of the Treaty of Alexandropol marked the beginning of the process of international revision of the Treaty of Sèvres that culminated in a victory of Turkish diplomacy at the Lausanne Conference.

In the early days of December the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia was still not fully aware of processes occurring around Armenia; nevertheless, it submitted instructions regarding the Turkish question to the CC RCP Politburo. Having discussed the instructions, the Politburo approved them on December 4 (Politbiuro TsK
Even before this instruction, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on December 6 forwarded to the CC RCP (B) its suggestions regarding certain aspects of a treaty to be concluded with Turkey. These suggestions reflected questions of recognition of the independence of Armenia and Georgia, historical-ethnographic terms of determination of borders with Turkey, Russia’s careful handling of the Entente, the desire to keep Batum a part of Georgia, and other issues (FPARF, December 6, 1920, f. 04, r. 39, f. 232, vol. 53001, p. 9, Letter from PCFA to CC RCP (B)). On the same day the Russian People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs received from the Turkish Foreign Ministry a letter clarifying Turkey’s stance concerning Georgia. Ahmet Mukhtar bey reported to Chicherin that the Georgian government had expressed its desire to commence talks with Turkey to specify interrelations within the boundaries set up by the Treaty of Moscow of May 7, 1920. Ahmet Mukhtar asked Soviet Russia to express its opinion regarding this question as well as to send the text of the treaty of May 7 to Ankara (FPARF, December 6, 1920, f. 04, r. 39, f. 232, vol. 52987, p. 62, Letter from Ahmet Mukhtar bey to Chicherin). The Turks had approached Moscow with such a request via Mdivani on November 22. However, this request did not get to Moscow (FPARF, December 14, 1920, f. 04, r. 39, f. 232, vol. 52987, p. 64, Letter from Chicherin to Eliava).

The Sovietization of Armenia in November 1920 favored the transition of Russian-Turkish relations toward a legal framework and preparation of bases for interrelations between these two countries. As noted, the Turkish side wanted the talks with Soviet Russia to be held in Baku; however, Chicherin, on various pretexts, insisted on holding the Russian-Turkish conference in Moscow. So Turkey had to agree. In a telegram to Turkish foreign minister
Ahmet Mukhtar, Chicherin wrote: “The conference that will be attended by representatives of Turkey, Armenia, Russia, and Azerbaijan is extremely important for the Soviet government, for it may establish a mutual friendship and understanding among countries participating in it. Regarding this conference as a matter of paramount importance, the Soviet government has appointed me to lead a delegation of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to attend the conference. In such a situation, conducting talks in Baku would have required all of the leaders of our foreign policy to miss work, which seems quite impossible. For this reason the Soviet government suggests holding a conference in Moscow instead of Baku.” (FPARF, December 1920, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 12, Telegram from Chicherin to Ahmet Mukhtar bey).

On December 31, 1920, as the Turks agreed to arrive in Moscow, Chicherin instructed Eliava to invite the delegations of Azerbaijan and Armenia on behalf of Soviet Russia to attend the forthcoming conference (FPARF, December 31, 1920, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 75, Instruction from Chicherin to Eliava). It should be noted that Armenia (like Chicherin) was also against holding the conference in Baku. The Armenians wanted the conference to take place in Moscow. In mid-January 1921 Kazim Karabekir Pasha on behalf of the Ankara government told the RSFSR’s plenipotentiary representative to the Turkish government, Budu Mdivani, that Turkish representatives were prepared to leave immediately to conclude a political treaty and military alliance with Soviet Russia in accordance with a ciphered telegram from Lenin and Stalin (FPARF, January 14, 1921, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 18, Telegram from Karabekir Pasha to Mdivani). Later the same day Mdivani sent a return telegram to Karabekir Pasha, confirming that he had received a directive signed by Lenin and Stalin: “It is possible to conclude a political and even a military treaty between Turkey and Russia.” (RSASPH, January 14, 1921, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 526, p. 5, Telegram from Mdivani to Karabekir Pasha).

The Turkish delegation left Ankara in mid-December 1920 and reached Kars on January 7, 1921. A week later the members of the delegation took a train. On their trip to the Russian capital, they stayed ten days in Tiflis and then reached Baku on January 29 (Sürmeli, 2001, p. 615). On the day of the delegation’s arrival Nariman Narimanov as chair of the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan and Sergo Orjonikidze as a member of the Military Revolutionary Council of the 11th Army received the Turkish delegation (RSASPH, January 29, 1921, f. 85, r. c/ (Turkey), vol. 27, pp. 4–7, Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin). Orjonikidze tried to send the delegation to Moscow as soon as possible, but the Turks managed to stay several days in Baku to exchange views with the government of Azerbaijan.
on a number of questions. Narimanov gave some recommendations to the guests. He warned that Chicherin, who was continuously making mistakes in the Eastern policy, would cause problems for the Turkish delegation, so it was extremely important to meet Lenin personally. In case that was not possible, Narimanov recommended asking Stalin for help (Azer, 2011: 298). After unsuccessfully attempting to sound out the Azerbaijanis’ opinion, the Turkish delegation left for Moscow on February 6, 1921. Making use of this opportunity, Narimanov sent a letter to Lenin through Shahtakhtinskii containing his conclusions on the talks with the Turks (Adıgüzel, 2006: 103-107). Delegates of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia reached the capital of Russia only on February 18. Yet in December 1920 Chicherin instructed Orjonikidze to send the Turkish delegation from Baku to Moscow by a special fast train (RSASPH, December 1920, f. 85, r. 14, vol. 49, p. 24, Correspondence of Chicherin with Orjonikidze).

On February 19 the Turkish delegation was received by Chicherin and Karakhan. On the same evening, Ali Fuat Pasha handed over his credentials to Chicherin. The talks were continued on February 21, but the Soviet side held firm to its previous stance: demands regarding Van, Bitlis, and Batum put forward by Chicherin in talks with Bekir Sami bey on August 27, 1920, were repeated. Further talks promised nothing good. Chicherin’s attitude toward the Turks caused no positive sentiments. The Turks apparently felt that Chicherin did not want to talk with them because he had started being inclined towards the West. Following the first preliminary working meeting with the Turkish delegation, Chicherin sent an extensive report to Lenin. Apart from other questions, he noted: “I knew nothing of what you and comrade Stalin had sent in a ciphered telegram to comrade Mdivani. I am still unaware of the exact content of this ciphered message; however, based on it, comrade Mdivani on behalf of our government, as you can see from this written correspondence, officially proposed a political and military alliance with the Turks.” Chicherin reminded Lenin that “we always carefully avoided using the word “alliance” in our talks with the Turks because an alliance with the Turks is incompatible with an alleged agreement with England. The treaty that we drafted jointly with Bekir Sami last year and that remained unsigned due to certain unidentified particularities was called a treaty of friendship and brotherhood; nevertheless, at the time we refrained from introducing the word “alliance.” Incidentally, comrade Mdivani, in response to your ciphered message, suggested concluding not simply an alliance but a political and military alliance. The Turks caught onto this idea, and the mandate of the delegation prescribes that Turkey hold talks with us over the conclusion of a political and military alliance.... At present, it is quite unclear to me to what extent we can yield to the Turks in this case.” (RSASPH, February 22, 1921, f. 2, r. 2, vol. 526, pp. 1–2, Letter from Chicherin to Lenin).
To pressure Chicherin, on February 22, the Turks met with Stalin: this meeting made them definitely hope that the talks would go on. Stalin stressed that Soviet Russia might cede Artvin and Ardahan to the Turks (RSASPH, March 6, 1921, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 824, p. 7, Letter from Stalin to Chicherin). It was Orjonikidze who proposed to Moscow to involve Stalin in the talks. When the Turkish delegation was still on its way to Moscow, Orjonikidze had sent the following ciphered telegram to Moscow: “Stalin’s participation in the talks with the Turks is quite necessary: Chicherin is distrusted; Karakhan is hated.” (RSASPH, February 12, 1921, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1247, p. 3, Answer from Orjonikidze to encoded telegram from Stalin). After the meeting with Stalin the talks were restarted; however, Chicherin’s provocative demands forced the Turks to interrupt the talks again. They suspected that all this was a result of Karakhan’s influence (State Archive of the Azerbaijan Republic (hereafter referred to as SAAR), January 4, 1922, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, p. 4, Conversation of Mikhail Frunze and Ibrahim Abilov with Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Yusuf Kemal bey). The initial important success of the Turkish delegation was that it became possible to dismiss Karakhan (deputy people’s commissar of foreign affairs of Soviet Russia) before the talks officially began. In addition the Turkish delegation advanced the argument that it was authorized to hold talks only with Soviet Russia, so the Turks protested the participation of the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus in the Moscow conference. Soviet Russia was forced to agree with this (FPARF, March 12, 1921, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 12, p. 52, Meeting of the Political Commission of the Moscow Conference).

The Moscow conference that began on February 26 was headed by Georgii Chicherin and Jelaleddin Korkmazov on behalf of the Soviets and Yusuf Kemal bey, Dr. Rıza Nur, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy on behalf of Turkey. Chicherin chaired the first meeting of the conference. In his opening address he noted that the Moscow conference would play an important role in the history of the East and would strengthen the friendship between Russia and Turkey (FPARF, February 26, 1921, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 12, pp. 26–30, Russian-Turkish conference in Moscow, plenary session ). Chicherin was followed by the head of the Turkish delegation, Yusuf Kemal bey. He thanked Chicherin for his praise of Turkish soldiers and all of the Turkish people struggling for the independence of their country. Yusuf Kemal bey assured the delegates that the Turkish people would never be reconciled with the burden of the Treaty of Sèvres articles and would fight world imperialism jointly with the Russian people, saying that the Turks stretched out their hands toward the Russian people with a wish for victory and open hearts (APDPARA, February 26, 1921, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 2, Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to Huseinov). A day before the Moscow conference began, on February 25, Soviet Russia
managed to Sovietize the third South Caucasus republic: Georgia. This action caused a new geopolitical situation in the region and strengthened Soviet Russia’s positions at the Moscow conference.

Despite solemn assurances at the opening of the conference, discussions in the commissions were far from smooth. The Turks suggested the concept of a National Pact that included notions such as recognition of Batum, Kars, and Ardahan as Turkish territory, conducting a plebiscite in these places, and keeping the Treaty of Alexandropol in force. To substantiate their stance, the Turks prepared statistical material about the ethnic and confessional composition of the population of this region since 1831 (National Archives and Records Administration USA, (hereafter referred to as NARA), RG 59, Box 4010, NND 7600050, Doc. 761.67/3–446, Short Synopsis of the Region of Kars and Ardahan). Even the Moscow-based RSFSR People’s Commissariat for the Affairs of Nationalities journal, Zhizn’ Natsional’n’nostei (Life of Nationalities), noted at the time that Armenia’s claims to Kars and Ardahan were a manifestation of imperialist policy, primarily because 67 percent of the population of these regions was Muslim (Zhizn’ Natsional’n’nostei, March 4, 1921). This question was discussed at a six-hour meeting of the political commission on February 28. Having submitted a voluminous report on this meeting to Stalin, Chicherin reported that the talks with the Turks were difficult: “Their demands are unbelievable in all respects; moreover, they demand that the government give an answer within three days and threaten that otherwise they will leave the conference. First of all, we have discovered that their “National Pact,” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi, 2004, pp. 185-187). 1 which is like a charter, was adopted in Constantinople before the parliament was dissolved and thus is considered something sacred, untouchable, to them. The pact’s second article reads that Turkey agrees once again to conduct a plebiscite in the sanjaks of Batum, Ardahan, and Kars that already had decided to join the homeland in 1917.” (RSASPH, February 28, 1921, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 16, Letter from Chicherin to Stalin). Having analyzed the National Pact, Russian experts submitted to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs a reference noting that Batum, Kars, and Ardahan allegedly were not included in the National Pact and that Russia had not ever, anywhere, recognized these sanjaks as Turkish territory (FPARF, March 2, 1921, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 52997, p. 17, Russian expert review by Chicherin on the National Pact). During the talks Chicherin asked Stalin to familiarize the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (PCFA) beforehand with the content of a statement that he was going to make at a meeting with Turkish delegates.

1 The “National Pact” (Misak-i Milli), including the main decisions of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, prepared by Mustafa Kemal Pasha on January 28, 1920, in Istanbul, was accepted by the Ottoman Parliament and was announced worldwide on February 17.
on the occasion of Soviet Russia’s potential compromises. In a response to this request of March 6 Stalin wrote:

1. The majority of the Batum district will remain part of the RSFSR; Artvin and Ardenuch will join Turkey; a new border between the RSFSR and Turkey is to be drawn approximately on the line from Liman to Borchkha to the Chorokh River to the Imerkhevi River and eastward up to the Kars district border.

2. Military leaders do not agree to cede Ardahan to Turkey, viewing it as a key to Tiflis; nevertheless, I will try to persuade them to make a concession so that the border between the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) and Turkey will pass approximately along the line of the previous border between the Kars district and the Tiflis province.

3. The Turks will withdraw from Alexandropol; a strip approximately twenty versts deep along the whole railway Alexandropol-Kamarli (west of this line) will be a part of the RSFSR.

4. As for the Nakhchivan question, it is up to the representative of Azerbaijan to say his last word.

Stalin noted that the borderline he offered in points 1 and 2 was only approximate and that the exact borderline was to be defined by an appropriate commission (RSASPH, March 6, 1921, f. 558, r. 11, vol. 824, p. 8, Letter from Stalin to Chicherin).

In a letter to Stalin on March 10 Chicherin detailed some aspects of talks with the Turks, particularly their desire to reflect the issue of passing the promised weapons and gold to Turkey in the treaty in a written form. In the Turks’ explanation, they had prescribed not oral talks but written documents in the mandates. Chicherin wrote: “They did not mention this earlier and, in recalling all the talks with them, I am convinced that they invented this only now.” As for the financing and gold, he reported to Stalin: “The sum of 150,000,000 gold rubles is undoubtedly a demand of the eastern people. Last year Bekir Sami insisted on 8,000,000 rubles. The Central Committee agreed to assign 5,000,000 gold rubles, of which the Turks have already received 3,000,000 rubles. Thus they had to receive 2,000,000 rubles. Yet...naturally, this is a tiny assistance to their budget. Given that we can give them very few weapons, they insist on being given a larger sum in gold to be able to buy weapons. In fact this clause plays a huge role, for rapprochement with us gives the Turks very little real assistance if we don’t help them in such a considerable way. If we don’t help them, they
actually may consider themselves forced to change their policy. Thus this clause deserves particularly serious attention.” (FPARF, March 10, 1921, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 31, Letter from Chicherin to Stalin). In a letter to Lenin on March 10 Chicherin reported that the draft treaty had already been agreed upon in all districts and recommended signing it as soon as possible. Specifically, he mentioned the names of justice commissar Dmitrii Kurskii and Andrei Lezhava, who were expected to give references immediately (FPARF, March 10, 1921, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, pp. 29–30, Letter from Chicherin to Lenin). The text of a treaty submitted to the Justice Commissariat the next day was returned to the PCFA with one minor correction (FPARF, March 11, 1921, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 37, Letter from Kurskii to Chicherin).

On the evening of March 10 a political commission of the Russian-Turkish conference began work. Chairing this meeting was the head of the Turkish delegation, Yusuf Kemal bey. The discussions started with border questions. The other disputed issue at the political commission’s meeting was the discussion of the Nakhchivan question. The Turkish delegates said: “Because the population called for Turkish troops, Nakhchivan is under the protectorate of Turkey. Nevertheless, it is ready to yield this protectorate to Azerbaijan if the latter promises not to yield this protectorate to a third state. Turkish troops would have found it difficult to remain impartial if the local population was beaten again, as once before.” But the Russian side simply suggested putting Nakhchivan’s autonomy under the protectorate of Azerbaijan. If this clause of the treaty was violated, the whole treaty would be considered violated. Aside from this, the Russian side rejected a formula in which Turkey was to concede its right to a protectorate because the Alexandropol Treaty had not yet been ratified, while the population’s calling for Turkish troops could in no way be regarded as legal grounds for such a protectorate. Finally, it seemed difficult to amend the treaty with a commitment from Azerbaijan, because this state was not represented at the talks. Thus the Russian delegation suggested finding a formula stipulating that the Nakhchivan region would be permanently linked with Azerbaijan and enjoy autonomy under the latter’s protectorate. However, the Turks insisted on editing the second part of this formula: “on the condition that Azerbaijan will not yield this protectorate to any third state.” The minutes of this meeting contain no indications that the Soviet delegation objected to this, so everyone apparently agreed. As for the borders of Nakhchivan itself, it was the responsibility of military experts to demarcate them (Kireev, 2007, p. 140; Sürmeli, 2001, pp. 604-703).

On March 15 Chicherin informed Stalin of the course of the talks. However, this information concerned behind-the-scene talks rather than discussions within the political
commission. The Turkish delegates tried to get Russia’s written assurance that it would provide financial and military aid to Turkey. Russian diplomats answered that their government was busy with preparations for a Party congress and thus tried not to make written commitments. Chicherin directly told the Turks that “the government will not do this.” As for the treaty itself, Chicherin reported to Stalin that “not much work remains to be done. The stumbling block is the question of aid and a written commitment.” (FPARF, March 15, 1921, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53001, p. 38, Letter from Chicherin to Stalin).

The Soviet-Turkish treaty that went down in history as the treaty of March 16 was not truly signed until March 18. On the eve of its signing (March 17), Chicherin wrote to Lenin: “When I told the Turks during the last meeting that we are giving a certain quantity of weapons and 10 million gold rubles (half now after the Turks withdraw from Batum and the rest later) they said nothing. However, they returned to this question today. They noted that this was too little and demanded a written commitment immediately. Following long debates, they finally declared that they were ready to sign the treaty on the following terms.

1. I must give a promise that we will give them 10 million rubles annually for several years;

2. They agree to avoid a written commitment regarding weapons but insist on a written commitment that they will be given 10 million rubles annually for several years and propose writing that this is needed for the economic restoration of the country so that this will not be a hostile act against England, which itself is giving them a loan. This money is needed to buy weapons because we are giving too little, but they need the weapons to be safeguarded against the Entente.

3. All is ready to be signed. We will sign the treaty tomorrow evening, but before signing it they should receive this paper from me....

According to them, an annual subsidy of 10 million rubles will calm down the Majlis and make opponents keep silent. I am determined to give them such a subsidy. The Soviet republics will thus painlessly take over Batum. The treaty itself will be impressive. And the diplomatic position of the Soviet republics is excellent. France especially is flattering them, and the annual subsidies are a matter of the future. Nothing is steady nowadays. I need an answer before 6 in the evening to have enough time to write the paper, so sign it without delay. The treaty will be dated March 16, when we did not know yet that Krassin had signed a treaty with England.” (FPARF, March 17, 192, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232, vol. 53004, p. 44, Information from Chicherin to Lenin)
On March 18 signed a treaty consisting of sixteen articles and two appendixes. This treaty of “Friendship and Brotherhood” was signed by Georgii Chicherin and Jelaleddin Korkmazov on behalf of Soviet Russia and Yusuf Kemal bey, Dr. Riza Nur, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy on behalf of Turkey. The treaty covered a wide circle of interrelations between Russia and Turkey. It reflected the notes exchanged on March 16; the territories provided by the National Pact recognized in Istanbul on January 28, 1920, by the Ottoman House of Representatives under the title “Turkey,” published in the media, and submitted to the superpowers for consideration; providing assistance to the struggle of nations of the East; providing an opening of the straits; development of the international status of the Black Sea in a way not damaging to Turkey’s sovereignty, including Istanbul’s security; cancellation of treaties between Tsarist Russia and Turkey for not serving national interests as well as annulment of financial payments imposed on Turkey; incompatibility of the regime of capitulations and free national development in Turkey; and agreement not to let organizations or groups vying for the role of being a government of the other side to be formed or to remain within its territory.

Russia and Turkey made the same commitment regarding the Soviet republics of the Caucasus on the condition of reciprocity; nonstop operation of the railway, telegraph, and other means of communication as well as the provision of free traffic of people and goods; stipulation that rules will be established and applied in every country concerning the entry/exit of people and goods; and an agreement to favor citizens of both sides to the treaty who reside in the territory of the other side as much as possible. All residents of territories that constituted a part of Russia prior to 1918 and now were recognized by the RSFSR government as being under Turkey’s sovereignty had the right to leave Turkey freely with their things and property. Russia made a commitment to deliver Turkish prisoners of war to the Turkish borders within three to six months at its own expense. Also, the treaty included articles on a future conclusion of a consular convention and an agreement regulating all economic, financial, and other questions. Regarding the South Caucasus republics, Russia would take the steps necessary to be recognized by these republics in the treaties that they would conclude with Turkey as well as this treaty’s articles directly concerning them (RSASPH, March 16, 1921, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, pp. 77–80, Agreement between Russia and Turkey).2

The most significant parts of the treaty — the questions of Batum and Nakhchivan — are reflected in article 2 and article 3. In article 2 Turkey agreed to cede sovereignty over the port and town of Batum to Georgia on the condition that the population of localities indicated in

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2 For the Turkish text of the Moscow Agreement, see Soysal, 1945:32-38. For the English text of the Moscow Agreement, see the “Treaty of Friendship between Russia and Turkey Signed at Moscow, 16 March 1921,” in British and Foreign State Papers, 1923, Part 2, vol. 118, His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1926, 990–96.
the treaty would have broad local administrative autonomy so that each commune could enjoy its cultural and religious rights. At the same time, Turkey was authorized freely to transfer goods tax and duty-free via the port of Batum, without delay (RSASPH, March 16, 1921, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 77, Agreement between Russia and Turkey). Appendixes 1(A) and 1(B) described Turkey’s northeastern borders with the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus, including Batum (RSASPH, March 16, 1921, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, pp. 80–81, Appendixes 1(A) and 1(B) to Agreement between Russia and Turkey).

Article 3 and appendix 1(B) concern the Nakhchivan question: “Both sides to the treaty agree that the Nakhchivan region within the boundaries indicated in appendix 1(B) to this treaty will form an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan on the condition that Azerbaijan will not yield its protectorate to any third state. Within the triangle of the Nakhchivan territory, the area stretching between a thalweg [line connecting the lowest points of a valley] of the Arax River, the line from Mount Dahna (3,829) to Veli Dagh (4,121) to Bagyrsag (6,587) to Komurlu Dagh (6,930), the borderline of said territory starting from Komurlu Dagh (6,930), crossing the mountain of Sari Bulak (8071) to Ararat Station, and ending at a crossing of the Kara-Su River and Arax River will be corrected by a commission consisting of delegates from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.”(RSASPH, March 16, 1921, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 77, Agreement between Russia and Turkey). Appendix 1(C), entitled “Territory of Nakhchivan,” read: “Station Mountain Ararat, Saray-Bulak (8071) to Komurlu Dagh (6,839), (6,930)–(3080) to Sayat Dagh (7,868) to the village of Kurt-Gulag to Hamesur Dagh–height 8022 to Kuki Dagh and the eastern administrative border of the former Nakhchivan province.”(RSASPH, March 16, 1921, f. 159, r. 2, vol. 57, p. 81, Appendixes to the Agreement between Russia and Turkey). Thus the Treaty of Moscow for the first time ever fully clarified the question of Nakhchivan’s status as a protectorate of Azerbaijan and territorial integrity. The signing of the Treaty of Moscow resulted in the legal formalization of the return of territories that had been linked to Russia as a consequence of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–78 to Turkey.

Having ended affairs in Moscow and taken the 4 million gold rubles assigned by the Soviet government, the Turkish delegation left for Baku on April 1. On their way home the Turks planned to conclude one more treaty in Azerbaijan in order to give its independence a practical character. However, Soviet Russia concentrated both political and economic ties with Turkey in its hands in an effort to centralize all the aid that it was providing. Moscow was particularly displeased that Azerbaijan, inspired by the Treaty of Moscow, had opened a separate oil route to Turkey and viewed this as “tyranny.” To prevent actions of such sort, on
April 1 (the day the Turks left Moscow) the PCFA sent the CC RCP instructions to prevent independent actions by the Caucasus republics in their relations with Turkey. This document was based on Chicherin’s letter to the CC RCP on March 24, while the Turkish delegation was still in Moscow. Chicherin had written that the Turks wanted to conclude a treaty with the Caucasus republics in Tiflis in an effort to “snatch” something from them (RSASPH, March 24, 1921, f. 2, r. 1, vol. 7789, pp. 1–2, Letter from Chicherin to the CC RCP (B)). On April 3 the CC RCP (B) Politburo discussed the notification of the PCFA, approved Chicherin’s proposal, and banned the Soviet republics of the South Caucasus, primarily Azerbaijan, from taking independent steps in relation to Turkey (RSASPH, April 3, 1921, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 145, p. 1, Extract from minutes no. 8 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B); Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b): Povestka dnia zasedanii, 93).

Despite the signing of the Treaty of Moscow, Chicherin, a former Tsarist diplomat who had long worked in Europe, could in no way give up the policy of partition of Turkey. Russian historian Petr Moiseev writes that Moscow was masterminding a fantastic adventure against Turkey (Moiseev, 2003, p. 122). A month after the treaty with Turkey was signed, on April 22, 1921, the people’s commissar of foreign affairs of Soviet Russia proposed to the Central Committee of the RCP (B) to promise Petr Wrangel’s followers political amnesty and an obstacle-free return home, in order to use them to seize Istanbul, which should then be transferred to the control not of the Kemalists but of organized, armed left-wing working elements led by Russia (Kazandzhian, 1996, pp. 12-13). In fact such proposals were a continuation of the secret treaty signed by Russia, England, and France in March–April 1915, which envisioned the transfer of Istanbul and the Straits to Russia (Iurii Kliuchnikov and Andrei Sabanin. Mezhdunarodnaia politika noveishego vremeni v dogovorakh, notakh i deklaratsiiakh. Vol. 2. Moscow: Litizdat NIKD, 1926, pp. 25–27, 53–54).³

Finally, on July 20, 1921, the Central Executive Committee of the Russian Federation ratified the Treaty of Moscow. A week later the Grand National Assembly of Turkey also ratified this treaty with two hundred one votes in favor, five votes against, and one abstention (RSASPH, July 27, 1921, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2203,p.117, Telegram from Natsarenus to Chicherin). An exchange of the ratification documents took place in Kars on September 22 of the same year. Thus a “Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood” of March 16, 1921, between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey entered into force of law. The Treaty of Moscow marked a great success of the Eastern policy of Turkey. Recognition of the Turkish borders by a superpower

³ For additional information about the secret agreement on the Russian transfer of Istanbul and the Straits in 1915, see Division of Iran and European Turkey, from brochures by S. Koska, “Secret Contracts and Agreements of 1918,” SAAR, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, pp. 69–70.
such as Russia within the framework of the National Pact was an internationally important event that laid the foundation for long-term relations in the region.

After the Moscow Treaty, Azerbaijan began displaying serious interest in expanding relations with Turkey as well as paying increased attention to the political processes and military operations in Anatolia. With these factors in mind, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan decided to choose a candidate for plenipotentiary representative, who was to be sent to Ankara in May 1921. The Russian People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was asked to affirm this candidature. Narimanov and Huseinov recommended Ibrahim Abilov — the deputy people’s commissar of foreign affairs of Soviet Azerbaijan — as the ambassador. In his telegram on May 26, 1921, Chicherin told Huseinov that Moscow did not object to Abilov as the plenipotentiary representative of the Azerbaijan SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) to Ankara (APDPARA, May 26, 1921, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 96, p. 43, Telegram from Chicherin to Mirza Davud Huseinov). Abilov was appointed to this post in June 1921, which was announced in the media. It was universally believed that Abilov would be able to help develop relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey as well as help expand links between Soviet Russia and the GNAT government in fighting the Entente. Aside from this, Abilov would coordinate his actions with the RSFSR plenipotentiary representative to Turkey, Sergei Natsarenus, who had been performing his duties since early May (RSASPH, from November 1920 to November 1921, f. 5, r. 3, vol. 630, p. 51, Principal points in the political life of Turkey). In August 1921 Abilov left for Turkey.

On his way he paused for several days in Tiflis to solve certain technical and financial questions. In his letter Abilov also told Huseinov about a meeting on August 25, 1921, with Aleksandr Svanidze, people’s commissar of foreign affairs of Georgia, and noted that Tiflis was displeased with some clauses of the Treaty of Moscow. Svanidze warned Abilov that Georgia was going to take a series of steps at an upcoming conference with Turkey and the Caucasus republics. The Georgians disagreed with some clauses of the Treaty of Moscow that specified the Turkish-Georgian border and planned to raise this issue again in Kars. Abilov told Svanidze that the question of the border with Georgia had been discussed at length at the Moscow conference, so it would not be appropriate to raise it again at the forthcoming conference, reasonably noting: “It is evident from the Turks’ sentiments and hints that they won’t make any compromises or concessions now.” Abilov claimed that “raising these questions at the conference would cause undesirable precedents for our reality.” (APDPARA, August 26, 1921, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 81, pp. 9–10, Letter from Ibrahim Abilov to Mirza Davud Huseinov).
Abilov recommended that Huseinov discuss these and similar urgent questions with Georgian comrades before the conference. Svanidze intended to protest against a Treaty of Moscow clause giving national and religious rights to the Muslim population of Batum. He was going to demand expansion of the borders of Batum and giving Ardahan and Artvin back to Georgia and had already appealed to Chicherin in May 1921 (Azer, 2011, p. 303). Svanidze wrote that Georgians “want to demand that Turkey give the whole southern part of the Batum region that has been given to Turkey according to the Treaty of Moscow back to Georgia.” Chicherin immediately warned Molotov and the CC RCP that the Turks would never agree to Georgia’s demands and that Moscow as a great hardship had agreed with part of Batum being annexed to Georgia (RSASP, May 29, 1921, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 91, Letter from Chicherin to Molotov).

The Turks were also notified that the Georgians and Armenians were openly and secretly displeased with the Treaty of Moscow. As they suspected, the source of this displeasure was Soviet Russia. Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin representatives elected as GNAT deputies tried to explain the situation to the population and recommended treating changes in Russia with caution. Many Turks openly noted that they were most threatened by communism from the eastern borders. They regarded the eastern provinces as a buffer between the Turks and the Bolsheviks (APDPARA, May 29, 1921, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, p. 102, Report from Mahammadov to Mirza Davud Huseinov on “Government Policy of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Leaders of This Policy). Especially in a period of aggravation of the situation on the Greek front, a secret appearance of Enver Pasha as the head of a small group in Batum in August 1921 caused serious questions within the leading circles of the Kemalists. Enver Pasha has secretly arrived in Batum. Even Orjonikidze was unaware of Enver Pasha’s arrival in Batum and voiced his surprise at such “close links” between Moscow and Enver Pasha in his enciphered telegram to Stalin. Orjonikidze asked to what extent the arrival of Enver and Khalil was appropriate during a time when the deadly war against the Greeks was being fought and the destiny of the Kemalists was at stake (APDPARA, May 29, 1921, f. 85, r. c /Turkey, vol. 4, p. 1, Cryptogram from Orjonikidze to Stalin).

Orjonikidze admitted the political significance of Enver Pasha for the Soviets in his telegram to Lenin, Stalin, and Chicherin but claimed that Enver Pasha’s current arrival in Batum would make a collision with the Turks inevitable: “The people from Anatolia came to visit Enver some days ago and, as he confesses, asked him: as you go this way Russia backs you, but does it mean the Communists will act as lords in our country? We will back you, but we will fight Communists mercilessly.” Enver replied: “I do not know and this is not
important; the only important thing is how this will end. I do not interfere with this story for it is too late (I’m afraid, they’ve already been aware of his stay in Batum). They are supposed to hold a conference some days later. There we have a man who will inform us.” Budu Mdivani “believes that this should not have been done now and that Enver should have been recalled.” (RSASPH, August 26, 1921, p.1).

The joint arrival of Enver Pasha with Grigorii Zinov’ev in Baku in September 1920 to attend the 1st Congress of the Peoples of the East stirred up anti-Soviet sentiments among the local population. Visiting Baku at that time, the Italian representative Bodrero noted: “His arrival in Baku caused extraordinary ecstasy in the Muslim population of Azerbaijan. He was heartily welcomed everywhere; locals kissed his hand. The state reception in his honor cannot be explained by his being converted to communism. That was due to inexhaustible hatred between Azerbaijanis and Armenians.”(Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, Le Centre d’Études des Mondes Russe, Caucasien et Centre-Européen (CERCEC), September 18, 1920, Archives d’Ali Mardan-bey Toptchibachi, Le Centre d’Études des Mondes Russe, Caucasien et Centre-Européen (CERCEC), l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), carton no. 1,11). In his memoirs Aziz Alpoud describes the arrival of Enver pasha in Baku: “A few in Azerbaijan did not know who Enver pasha was — a hero of the battle for Edirne and Sarykamysh. Azerbaijanis treated him lovingly. It was no mere coincidence that many boys born in Baku and other towns and regions of the country were named after Enver Pasha. Azerbaijanis were happy to congratulate one another on this event. Emotional upheaval unrecognizably changed people. All of them forgot about their misfortunes and hoped that the freedom would remain in their country after Enver Pasha’s arrival. The staple subjects of the talk in the town’s streets and markets, blacksmith shops, and ploughed fields were his life and feats.” (Alpoud, 2011, pp.186-187).

In the meanwhile Memduh Şevket Esendal, a diplomatic representative of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, attempted to attend the 1st Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku. With that end in view, he and a military attaché, Omer Lutfi, left Ankara on August 15. However, they reached Baku after the congress had already ended. Mustafa Kemal Pasha attached great importance to the opening of a diplomatic mission in the country. In his telegram to Karabekir Pasha he pointed out that the opening of Soviet Azerbaijan’s Embassy in Ankara would mark the transformation of the Baku diplomatic mission into a plenipotentiary Turkish Embassy in Azerbaijan (Şimşir, 1996, p. 76).

As head of the first diplomatic mission of Turkey, Esendal was authorized to act not only in Azerbaijan but in the entire Caucasus as well. According to written instructions composed
of nine clauses, Esendal was entrusted to gather and send to Ankara information about the government of Azerbaijan, the principles of its functioning, its staff, their political views, and so forth. He was also instructed to gather information about the political, economic, and diplomatic ties of the government with Russia, Iran, Armenia, and Georgia. Clause 9 stipulated that Esendal should identify relations between Azerbaijan and the Turkic population in the north of Iran and their scope and level of development, if not the means of their establishment (Şimşir, 2011, p. 59). In a short while Esendal succeeded in establishing stable and confidential ties with members of the Azerbaijani government, public figures, and ordinary Azerbaijanis. The so-called uklonists (deviationists) and national Communists privately told him that the fraternal Turkish aid would deliver “Russification-pregnant Azerbaijan” from the yoke of “Red imperialism.” (Akhmedov, 2006, pp. 72-79)

The appearance of Enver Pasha in Batum made the Kemalists more cautious. They took control of all the Soviet diplomatic institutions in Ankara and all the towns along the Black Sea shoreline and began seriously examining all Russian ships arriving in Turkish ports and even subjected the crews of some of the ships to temporary arrest. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was deeply concerned over the provocative game of the Russians. Boris Piskunov, an employee of Soviet Russia’s embassy in Ankara, wrote to Chicherin on September 15, 1921; “Dozens of times I have heard both Yusuf Kemal’s and Mustafa Kemal’s complaints about Moscow’s support and help to Enver Pasha and about certain military preparations of the Transcaucasus Republics directed against Turkey.” (FPARF, September 15, 1921, f. 04, r. 39, fol. 232 vol. 52992, p. 26, Report from Piskunov, employee of the government of the RSFSR, to Chicherin). Kemal Pasha even told Natsarenus: “If Russia desires to Sovietize Turkey, it is easier to do it through me than through Enver.” (RSASPH, f. 5, r. 3, vol. 630, p. 51, Principal moments in the political life of Turkey). In the spring of 1921 a Soviet diplomatic representative to Ankara Ian Upmal-Angarskii tried to persuade Mustafa Kemal Pasha that Soviet Russia’s friendly attitude toward Turkey depended on Turkey’s communization. With this in mind Kemal Pasha created and controlled the organization entitled the Turkish Popular Communist Party (TPCP). When Chicherin later explained that Russia had no urgent need for communization of Turkey, the TPCP was dissolved. Russian Bolsheviks did not trust Mustafa Kemal to be devoted to communism. The presidium of the Council of Peoples of the East believed that the Mustafa Kemal government was engaged in intelligence work under the pretext of communism (RSASPH, March 20, 1921, f. 544, r. 3, p. 4, vol. 2, p. 200, Report on Communist factions of Soviet propaganda and actions of eastern peoples).
During his two meetings with Chicherin in August 1921, the Turkish ambassador to Moscow Ali Fuat Pasha expressed his opinion frankly. In handing over a memorandum signed on August 4 by Turkish foreign minister Yusuf Kemal bey, Ali Fuat Pasha said: “When the Greek army was about to win in July we sent Enver Pasha with comrades and provided him with help and funds to establish a new government in Anatolia to replace our government and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which was under threat of collapse, and he did not even notify us of this. What were you going to do with Enver Pasha?” (FPARF, August 4, 1921, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 2, p. 78, Memorandum from Ali Fuat Pasha to Chicherin). This open diplomatic demarche of the Turkish ambassador deeply concerned the leaders of Soviet Russia. Russia tried to cover Turkey’s displeasure with alleged preparations for the Kars Conference, about which various rumors had already been spread.

On September 22, 1921, Natsarenus, the Soviet representative to Ankara, reported to Chicherin that Mustafa Kemal’s brilliant victory over the Greeks had increased his authority in the country to an unprecedented level: “This victory is the greatest success of Mustafa Kemal, where he showed himself as a great military leader.” (RSASPH, September 22, 1921, f. 17, r. 84, vol. 104, p. 107, Telegram from Natsarenus to Chicherin). In late September Chicherin sent Mustafa Kemal a telegram containing solemn congratulations on the occasion of the brilliant victory against the Greeks. Kemal Pasha’s answer was delivered to Moscow on September 29 through Natsarenus: “Your congratulations touched me most of all because they come from Soviet Russia’s working people who, at the most difficult moment, did not hesitate to admit the correctness of our business and the lawfulness of the struggle that the Turkish people have been carrying out for their freedom and independence.” (FPARF, September 29, 1921, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 5, p. 154, Telegram from Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Chicherin).

Serious preparations for the Kars Conference were underway in the summer months of 1921. On August 26 the Politburo of the CC CPA discussed the question of sending a delegation to conclude a treaty with Turkey. Shahtakhtinskii was appointed to head the delegation (APD PARA, August 26, 1921, f. 1, r. 2, vol. 16, p. 85, Minutes no. 15 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC CPA (B)). In the last days of August he and thirteen members of the delegation left for Tiflis (RSASPH, August 1923, f. 85, r. 2c., vol. 3, p. 49, Letter from Shahtakhtinskii to the CC RCP (B)). The candidature of Shahtakhtinskii was approved, first, because he had attended the talks on the sidelines of the Moscow conference and, second, in relation to the situation in Nakhchivan. Though the Treaty of Moscow clearly defined the destiny of Nakhchivan, the government of Armenia did not give up its territorial claims to this region and thus was taking various provocative steps to destabilize the situation.
At its plenum on September 3 the CC RCP Caucasus Bureau discussed the question “About the Kars Conference.” In the first days of September Georgia and Armenia also formed their delegations. Representing Georgia at the conference were Svanidze (commissar of foreign affairs and finance) and Eliava (naval commissar). The Armenian representatives were members of the Council of People’s Commissars (CPC): Askanaz Mravian (commissar of foreign affairs) and Boghos Makintsian (commissar of internal affairs) (Sofiyev, 2000, p. 45).

Heading the Turkish delegation was a GNAT deputy from Edirne: the chief commander of the Eastern Front, Kazım Karabekir Pasha. The delegation included Veli Saltıkgil, a deputy from Burdur; Ahmet Mukhtar Çilli, the chief engineer-builder of the railways of Eastern Anatolia; Memduh Şevket Esendal, Turkey’s diplomatic representative to Soviet Azerbaijan; and, in the capacity of advisors, deputy Edip bey; Muvaffak bey, controller of Turkey’s tobacco industry; Gadri bey, commander of the Eastern Front headquarters; and Col. Veysal bey and Col. Talaat bey. The conference’s secretariat on the Turkish side included Foreign Ministry employees Inhan Zuhtu bey and Osman bey and two aides to the Eastern Front commander, Nazmi bey and Selaheddin bey (Karabekir, 1988, p. 956). Persons who had attended the Moscow conference were not included as members of the Turkish delegation: Yusuf Kemal bey, who had become the foreign minister; Ali Fuat bey, who had become the ambassador to Soviet Russia; and Dr. Rıza Nur, who spoke against the Kars Conference (Toksoy, 2007, p. 321).

Having left Tiflis, a delegation of Russian, Azerbaijani, Georgia, and Armenian representatives arrived at 11:30 a.m. on September 26 in Kars and was solemnly met. At 7:30 that evening, in a specially prepared building on the Army Street, Karabekir Pasha opened the conference with a welcoming address. He was followed by Russian delegate Ganetskii, while Mravian greeted the conference on behalf of all of the Southern Caucasus republics. Ganetskii noted that “the glorious Turkish and Armenian peoples will prove to the whole world not in words but in deeds that the hostility between these two nations has been abandoned once and forever. They approach each other not with a hidden poniard but with a warm fraternal love.” (Aslan, 2004, pp. 141-143; Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 4, 1960, p. 372).

Based on a proposal from the South Caucasus representatives, at the first meeting of the conference two commissions were established: an economic one and a commission in charge of the study of border questions. This meeting included a hot debate over the form of the final treaty. Karabekir Pasha suggested concluding Turkey’s treaties with each South Caucasus republic separately. Stressing that this was the opinion of the Turkish government, he noted
that he was authorized by the government to sign a treaty with each of the republics separately. Karabekir Pasha noted that the Russian Soviet government recognized the South Caucasus republics as sovereign states and insisted that he wanted to conclude a separate treaty with each of the independent republics. However, Russian representative Iakov Ganetskii objected to this idea. In particular he stressed that after the conclusion of the Treaty of Moscow the situation in the South Caucasus had changed radically: now all three fraternal peoples strove for unification both politically and economically. Ganetskii tried to prove that only a joint treaty of the three republics with Turkey might lead to a close alliance with Ankara against the common enemy and give a new impetus to the struggle (SAAR, September 26, 1921, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 81, p. 3, Minutes no. 1 of the meeting of the Kars Conference). Karabekir Pasha’s hopes to draw Azerbaijan to Turkey’s side during the discussion were not fulfilled. In his speech on September 30 Shahtakhtinskii, the representative of Azerbaijan, was on Ganetskii’s side. He noted that revolutionary necessity had “made us conclude a common treaty.” He ended his speech by saying: “On behalf of the Azerbaijan Republic, I propose that the treaty be a common one and contain no special clauses on each republic.” (APD PARA, September 30, 1921, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 81, p. 30, Minutes no. 4 of the meeting of the Kars Conference).

Representatives of the South Caucasus Soviet republics told the Turkish GNA government on October 3, however, that all questions had to be solved jointly in this context because of the close political and economic links among them. Shahtakhtinskii’s report regarding the normal work of the conference was published in Baku newspapers (Kommunist, October 4, 1921). After this development Karabekir Pasha was forced to retreat and agree to a joint treaty. Thus the most complex moment of the conference was overcome.

Despite a whole series of discords and disputes, the bases of interrelations between Turkey and the South Caucasus republics were reflected in the Treaty of Kars, which was signed on October 13, 1921, at 2 in the afternoon. This treaty consisting of twenty articles and three appendixes was concluded between Turkey and the republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan with the participation of Russia (NARA, January 1952, CIA–RDP 79, p. 9, “The Boundary between Turkey and the USSR: Secret”). In the treaty both parties recognized “as annulled and invalid all the treaties concluded between governments that were previously responsible for the sovereignty of territories of the agreeing parties concerning these territories as well as treaties concluded with third countries regarding the Transcaucasus Republics.” (Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol.4, 1960, pp. 420-426) Article 2 of the treaty notes that the term “Turkey” in the treaty means territories included in the National Turkish Pact of January 28, 1920. Parties to the treaty agreed not to recognize any peace
treaty or other international acts that one of the parties to the treaty was committed to by force. This article marked the refusal of all three Caucasus republics to observe the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920, primarily recognition of Turkish bounds specified in the National Pact by Armenia. Most importantly, it meant giving up claims based on the Treaty of Sèvres for the existence of a “Great Armenia.” (Azer, 2011, pp. 304-305) Article 4 drew a borderline between Turkey and the South Caucasus republics stretching from the village of Sarp to the lower reaches of the Kara-Su River. A more exact borderline was defined in appendixes 1 and 2. Article 5 stipulated that “the Turkish government and the Soviet governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia agree that the Nakhchivan region within the bounds indicated in appendix 3 of this treaty will form an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan.” (APD PARA, October 13, 1921, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, pp. 112, 116, 114, Trascaucasia-Turkey agreement). Under article 6 Turkey agreed to accept Georgia’s sovereignty over the port of Batum and a territory stretching north from a border indicated in article 4 and included in the composition of the Batum port. Georgia was to grant broad local autonomy to the local population, provide every commune with its cultural and religious rights, and give the population the opportunity to make use of the land law at will. In addition Turkey was granted duty-free, tax-free transfer of goods through the Batum port. Article 9 included the international status of the Black Sea and the straits. Both parties agreed that solution of this question should not damage the full sovereignty of Turkey as well as the security of Turkey and its capital, Istanbul. Under article 10 parties to the treaty agreed not to allow formation in their respective territories of organizations or groups claiming the role of government in another country or in a part of its territory. According to article 20, the governments of Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia had to ratify the Treaty of Kars and that the exchange of ratification notes had to take place in Erivan as soon as possible. Signing the treaty were Askanaz Mravian and Boghos Makintsian on behalf of the government of Armenia, Behbud Shahtakhtinskii on behalf of the government of Azerbaijan, Shalva Eliava and Aleksandr Svanidze on behalf of the government of Georgia, Iakov Ganetskii on behalf of the government of the RSFSR, and Karabekir Pasha, Veli bey, Memduh Shevket bey, and Mukhtar bey on behalf of the government of Turkey. In some instances the Treaty of Kars repeated the articles of the Treaty of Moscow. Nevertheless, the Moscow and Kars Treaties marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish-Russian relations (Gürün, 1991, p. 71). With short breaks, this era lasted until the end of World War II.

Despite being somewhat limited, the Treaty of Kars became an important victory of Turkish diplomacy. From the point of view of postwar international relations and revocation
of the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, this treaty became the first crisis of the Versailles system. Having signed a treaty with the Southern Caucasus republics with the participation of the RSFSR, Turkey affirmed the victory of its Eastern policy. The four neighboring countries recognized Turkey’s borders as specified in a National Pact, which strengthened the internal and international position of Turkey. Opening the third meeting of the GNAT in 1922, Mustafa Kemal Pasha noted: “On October 13 in Kars we signed a treaty with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia based on the Treaty of Moscow. This treaty has legally strengthened our current position in the East and become a reality indicating that it is no longer possible to realize the Treaty of Sèvres.” Together with the Moscow Treaty, the Treaty of Kars removed the international legal basis of claims for the establishment of a “Great Armenia,” ensuring that this dream would never come true. On March 1, 1922, Mustafa Kemal Pasha told the Grand National Assembly: “What was called the Armenian question was beyond the true interests of the Armenian people, would have served the economic interests of world capitalism, and found its most correct solution in the Treaty of Kars.” (Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1989, pp. 247-248).

The conclusion of the Treaty of Kars was followed by certain changes in the system of administrative government of the Nakhchivan region and a series of organizational measures. The first congress of Soviets of the South Caucasus that was held in December 1922 made a decision about the establishment of Nakhchivan’s autonomy as a part of the Azerbaijan SSR. With this in mind, the Caucasus Committee of the RCP (B) in January 1923 made the following decision: “Proceeding from the decisions of the congress of the Soviets of the South Caucasus, to propose to the CC CPA to make Nakhchivan an autonomous region.” (Musayev,2010, p. 537) On February 27, 1923, the 3rd All-Nakhchivan Congress of Soviets decided that the Nakhchivan SSR was to join the composition of Azerbaijan as an autonomous region: “the whole Nakhchivan region with all of its institutions is to join the Azerbaijan SSR as an autonomous region.” This decision was followed by a broad discussion of the Nakhchivan question at the fifth congress of the CPA, which opened in March 1923. The congress noted that putting as large a territory as the Nakhchivan Republic under Azerbaijan’s protectorate did not meet several requirements, so it was considered appropriate to recognize Nakhchivan as a constituent part of Azerbaijan as a autonomous unit. The third session of the CEC plenum of the second convocation in June 1923 reacted to the appeal from the congress of Soviets of Nakhchivan and drafted a provision about the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Azerbaijan SSR, in recognizing the Turks as an indigenous population of Nakhchivan, declared this territory to be an autonomous part of the
Azerbaijan SSR and decided to name it the Nakhchivan ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) of the Azerbaijan SSR. Such radical changes of the status of Nakhchivan strongly troubled Turkey. Owing to the great difficulty in transferring Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan’s protectorate according to the Moscow and Kars Treaties, Ankara feared that in Soviet Russian political conditions these changes might lead to the loss of Nakhchivan for Azerbaijan. The government of Turkey thus protested against Azerbaijan’s violation of a Nakhchivan-related article. In a note of June 25, 1923, to the PCFA of Soviet Russia, the Turkish Foreign Ministry said: “This resolution of the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan is a direct violation of article 3 of the Moscow Turkish-Russian treaty of friendship of March 16, 1921, and article 5 of the treaty of October 13, 1921, that Russia signed as well.” (Russian State Archive of Modern History (hereafter referred to as RNAMH), May 31, 1966, f. 5, r. 58, vol. 3, pp. 8-9, Information on “Nakhchivan ASSR in Soviet-Turkish agreements”).

On August 17, 1923, the PCFA Board of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) discussed the current situation and set up instructions for a PCFA USSR representative to the South Caucasus. From then on, the South Caucasus republics had to observe the directives of the PCFA USSR in international treaties and in foreign policy issues (RSASPH, August 17, 1923, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 375, p. 4, Minutes of the meeting of colleagues of the PCFA). The PCFA instructions were approved, with minor changes, at a meeting of the Politburo on August 23. It would be appropriate to say that all points of the instructions were caused by controversial moments that had emerged in relations between Turkey and the South Caucasus republics. One of these contradictions was the Nakhchivan question. After protests by Turkey, Chicherin wrote to Stalin and other members of the Politburo: “Under the Moscow and Kars treaties Nakhchivan is regarded as an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan. The Turkish government has learned that by a decision of the CEC of the Azerbaijan Republic Nakhchivan has been made part of the territory of Azerbaijan, which contradicts the treaties with Turkey. All our respective letters and telegrams sent to Tiflis went unanswered. When comrade Orjonikidze arrived in Moscow, I wrote to him about this; now I have received an answer from him in Berlin that a congress of the Nakhchivan region has declared the region an inseparable part of Azerbaijan and that it currently enjoys the rights of an uyezd. Comrade Orjonikidze says that he did not object to this and that he supposes that Nakhchivan has the right to this. Regretfully, this is wrong. If a certain territory has a known status according to the treaty, this status cannot be changed without agreement between parties to the treaty. For instance, Luxembourg cannot be annexed to Germany or France or Belgium no matter what the desire of Luxembourg is. This case is a real violation of our accords with Turkey. Why
can’t Nakhchivan be declared an autonomous region? In fact, this won’t differ much from its position as an uyezd.” (RSASPH, August 21, 1923, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 375, p. 12, Letter from Chicherin to Stalin).

Following this letter, the question “About Nakhchivan” was submitted for discussion to the CC RCP (B) Politburo on August 23, 1923, at the suggestion of Chicherin and Narimanov. It appears from the decision made that Chicherin’s proposals cited above were taken into account and that the CC secretariat was instructed to “settle the Nakhchivan matter with the Transcaucasus regional committee.” (RSASPH, August 23, 1921, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 375, p. 2, Minutes no. 27 of the meeting of the Politburo, CC RCP (B)). Once this was done the Azerbaijani CEC again returned to the Nakhchivan question and made a decision to establish an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a part of the Azerbaijan SSR. On January 8, 1924, the CEC of the South Caucasus approved a decision of the Azerbaijani CEC on the establishment of the Nakhchivan ASSR. On February 9 the Azerbaijani CEC issued an appropriate decree. That is how all disputes arising from the Nakhchivan question were settled.

Before the Treaty of Kars was signed, Abilov arrived in Ankara as plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan. On October 14, 1921, Mustafa Kemal Pasha received Abilov, who said: “Dear gazi [hero], Your Majesty. With your permission I am authorized to convey, through your mediation as a representative of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and commander-in-chief of the Turkish army, fraternal greetings from the socialist Soviet government of Azerbaijan and Azeri Turks. On behalf of my government I cordially welcome the GNAT, famed for its bravery and heroism, the heroic Turkish army, and people of the whole Turkish nation, who are laying down their lives to protect the political and economic rights of the nation. Abilov touched upon the “Western oppressors” who had brought misery to the Muslim peoples by dictating the Versailles and Sèvres treaties. He also stressed the major role of the Turkish national movement in the struggle against the imperialistic yoke: “Azeri Turks freed from slavery thanks to the great Russian revolution are ready to sacrifice the lives of their sons to liberate Turkey and all oppressed peoples of the East.” Abilov told Kemal Pasha that the latest victories of the Turkish army delighted Azeri Turks and the rest of the Islamic world (RSASPH, October 14, 1921, f. 544, r. 3, vol. 115, pp. 175–76, Speech of Abilov).

In reply Kemal Pasha welcomed the people of Azerbaijan on behalf of the GNAT, saying: “We want to live freely and independently within our borders, and we are fighting for implementation of this idea. Our nation is proud of bolstering efforts in the name of Islamic
salvation and improvement of the welfare of the oppressed peoples worldwide. Our nation is extremely happy to hear the confirmation of this truth from representatives of fraternal Azerbaijan. The peoples of Rumelia and Anatolia are aware that the hearts of Azeri Turks are beating in unison with their hearts. That is why they are praying for the rights of Azeri Turks to be preserved and for freedom from slavery. The misfortunes of the Azeri Turks are ours; their joys are ours too (RSASPH, October 14, 1921, f. 544, r. 3, vol. 115, p. 177, Reply of Mustafa Kemal Pasha).

On October 22, 1921, Abilov gave Kemal Pasha his credentials as the plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan. On November 18 at 1:00 in the afternoon Mustafa Kemal Pasha hoisted the flag of Azerbaijan over the embassy building. Attending this grand event were prime minister Fevzi Chakmak Pasha; members of the GNAT; foreign minister Yusuf Kemal bey; the ministers of education, justice, public health, and internal affairs; Tochi, the representative of Italy; Sultan Ahmad Khan, the ambassador of Afghanistan; secretary Hidayatullah khan; Mikhailov, secretary of the Russian diplomatic mission; and other officials. When opening the meeting, Mustafa Kemal Pasha declared: “Dear ambassador! Let me personally and on behalf of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey express to you my gratitude for today’s holiday. I highly appreciate this holiday because I had the honor to raise the banner of our brother country. Our enemies attempted to hoist a hostile Greek flag over Ankara. Praise Allah that they failed to do that, and today we have hoisted the fraternal flag. It is obvious today that relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are sincere and open-hearted. Greatly contributing to this is our respected Ambassador Abilov. The geographical location of Azerbaijan also contributed to the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries. Dear ambassador! It is a great holiday for us to watch the flag of Azerbaijan flying next to the Turkish flag. Once again I would like to repeat my cordial gratitude for this inimitable holiday.”(Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1989, pp. 23-24)

In regard to the activity of the Azerbaijani Embassy, Mikhailov wrote to Orjonikidze on November 8, 1921: “The Azerbaijani Embassy is actually standing idle. Embassy members were cordially welcomed in the province; however, the situation in Ankara was different. Turks are harping on the same tune about Azerbaijan’s ‘dependence’ and making it known that they do not regard Azerbaijani as having enough political strength to deal with.” As for Abilov’s activity, Mikhailov told Orjonikidze about Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s opinion of comrade Abilov: “He is excessively and obviously Communist and a very bad diplomat.” (RSASPH, November 8, 1921, f. 85, r. c /Turkey, vol. 96, pp. 42–43, Letter from Mikhailov to Orjonikidze).
The Soviet Caucasian Republics were not in a hurry to ratify the Kars Treaty of October 13, 1921. They explained the delay as being due to the formation of the South Caucasian Federation. In the meanwhile urgent ratification of the treaty, especially by Soviet Armenia, mattered most for Turkey. During the first conversation between Abilov and Frunze and Mustafa Kemal Pasha on December 25, 1921, as well the second conversation on January 4, 1922, the parties touched upon some disputed questions. In the course of the second conversation Yusuf Kemal bey openly declared that some suspicion and mistrust between the Soviet Republics and Turkey were linked to the malignant actions of the Russian Foreign Ministry and Chicherin personally. He noted that Chicherin’s activity made a bad impression on the Turks. Perhaps influenced by Levon Karakhan, Chicherin tended toward the West rather than toward the East. Thus when questioned by Yusuf Kemal bey Frunze gave evasive answers: ”It is widely known that Russia’s domestic and foreign policy is ruled by the Party and its Central Committee. As for Chicherin’s personality, he is an exemplary Communist; however, his twenty-year stay in Western Europe has given him a fondness for the West.... In the meantime Karakhan is not such a bigwig that he should influence Chicherin’s policy (SAAR, January 4, 1922, f. 28, r. 1, vol. 68, pp. 4–5, Second talks between Frunze and Abilov with Mustafa Kemal Pasha). The meeting between Abilov and Yusuf Kemal bey on January 26, 1922, was devoted to debates about ratification of the Kars treaty. In the beginning of the talks Yusuf Kemal bey reported that at the request of Azerbaijan he had instructed the Interior Ministry to liquidate all counter-revolutionary organizations in Azerbaijan, so he was confident that in a day or two the interior minister would take measures to achieve this goal. When Yusuf Kemal bey asked Abilov about the prospects of the South Caucasus Federation, Abilov replied that he had no full information on the matter. Should it be formed, however, the South Caucasus Federation’s attitude to Turkey would remain invariable. He added that Narimanov was expected to be appointed chairman of the Council of the South Caucasus Federation and Shahtakhtinskii as commissar for foreign affairs. Other positions would be announced later. In Abilov’s view, this process accounted for the delay in ratifying the Kars Treaty. He noted that the treaty would be approved by the union council on behalf of the Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Georgian Soviet Republics. Under this circumstance Yusuf Kemal bey claimed: ”Ratification of the treaty by Azerbaijan makes no difference to us. The same goes for Georgia. The treaty’s ratification by Armenia, however, is of great importance for us. As you know, we are supposed to attend a conference on the eastern issue. Also, as a result of skillful propaganda work by Armenians in the West stormy debates and scandals are underway on the Armenian question. Hence the probability remains that either England or the United States will bring up this question. In this case we shall be able to protect
your interests provided that agreements are reached both with Armenian Dashnaks and with Armenian Communists. If the Kars Treaty is ratified not by the separate republics of the South Caucasus but by the Union Council, then the conference may assert that it is not a manifestation of the Armenian people’s will and that it has been forcibly imposed by Turkey and Soviet Russia. Now you understand that the free ratification of the treaty by Armenia is of paramount importance and we need it badly. So I ask you not to refuse contacts with comrade Narimanov and take measures aimed at ratifying the Kars Treaty by each of the republics and step up this process.” (SAAR, 26 January, 1922, f.28, r.1, v.68, pp. 17–20, Conversation between Abilov and Kemal bey).

Yusuf Kemal bey in turn asked for a Russian diplomatic representative to be sent to Ankara to speed up the Kars Treaty ratification. On January 24, 1922, Boris Mikhailov telegraphed Chicherin that “the Federation of Republics causes the Turks concern over the destiny of the Kars Treaty.... When it comes to ratification, I had talks with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who stressed that in view of Transcaucasian developments the Turkish government expects the [South Caucasus] republics of the federation to create a federal government; however, if we go on insisting, Turkey will be the first to ratify the treaty. I’m confident that if the matter of Chorokh is of no importance it would be appropriate to get the Turks to ratify it first. But it is desirable that the Transcaucasian authorities should ratify it first, for this could make a powerful impression in our favor and thus dissipate any rumors about the aggressive nature of federalization spread in the Majlis by the followers of Bekir Sami, who is Ossetian by origin and an expert on the Caucasus.” (RSASPH, January 24, 1922, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 2204, p. 18, Telegram from Mikhailov to Chicherin).

These serious and insistent actions by Turkey caused the CC CPA to convene meetings of the Politburo and Orgburo on February 14, 1922, which put the ratification of the Kars Treaty on the agenda of the March session of the CEC of Azerbaijan (APD PARA, February 14, 1922, f. 1, r. 74, vol. 126, p.57, Protocol no. 6 of the meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA). Thus Azerbaijan was the first to ratify the treaty on March 3, 1922; then the GNAT on March 17; Armenia on March 20; and finally Georgia on June 14. The exchange of ratifications was held on September 11, 1922, in Erivan (Dokumenty vneshei politiki SSSR, vol.4, 1960, p. 429).

In late 1921 Sergei Natsarenus was recalled from Ankara. Moscow was dissatisfied with his work, as were Ian Upmal-Angorskii and Budu Mdivani. On January 5, 1922, Semen Aralov was appointed plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Russia to Turkey. Upon arrival in Turkey, he first met with Abilov, who informed him about the state and public life of Turkey, the distinctive features of diplomatic and political work in the East, and the political
climate in Ankara. On January 31 Aralov presented his credentials to Mustafa Kemal Pasha and became a central figure of Soviet diplomacy in Ankara until the end of April 1923. Thus in 1920–22 the Soviet policy balancing between Kemalists and Ittihadists after Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s victory over foreign aggressors under Sakaria was leveled out. From then on, plans were contrived to eliminate Enver Pasha physically and politically as a “headache” for Soviet policy. An atmosphere of general enthusiasm took hold after a victory of the Turkish army in the western part of the country on August 30, 1922. On September 14 of the same year Esendal sent a cipher text to Mustafa Kemal pasha, which said that this victory inspired a feeling of pride in the whole Turkic population of Azerbaijan, from members of the government and intellectuals to ordinary people. Narimanov sent congratulatory messages to Ankara on the strength of it. 112 Memduh Şevket Esendal performed his duties until March 31, 1924, when Turkey had to close its diplomatic mission due to the formation of the USSR and transfer of foreign political functions to the Union Center (Şimşir, 1996, p. 84).

After the South Caucasus Union was established, the South Caucasus regional committee considered it unnecessary to maintain three representations of the three republics in Ankara. On August 5, 1922, the presidium of the Transcaucasus Regional Committee told the Armenian and Georgian governments that their representations in Ankara were no longer appropriate. Thus Erivan and Tiflis were instructed to transfer these powers to Russia or Azerbaijan (RSASPH, September 25, 1922, f. 85, r. 24, vol. 28, p. 21, Minutes no. 25 of the meeting of the Presidium of the Transcaucasus Regional Committee RCP (B)). On September 25, 1922, the presidium of the Transcaucasus regional committee made a decision to instruct Ibrahim Abilov to represent all three South Caucasus republics in Turkey. The decision also noted that it was possible to open staff positions for advisors for Georgia and Armenia under the Azerbaijani government (RSASPH, September 25, 1922, f. 85, r. 24, vol. 28, p. 21, Minutes no. 34 of the meeting of the Presidium of the Transcaucasus Regional Committee RCP (B)). In the spring of 1922, however, rumors spread that Abilov had been recalled. In May Turkish newspapers alleged that Abilov had tried to conclude an anti-Russian Turkish-Azerbaijani treaty and thus would be recalled on the order of the Soviet government. On June 12 Abilov published a refutation in the newspaper Varlyk (Entity), saying that the issue of recalling him had not been raised; furthermore, any Turkish-Azerbaijani treaty was out of the question. Abilov noted that these rumors were provocative, concocted by enemies of Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.

The broad discussion of such rumors stemmed from Abilov’s complaints that Moscow had cut the powers of Soviet republics, primarily the South Caucasus republics, in neighboring
countries. Yet on February 3, 1922, Abilov wrote to CPC chair Narimanov that some days before the Russian mission had received a letter from Chicherin expressing his displeasure with attempts by the South Caucasus republics to pursue an independent foreign policy. It appears from Chicherin’s letter that exactly for this reason the Central Committee had made a decision to transfer the powers of representatives of the Soviet republics abroad to a RSFSR representative. Abilov wrote to Narimanov: “I regard this measure as quite unnecessary because we — representatives of the Soviet republics — elsewhere pursue a mutually accepted policy, so such measures would only help our enemies strengthen their work. I have still had no report on this subject from you. I don’t know if you have received a copy of this resolution; if you have, then tell me whether you held talks with the CC and comrade Chicherin on this topic. I would like to ask you in detail about this question. I find this phenomenon to be abnormal and practically unrealizable.” (APDPARA, February 3, 1922, f. 609, r. 1, vol. 94, pp. 169–71, Letter from Abilov to Narimanov). The representations of the South Caucasus republics existed until the death of Ibrahim Abilov himself, on February 23, 1923 (APDPARA, f. 276, r. 5, vol. 1, p. 130, Aralov, “About Ibrahim Abilov;”). Following the sudden, suspicious death of Abilov at the Turkish economic conference in Izmir, no new ambassador of the Transcaucasus Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR) was appointed and the plenipotentiary representation was eliminated. The process of the establishment of the USSR ended soon after the Transcaucasus SFSR was established. The 10th All-Russian Congress of Soviets that took place on December 23–27, 1922, with the participation of representatives of the Transcaucasus SFSR, Ukrainian SSR, and Belarus SSR made a decision to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On December 30 representatives of the Soviet republics signed a declaration treaty establishing the USSR.

At the Lausanne Peace Conference (November 20, 1922 - June 24, 1923), while the Soviet administration tried to prevent Turkey from reaching an agreement with the West, it put pressure on Ankara, either openly or indirectly, by proposing joint projects on the Black Sea. The Russian Foreign Ministry and various intelligence agencies were developing various plans to prevent the Lausanne Peace Treaty. Without waiting for a response from Western states and Turkey, the Soviet administration prepared a report to express Moscow’s official position on the Turkish Straits. The report, which was prepared on October 17, was sent to members of the Politburo. The report included the following considerations: “Keeping the Straits closed for warships of all countries during peacetime can be calculated as the least harmful situation; Turkey is the center of The Straits and its sovereignty over the Straits must be maintained; Turkey may have the right to grant individual transit permits to warships
sailing for civilian purposes; The Strait of Istanbul and the Dardanelles can be open for commercial ships and civil aircraft of all countries; The Soviet government was loyal to the Treaty of Moscow in 1921 and favoured the drafting of the status of The Straits in the commission of the riparian countries; However, it sees these negotiations as concessions to allow transit to Antant countries; The Soviet government considers it necessary to adopt the international resolution on the conversion of the Black Sea, where warships of other countries are not allowed to cross, into the closed sea of the coastal countries.” (FPARF, October 17, 1922, f. 0421, r. 1, fol. 1, vol. 6, p. 341, Letter from Chicherin to Stalin and members of the Politburo). These proposals, consisting of 7 paragraphs reflecting the basic expectations of the Soviets from the Lausanne conference, were approved by the Politburo on October 19, 1922.

The conference opened on November 20, 1922. The Soviet delegation arrived in Lausanne on December 1. On December 4, Chicherin issued a statement on the issue of the Straits on behalf of the republics of Russia, Ukraine and Georgia. On December 4, the head of the Turkish delegation, İsmet İnönü, said in his speech that the Straits should be open for world trade without violating the security of Istanbul and that he opposed the free passage of warships and aircraft through the Straits. According to Chicherin, Turkey’s position came from the desire to maintain the Russian-Turkish friendship and Turkish suspicion of Russia (FPARF, December 4, 1922, f. 421, r. 1, fol. 1, vol. 1, pp. 97-98, From Chicherin to Litvinov). During informal contacts in the conference, Chicherin determined that İsmet İnönü was ready to make concessions to the Entente regarding the Straits. On December 5, Chicherin wrote to Lev Karahan, that “in order to put pressure on Mustafa Kemal, someone from Moscow should be sent to Ankara. If the Turkish government decides against us, we must inform Ankara that we will resort to other means to defend ourselves.” (FPARF, December 5, 1922, f. 0421, r. 1, fol. 1, vol. 6, p. 6, Telegram from Chicherin to Karakhan). But, in his letter to the Politburo, Karahan specifically stated that there was no need to send someone to Ankara and that this would be a long overdue step, and that it would not help to put pressure on the Turks in the current psychological situation. He wrote: “The frequent visits of our officials to Ankara create a negative perception about us. The smug Turks will hold their noses in the air, thinking we are going to their feet every once in a while.” According to Karahan, this will not be in the form of someone going to Ankara or Aralov talking to Mustafa Kemal, but in the form of a note. According to Karahan, the note should contain bold statements and be a “cautious threat” and include the following points: “If the Turkish delegation approves the passage of warships through the Straits in Lausanne, we will consider it a formal violation of the Moscow agreement. We will treat it not just as an unfriendly step, but as a hostile act. In
this case, we will not see Turkey as a friendly country in the Black Sea and we will have to look for ways to ensure our interests.” (RSASPH, December 6, 1922, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1984, pp. 5-6, From Karakhan to Stalin). With these instructions in mind, a sharp note was sent from Moscow to Ankara on 8 December. But that note did not have much effect. In a speech in Lausanne the same day, İsmet İnönü declared that he was not opposed to the Allies’ proposals involving the passage of ships through the Straits (RSASPH, February 20, 1923, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1990, p. 7, Chicherin’s letter from the Lausanne conference to Aralov). Welcoming İsmet Pasha’s conciliatory speech, Lord Curzon suggested that the Allies’ representatives meet with the Turks to clarify some issues. But Chicherin expressed Russia’s opposition to any secret negotiations. On December 12, Chicherin conveyed to Litvinov his views on the concessions of İsmet Pasha and the tendency of the Turks to conduct secret negotiations with the British, writing: “There is no common agreement between them. But it can be said that there is agreement on separate paragraphs. These paragraphs consist of Turkey’s obligation to strengthen the Straits and the permitting the passage of a certain number of Warships.” (Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. 5, 72). The evening of December 13, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to in response to Russia’s note of December 8. Ankara expressed regret that the Soviet note was not written in a friendly manner. The note also emphasized that the attitude displayed by the Turkish side is not contrary to the spirit of the Misak’i Milli, nor to the spirit nor to the letter of the Moscow and Kars treaties (FPARF, December 13, 1922, f. 132, r. 4, fol. 4, vol. 6, pp. 205-206, Note of the Turkish Foreign Ministry to the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs).

In the reports that Chicherin sent to Moscow in January 1923, he wrote that the Turks had reached a secret agreement with Western countries on the Straits issue. When he met with İsmet Pasha on January 4, Chicherin tried to dissuade him from this idea, but İsmet Pasha did not say anything definite about it. Chicherin wrote to the Russian Foreign Affairs Commissariat that, “İsmet is a good soldier and understands the situation well. But he is a child in diplomacy.” (RSASPH, January 5, 1923, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1988, p. 16, Letter from Chicherin to Litvinov). Chicherin thought that it was not possible for İsmet Pasha to make concessions to the West on The Straits without the instruction from Ankara. He wrote that despite all the maneuvering, the Turks wanted to solve the Straits problem with the British. He wrote, “The Turks are implementing a minimum program, while Russia is advocating a maximum program. In my opinion, allowing warships to pass through the Straits is an unfriendly attitude towards Russia.” (RSASPH, January 5, 1923, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1988, p. 20, Letter from Chicherin to Litvinov). During discussions on January 8, Chicherin tried to persuade İsmet Pasha not to
agree with the British and French during the Lausanne negotiations. But Ismet Pasha declared that the Allies would withdraw and accept Turkey’s demands on the Straits. According to Chicherin, the British had indeed made concessions to Turkey regarding the disarmament of The Straits, as well as the security of Istanbul and The Straits. He wrote that, “these two important issues brought the signing of the Straits treaty closer.” (RSASPH, January 8, 1923, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1988, p. 31, Letter from Chicherin to Litvinov). In his report to Litvinov dated January 10, Chicherin admitted that the Turks had now prevailed. He wrote, “In Lausanne, Antant is making concessions to the Turks on everything. The occupation regime is de facto abolished, and the League of Nations says it cannot appoint a special representative in order to control the situation of minorities. Turkey is becoming a real winner.”(RSASPH, January 10, 1923, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1988, p. 41, Letter from Chicherin to Litvinov). On January 10, when Chicherin and Krasin met with Ismet Pasha, he said that this victory of the Turks was possible as a result of the Russo-Turkish joint front. He stated that although some unwanted decisions were made on the Straits, the life of these decisions would be short and that Turkey would succeed in closing the straits at the first opportunity. Chicherin wrote to Litvinov on January 10 and gave the order to send a letter to Aralov, the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, and that he should be informed about the Turkish position (RSASPH, January 10, 1923, f. 5, r. 1, vol. 1988, pp. 41-43, Letter from Chicherin to Litvinov).

The results of the Treaty of Lausanne, according to the Soviet administration, were not successful results for the USSR. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party negotiated the activities of the Soviet delegation at the conference on January 25, and it was of the opinion that it would be appropriate for the group headed by Chicherin to return to Moscow in the coming days (RSASPH, January 25, 1923, f. 17, r. 3, vol. 331, p. 1, Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party on the Lausanne conference).

After protracted negotiations, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923. The results of this treaty were positive for Turkey. First of all, the Treaty of Lausanne was instrumental in Turkey’s international recognition. The Treaty of Sevres was buried in the archives of history. The Lausanne peace treaty ended the interference of other states in Turkey’s internal affairs. This development was a great success of Turkish diplomacy. After Lausanne, Cicerin prepared a 9-page report to Lenin, the chairman of the Soviet of People’s Commissars, and sent the copy to Aralov, the Soviet ambassador to Ankara. Chicherin admitted the success of the Turks at the Lausanne conference, but was trying to link this victory to the Turkish-Soviet friendship.
The Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood signed on March 16, 1921 between Soviet Russia and Turkey, the Kars Treaty between Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia signed on October 13, 1921, as well as the treaty between Turkey and Ukraine of January 21, 1922, laid down the principles of friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union. A logical continuation of these relations was the “Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality” signed in Paris on December 17, 1925, which provided for the observance of neutrality, non-aggression and non-participation in hostile groups in the event of military clashes. In Article 2 of the Treaty, the sides undertook to “in the event of a military action against one of the sides by one or more third powers to observe neutrality” and “to refrain from any attack on the other side and not to take part in any alliance or agreement of a political nature with one or more third powers or any other hostile act directed against the other side.” (SAAR, January 25, 1944, f. 28, r. 4, v. 3, pp. 3–6, Report on existing and operating political treaties and agreements between the USSR and Turkey as of January 1, 1944). The treaty would initially last for a period of three years and was automatically extended annually, unless one of the sides declared its intention to withdrawn within six months of its scheduled termination. In practice, on December 17, 1929, the Treaty was extended for another 2 years. On October 30, 1931, it was extended for another 5 years and on November 7, 1935 for another 10 years. The Treaty of Paris provided legal solutions for a wide range of issues. On June 5, 1939, there was an exchange of notes between the Soviet Embassy in Ankara and the Ministry Foreign Affairs of Turkey in which it was indicated that the Protocol of November 7, 1935 was extended for another 10 years (until 7 November 1945). In addition to these documents, archival documents revealed that on October 1935, an oral agreement was reached between the People’s Commissariat for foreign Affairs and the Turkish Embassy in Moscow on the conclusion of a “gentleman’s agreement” for the regular exchange of information on terrorist activities aimed against one of the parties. In addition to treaties and agreements of a political nature, the sides concluded a number of treaties, agreements and protocols covering economic, commercial, financial, credit, border, transport issues, transit of coastal waters, use of post and telegraphs, mutual visits of warships, etc (SAAR, April 22, 1944, f. 28, r. 4, v. 3, pp. 7–27, Report on unsettled questions between the USSR and Turkey as of 15 April 1944).

Later in 1922, the leader of the independent Azerbaijan Republic and head of the Musavat party, Mehmet Emin Rasulzade, arrived in Istanbul from Moscow via Finland. This was an important event in consolidating Azerbaijani emigrants who had settled in Turkey. Later in 1922, he set up a Foreign Bureau of the Musavat Party and led the work of this organization (Mehmedzade, 1992, p.177). On January 1, 1923 in a letter to Stalin, he noted in particular,
“by the will of fate came to power the Communist party, retreating on all fronts from its ideology, comes to the idea of restoring the old Russian Empire...”. In 1923, a few months before the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, Mehmet Emin Rasulzada’s book “The Republic of Azerbaijan” was published in Istanbul. For the Turkish public, this book was very useful, because it contributed to the spread and strengthening of Republican ideas in Turkey. At the Book Fair in Izmir, Rasulzade’s work was awarded the highest prize. In 1923, he began publishing the almanac “Yeni Kafkasya” (New Caucasus). During the first five years of the existence of the Turkish Republic (1923-1928), this almanac focused readers’ attention on the ideal of independence of the Azerbaijani Turks, the dreams of freedom of the Russian Turks and the Republican construction of the Anatolian Turks.

In 1924, an anti-Soviet uprising took place in Georgia. The Soviet Union accused Turkey of supporting the uprising from its territory and that the Musavatists had established ties in Istanbul, Riza, Trabzon and other places. Citing the growth of pan-Turkism, the Soviet Union attempted to expel Musavatists and Georgian emigrants from Istanbul. On September 26, 1924, Soviet Ambassador Surits wrote from Ankara to Chicherin, “It seems to me that now is clearly a favorable moment to raise the issue of the Turkish government’s support for counter-revolutionary elements in the Caucasus and demand, in the form of guarantees, the immediate expulsion from Constantinople of a number of musavatist and Georgian leaders.” (RSPHSA, September 26, 1924, f. 82, r. 2, v. 1328, p. 63, From Surits to Chicherin). In 1930, the Soviet Union and Turkey came to a secret agreement to ban and dissolve organizations and societies conducting counter-propaganda against each other. In May 1932, Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Pasha, who arrived in Moscow on a visit, had a tete-a-tete conversation with Molotov (he asked Molotov that Foreign Ministers Rüştü Aras and Maxim Litvinov not participate in the conversation -C.H.) Ismet Pasha said, “Two years ago, at the time of his arrival in Ankara, L. Karakhan complained to Ismet about the anti-Soviet activities of some nationalist Russian elements who had settled in Turkey. Ismet promised then to do his best and kept his word by following a definite programme of action and achieving the total elimination of these undesirable elements in Turkey. Thus, now neither he, nor Kemal, nor the Turkish government as a whole can be reproached not only for allowing open anti-Soviet propaganda, but also for patronizing any secret types of this propaganda.” (RSPHSA, May, 1932, f. 82, r. 2, v. 1328, p.125, f. 82, r. 2, v. 1328, p. 125). In the wake of this collusion one of those who left Turkey was Rasulzadeh.

In 1934, Lev Karakhan was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Turkey. Since the signing of the Treaty of Best-Litovsk, Karakhan was infamous in Turkey. In reality, he was the Armenian, Levon Karakhanyan. By appointing him as a Ambassador, Stalin demonstrated the cooling
of relations between the two countries. As a participant of the Russian–Turkish talks in 1921, Stalin was well aware of the inimical attitude of Turks to Karakhan. As written in the previous pages, a demonstration of this is given in a cipher telegram sent by Sergo Ordzhonikidze to Lenin on February 8, 1921 from Baku: “Stalin’s participation in the talks with Turks is quite necessary. They do not believe Chicherin and they hate Karakhan.” (RSPHSA, February 8, 1921, RSPHSA, f. 5, r. 1, v. 1247, p. 3, Ordzhonikidze to Lenin).

Despite the episodes mentioned above, both countries managed to preserve relations with each other throughout the mid-1930s. Increasing international tensions in the period in question and the danger of war encouraged Turkey to pursue a prudent and balanced foreign policy. Contributing to Turkey’s increased influence in the West were the countries joining the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the signing of the Moscow Protocol, the joining of the London Convention for the Definition of Aggression, participation in concluding the Balkan Entente Pact and Saadabad Treaty, and Turkey’s transformation into the leading actor during the Montreux Conference on the Turkish Straits. The first President of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, attached great importance to friendship with the Soviet Union, but was equally afraid of strengthening his northern neighbor.

The Straits Conference started its work in Montreux on June 22, 1936. Turkey, the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, France, Great Britain, Japan, Greece, Yugoslavia and Australia participated in the conference. The first meeting discussed a draft of a new treaty on the Straits’ regime developed by the Turkish government. Following stormy debates, the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits was signed on July 20, 1936. The Convention consisted of five sections, twenty-nine articles, four appendices and one protocol, and was signed by representatives of Turkey, the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, Great Britain, France, Japan, Greece, and Yugoslavia. All the participants reaffirmed that “the Black Sea Straits regime was based on the security of Turkey as well as that of the Black Sea states.” The Convention was signed for a period of twenty years. Two years before the termination of the Convention, any of signatories could demand to terminate it (SAAR, November 26, 1943, f. 28, r. 4, v. 3, pp. 10–11, Adamov, Garmash, Koblyakov. The question of the Straits at the Montreux Conference). Thus, the International Commission was dissolved at Montreux, and Turkey was entitled to interpret the new treaty at its own discretion. In 1938, Italy joined the Convention and in 1951 Japan left it (Potskhveria, 2003, p. 80). The Montreux Convention did not fully satisfy the interests of the USSR, but subsequent events, and especially World War II, showed that the Treaty proved to be an important international tool for ensuring the security of the Black Sea basin and the Soviet Union as a coastal state.
After the Montreux conference, bilateral Soviet - Turkish negotiations on a mutual assistance pact began, but Turkey abandoned the idea in October 1936. On 28 October, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Zekai Apaydın, said to Litvinov that according to the Turkish government, the Montreux Convention was sufficient for the interests of the USSR and Turkey and there was no need to start a new agreement other than the Convention or based on any part thereof. Soviet official circles attributed the change of position of Turkey to the strengthening of British influence. When in early November 1936, the Soviet representative in Ankara, Lev Karakhan explained the position of his country, Prime Minister Ismet İnönü and Minister of Foreign Affairs Rüştü Aras did not bother to hide that they have consulted about this with Great Britain (Rosiya i Chernomorskie prolivy, 440). If Turkey had signed the Treaty, Turkey would have assumed additional obligations to the Soviet Union for the protection of the Straits. It was clear that in the tense international context of the time, these obligations would have created additional problems for Turkey. In turn, the breakdown of the talks brought a certain coolness to Soviet-Turkish relations. In the first days of 1937, this coolness became clear.

On January 7, 1937, after his return from Ankara, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Trade, Arkadi Rozengolts, sent Stalin and Molotov a report under the heading “Top secret” with a record of conversations with Lev Karakhan and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk from October 29, 1936 at the Soviet Embassy at a reception in honor of delegations of “OSOAVIAKHIM” (Society for the Promotion of Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction). After reading the text of the conversation, Stalin imposed a very curious resolution: “to Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Litvinov. It is interesting to get acquainted with the recording of ‘speech’ of our ‘friend’ Atatürk.” What was discussed in the confidential report of Rozengolts? Why was this report sent to Stalin two months after the event?

Coincidentally, on that day, October 29, Turkey celebrated the Republic’s Independence Day, and therefore Atatürk and his entourage arrived at the Soviet Embassy well after midnight. Mustafa Kemal was met by Lev Karakhan, and together they went to the buffet, where they struck up a lively conversation. Kemal began to talk about his friendship and sympathy for the Soviet Union, but then said that he was very offended that Soviet leaders did not send congratulations on the anniversary of Turkey’s independence. Karakhan told him that was wrong. Such a greeting was telegraphed by comrade Kalinin. Mustafa Kemal in an irritated tone said that “Yes, I know this, and I even instructed him to answer, but I do not want to deal with intermediaries. I am not only the President of the Republic of Turkey, but the leader of the Turkish people.” And he asked Karakhan point-blank: “Who is your
leader?” to which Karakhan replied that their leader is comrade Stalin. “Then why didn’t he send me a congratulatory telegram, everyone sent, except him. By this he shows that he does not want to know me.” Lev Karakhan answered him that it is wrong to not accept the congratulations, and added that on October 28 Stalin sent a personal congratulatory telegram congratulating Kemal on Independence Day. Kemal testily said that he was a great friend of the Soviet Union and that this friendship would exist as long as he lived, but he would adhere to this friendship only as equal with equal. He repeated that Stalin had to send a telegram, that he was very offended by the absence of this telegram, and that he objected to dialogue through intermediaries. Lev Karakhan answered him that to some extent this is true and that when he (Karakhan) talks with Foreign Minister Rüştü Aras, they do not always understand each other. Maxim Litvinov and Rüştü Aras understood each other even more. Karakhan was sure that if Kemal Pasha had personally met with comrade Stalin, they would have agreed in a few minutes on all issues without exception. Then they talked about a possible meeting between Kemal Pasha and Stalin. Atatürk again stressed that supported equal relations and he did not accept other forms of relationship. He said, “I know that you have a very strong army, very mechanized, but I’m not afraid of it, I’m not afraid of anyone in the world, including you. I have 18 million people behind me, and enough only order, and they will follow me, where will I take them. I can do much harm, I certainly will not do it, for my words, like my friendship, are sacred and indestructible.” (RSPHSA, January 7, 1937, f. 558, r. 11, v. 388, pp. 9-12, From Arkadi Rozengolts to Stalin and Molotov).

Analysis of this conversation shows Atatürk’s concern caused by rising tensions in Europe in the 1930s. Turkey’s refusal to conclude a pact with the USSR was prompted by the need to pursue a more balanced policy in a changing world. On April 25, 1937, the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara, Lev Karakhan in the report about the conversation with Prime Minister İsmet İnönü explained the concern of Turkey, “at first the Turks wanted to be our allies and achieved this, now they are afraid of it, do not want to be automatically involved in any war just because, we get into it.” (Dokumenty vneshei politiki SSSR, vol. 20, 1976, p. 197) At the beginning of 1937, İsmet Pasha in conversation with Lev Karakhan openly declared that in case of war of France with Germany Turkey would remain neutral, but if war breaks out between Germany and the USSR, Turkey would remain faithful to the old and unchanging friendship (Dokumenty vneshei politiki SSSR, vol. 20, 1976, p. 197). In the speech of Atatürk on the opening of the Grand National Assembly in 1936, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in June 1937 in the Turkish Parliament confirmed the loyalty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. İnönü said, “For those who believe that in recent years, a cold atmosphere
between us and the Soviets reigns, my opening statement, obviously, will be a shock. Our talks with Mr Litvinov and our meeting with the new Soviet Ambassador in Ankara have once again demonstrated the existence of friendly relations.” (İsmet İnönü’nün TBMM’deki Konuşmaları, p. 423).

In July 1937, the Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras and the Internal Minister Şükrü Kaya visited Moscow. They were received by the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR Molotov and People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov. During their talks with Molotov and Litvinov, Aras and Kaya stressed the necessity of preserving friendly relations between the two countries. The parties came to agreement on preserving friendship and allegiance to the cause of peace and principles of the League of Nations (Miller, 1948, p. 183). The Moscow trip of the two Ministers contributed to improving relations between the USSR and Turkey. After the Montreux conference, the Soviet special services started to collect compromising materials against Turkey. They had emigrant organizations shadowed. In turn, Turkey closely watched expansionist trends in Soviet foreign policy. Turkish political circles began focusing on the problems of fascism and communism.

The resignation of İsmet İnönü as Prime Minister in October 1937 and the appointment of Celal Bayar, in the public opinion of a Westerner, were perceived by the Soviet side as a continuation of the cooling of relations with Turkey. According to the diplomat of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR İsmet İnönü, contrary to expectations, the Soviet Union, was one of the authors of the policy of rapprochement with the West. In an extensive briefing about the İsmet İnönü prepared by the head of Middle East Department of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, N. Novikov noted that İsmet İnönü was considered representative of the radical part of Kemalists and a supporter of statism and reliance on domestic resources (SAAR, October 21, 1940, f. 28, r. 4, v. 3, p. 97, N. Novikov. Brief Dossier of İsmet İnönü ).

The death of Atatürk on November 10, 1938 aggravated Soviet-Turkish relations. In spite of the balanced foreign policy of Turkey started in 1936 during the Montreux Conference, the Soviets made additional attempts to revise the course of Turkey’s foreign policy. Anatoli Miller, chief adviser to the people’s Commissariat for foreign Affairs of the USSR on Turkey and the author of a number of secret inquiries about Turkey, later wrote, “Kemal Atatürk died—a man who loved his country and his people and had, whatever his fluctuations, a broad political horizon and a great will. He was a figure who understood the crucial importance of Turkey’s friendship with the USSR and was able to keep the wheels turning at critical moments. Turkey’s policies from a catastrophic turn.” (Miller, 1947, p. 20). On November 11, 1938, the
Grand National Assembly of Turkey elected İsmet İnönü as the second President of Turkey. In November 1938, Şükrü Saracoğlu was appointed Turkish Foreign Minister. With İnönü and Saracoğlu’s coming to power, there began a new stage in the foreign policy of Turkey.

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Thus, during the period between the two world wars Soviet–Turkish relations passed through an interesting path of historical development. Both countries shared identical historical destinies in the 1920s. Both states took their place within the system of international relations and both sought to maintain bilateral relations, collaborate on a wide range of issues, and consolidate their international positions. Until the mid-1930s, Soviet–Turkish relations were characterized as friendly, and in some cases as fraternal.

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