Theorizing the Developmental State beyond Nation-State Histories and Trajectories: The Non-Sovereign Model and the Case of Finland

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Abstract
Developmental state theorization has largely centered on sovereign nation-states and the post-World War II era even while, first, historical work has shown important continuities across even the 1917-1919 divide and, second, recently the importance of a capabilities approach that extends beyond the confines of strictly sovereign state agency has been stressed. Focusing on these two considerations, this article brings historical variance to the developmental state literature by introducing the non-sovereign model that is based on the Finnish national historical trajectory. It argues that the Finnish developmental state project began in the pre-independence era in the Russian Empire and continued along the same core strategy through the interwar years and Finlandization under the Soviet Union all the way to membership in the European Union.

Keywords: Non-sovereign • Developmental state • Finland • Peripheral gaze • Historical sociology

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Unsymmetric comparisons that anticipated problems and solutions became an important political practice in places where the national self-image was imbued by the experience of belonging to the periphery. The ways in which the benefits of backwardness as theorized by Alexander Gerschenkron were mobilized varied according to the state structures that framed the making of the nation and its integration into expanding capitalism” (Kettunen, 2019, p. 204).

In this paper I take aim at the variation of developmental states from the perspective described in the opening quote from historian Pauli Kettunen by considering the experience of a historically successful peripheral and in both its origins and later developments non-sovereign state. Finland’s developmental trajectory and state-building began as a peripheral, though autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. Finnish nationalist activists imagined and defined for themselves a non-sovereign statehood (see for example Jussila, 1987, p. 152). After the loss of the Russian emperor’s sovereign rule Finland gained independence in 1917-1919, despite its political actors’ best efforts to rather secure autonomy by aligning with a strong sovereign power. Finland then spent the interwar years and the Second World War (WWII) in search of new alliances.

Following WWII, Finland was once again, like after the First World War (WWI) placed under post-war Allied supervision, this time of the Soviets. But, Finland was historically better prepared to encounter this position, unlike the type of unguaranteed and weak independent nation-state sovereignty imposed by the US and Britain after WWI that was at best relying on a dysfunctional League of Nations. Finland’s post-WWII state policy is perhaps most famously remembered in the words attributed to then president Paasikivi and engraved in his monument in Helsinki. He described the best foreign policy strategy for dealing with the new situation of Soviet domination with the phrase “facing facts is the start of all wisdom”. By this Paasikivi referred to an acceptance, or practically a domestic depoliticization of Soviet domination in order to turn the existing relation into the most beneficial possible for the Finnish nation. This line of state strategy considers it better not to fight a losing fight against restrictions on sovereignty especially in state foreign policy and rather turn those eventualities into tools and reasons for beneficial relations in other sectors, such as trade, industry, and commerce, but also in more cultural and national aims of strengthening the civil society’s networks and adaptability to a global imperial environment, not only with the Soviets but also with other powers, as only a good and trustworthy neighbor could be allowed to do. A fitting example maybe the parasitic worm that eats the tongue of a fish and takes its place and role; Soviet relations with Finland were to be made an example of friendly, peaceful and, most importantly, mutually beneficial Soviet diplomacy with smaller states (see for example Aunesluoma & Rainio-Niemi, 2016; CIA, 1972; Vartiainen, 1999, p. 230).

1 The monument itself is titled “East and West” and symbolizes Paasikivi’s and Finland’s existential balancing act as a small gateway between two giant monoliths, between a rock and a hard place, one could say.
Such an approach came naturally to Paasikivi and other Finns, especially those who before independence had supported the so-called Old Finn strategy of compliance and diplomatic management towards the imperial metropole as the best means to secure and extend the Grand Duchy’s autonomy and what was often termed at the time “domestic independence”. In 1918 Paasikivi was even one of the main proponents of ordering a German king to rule Finland, rather than choosing democratic republicanism, in order to secure an alliance with a new sovereign metropole. This strategy of compliance and management towards imperial powers like the Soviet Union in order to secure a most beneficial environment for the national project, even at the cost of limited sovereignty, was spearheaded after Paasikivi by the long term president Kekkonen and became described by Western observers as “Finlandization”. Following the fall of the USSR, Finland quickly joined the European Union and ever since one of the main dividing lines of domestic politics has been the infringements of the EU over Finnish sovereignty cast against the benefits that the membership provides, much like the domestic political divisions under the Russian empire. So far the latter perspective of national benefits over sovereignty, upon which the Finnish national development project is historically founded upon, as I argue in this paper, has remained dominant.

I will begin by outlining the main theoretical expansions that the non-sovereign model proposes and then proceed to discuss the historical variance introduced by the non-sovereign model and the specific case of the Grand Duchy of Finland and its post-independence statehood from a developmental perspective. I end with a discussion of key suggestions for development state research. Throughout the article, various historical examples of the Finnish long-term model are connected with discussions in development state theory to introduce new theoretical dimension for consideration.

The Traditional Developmental State Trajectory

It is often assumed that the “developmental state is associated with the developmental class coalitions that led the formation of the nation-state” (Bresser-Pereira, 2016, p. 3). Historically, as developmental economist Bresser-Pereira recounts, a national ruling class (or its segments) allies with the bourgeoisie or “progressive classes” (or parts of it) and, say, urban workers or another segment of the lower classes for the shared interest of seeking a sovereign politico-territorial society within which to consolidate their interests as nation-state sovereignty. This, however, need not be the case. Similar alliances could be and were formed also within and against sovereign entities in search of protection and benefits based on autonomous relations, not necessarily only for or within a nation-state and the type of sovereign politico-territorial formation associated with it, as Bresser-Pereira supposes.

In this paper I outline one non-sovereign model, perhaps the most successful one, that of Finland, while others, especially in the form of aborted development by external
intervention have also existed\(^2\). Importantly, the early strategies of developmentalist alliances in the sovereignty seeking cases that Bresser-Pereira recounts using the particular example of Brazil are different if not sometimes opposite compared to the non-sovereign cases. Bresser-Pereira writes that these class coalitions “were authoritarian because the state was absolute; they were nationalist because they turned relatively heterogenous peoples into sovereign nations; they were developmental because, in addition to being nationalist, they implied moderate market intervention from the state to foster economic development” (ibid., 3). In the non-sovereign cases, as the attainment of sovereignty did not dictate the political ends of developmentalism, the variety of strategies was much more open, though dependent on the non-sovereign position. So, for example, in the case of Finland the class coalitions forged were democratic, because the dominant state was absolute and the Finnish state was non-sovereign; they were nationalist because their autonomy was linked to their national relation with the sovereign power; and they implied market intervention to foster autonomous political agency within the empire.

The larger point of this paper then is to unzip the straightjacket of the connection between developmentalism and national independence. In all senses, the fundamental logic of the non-sovereign developmental state is the same as that of the developmental state that Bresser-Pereira argues to be the explicit domain of the nation-state, i.e. “to socially integrate the peoples that form its territory as a means to enhance competitiveness” (Ibid., 5). Furthermore, one of the crucial aspects of the developmental state, that is bureaucratic capacity and embeddedness, is equally if not more critically present in non-sovereign developmental states (for historical examples, see for example Snyder and Younger [2018], Kuisma [2010]).

Indeed, despite his thorough world historical typology of possible developmental states starting from the 19th century, Bresser-Pereira, for example, does not mention Finland. This is because his typology, based on sovereignty, recognizes the peripheral independent and latecomer centralist models but, being based on the 1917-1919 historical keyhole, forgoes the possibility of a peripheral non-sovereign developmental state, because from the sovereign and historically narrow perspective the latter falls, incorrectly, within the purview of dependency theories only. This is a historical fallacy hidden in the dominant theoretical positions. In fact, one does not need to abandon the developmental state perspective, even in its strictest opposition to dependency and world-systems models to consider the Finnish case of non-sovereign peripheral development. Had Bresser-Pereira studied the history of Finnish statist development

\(^2\) As referenced in this paper, Ireland is a similar case and one can consider several other developmental states where the national and politico-territorial society, to use Bresser-Pereira’s term, that is the object of development has not historically equaled a sovereign nation-state but has been able to develop a successful developmental state under non-sovereign or restricted statehood, such as Quebec, Catalonia, Iceland, or historically many former Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian borderlands.
under the Russian Empire, he would have had to reconsider the historical-political fundaments of his typology.

Bresser-Pereira is not alone, many equate the developmental state and the application of development theories to comparisons of national societies with the post-WWII era, the end of empires and the default of the nation-state. Peter Evans, for example, writes that “ever since the term “development” began to be systematically applied to the comparative evolution of national societies in the mid-20th century, an “accumulationist” paradigm of the process of economic and social change has dominated global thinking” (Evans 2014, p. 87). This is, of course, far from the truth. Nationally based comparisons of state development were central to mid-19th century comparisons already and capital flows and accumulations were one aspect already in play and in consideration at the time. What Evans refers to is the invention of a clean slate, upon which Western scholars began to reinvent the wheel of development comparisons after the experiences of WWI and WWII. National societies and their states, however, did not, in most cases, experience or even desire such as clean slate, as Chalmers Johnson has shown regarding Japan (see for example Johnson, 1999). In following a rationale similar to Evans’, without even stating it out loud like Bresser-Pereira, theorists of the developmental state have included strong historical assumptions and restrictions to their possible cases, to the forms and ways of doing comparisons and to the contextual limits of the key components of developmental state theories, such as embeddedness, state-society relations and bureaucracy. Problematically, when this assumed historical narrative and focus on a particular sovereign politico-territorial unit as the default is left unstated, it also becomes unapproachable to questioning or critique from the perspective of alternative historical relations and consequent theory extension and theory building.

This default model is sometimes called the agency-based model of a developmental state, sometimes also called the Huntingtonian model (Kelly, 2008, p. 325) especially in juxtaposition to more structuralist models of dependency. It has historically taken for granted the bases of that agency in the sovereign state, more specifically the independent nation-states. This has, on one hand, caused modelling to overlook state agency constructed against the grain of sovereign development and, on the other, the constructivist nature of the international order. The latter becomes important especially for consideration of developmental states historically beyond nation-states’ global hegemony following WWII, not to mention cases and trajectories dating to pre-WWI times.

The Huntingtonian model relies on the effects of political institutionalization in creating a strong developmental state. However, the protections and stability achieved through independence and sovereign political institutionalization can also be achieved

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3 A good example of this are recent works reassessing and reconsidering Max Weber’s theories of bureaucracy within the historical context and comparisons, especially regarding statehood and nations, that Weber himself wrote about and referred to (see for example Bhambra [2016], Zimmerman [2006]).
through the pressures and the checks and balances brought about by non-sovereign or threatened state agency, as in the case of Finland. The main difference of a non-sovereign developmental model to the traditional East Asian model is a lesser focus specifically on a state bureaucratic elite insulated from national political networks; Because the state-society relations are defined and perceived differently, therefore also effective autonomy of the bureaucracy cannot rely on the non-sovereign state, though it continues to be supported by it. Public-private co-operation, wealth distribution and high education levels as well as allegiance to price mechanisms remain similar. However, the latter are dictated by and mobilized in order to trade and interact with the external, often imperial, powers that are de facto controlling or overseeing sovereignty.

In the non-sovereign model coordination between political institutions and firms and disciplining of firms are organized around the political and economic sectors’ efforts to navigate and, if possible, benefit from the non-sovereign position. The restrictions yet stabilities offered by these politicized trade relations with the external power encourage, as safety and security on one hand, yet as relative advantage on the other, the development of new sectors and technologies to balance the dependency of other sectors. For example, Finnish trade with the Soviet Union was beneficial but heavily focused on the textile, forestry, and construction industries. Therefore, balancing development, especially in R&D, was initiated through the cooperation of peripheral state institutions with non-state networks, exemplified by the rise of Nokia (Bresnitz & Ornston, 2013; Ornston & Vail, 2016). The necessity or desire for absolute de-linkage is never there, as one end of the political economy is based on sectors that do not seek a comparative advantage, but are backed through political arrangements with the external power. Such less competitive industries are increasingly meaningful and provide a common ground and point of entry for state-industry relations. In the case of Finland this has traditionally included different export segments of the forestry and later construction industries (Koponen & Saaritsa, 2019, p. 24), including the relocation of basic value-added industries, such as textiles or oil, in the non-sovereign state as well as other cross-state production chains that complement the political relation. The Finns, for example, were commissioned to construct the massive Kostomuksha industrial complex and city in the 1970s, which required coordination between seven Finnish and one Swedish construction company and provided iron ore that was then refined in Finland and sold back to the Soviet Union. Tellingly, the Kostomuksha project led to the creation of new investment and R&D in Northern Finland (see for example Isohookana-Asunmaa, 2009). These political and international public-private production chains released and fostered peripheral and balancing developmental networks, especially across non-state actors and marginal public actors, indeed because the state is non-sovereign and not the absolute measure of the limits of the national developmental project.
In the non-sovereign model, development remains highly state-led, but the state’s agency is not that of an independent nation-state or sovereign state, not of the Huntingtonian type. What Kelly (2008, p. 326) calls the national mission of development, executed by the state and reducing resistance in civil society and the market, is not that of sovereign state developmentalism but rather one of non-sovereignty that identifies the possibilities and limits of the state’s agency across domestic-to-international production chains. The state does not similarly need to isolate political institutions, protect development from civil resistance or the market as these are subject to and restricted by the recognized non-sovereign politics vis-à-vis foreign powers. Autonomous civil society, democratization and poverty alleviation become key features of maintaining non-sovereign autonomy and preventing dependencies. They establish the framework of statehood’s limits and become the yardsticks for development. Comparative advantage and market forces outside the non-sovereign power relations, within the restricting set of international politics, are recognized as key milestones in consolidating non-sovereign autonomy and capabilities of the non-sovereign actors. Internal struggles against the state, against democratic politics or between developmental class interests are less significant, since chances of interferences from or through the outside are likelier and more systemic and chances for consolidation of interests vested in (sovereign) statehood and politics against other domestic actors are lower and themselves constrained by the external relations or, in simple terms, there is more to lose than to gain.

Then, much like with analyzes of the Japanese case, especially regarding its statehood, in an historicized manner, we need to consider the long-term history of the Finnish state. When, in Japan “the historically constructed ‘normalcy’ enabled the Japanese developmentalists to challenge neoliberalism by offering the justificatory foundation for the international validity of state-led economic development” (Lee, 2008, p. 525), in Finland similar ‘normalcy’ was constructed historically as non-sovereign statehood, actively engaging dominant externalities, a situation which similarly lent international validity to Finnish state coordination across imperial and later Cold War economic blocs. This will be exemplified through a later discussion on the CIA’s take on Finlandization. Importantly, “this connection between discourse and practice calls for reflexive and historicized analysis of, for example, international political economy with sufficient scope for the importance of shared meanings for policy choice” (Lee, 2008, p. 525).

The non-sovereign model therefore speaks to Bob Jessop’s general critique of the developmental state paradigm’s wholehearted acceptance at face value of the distinction between economy and a sovereign nation-state as an empirical reality rather than a socially and politically constructed division. In Jessop’s terms, the developmental state paradigm embraces a “reified distinction between the market economy and sovereign
territorial state”, which is naturally combined with a focus on state-centric forces as the enablers of an autonomous but embedded bureaucracy that promotes and coordinates developmental policies (Jessop, 2013, p. 33). Jessop continues that “such distinctions indicate the risk of focusing on state managers at the expense of the broader coalition of forces, within and beyond the state (and its borders), that steer development strategies and enable the state to project its power through these alliances” (ibid.). In this paper, I offer one long-term historical model of the latter, that has its roots in the network building activities of the national project of a peripheral non-sovereign state. I will briefly return to Jessop at the end.

**Expanding the Historical Variance of Developmental States**

Ornston and Vail (2016) have described some the outcomes that the type of historical variance described by Kettunen in this article’s opening quote brings to the fore concerning how and why the state apparatus is embedded on one hand and autonomous on the other. In their analysis of specifically the late 20th century developmental state, they argue that in France in comparison to Finland embeddedness has been restricted by state-centric autonomy of the bureaucracy, whereas in Finland embeddedness has been a form of creative compensation. In the latter, the state supports and relies on bureaucracy to seek flexible ways to react to external blows and facilitates strategizing and implementation rather than directly countering externalities as in the French model, i.e. more passive measures, as Ornston and Vail put it, in reference to external shocks: “Finland’s ability to convert traditional industrial policies into ambitious innovation policies reflected significant bureaucratic autonomy”, where the key differences in success arise from qualitative differences between and historical particularities of state-society relations (Ornston & Vail, 2016, p. 13, 16). This invites a closer look at the historical constitution of those relations and the long term definition and understanding of them by the wider national project.

First, let me address why this approach and the case of Finland has not been considered before. In general, the Finnish developmental state has been overlooked or misunderstood because Finland was made a sovereign independent state in 1918-1919. The developmental trajectory and policies and especially the nation-building project including democratization that formed the core of this developmentalism and originated from the pre-independence period under Russian rule have not been taken into consideration. The overall and long-term trajectory and dynamics of the Finnish developmental state has therefore been analytically skewed. Thankfully, more and more work that highlights this continuity has recently come out, especially from Finnish researcher. They however, often take the long-term developmental trajectory as granted and do not critically reflect upon its differences in light of international debates and comparisons, at least until recently (see Saaritsa & Koponen, 2019). On the international
side the Finnish historical case remains unknown. Bagchi, for example, in a long-term historical overview of developmental states, due to overlooking Finland, falsely claims that “the only developmental state to arise in the nineteenth century and survive into the late twentieth century was the Japanese DS” (Bagchi, 2004, p. 30). For Bagchi’s argument, this occlusion is very unfortunate, since he proposes that developmental states need to be built on the foundations of “developmental democracy” (Bagchi, 2004, p. 38), which happened in Finland, where democratization as part and as guarantee of the national developmental project preceded state sovereignty and independence.

The few existing comparative analyses that consider Finland nevertheless abstract late 20th century developments from their historical continuities (see for example Bresnitz and Ornston [2013], Ornston and Vail [2016]), of which especially foreign relations, including Finland’s non-sovereign status at different times, and democratization and the national project originating from late 19th century are crucial to a proper analysis of the Finnish developmental state. As a result, the Finnish model is often falsely placed under the category of advanced developed countries and analyzed from that retrospective perspective (See for example Fosu [2013]) even though it caught up with the advanced countries only in the 2000s, as will be detailed below.

These continuities therefore need to be analyzed as they relate to the developmental state. I will outline the historical origins and main strategies of this Finnish non-sovereign model that is later on described as comparatizing and reflexive. Underlying this is a historically different understanding of the state’s role vis-à-vis national interests, the basis of which has been a mutual consideration towards, on one hand, of the state’s limited capacity to further national development and, on the other, of the mismatch between the state’s role and the benefits of national development. In the Finnish case the state and even the country geographically is not believed to encompass the extent of national interests, as they are interlaced with external necessities and benefits that national networks and bureaucrats seek to anticipate, understand and debate on the state’s behalf. Bresnitz and Ornston (2013), for example, further underline this perspective on the need to better understand the agency of the state as it is defined and imagined by the actors, rather than just in the extent of their embeddedness in domestic and international networks. In that perspective, for example, low-profile peripheries of the public sector come into play and gain importance and agency over central public sector agencies (see Bresnitz and Ornston [2013]).

In the Finnish case the state’s role begins from an understanding of its limitations vis-à-vis the bureaucracy and the national public and private sectors embedded in the periphery of an encompassing imperial polity. Peripheral and low-profile public agencies are therefore almost the raison d’etre of the state; they are the extent of the
state’s means of anticipation and evaluation of irresistible externalities. “In contrast to the literature on the developmental and neo-developmental state, we argue that this type of radical innovation is more likely to occur at the periphery of the public sector, in low-profile agencies with relatively few hard resources and limited political prestige” (Bresnitz & Ornston, 2013, p. 1220). This could be called the default situation for a peripheral non-sovereign state operating within the political and economic framework of an empire and trying to reach beyond it. A good example of the importance of the peripheral agencies in the Finnish case have been public sector employees of the educational and research sectors, but also artists, who have since the 19th century both travelled and networked widely and promoted the Finnish national project and its political economy. This networking reached its peak during the early 20th century with the Paris World exhibition of 1900 as sort of high-water mark. But besides such better known cases of networking especially in the West, Southern Europe and Scandinavia, Finnish scholars were in a central role in promoting the national project and mediating on behalf of the state and establishing relations directly or indirectly, for example, with Eastern Europe, the Ottomans and Korea, not to mention other parts of the Russian Empire. Finns were highly active in the imperial circuits of research and education between the borderlands empires of the Habsburg, Germany, Ottomans and Russia. For example, former professor of St. Petersburg University B.E. Nolde, who had critically written on the active making and imagined character of the statehood of Finland starting in the 1860s by Finnish scholar-activists, calling it “historically unreliable, but undeniably skilful”, remarked later that Finland should erect a monument to the scholars who in the pre-independence years had “taken care of the propaganda abroad [about the imagined Finnish statehood]”, a state that, it is good to note, the Finns themselves in this international nation-making effort had defined as a non-sovereign state (Jussila, 1987, p. 152, 161, 169).

Looking at the case of Ireland, O Riain has in a similar fashion called for a rethinking of the state’s role in developmental states and in favor of a focus on “the ways in which the state mediates between local and global networks and the institutional foundations of this role”, which O Riain shows are different in Ireland than in the traditional cases of developmental states (2000, p. 163). Historically, of course, Ireland is another long-term periphery in proximity to an imperial metropole with a long historical struggle for autonomy. Theorizing from the Irish case, O Riain calls it a model of a flexible developmental state, a category under which we could also place the Finnish case. O Riain lists three things as the theoretical differences of a flexible developmental state vis-à-vis the traditional bureaucratic developmental state: A focus on state interactions with globalization processes, the conditions and sources of embedded autonomy, and, most pertinent to my case, threats to sustainability of the developmental state that emerge as part and parcel of the wider developmental project (2000, pp. 164–165). All of these, but especially the latter should be focused upon in the Finnish case as
well, which I will do here from a long-term historical perspective. As will be discussed, and as O Riain suggests, the difference in terms of threats to sustainability in the traditional model and the flexible model is the consideration of strategies of internationalization of society and fragmentation of state (flexible model) over internationalization of capital and rigidity of state bureaucracy (traditional model). Almost as important is the flexibility of state structures in the new model over a coherence of state bureaucracy (2000, p. 165). Both will be elaborated upon as crucial dimensions of maintaining autonomy under non-sovereign statehood as well.

Non-Sovereign Origins of Developmental Statehood

Prominent Finnish economists Jäntti and Vartiainen, in their brief exploration of Finnish developmentalism, confirm the difference in focus that Bob Jessop above outlined, between a narrow analysis of central state actors over wider developmentalist alliances: “Finland is an example of a developmental state, but the relationship between the state and other societal actors was not one-sided” (2013, p. 32). Rather than arising from state agency, in the Finnish case, relying on its historical experience as a non-sovereign periphery of the Russian Empire, “a political demand for social corporatism... arose quite naturally from the country’s external and internal challenges” (Jäntti & Vartiainen, 2013, p. 37).

In terms of its historical trajectory, what is interesting about the Finnish case is that its developmental success, the jump to the Western developed world was reached at the same time as the East Asian economic crises convinced many that that developmental state model “was a flash in the pan and that the “end of history” that is, the elimination of all alternatives to the American way of life, had finally and definitely arrived” (Johnson, 1999, p. 33). Meanwhile, however, the Finnish developmental state was just slowly ending its long trajectory while recovering from one of the many external shocks that it almost thrives in, the fall of the USSR. Historical context and continuity crucially comes to play in explaining a non-sovereign model of a developmental state in contrast to traditional cases.

As Chalmers Johnson famously argued, the credit for the success of the Japanese developmental state “should go primarily to conscious and consistent governmental policies dating from at least the 1920s” (1999, p. 37). Similarly, I argue that the credit for the success of the Finnish developmental state should go primarily to conscious and consistent governmental policies dating from at least the 1880s. Indeed, sociological theorizing on developmental states has been too strongly conditioned by sociologists’ reliance on post-WWII national historiographies. Considering the Finnish case, the two caveats highlighted by the historical context then are that the Finnish conscious and consistent policies were formed as and for the purposes of a non-sovereign autonomous periphery of the Russian Empire and, second, thereby the state was less
important and even secondary as an original shaper and later as the carrier of those governmental policies. As Johnson (1999) writes, “a state’s first priority will define its essence … For more than 50 years the Japanese state has given its first priority to economic development,” whereas the Finnish state makers, recognizing their endangered and non-sovereign position, defined the state’s essence as the securing of autonomy and capabilities for non-state actors seeking economic development, including bureaucratic networks (connected to but not defined by the Finnish state) stretching beyond state limits, as was the case and necessity within an imperial framework of rule.

As part of these developmentalist efforts, the state itself was defined by the national actors themselves as a non-sovereign state in its very inception. Due to this non-sovereign position, where other domestic actors could enjoy and benefit from imperial networks, but the state was often threatened or intervened in by the sovereign, Finland is a good example of a state in which the support for other national actors’ capabilities predominates, unlike Japan in Johnson’s classic depiction “in which the developmental orientation [of the state] predominates” (Johnson, 1999, p. 37). Because of this relation and the non-sovereign yet autonomous position, these non-state or pseudo-state-actors and the accompanied national project were the primary promoters of developmentalism. The gist of the historical contextual difference is, that unlike in Japan, the relationship between a sovereign state’s bureaucracy and privately owned business never developed into the “the fundamental problem” (Johnson, 1999).

Unlike in Japan after WWII, in Finland both the settlement of WWI and of WWII severely weakened the state’s position and forced it to rely more strongly on the historically non-state national project (see for example Kähönen [2019], Vares [2011]). Regarding democracy, the historical difference is important. Due to the focus on sovereign state-centrism in overall theorizing of developmental states, the compatibility of democracy with a strong developmental state has been questioned. In the Finnish case democratization took place as a non-sovereign imperial periphery (in 1905-1906) and was not connected to sovereignty and independence that happened more than a decade later (1918-1919), but rather to preservation of imperial autonomy and the Grand Duchy’s beneficial status within the empire, i.e. to its developmental project as a non-sovereign state. Following democratization, the parliament and the accompanying fact that Finland bolstered the most progressive and most democratic system in the world at the time became an argument supporting autonomy and part and parcel of the Finnish national project. Once sovereign statehood became a reality, it was considered a threat to this democracy and as such the relationship between the state and democratic politics has not been a similarly contested relation (Korhonen, 2019). Finland democratized not for but against sovereign politics, thereby democracy’s key political relation is linked to the maintenance of national autonomy and capabilities.
represented by the nation rather than the state, whereas the state can be compromised and in fact should work as a buffer to protect national politics, as Finnish post-WWII foreign policy and later Finlandization well exemplify and will be discussed below.

Despite these differences, it is nevertheless in the end good to remember that these are still differences between the main moving parts, the main historical relations of developmental states, as Johnson notes in that “whatever legitimacy their rulers possessed did not come from external sanctification or some formal rules whereby they gained office but from the overarching social projects their societies endorsed and they carried out” (Johnson, 1999, p. 52). The most obvious big picture examples of this primacy of the overarching national social projects are the flexibility and easiness with which the Finnish state moved, within the span of little more than two years in 1917-1919, from the emperor’s sovereignty to establishing a new relationship with the Provisional Government, seeking independence from the Bolsheviks, ordering a German king, to becoming controlled by the Allied Trade Committee and forming a presidential republic. Moreover, this was followed in the interwar years by waging war on the Soviet Union and seeking replacement alliances in Scandinavia and the borderland states. Domestically, this flexibility regarding statehood was present in the almost immediate re-instatement of the Social Democrats after the 1918 civil war and their forming of government already in 1926. In other words, the state was willing to practice extreme flexibility, both domestically and internationally to preserve its developmental logic and the capabilities of its national actors, and was not in itself or through its external sanctifications a source for legitimacy.

Outlines and Comparisons of Finnish Development

There are various ways to measure development. Recent more holistic work based on so-called HDI (Human Development Index) measurements offer a good standard for a long-term developmentalist perspective that takes into consideration a capabilities approach. In this view, Finland remained significantly below any European development levels up until the 1890s when it began to catch up with countries like Portugal and Greece, all of which remained far behind the Western and Northern developed countries. Then in the 1940s and 1950s Finland begins to separate from the trajectory of Greece and Portugal and finally catches up the developed core only by the 1990s and 2000s. From the perspective of traditional developmental state literature, it can be useful to note that Finland’s overall trajectory resembles that of Japan’s (Saaritsa, 2019, p. 39).

In terms of GDP per capita only, Finland slowly began to distance itself from other Eastern European countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary right after WWII, but it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that it made a leap away from this group and slowly began to advance towards the developed countries. In terms of education, the development is perhaps even more surprising considering the educational hype around
the Finnish-model since the start of the PISA-tests. Up until the 1950s and 1960s Finland lagged behind its Eastern European peers in average schooling years, with the exception of Poland. And it was not until the 1980s that it caught up with Czechoslovakia for example. Regarding welfare measured by life expectancy, independence brought about a decline and Finland dropped to the deep periphery and did not catch up with its Eastern European peers until the 1960s and Western and Northern Europe as late as the 2000s. Combining the indicators, Saaritsa summarizes that overall Finland caught up with developed countries and Western Europe starting in the 1990s only (Saaritsa, 2019, p. 45), but, besides clear shocks such as the World Wars, the development trajectory was steady and long. The remarkable aspect is that on most levels Finland’s starting position in the 1870s and 1880s was significantly lower than that of its Eastern European peers. Jäntti, Saari, and Vartiainen pay closer to attention to the fact that “as late as in the 1950s, more than half the population and 40 per cent of output were still in the primary sector” (2006, p. 11).

To rid one of the explanatory burden of such long and late developmental trajectory starting from the deep periphery, an innovation perspective is often offered as the solution. An autonomous bureaucracy and population was less restricted in developing innovative ways to fill niche economic, policy and technological demand in the long run, the argument goes. However, this is not the case with Finland, which was “among the least research-intensive and lowest-technology economies in the early postwar period, spending less than 1% of GDP on research and development”, as Bresnitz and Ornston outline (2013, pp. 1223–1224). Technology and research began to feature significantly in the Finnish economy only after Soviet collapse, with high tech exports climbing from less than 5% to over 20% in less than two decades (2013, p. 1225). Rather, we must turn our analytical gaze to the long term political developmental project.

Overall then, Finland provides a similarly if not more successful model of developmentalism as South Korea and Japan. However, it has rarely been considered as a basis for sociological theorizing on developmental states, possibly because of the more complicated state-society and foreign relations of the country that seem to escape comparisons grounded in post-WWII sociological thought and historical assumptions. Yet, as Jäntti, Saari, and Vartiainen point out, “the very notion of a strict separation between ‘state’ agents and ‘private’ agents, so central to modern economics, becomes anachronistic when applied to the Finnish policy experiences” and go on to suggest that, nevertheless, Finland’s “growth strategy bears surprising similarities with those of the Asian tiger economies”, that in Finland, just like Korea and Taiwan, for example, pragmatic cooperation played a key role (2006, pp. 12–13). Importantly, they go on to specify that in Finland the strategy was based on a logic of intentional attempts to “exploit growth externalities … by direct intervention, but without infringing private property rights and without formally recurring to ‘economic planning’ that would have
been interpreted as a challenge to the capitalist order” (2006, p. 13). How was growth then achieved? An important role was played not only by foreign industrialists and capital, as in the mid-19th century, but later also by international aid. Finland was considered a donor darling after WWII due to low corruption levels. Such an image traces back to the nationalist activists’ networks of pre-independence times. Helping Finland was unproblematic. Even though Finland refused Marshall-Aid it remained a destination for other forms of aid and was, for example, one of the most successful early aid receivers from UNICEF. This situation, as well as the oxymoronic direct state intervention without recurring to anything that might have been interpreted as anti-capitalist was highly dependent and related to the strategy of non-sovereign development that aimed to close as few doors as possible in terms civil society’s and national actor’s capabilities. In this sense, though Finland lost its beneficial position within the Russian Empire with independence in 1918-1919, that process was likely significant for later development. Finland was at that point put under the purview of the Allied Trade Committee and already the earlier process of seeking recognition from the US and the UK led the highly capacious and autonomous Finnish commercial and trade networks to seek new export opportunities in the West and the US (See for example Kuisma [2010]). Finally recovering the Eastern dimension after WWII, Finland was then in an even more beneficial position to continue to its non-sovereign developmental policy.

Therefore, it is telling and natural that, compared to the so-called humane and long-term development models of the other Scandinavian countries, Saaritsa describes Finland’s trajectory more as a chaotic and at times ugly (Saaritsa, 1919, p. 50). Jäntti, Saari and Vartiainen, also point out how “the Finnish economy suffered quite large shocks relative to those in other countries”, such as Sweden (2006, 9). This describes the position of a non-sovereign developmental state, that is dependent on its autonomous relations to external powers and whose fortunes are more difficult to describe with nation-state centric comparisons. Adding to the mixture the role of state security, some historians have even compared Interwar-Finland to a fragile state that could have collapsed (Kähönen, 2019). It is fortunate and particular of the Finnish model, that the fragile interwar years did not interrupt or disrupt the non-sovereign developmental model. Democratic rule, especially on the local level, and international trade were seen as core supports for the national project and continued based on previous trajectories even when the newly sovereign state’s legitimacy and monopoly on violence was questioned and threatened. Indeed, the importance and particularities of extraparliamentary politics for the durability of the system stretching across the 1918-1919 independent nation-state divider is important. Simple central state capture was at no point a feasible solution to gaining control. Kähönen, for example, touches upon the problems of this regarding the fragile years and suggests that legitimacy of the political system at-large was dependent on the ability to include all political and
economic segments even at the price of state capacity and sovereignty, whereas in Estonia, for example, state independence was seen as a legitimate reason for political exclusion and authoritarianism (2019, pp. 307–311). Unlike in the Estonian and many other interwar cases, in Finland state independence and sovereignty did not take primacy over the national developmental project and fascist movements and centralization efforts were fought off by developmentalist class coalitions.

Since the mid-20th century, as the neighboring regions were engulfed behind the Iron Curtain and Bolshevik-led developmentalism, Finland has also been compared to and even grouped together with its Scandinavian neighbors whom it at the time slowly began to catch up. However, historically beyond the 1917-1919 nation-state vs. socialist nation divide, many have pointed out that Eastern countries would be the more natural and structurally reasonable comparison point for Finland (Koponen & Saaritsa, 2019, p. 21). The major difference of course is, that during and after WWII Finland was able to retain its 1919 nation-state form, though it remained politically within a Cold War limbo not unlike its previous autonomous status under the Russian Empire, when it also had one foot in the Nordics, another in Central Europe and at least an arm reaching out to the West, while calmly resting its head on Russia. The one other possible natural comparison point, Austria, does not apply for a developmental state perspective, since Austria was the rich metropole of a former empire rather than a poor periphery.

I will further briefly discuss one false assumption of the so-called Scandinavian model of development unto which Finland has been retrospectively and historically incorrectly latched, before delving into more historical description. One of the main factors of the Scandinavian model is the “Circle of Good”, a mutually reinforcing development between equality, welfare and education. But, especially regarding education and welfare Finland has not historically followed the Scandinavian model. According to historian Saaritsa, it would be “difficult to claim” that Finland had high human capital despite its low economic capital. In terms of human capital, Finland caught up with parts of Western Europe at the earliest in the 1960s and it was not until the 1990s that Finland caught up with the rest of the Scandinavian countries (Saaritsa, 2019, p. 37). In fact, after independence Finland’s education levels dropped to the extent that the country dropped far behind Latin America. By the 1950s Finnish educational attainment levels were very low compared to Western Europe, but at this point growth had accelerated to new levels (Saaritsa, 2019, p. 42).

Histories of the Finnish Non-Sovereign Developmental State

**Structure**

In the Grand Duchy of Finland, decision-making institutions and both a strong and efficient bureaucratic tradition and corporatist networks developed under Russian Rule,
when trade opportunities and politics went hand in hand, were linked to Finland’s autonomous status, and were mutually coordinated along the Helsinki – St. Petersburg axis. This civil service remained mainly in Finnish hands though stretched beyond the Finnish state and was based on a legalistic tradition that relied equally and importantly on separate legislation for the Grand Duchy and the metropole but one that was backed up directly by the sovereignty of the emperor. The Finnish status has falsely been described as a shield against Russian imperialistic aspirations. Such arguments conflate the imperial state with Russian nationalism and centralization interests, whereas the Finnish position and its governance were characteristic rather than exceptional modes of imperial governance and sovereignty. The civil service bridged the intra-imperial horizontal relations across the sovereign entity, while the state was developed parallel, and even as a counter-force against other states of the empire, most notably the metropolitan one.

In the influential volume by Woo-Cumings (1999), Juhana Vartiainen, offers a solid though historically problematic and simplistic overview of the making of the Finnish developmental state. Vartiainen, in his brief summarization, falls victim to methodological nationalism of historiography but otherwise acutely and correctly observes the consequences of Finland’s non-sovereign position vis-à-vis other developmental states: “In comparison with East Asian countries, one may say that the Finnish state, if understood as the political power of a parliamentarian government, has been relatively weak, whereas business corporations and a relatively autonomous bureaucracy have been very strong” (Vartiainen, 1999, p. 228). What Vartiainen perhaps leaves out, or at least implicitly subjects to a statist comparison, is the fact that especially the autonomous and strong bureaucracy was not a Finnish state bureaucracy, but an imperial bureaucracy bridging the periphery and metropole, and it was in relation to such a bureaucratic network with which the business corporations and other national interest groups developed and were accustomed to dealing with.

Vartiainen furthermore exaggerates the 1918-1919 historical keyhole and nation-state continuity over institutional continuity in his freehand historical summary of the development of the Finnish developmental state. He proposes that with independence a corporatist and developmentalist state was set up, including a half-official-half-corporatist decision-making structure. However, that structure had been key to Finland’s autonomous imperial position (see for example Jussila 1984). Furthermore, what Vartiainen portrays as the improvisation of the victors of the civil war, was in fact a long-standing tradition of non-sovereign Finnish politics in relying on a strong sovereign power, first the Russian Emperor then as a failed enterprise a German King. This strategy combined an “external” sovereignty distanced from democratic politics to emphasize the autonomy of both spheres and to allow for the space and freedom of effective bureaucracy as the middleman not beholden to either. Though falsely
connecting the origins of this alliance to independence, especially to the form of nation-state independence that was imposed upon Finland in 1919 against the wishes of the victorious whites whom Vartiainen again incorrectly associates with nation-state independence, Vartiainen is nevertheless again right about the consequences. He points to something he names the “basic commitment” that is “crucial for a country situated within a contested zone between the world’s ideological blocs”. This basic commitment can also be characterized as a class alliance like the ones Bresser-Pereira talks of, but one committed to developmentalism under non-sovereign statehood by means of compromising sovereignty over autonomy and economic development. Ironically, in terms of state capacity, especially a “capability enhancing developmental state” a la Evans (2014) this non-sovereign alliance can be much more effective and less prone to internal conflict, though perhaps riskier in terms of its exposure to external relations.

For example, it was the minister-state secretary’s office in St. Petersburg, and thereafter political but more importantly business relations to Germany and then again the US and the UK that prevented the transferal of sovereign power to Finnish democratic political institutions past a sovereign “strong man” institution during the uncertain years of 1917-1919 (and again during the Second World War and its aftermath, especially in terms of Germany and the Soviet Union again). Whereas, Finnish independence was directly secured in 1919 through business networks with Wall Street that were able to sway the Wilson administration’s stance towards Finland (Kuisma, 2010) after the Paris Peace Conference had decided not to recognize Finland’s independent nation-state status. A very concrete example of this trade-led diplomacy was an earlier failed effort to defy the allied naval blockade by sending a ship full of cheap pulp towards the UK, like dangling a carrot in front of a horse. These examples point to the role of informal yet highly capable international networks where business and bureaucrats come together beyond the state’s existing mandates and indeed redefine statehood from a perspective outside the state and through strategic considerations that were intentionally distanced from domestic democratic politics.

Here, though oblivious to them, Vartiainen too establishes continuities between the pre-independence and post-WWII developmental state in Finland: “In fact, much in the Finnish experience rings a bell for scholars of the Korean experience. Both countries were confronted with a difficult international situation, but both turned it to their advantage.” (Vartiainen, 1999, p. 230). From the perspective of the trajectory of the Finnish developmental state, independence has little explanatory value, at most times Finland’s international situation is near equivalent with its pre-independence imperial situation, even if the international order itself has transformed. Indeed, exactly as Finnish autonomy under the Russian Emperor, importantly in the post-WWII order “Finland was to become a kind of “showpiece” for Soviet postwar diplomacy. Trade with the Soviet Union greatly enhanced the etatist aspects of Finnish economic management.
This trade was organized politically, and close ties with the political elites became a source of lucrative business contracts as well” (Vartiainen, 1999, p. 230).

Capabilities

Embeddedness and autonomy cannot be historically theorized or understood in the nation-state framework only if one wants to seriously separate the developmental state and the contributions of that literature’s claims from dependency theory, because the nation-state framework cannot be used ahistorically and a priori to determine the unit of analysis and comparison as well as the, especially longer term, limits of state agency. Illustrative of this are especially Weberian theories of bureaucracy and political autonomy that were developed within and talked about a national bureaucracy of an imperial state instead of a nation-state bureaucracy (see for example Bhambra [2016], Zimmerman [2006]). Connected to this problematic dehistoricization of concepts and methods is the occlusion of how, long before the move from well-being to capabilities that Peter Evans credits to Amartya Sen, especially peripheral and non-sovereign states as well as stateless, displaced or minority citizenries and denizenries emphasized and prioritized capabilities, i.e. the idea to increase “the capacity of human beings to do the things that they want to do” (Evans, 2014, p. 86) specifically by actively recognizing the restrictions and confines within which that is optimally possible for an emerging nation or populace seeking recognition⁴.

This especially included political considerations and visions based on limitations of state and sovereign power. The difference of this non-sovereign model with the Nordic model, that has historically also focused on the joint capabilities of its population, is the differently defined role of the state. According to Kettunen (2019), the non-sovereign state emphasizes and prioritizes a comparatizing and reflexive national approach to development, one not based on straightforward direct nation-state or sovereign comparisons, as is further elaborated below. Evans points to the capabilities model of the developmental state as prioritizing the creation and utilization of new ideas, in other words human capital over capital, within the developmental state. According to Evans this counters theorizations based on what he terms the “outmoded Anglo-American anti-statist ideologies”. This does indeed seem crucial, as it forces one to consider the state’s agency in creating human capital and its distribution as well as moves discussion away from a zero-sum-game within the state. However, historically, especially when analyzing continuities over the 1918-1919 divider, this juxtaposition is a restricting starting point for theorization and in fact not present at all in many cases. The Nordic model was historically not constructed against such anti-statist ideologies and prioritization of human capital was not an option but a default. Rather,

⁴ For historical examples of this type of projects see for example Snyder and Younger (2018), Amzi-Erdogdu-lar (2018), Blumi (2011), or for historically contemporary analysis Osten-Sacken (1909/1912).
disputes and debates were aimed at how to maintain the so-called circle of good, how best distribute and use capital to increase capabilities. This, however, was still based on national comparisons and on a state that represents the continuity of the nation. This state, while coordinating internally, alleviates external shocks and maintains sovereignty in their face. The non-sovereign model shares with the Nordic model the baseline of human capital, but understands the state-society relations and especially the moving pieces of a circle of good differently.

A good example of the qualitative difference is the debate about the relation between inequality and development that Evans considers an important addition to the capability focused theories. “While an inequitably distributed increase in wealth may still count toward growth, it is much more problematic to count an inequitably distributed increase in capabilities as a contribution to development defined as capability expansion” (Evans, 2014, p. 89). In simplified terms, the understanding of a need for equitable distribution of capabilities as a means to secure long term economic welfare underlies the Nordic model. This was behind the democratization of the state that consolidated, corresponded, balanced and ultimately guaranteed workers and employer unions’ corporatism. In Scandinavian countries this had its historical origins in the alliance between agrarian and labor politics.

However, in Finland “The workers and peasant’s” cooperation did not arise from consideration of the political economic reform as it did a little earlier in Denmark, Sweden and Norway” (Kettunen, 2019, p. 213). In the interwar years, as before in 1906, democratization of the state and accompanying class alliances and the reforms they jointly sought in Finland were connected with external relations and threats. For example, already in the old diet of 1880s the first workers’ protection law was discussed with reference to existence of the nation: “The capability of the [Finnish] nation to compete in industry as well as its hopes in general to be victorious in the struggle for existence, are dependent not only on the amount of laborers but also and especially on their quality” (Kettunen, 1994 as cited in Kettunen, 2019, p. 210). The traditional state-centered national coordination framed problems and solutions as external and internal. The peripheral gaze, however, inherent for non-sovereign states and peripheries of empires, took the aforementioned state-centered frame as an external problem and, though it strived for it, also feared it in the failed examples it witnessed elsewhere. In other words, the state’s existence as a backbone and existential proof of the nation is not the starting point of a non-sovereign understanding of capabilities, especially since problems and solutions are by default, by the nature of non-sovereign politics seen to cross and transcend the internal-external, domestic-international divides.

This was especially the case for bureaucracy and industry of the nation, that stretched, and, as in the case of Finland, could greatly benefit from a position independent of
and traversing such national political boundaries at ease. And so, while Finland adopted the Nordic model as a motivation and ideal for its development aims, it did so already under the Russian Empire, since the 1860s according to Kettunen (2019, p. 205), with no pretense of actually copying it. The Nordic model became the foundation of the emerging state’s peripheral gaze, while at the same it was clear for the national political elites that that very state could not rely on a Scandinavian or Nordic form for existence. To clarify the distinction, we can follow Kettunen in using Reinhart Koselleck’s concepts of “the horizon of expectation” (Erwartungshorizont) and the “space of experience” (Erfahrungsraum) (Kettunen, 2019). While the Nordic model gave form to the horizon of expectation of the nation, it remained strictly distanced from the space of experience of the state. This tension was understood and productively used as a tool for organizing political discourse and the space of political imagination in the early 20th century. Moreover, it was successfully applied as a form of foreign policy that allowed nationalist activists to distance their arguments concerning an imagined horizon of expectation from the bureaucracy’s and every day political interaction’s space of experience. A good example, is the democratization process where Finland, selectively adopting civilizational arguments, portrayed and advertised itself as the most democratic (thus also the most progressive and developed) nation, which therefore meant that it had the most legitimate claim for national existence (Korhonen, 2019). This was done in the face of an understanding that the democracy was fragile and not seriously recognized by imperial powers, being non-sovereign.

Another descriptive example is the discussion around the legal status of the Finnish state in the empire. Abstract claims of the legal idea of Finnish statehood parallel and equal to that of Russian statehood were promoted by Finnish polemicists since the mid-19th century, especially outside the empire itself. These claims for a share in sovereignty were in fact nested entirely within the empire’s sovereignty and only made sense as an intra-imperial political position and under the umbrella of the Russian imperial state. No Finnish actor had the intention to portray Finland as an inter-imperially equal state with its own sovereignty; as such the Finnish position crucially hinged upon the distinction of the horizon of expectation and the space of experience in imagining something promoted as “Finland’s Internal Independence” as one prominent Finnish volume about the matter was titled (Danielson, 1892). This imagined arrangement was considered purely separate from the practical matters of sovereign statehood. Intra-imperial sovereignty was projected vis-à-vis the imperial state and its constituent parts while inter-imperial sovereignty was recognized to be held only by imperial states together. Danielson himself, one of the most prominent promoters of Finland’s special position, noted that the word “province” could in fact be used, if one remembered that it meant Finland’s position from the perspective of foreign policy, but not in terms of its (intra-imperial) independent relation within the Russian Empire (Jussila, 1987, p. 155). It was an imagined statehood for the newly imagined Finnish
nation that did not correspond with the state’s space of experience, but promoted the normalcy and legitimacy of benefits arising from the very non-sovereign position itself. To give an example, Finns were able to move and trade throughout the empire while it was extremely difficult for other nationalities to own property, practice commerce or participate politically in the Grand Duchy of Finland. Regarding this imagined statehood, the esteemed Finnish statesman J. V. Snellman joked that perhaps this Finnish state needs to establish diplomatic relations with Russia then, and have its head, the Grand Duke, negotiate with the Russian Czar. The joke is of course, that those were the one and the same person.

This imagined non-sovereign statehood remained as a model for Finnish developmentalism after the loss of Russian imperial sovereignty in 1917 and repairing it in order to recover the horizon of expectation of Nordic democratic welfare became the aspiration and divider of political action. Depending on their politics Finns sought to re-forge a relation with the Soviet or the German Empire. They thereafter sought Scandinavian as well as so-called borderlands alliances with Poland and other newly independent states and participated actively in the League of Nations. Even with the highly beneficial Tarto peace agreement in 1920, the industrialist, minister of defense and general Rudolf Walden lamented the problems of sovereign independence that brought all sorts of disruptions and obstacles to trade and industry, not the least the organization and paying for independent foreign relations and defense of the state. Tellingly Walden was also the representative of the export heavy forestry industries. Politics of the early independence years were largely founded on the re-establishment of foreign commercial and trade relations and opportunities that led also to political linkages, especially with Germany. Second World War then saw Finland re-kindling its alliance with Germany. That project fortunately failed, yet the post-WWII position between the West and the East fitted naturally with Finnish imagined statehood. The term “Finlandization” was coined in Western German political debate to describe such a position where nominal independence and political and economic autonomy and gains are maintained with the agreement that external power relations can interfere and compromise full sovereignty. In simplest terms, foreign policy alignment and perceived political neutrality were the requirements for beneficial bilateral trade. It was the period of Finlandization during which Finland’s developmental state ultimately caught up with its Eastern peers.

The core of Finlandization was the very same peripheral gaze of comparativizing and reflexive anticipation accompanied with internal adaptation through which the state provides space and capabilities for national development beyond the existing confounds of sovereignty. A CIA intelligence report from 1972 describes Finlandization and Finland’s strategy as a policy of reassurance that demanded “a highly developed sensitivity to Soviet wishes on a wide range of subjects and the ability and willingness
to voluntarily restrict their own courses of action” (ii). Not unlike the times of the
Grand Duchy, the Finns’ imagination, horizon of expectation, of their own nation was
far removed from Soviet views or the actual space of experience of the state. This
tension, however, promoted the autonomy of bureaucracy, trade and the everyday
running of things in that space of experience and bore the brunt of potential political
conflicts that could have intervened there. The same CIA report describes the difference
as follows: “Finland’s neutrality obviously does not meet any conventional strict
definition of the term. It is not a static concept to the Finns, but a living policy which
they are continually adapting to their perceived national interests and opportunities.”

Here, it is descriptive to return to Finland’s post-war president Paasikivi. The later
carrier of his mantle and long-term president (1956-82) Kekkonen described in 1960
the strategy of Paasikivi as “foreign policy always preceding domestic policy”, referring
not necessarily to the primacy of foreign policy but rather to its informational and
strategic importance to planning and consideration of any domestic efforts. Now then,
we can revisit Paasikivi’s famous statement mentioned above that “facing facts is that
start of all wisdom”. With this Paasikivi referred specifically to the actions of the state
and the foreign policy of the state in that it should not be subject to domestic politics
lest it risk implicating and risking the freedom and autonomy of national political
projects, as president Kekkonen in a 1960 speech also elaborately argues (1960). What
Paasikivi refers to as facts is the space of experience of a state, and it should remain
at distance from the horizon of expectation of the nation, a critical relation that
Kekkonen points to in his speech in connecting the above statement of Paasikivi
directly with another quotation from him: “A sense of political realism is not one of
the strongest suites of the Finnish nation. We believe, as we hope things to be, and we
act as if what we hoped, was true”. Kekkonen underlines this further by quoting
Paasikivi again in that “the key for our country’s future is the relationship to the Soviet
Union”, i.e. the autonomy and agency of national development and its future, can only
be based on the primacy of the state’s relationship with the USSR. With this in mind,
Kekkonen is able to state that “nothing from the side of the Soviets threatens our
independence and freedom”. In other words, by instrumentalizing the state into a tool
for national capabilities even at the cost of compromising on its agency, the external
relationship can be at worst neutralized and predicted and at best controlled and
benefited from.

In this line Kekkonen continues to outline that the state needs to not just manage
and deal with foreign policy, but stabilize and secure its foreign relations and existence,
be they based on the domination of a superpower neighbor or not, in order to guarantee
national freedom. Kekkonen further backs up his line of argument with a more abstract
but descriptive quote from Paasikivi about this relationship between state policy and
national development, or the space of experience and the horizon of expectation: “We
must find not just a modus vivendi, but create such good relations that Russia can not only tolerate Finland’s special status, but also even perceive it as the best option for itself” (Kekkonen, 1960). Any disagreements against this fundamental distinction Kekkonen regarded as “a waste of capabilities” (Kekkonen used the Finnish word ‘voimavara’) that “goes not only against our national interest and the prevailing factual circumstances, but also cannot lead to results in practical politics” (Kekkonen, 1960). The juxtaposition by Kekkonen of ‘results in practical politics’ with any ideological opposition to the loss of sovereignty is crucial here. To create space for action and capabilities, the two naturally are in a constant irreconcilable tension.

Diplomat and historian Talvitie has further characterized this foreign policy strategy as one aiming to navigate great power imperial aims while not necessarily understanding independence as a goal in itself, but as a tool to aid the nation (2020). Pointing to a descriptive distinction, Talvitie notes that in the Paasikivi-type framework, Finnish independence did not fit well into the post-WWII international legal definition of a sovereign state. (Ibid.)

**Strategy**

To summarize a convincing agentic perspective from Finnish national historiography on the developmental state we can consider historian Pauli Kettunen’s take based on the strategic thinking of Finnish elite nationalists of the late 19th century. Kettunen describes their thinking as a comparativizing and historically reflexive stance on the state’s role and activity (Kettunen, 2019, pp. 201–202), in other words, a view compiled from a multiplicity of perspectives from the outside. Kettunen clarifies, that the elite segmented the state’s developmental policies and picked as models for strategic action the particular metropoles and world regions that seemed most successful in that particular segment. The process and activity of importation of these strategies from the outside and their successful incorporation into a holistic view for the peripheral developmental state defined the idea of nationalism, nationalist motivations and “action for and beneficial to the nation”, a nationalization of the prevalent world order, Kettunen summarizes, where modernization itself was understood nationally as the successful bridging or bringing together of internal capacities and skills with external necessities (ibid., 202). Implementing this strategy required and could, in fact, only take place with extensive domestic-international and trans-state networks across various sectors from education to industry and arts.

Importantly, the earlier mentioned tradition of mixing up Finland with the other Scandinavian countries takes a different form but continued importance in this sense. Finns looked upon the other Nordic countries to see how they adopted and how they themselves copied new developments from centers and metropoles of modernization (Kettunen, 2019, pp. 205–206). Finns then assessed whether those adaptation processes
turned out beneficial or not. It was a doubly reflexive developmentalist strategy in this sense, not only benefitting from later development but also strategizing based on how other later developers adopted new strands and forms of thinking around different segments of developmentalism. It could be described as a highly conservative and careful latecomer strategy with a focus on compatibilities with the state’s external environment. Regarding the discussions of the developmental state it is meaningful to stress that it was in this fashion that Finland looked upon especially Norway and other Scandinavian countries as they adopted the core strategy of state-led capitalism as a broad based societal movement. Finland did not strive to copy and mimic Scandinavian countries, but sough to recreate similar processes of reform and adaptation, at least the ones deemed successful in Scandinavia and plausible in the Finnish context to implement. In a nutshell, these comparisons played and continue to play an anticipatory role aiming to maximize control and predictability before implementation.

These strategies have thereafter continually characterized Finnish national economic policy. A good example is the influential pamphlet by the long-time president Kekkonen with the revealing title “Does our Country have the Patience to Prosper?” (in Finnish Onko maallamme malttia vaurastua?) (Kekkonen, 1952). As Jäntti, Saari, and Vartiainen explain, this type of thinking was a continuity of the non-sovereign logic of the Grand Duchy, for key political players, and “foremost among them was President Urho Kekkonen, who sought to build a solid national consensus on economic and social policy, so that no political contradictions on the domestic scene would undermine the country’s thin geopolitical elbow room” (2006, pp. 20–21). This meant that domestic imagination of statehood had to be founded on external political economic possibilities and threats. Jäntti, Saari, and Vartiainen continue, that for state actors such as Kekkonen “a broad consensus on economic matters may have played a positive role for the country’s external security” and a “safeguard” against external threats, mainly the Soviet Union (2006, p. 22). In other words, reform and development had to be slow and based on carefully constructed consensus regarding the implementation process in order to prevent conflicts that the non-sovereign state could not afford.

Kettunen summarizes this type of developmental political strategy in the following manner: “International dependency created a foundation for the primary position of national economy and society as the central focus of the understanding of reality that guided politics” (Kettunen, 2019, p. 206). He clarifies this central statement of Finnish developmental state thinking in that, when considering what to reform, what to modernize, and what to let go of, the central arguments revolved around national particularities and specificities regarding two key developmental aspects (Kettunen, 2019, pp. 206–207). First, in terms of a developmental state and considering the developmental level of the state, it is understood in a segmented fashion, where the
relations between different segments are accepted as asymmetrical, largely due to the heavy and incoherent exposure to external relations and the conservative reform pace that requires outdated segments to be dragged along, even at the expense of speed, in order not to jeopardize a broad consensus. Second, what was the particular position of the nation in the global gathering of states and nations was crucial and, as a most important addendum to the latter, what maintained its individualistic and separate position in those relations was focused on. Regarding the latter (the nation), it became therefore a goal and a strategy to maintain particularity and autonomy, even at the expense of hierarchies of state relations and absolute sovereignty.

In practical terms, a key consequence of this developmentalist strategy was that there was a significant delay with the introduction of new ideas and their practical implementation. On the flipside, however, critique and critical discussion of new ideas surfaced already before any practical measures were taken, which again enforced control, consensus and predictability over implementation and reform processes. Kettunen gives Taylorism as an example. Taylorism entered Finnish societal discussions in the 1910s and critiques of it in the 1920s, but Taylorist inspired policies were actually implemented as considerations of the organization of work only after WWII (Kettunen, 2019, pp. 208–209). This meant that the political struggles over national futures based on such novel ideas was begun and shaped the aforementioned understanding of the non-sovereign developmentalist state, and especially its future alternatives already beforehand.

With this comparativizing and historically even doubly reflexive strategy, coming from its non-sovereign position in the Russian Empire, Finland smoothly though slowly adopted its version of the Scandinavian model as its new framework, if not reality, for thinking and framing a developmentalist future. Being Nordic, as Kettunen recounts, meant a definition of nationalism as a supranational framing based on relationalism and interaction, a progressivity based on active and reflexive comparisons of global metropoles and global developments and their localized implementation through a nationalism that is less inward looking and more cohesive than its actual models in the world by the virtue of being founded on relational comparisons.

Even though they do not explain it further, Jäntti, Saari, and Vartiainen also acknowledge the importance of a historically non-sovereign foundation of national bureaucracy and its continuity into post-1918-19 in focusing on external challenges as contributing to Finland’s favorable outcome: “There was a nationalistic and meritocratic civil service in place, and the prestige and strength of this bureaucracy was largely due to the country’s autonomy period under Russian rule. At that time, its legalistic tradition provided a protective shield against the imperialistic aspirations of Russian politics. This provided for a meritocratic self-esteem within the bureaucracy,
so that it saw itself as a bearer of national success” (Jäntti, Saari, & Vartiainen, 2006, p. 17). In this regard, even though comparisons with Taiwan and Korea make sense trajectory-wise, in terms of developmental statehood differences remain. Going from a non-sovereign state to an imposed form of sovereign statehood that was perceived as uncertain, fragile and threatened, the state was not the primary force of developmentalism in Finland. Rather, existing and long-lasting networks and national projects stretching beyond the state’s geographical and temporal reach, such as winter navigation, formed the primary motor of developmentalism. The market environment therefore, could be described as market liberalism with reservations (Fellman, 2019, pp. 295–296). Those reservations were particularly based on the imagined statehood and its deficiencies in becoming the carrier and vessel of the long term national project. Direct state intervention in the traditional sense was low, even if the state was broadly present (Fellman, 2019).

Telling of this variance and difference in developmentalist strategy is the divergence in economic and especially labour politics across the Nordic countries, but especially in terms of Finland, yet their joint active engagement and cooperation in international mutual cooperation organizations from the League of Nations to the ILO and UN and the establishment of the Nordic Council in 1952. A practical example of this reflexive and comparative nationalism was the establishment of official statistics and a national statistics agency in Finland already in the 1860s and a joint Nordic standardized statistical index in 1946. Similarly, already in the early 1950s the Nordic countries established passportless freedom of movement and joint labor markets, all motivated by the understanding of global market competition that necessitates such agreements (Kettunen, 2019, 214). Finland’s approach was not one of copying, but one of actively waiting, seeing and modifying, a “search for reform and transformation in peripheral Finland through the weaknesses of such structures that in the metropoles seemed to oppose change” (Kettunen, 2019, p. 215).

A Concrete Example of Non-Sovereign Developmentalism’s Dimensions

An interesting example of the non-sovereign developmentalist strategy in action is the connection between the development of winter navigation and nationalism in Finland. It describes further in concrete terms the so-called peripheral gaze and the tension between the horizon of expectation and the space of experience that Kettunen refers to. Finland is the only country in the world where during a normal winter all ports freeze. The development of a winter-seafaring system over a century from 1878-1978 was achieved as an integral national project, Matala and Sahari argue (2017). It developed into and aligned with Finland’s imagined statehood and especially its horizon of expectation; Winter navigation became a “central imaginary for Finland as a Western, industrial and modern nation” (2017, p. 220). It is a befitting example of the national
economic project and policy’s connection to externalities. The century-long project crosses the independence divider and represents the underlying long-term national vision that extends beyond statehood. Taming winter and ice “presents a case of technological nationalism in which a small, peripheral country sought to integrate itself into a modern international order” (2017). As a long-term bureaucratic-technological national project in the face of which the trajectories and uncertainties of Finnish statehood pale, it is also a fitting example of how the tension between the space of experience and the horizon of expectation functions as a carrier of developmentalism. As Matala and Sahari put it, it naturalizes the relation between the strong dependency on icebreaking and the particular capability of managing the wintry conditions (2017).

The origins of the icebreaking project lie in Finland’s non-sovereign position under Russian rule. Matala and Sahari argue that “icebreakers became important because a nationally-minded technocratic elite saw them as a technology that could greatly contribute to their nation-building efforts” and thereby “nationalism, economic and political incentives were inseparable components in this process” (2017, p. 221). But, much as with other aspects of national historiographies, “the search for and adoption of technology to overcome tangible problems of connecting Finland to the larger world has become muddled and obscured by later nationalistic narratives” (2017, p. 222). Icebreakers symbolically became the manifestations of the national project as a horizon of expectation as they were able to fight against the external threat to the national project by nature herself and transform it from a handicap into an economic capability. At the core was the transformation of a repeating period of uncertainty into a controlled and predictable environment through national effort. Perhaps paradoxically, yet fittingly for consideration of non-sovereign control of externalities, it was the first two icebreakers of Finland Murtaja and Sampo, commissioned respectively in 1890 and 1898, that escorted the German army and the Finnish Jäger volunteers, who had been fighting for the German army, into Finland in February and April 1918 and thus aided the bourgeois side to victory in the civil war.

The first icebreaker commissioned was not a particular success. Yet, through, again, international non-state networks, supporters of the project were able gain the necessary insight to commission more suitable icebreakers from elsewhere and finally transform into makers of icebreakers themselves.

Ultimately, Finnish winter navigation is a story of capabilities in the Evansian sense. However, it is one not centered around the nation-state but based on a bureaucracy and timeline that extends beyond the state’s borders and historical trajectory. Here the state is too fickle to be the central actor and is secondary and subject to the national technological-bureaucratic strategy aimed at addressing an external restriction that is
turned into extra-state capabilities: “the capability to eliminate seasonal variation in shipping became accepted as a natural feature of Finland as a modern country” and the very “ideal of winter navigation provided a flexible and appropriate object with which to present and give form to ideas of the nation (Matala & Sahari, 2017, p. 222; pp. 238–239). Matala and Sahari propose that, “the icebreaker mythology persists because it aligns neatly with Finland’s dominant notion of its distinctive place in the world”, I would add that it does not simply align but as a long-term technological-bureaucratic national project is part of the making of the particularity of that place and the required capabilities.

Continuities of the Non-Sovereign Model as a Member State of the European Union

Following the fall of the USSR in 1991, Finland was quick to join the European Union in 1995. Integration into the EU’s economic sphere came at the same time with the final catching up of the West by the early 2000s. In the EU Finland has continued its non-sovereign developmental state policy successfully. Finnish citizens are amongst the most highly appreciated and sought after workers in the EU and experience no discrimination, unlike Finland’s Eastern peer nationalities. At the same time intra-EU migration to Finland has remained on the lowest level among the Western and Northern countries, and lower than most of the Eastern member states (see for example Korhonen and Niemeläinen [2017]).

The continued prevalence of the peripheral gaze of the state and a comparativizing and historically reflexive strategy that seeks unsymmetric comparisons to anticipate problems and solutions beyond nation-state comparisons is suggested also in more recent studies that explore this final catch-up development phase of Finland’s and its transformation into a knowledge economy. Schienstock (2007), for example, makes the argument that unlike economic models of path-dependent techno-economic change based on self-reinforcing feedback loops, Finland’s transformation was based on processes of path creation and describes the development “of knowledge-economy in Finland as a national project responding the transforming international environment of the 1990s. Instead of state-support to specific sectors, there was a nationally coordinated adaptation of “a systemic transformation process” and the adoption of “national systems of innovation” that stressed the “interrelationship between various actors involved in innovation processes” (2007, p. 103). The state’s role in this process was to facilitate the systemic transformation by, for example, initiating a restructuring process to create “a closer link between the science system and the economy” (2007). Schienstock’s description would also apply to large-scale projects related to Soviet trade, such as the Kostomuksha construction project mentioned above. Schienstock summarizes this description appropriately “as a national programme for survival
including various actors from industry, science and politics” as opposed to purely objective structural factors (2007).

Haapala refers to complementary developments in a similar fashion. He mentions, for example, the program of “democratic information society” from as early as the early 1990s that aimed to secure easy access to the internet for all (Haapala, 2009, p. 57). Haapala goes on to summarize Finland’s developmental success in the long run as a question of adaptation: “how to adjust to a given environment (natural and social), how to protect your own interests and culture, etc.”. Haapala recounts the Finnish society to have focused on such adaptations from a flexible and open perspective that has itself identified as a requirement for that strategy that “there are people who know about the rest of the world … and they must enjoy public support”. Finally, Haapala points this to have led to a complementary relation between open-mindedness and an emphasis on national uniformity (Haapala, 2009, pp. 62–63).

Finally, one has to mention how, in true obedience and present day manifestation of the peripheral gaze, the highly authoritative trio of Jäntti, Saari, and Vartiainen, summarizes Finland’s successful development trajectory from the very bottom to the top in the following highly reflexive and comparatizing manner: “With hindsight, it is easy to be quite critical of the Finnish growth regime” (2006, p. 24).

In this manner Finnish statehood’s ambivalence as an instrument for safeguarding trade, industry’s and citizen’s benefits has continued as its main strategy. For example, during the Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine, Finland joined the European front in calling for and enforcing sanctions while at the same time also finalizing a contract for a new Russian built nuclear plant in Finland. Indeed, the joint Russia sanctions in place since 2014 have had a less detrimental effect on Finnish trade and economy than that of others, like Latvia, Austria or France, and in fact the rest of world in general, a report by the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, an employer’s organizations’ think tank, shows (Berg-Andersson, 2019). The sanctions largely did not have an effect on the products that Finland exports to Russia and after the sanctions were put in place Finland’s relative decrease in trade has been smaller than that of other countries.

Within the EU Finland positions itself commonly between the Nordic, Western and small states blocs, opting to cooperate with its northwestern and southern neighbors as well as the likes of Austria, the Netherlands and Germany. Despite domestic changes in government, Finnish parties across the board maintain the importance of subject matter based and consistent EU strategy that can best secure national interests over the long run, emphasizing again that the state is not the final manifestation of national political interests. This was true even during the 2015-2019 government, which the right-wing populist and strongly anti-EU True Finns party joined and in which it held both the position of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the minister for European Affairs.
Furthermore, even though loans to Greece by other EU states had been one of the main objects of the True Finn party’s political attacks leading up to the election, this government instead increased Finnish backing of non-collateral loans to Greece against its original program, making Finland relatively the fifth largest backer of Greece in Europe. Even anti-EU populism bends to the non-sovereign model and its idea of national interest.

**Conclusion**

Overall, in line with the observations of Block and Negoita (2016), even if it is the state that ultimately develops and through which in the long-term the benefits of successful developmental strategies are actualized, developmental efforts take long to reach fruition. Therefore, based on the non-sovereign model, and understandably by its virtue of historically non-sovereign statehood, it may be considered that projects other than the state drive and maintain long-term developmental strategies. As Block and Negoita suggest, embedded autonomy alone does not guarantee the development of sufficient specialized knowledge and cognitive autonomy, i.e. strategic historical and political projects, often based on extensive networks that themselves can be hard to sustain (2016, p. 69). Block and Negoita summarize as follows: “Pursuing these [successful developmental] policies is very much an art rather than a science even for those who have considerable scientific knowledge” (2016, p. 70). As an art it may indeed be one based on flexible comparativizing and reflexive asymmetrical comparisons, such as the peripheral gaze, and on constant interpretation and the search for alternative perspectives. Along the same lines, Bob Jessop has proposed a relatively similar new focus for developmental states. He calls for “discontinuities within a broader framework of continued commitment to catch-up competitiveness” (2013, p. 52). This is quite an apt characterization of the Finnish national project that also aims to maintain a long-term commitment to the horizon of expectation while constantly realigning it with external shocks and discontinuities in the space of experience, where the state bears the brunt of the latter while the broader national project maintains the former. Jessop continues in line with what has been sketched in this paper as the historical long-term non-sovereign model, though that is just one iteration of the more general realm of institutional arrangements that Jessop refers to:

It is interesting to note how strategies are framed in terms of more general economic imaginaries but adapted to local conditions through recontextualization and rearticulation with past structures and strategies. As the horizons of catch-up competitiveness change, so do the discursive, institutional, governance, and policy conditions needed for success (Jessop, 2013, p. 52).

The argument of the developmental state has largely centered around the effectiveness of “an autonomous, coherent and centralized bureaucracy” … for which the
“developmental state requires a powerful pilot agency, “outside and astride” traditional ministries to mobilize and allocate capital” (Bresnitz & Ornston, 2013, p. 1221). In the new developmental state this agency should then supposedly be embedded in multiple networks to be agile and swift to react, a networked coordinator rather than a slow consolidator. While this traditional view may apply to strict cross-state comparisons, it does not fully account for state forms and the ideas of national interest vis-à-vis variance in state forms or the changes in horizons of catch-up competitiveness and their localized imaginaries. Bresnitz and Ornston touch upon this by suggesting that we need to pay closer attention to how those pilot agencies are constructed and distributed beyond a centralized logic. They, however, do not historically contextualize the sources of that variance nor consider alternatives to a standardized sovereign nation-state as the comparative logic and the motivation of any pilot agency.

Then, the expansion to theorization about developmental states that the non-sovereign model points to is even more crucial when thinking about the so-called new developmental state of the 21st century that emphasizes the capabilities approach. It addresses key concerns regarding all the four points that Peter Evans lists as guidelines for thinking about the 21st century developmental state (Evans, 2014, pp. 90–91). I will lastly briefly describe these four aspects and the kind research that they call for from the perspective of the non-sovereign model

First, Evans lists the importance of capable bureaucracies. What the non-sovereign model points to is the need to consider national bureaucracies in supra- and interstate regimes of economics, point in case being the EU where the state’s relations form a mid-level governance and interaction system that is complemented by EU governance on one hand, and the rights bestowed to member nationalities especially in terms of the freedom of enterprise, work and movement on the other. In this sense, we could also add the need to theorize and research, so to say, below-state bureaucracies that connect such national networks as well as their interactions with supra-state bureaucracies often past the state-level, such as EU regional development projects. An important added dimension then is the ways in which the state continues to support and bolster these expanding bureaucracies and provide them autonomy beyond the state’s immediate borders.

Second, Evans argues that the ability of the state to pursue collective goals coherently, rather than responding to subjectively defined immediate demands is more important than previous research on the developmental state has suggested. The case of Finland and its continued coherent strategy through a tumultuous history attest to this observation. This question will become an increasingly important and visible factor as developmental state strategies that are based on the ideal-type nation-state, i.e. an imagined coherent and seamless fit between a nationally defined state, politics, economy and bureaucracies
becomes more and more contested. What kind of strategies and new institutional arrangements can facilitate developmental state policies under different configurations than the one provided by the nation-state? Recent confrontations and separatist movements in places like Hong Kong and Spain or discussions in Greenland and Northern Cyprus attest to the fact that the legitimizing power of a centralizing nation-state frame can no longer contain outgrowths and misalignments where the space of experience does not match horizon of expectation provided by the nation-state.

Third, embeddedness continues to matter for Evans in terms of an increasingly broader cross section of civil society, but also links to the previous point about the destabilization of nation-states as one plausible answer to the problem. Beyond that, embeddedness and its comparative and reflexive understanding in situations of cross-border movement of labor and a more globalized work market will be a question that states are going to increasingly face. Old forms and institutions of connecting with and reaching out to citizen and civil society will seem increasingly clunky and less appealing, especially for the broader cross sections of civil society that Evans emphasizes. Some of the more poignant examples of this are waves of migration and digitalization of societies, from politics to social movements.

Lastly, state effectiveness is, according to Evans, “even more clearly a political problem, and state-society relations are at the heart of the politics involved” (Evans, 2014, p. 91). This is perhaps the most important yet challenging aspect in thinking about the 21st century developmental state. On different levels it connects with the three previous points. Especially so, when it comes to perceiving, defining and imagining state effectiveness. There is serious political clash taking place over whether the state should protect the nation’s sovereignty or strengthen its international and regional ties and, in some cases, integration. Can state effectiveness be measured in its success to obtain benefits, say, in EU negotiations like the 2020 pandemic stimulus package or in defending the political and cultural autonomy/isolation of the nation, as many current populist parties would want to see. For a strictly national political imagination, the centering and intelligibility of the political debate may be further complicated by increasingly mobile capital and workforce. This type of political juxtapositions themselves can be questioned and politicized as the non-sovereign model of a developmental state would seem to suggest. In Finland the state traditionally took a secondary role as the supporter and defender of the autonomy and interests of the political, economic and civic spheres beyond the state itself. In either case, the ability to gather information, and assess and predict it in a comparative and reflexive manner will be increasingly important for both the state and society to maintain an understanding of what state effectiveness can mean and look like and what kind of new tools may be required to measure and implement it. Furthermore, to maintain effective coordination, and indeed embeddedness and collective goals, this shifting
and rapidly transforming understanding needs to develop as a shared one between the state and civil society. The latter may be easier to accomplish if the state in the first place is not imagined and understood as the primary agent of autonomy and sovereignty.

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