

CHAPTER 9

THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND UNITED NATIONS DEADLOCK

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INTRODUCTION

At the end of World War I, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was founded, incorporating the Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Macedonians and Albanians. The most influential people in this kingdom, where different religions and nationalities lived together, were the Serbs. The Serbs were advantageous, both in the economic and military sense. They acquired these rights through the 1921 constitution.

Because of the major problems in the governing structure of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, between 1918 and 1928, King Alexander abolished the 1921 constitution and took all powers in his hands. Thus began King Alexander's dictatorship, which would continue until 1934 in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This dictatorship would come to an end with the assassination of the king in 1934.

In the kingdom, from 1918 onwards, important arrangements were made with regard to the demographic structure of Kosovo in favor of Serbs. An attempt was made to force the Albanians living in Kosovo to expatriate. This continued in the following years. With the abolition of the kingdom and the establishment of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Tito, the situation of Kosovo Albanians improved.

Yugoslavia, which had been occupied by Germany in the Second World War, showed a great resistance against this occupation under the leadership of Tito and the partisans who gathered around him. At that time, Tito's discourses also affected Kosovo Albanians and they took sides with him. At the end of the war, Tito took over in Yugoslavia signaling one of the major changes in Yugoslavia. Kosovo and Kosovo Albanians were granted rights and these rights were secured by the prepared constitution.

In this study, preliminarily, issues such as the emergence and development of the Kosovo problem are discussed. The subsequent sections of the study address the resolutions and efforts of the UN in order to solve this problem. In the last chapter, the main arguments of China and Russia regarding the Kosovo Problem are examined.

1. Emergence And Development Of The Kosovo Crisis

With the end of the First World War, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was formed, bringing together different ethnic groups.¹ The kingdom was founded on December 11, 1918, and Karayorgievich - of Serbian ethnic origin - was brought to power. The kingdom incorporated a large number of ethnic groups. 43% of the kingdom was Serbian, 23% was Croat, 8.5% was Slovenian and 6% was Bosniak Muslims. The rest of the kingdom was composed of ethnic groups such as Macedonians, Albanians, Germans, Hungarians, Gypsies and Vlachs.² Although the kingdom contained many different ethnic structures, the ones holding the power were the Serbs, the Slovenians and the Croats. The Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian Kingdoms (SHS), which came to the stage of history under the name of these three ethnic nations, did not reflect any of the other ethnic groups within it.³ This situation made ideological, social and political integration within the kingdom difficult.

The dominant party in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia was Serbia because the Serbs were strong militarily due to a large army in their control and the rulers of the country belonged to the Serbian family. These two important conditions allowed Serbia to have a say in the running of the kingdom.⁴ In addition, the constitution - namely Vidovdan - which was prepared on 18 June 1921, was strengthening the fact that Serbs were dominant in the

1 Mustafa Türkeş, "Yugoslavya Devleti'nin Kuruluşu ve Krallık Dönemi", edited by Bilgehan A.Gökdağ,, and Osman Karatay, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, Volume: 2, 3rd edition, 2017, p. 16.

2 Fatma Taşdemir, Pınar Yürür," Kosova Sorunu: Tarihi ve Hukuki Bir Değerlendirme", *Gazi University The Journal Of The Faculty Of Economics And Administrative Sciences*, 3/99, p. 136.

3 Türkeş, p. 16.

4 Taşdemir and Yürür, p.136.

kingdom.⁵ In this way the kingdom was completely controlled by Serbs after 1921.⁶

Between 1918 and 1928, problems with the governance structure of the kingdom began to emerge because the administrative structure was kept open to federative discussions while at the same time, efforts were being made to increase Serbian rule. The army and the bureaucracy were doing their utmost to maintain the power of the Serbs and make it permanent. Croatia and Slovenia, on the other hand, were reluctant to support policies that would strengthen the situation of Serbs. Furthermore the Croats, who were mainly Catholic were more loyal to the Vatican, which supported the Catholics, rather than the kingdom. This incident also led the Croats to start illegal activities, to end the federal debates and to declare a dictatorship in the kingdom.⁷

In January 1929, King Alexander Karayorgiev took over all powers. Thus began a period of personal dictatorship, which continued until his death in 1934.⁸ On January 6, 1929, Karayorgevic dissolved parliament, political parties and associations were closed and the “One king, one state, one nation” motto period started.⁹

The King then eliminated the 1921 constitution. Thus, he was the only one to have a say in the governance of the country. Not content with all this, King Alexander prepared a new constitution in October 1929 to consolidate Serbian sovereignty. With this constitution, the name of the state was changed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.¹⁰ At the same time the borders of the provinces in the kingdom were changed. The country was divided into nine regions separated by the rivers and, generally speaking, according to the Serbian majority. Thus, the foundation of the Kosovo problem was laid as Kosovo was shared between Vardarska, Moravska and Zetska.¹¹ This led to an increase in Serbian pressure particularly in Kosovo, and the increase of unfair practices. Governors who were the rulers of Vardarska, Moracska and Zetska were given wide powers. Their rulers were often elected from within the army,

5 Selçuk Ural, “Balkanlarda Aşırı Milliyetçiliğin Gölgesinde Kosova ve Bağımsızlık”, *Çankırı Karatekin University Journal of the Institute of Social Sciences*, 5/1, p. 153.

6 Abdullah Özdağ, Tekin Önal, “Kosova Sorunu Ve Kosova'nın Bağımsızlık Süreci”, *Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, Sayı: 61, 2017, s. 558.

7 Türkeş, p. 16.

8 Barbara Jelavich, *Balkan Tarihi II*, Küre Yayınları, fifthedition, 2017, p. 166.

9 Murat Ercan, Zafer Pektaş, *Balkan Siyasetinde Kosova'nın Bağımsızlık ve Egemenlik Sorunu*, Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2015, p. 69.

10 H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Balkanların Makûs Talihi: Göç*, İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2013, p. 373.

11 Taşdemir and Yürür, p. 137.

who applied strict policies and who were Serbian nationalists in particular.¹² These policies led to a change in the demographic structure in Kosovo, expressed as former Serbia.¹³

Various methods were used to change the structure. Some of them were; forcing the Kosovo Albanians to migrate, assimilating those who did not migrate and establishing Slavic Colonization. Serbs wanted to increase the Serb population in Kosovo through these three methods. Thus, a certain fraction of Kosovo Albanians emigrated to Turkey or Albania.¹⁴

The main reason why Serbs wanted to change the demographic structure of Kosovo was the high fertility rates of the Kosovo Albanians living there because the Serbs feared that if the high population growth in Kosovo continued, their population would soon exceed the Serb population living in the region.¹⁵

In 1937, Vaso Cubrilovic, a historian and statesman, raised this topic. He asked the relevant authorities to take measures. Cubrilovic, who was not satisfied with the measures already taken, also made additional suggestions for solving the problem.¹⁶ His suggestions included the forced immigration of Albanians in Kosovo and the replacing them with Serbs.¹⁷ In addition, Cubrilovic stated in the memorandum he presented to the government that the fact that Yugoslavia was on the bloodland should not be forgotten.¹⁸

According to Vaso Cubrilovic, the only solution to the problem was forcing Albanians to collectively migrate.¹⁹ According to Cubrilovic, smugglers, forest-breakers and anyone letting their dogs run wild should be punished by the police to make it impossible for Albanians to live in Kosovo. In addition, Albanians should be dismissed from their duties and the state-owned pastures should be taken back.²⁰

There were two possible destination countries for the Albanians who were forced to migrate as a result of the measures taken in line with Cubrilovic's memorandum. These countries were Albania and Turkey. No matter how much those Albanians living in Kosovo were opposed to the planned migration, as a consequence of the agreement

12 Ural, p. 154.

13 İbid.

14 M. Murat Taşar, "Kosova Arnavutlarının Bağımsızlık Mücadelesi", *Ülke Dergisi*, No: 33, 1999, p. 4.

15 Halis Ayhan, "Arnavut ve Sırp Savları Bağlamında Kosova'nın Sahipliği Sorunu", *Selcuk University Journal of Social Sciences Institute*, 23/2010, p. 81.

16 İbid.

17 İbid.

18 Taşdemir and Yürür, p. 138.

19 İbid.

20 İbid.

signed between Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1938, 40.000 Albanian and Turkish Muslim families were approved to migrate to Turkey.²¹ However, because of the outbreak of World War II, this agreement could not be implemented. Over the course of the two world wars, somewhere between 90,0000 and 150,000 people migrated from Kosovo due to Serbian pressure.²²

Germany and its ally in the Second World War, Italy, invaded Kosovo and Albania. The policies of the two allies won the support of some Kosovo Albanians. The main reason for this was the perception that Kosovo, Western Macedonia and Albania were united under Italian occupation.²³ Tito, who was elected as the secretary general of the Yugoslav Communist Party, became an important figure for Kosovo.²⁴ Tito, along with the partisans he had gathered during the war, showed quite an effective resistance against the German and Italian occupation.²⁵ Meanwhile, Kosovo Albanians were divided among themselves. While there were nationalists on one side, there were partisans on the other side and both groups had different goals. Nationalists considered the Serbs as real enemies, while the real enemy for the partisans were the Nazis. They wanted to remove the Nazis from Kosovo by acting together with the Serbs. The common aim of the two groups was to give the Kosovo Albanian territory to Albania when the war ended.²⁶

Tito made great promises to Kosovan partisan fighters who fought alongside him. The most important of these promises was the right of self-determination. Thus, the people of Kosovo were convinced to fight against the occupation. However, when the Second World War ended, Tito backed out of his promises to the Kosovars.²⁷ Tito, who ejected the Nazis from Yugoslavian territory with the help of the Kosovo Albanians, founded the second Yugoslavia in 1945 and made Kosovo a part of it.²⁸ Thus, the Tito era began in the second Yugoslavia, which was established after the Second World War. Tito's coming to power was

21 Taşar, p. 5.

22 Taşdemir and Yürür, p. 138.

23 Ural, p. 155.

24 Taşdemir and Yürür, p. 139.

25 Seçil Şahin, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlık İlanının Uluslararası Adalet Divanı Kararı ve Self Determinasyon İlkesi Çerçevesinde İncelenmesi", *Ankara Bar Review*, 3/2015, p. 521.

26 Emel G. Oktay, Jonilda Rrapaj, "Sosyal İnşacılık Açısından Kosova'nın Kimliği: Bağımsızlık Sonrasında Ortak Bir "Kosovalı" Kimliği Oluşturmak Mümkün mü?", *The Journal of International Relations*, Volume: 13, No: 49, 2016, p. 46.

27 İsmail Arslan, "Kosova Sorunu: Tarihsel Perspektiften Bir Değerlendirme", <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/12926>, p. 50, (October20,2018).

28 Oktay and Rrapaj, p. 46..

a purely local movement, and it was enabled with the partisans who supported him.²⁹ In the period under Tito, Kosovo continued to be problematic.

In the constitution of the Republic of Yugoslavia which was founded under the leadership of Tito after the Second World War, there were 6 republics. These were Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia.³⁰ They were also considered as constituent peoples of the Republic. The name of the state was the Democratic Republic of Yugoslavia.³¹ Kosovo was excluded from the republics included in the constitution. Kosovo and Vojvodina were granted national status³² and autonomy under Serbia.³³ The main reason why Kosovo was not given the status of republic was the worries that Kosovo Albanians living here might join Albania. Kosovo Albanians were therefore given national status instead of being considered as one of the founding nations.³⁴ In this period, four keywords were foretelling the future of the political and economic structure of Yugoslavia. These were: federal structure, self-government, socialist market economy and unconnected foreign policy.³⁵

Both good and bad periods took place in Tito's time for the Kosovo Albanians. In the early days, Kosovo Albanians were accepted as a national group. In the meantime Albanian language was recognized as one of the Yugoslavian languages.³⁶ Tito's anti-Serb policies gave Kosovo Albanians an opportunity to live comfortably. The policies expressed as "Greater Yugoslavia, Small Serbia" reduced Serbian activity.³⁷ In the new constitution prepared in 1963, the autonomy status granted to Kosovo in the previous constitution was extended and expanded again.³⁸ Together with the new constitution, the name of Yugoslavia changed. The "Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia" became the "Socialist Federative

29 Mark Mazower, *Bizans'ın Çöküşünden Günümüze Balkanlar*, Alfa Yayınları, 2017, p. 175.

30 Arhivyyu, *Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, January 31, 1946*, http://www.arhivyyu.gov.rs/active/en/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akti_jugoslavije/ustav_finj.html#, (October 21, 2018).

31 Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih, İlkçağlardan 1918'e*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2000, p. 239.

32 Andrev Baruch Wachtel, *Dünya Tarihinde Balkanlar*, Doğan Kitap, 2009, pp. 129,130.

33 Osman Karatay, "Kosova: Bağımlı Bir Bağımsızlık İle Nereye?", *Journal of Black Sea Studies*, No: 16, 2008, p. 2.

34 Arslan, p. 51.

35 Pektaş, p. 87.

36 Oktay and Rrapaj, p. 46.

37 Jülide Karakoç, " ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Hegemonya Çabaları Etkisinde NATO'nun Kosova Müdahalesi", *Gazi University Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences*, 8/1, 2006, p. 228.

38 Volkan Tatar, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlık Süreci Ve Birleşmiş Milletler" *The Journal of Academic Social Science*, Year: 5, No: 59, 2017, p. 235.

Republic of Yugoslavia”.³⁹ The new constitution gave Kosovo an autonomous federal structure leading to more claims by Kosovo Albanians. Over time Tito did not intervene and Kosovo Albanians took over the administration of Kosovo. This partial liberation of Kosovo Albanians triggered nationalist movements. The University of Pristina, which was founded in 1968, had a great influence on the formation of this national consciousness.⁴⁰ Albanian courses were given at the university.⁴¹ This, in particular, enabled the Albanians to learn about their history and culture

With the emergence of national consciousness, the first independence movements began to show themselves. Injustice, which started in 1960 and continued until 1968, played an important role in the emergence of these movements. In particular the pro-Serbian policies pursued after the appointment of Aleksander Rankovic - of Serbian origin - as the head of the People Protection Branch (OZN), a secret service and intelligence agency which was founded by Tito, led to the displacement of many Kosovo Albanians living in the region. In addition, the policy of intimidation pursued by Rankovic led to the revolt of Albanians living in Kosovo.⁴² In 1969, Tito gave Kosovo and Vojvodina new rights in the federation.⁴³ He dismissed Rankovic.⁴⁴ Since Tito was mainly focused on the concept of a united Yugoslavia, he was opposed to such pro-Serbian policies, the idea of superiority of any group over other groups and the intimidation of any ethnic group by other ethnic groups. Consequently, political and social stability in Yugoslavia during the Tito period was partially achieved.⁴⁵

Although the 1963 constitution and the additions to this constitution gave important rights to Kosovo and the Albanians living there, these rights were seen as inadequate. Kosovo Albanians also demanded the status of republic, like other peoples in Yugoslavia. Consequently, the endless constitutional changes in the country continued. The amendments to the 1963 constitution were made official by the constitution prepared in 1974.⁴⁶ In the

39 Şecaettin Koka, “Sosyalist Yugoslavya Dönemi”, edited by Bilgehan A. Gökdağ ve Osman Karatay, Balkanlar El Kitabı, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, Volume: 2, 3rd edition, 2017, p. 28.

40 Bülent Sarper Ağır, “Kosova Cumhuriyeti”, *Çağdaş Balkan Siyaseti, Devletler, Halklar, Parçalanma ve Bütünleşme*, 2nd Edition, Ankara: Seçkin Yayınları, 2014, p. 273.

41 Arslan, p. 51.

42 Erhan Türbedar, “Kosova Sorunu”, edited by Bilgehan A. Gökdağ ve Osman Karatay, Balkanlar El Kitabı, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, Volume: 2, 3rd edition, 2017, p. 140.

43 Özdağ and Önal, p. 559.

44 Ahmet Çevikbaş, “Müttefik Güç Harekâtı İnsani Müdahalelerin Bir İstisnası Mıdır? NATO’nun Kosova’ya Yönelik Harekâtının Uluslararası Hukuk ve Askeri Bakış Açılırlarından Değerlendirilmesi”, *The Journal of Defense Sciences*, Volume: 10, No: 2, 2011, p. 22..

45 Hasret Çomak, İrfan Kaya Ülger, “Balkanlarda Siyasi İstikrar ve Geleceği”, <http://www.bilgesam.org/incele/1643/-balkanlarda-siyasi-istikrar-vegelecegi/#.W9WRiNizbIU>, p. 289, (October28, 2018).

46 Taşdemir and Yürür, p. 141.

constitution, the Republics were defined as states based on the sovereignty of the peoples who formed them.⁴⁷ Kosovo and Vojvodina were defined as autonomous regions. Republics, Kosovo and Vojvodina were granted the right to make their own constitutions.⁴⁸

With the 1974 constitution, Kosovo was given the opportunity to create its own bodies in social, political and economic terms. Kosovo gained equal voting rights in all organs of the federation, including the federal presidency. The rights provided by the Constitution to Kosovo and other republics disturbed Serbian nationalists.⁴⁹ These rights were even criticized by some Serbian writers. Critics linked the internal conflicts in the country and the country's destruction to these broad rights. Although the 1974 constitution granted Kosovo Albanians extensive rights, these rights were deemed insufficient by Albanians.

After Tito, the multinational federal structure of Yugoslavia was under fire from the nationalists.⁵⁰ For this reason, the Kosovo crisis continued until the 1990s.⁵¹ Moreover, both the Serbs of Kosovo and Serbia reacted strongly against the constitutional regulations. They considered those regulations as penalties against themselves. As a result they started to harbor feelings of hostility towards Tito.⁵²

When the Tito period is assessed, it can be seen that many ethnic groups (including the Kosovars) wanted to protect their identities and experience peace to some extent.⁵³ Although Tito was a Croat, he struggled against micro-nationalism in Yugoslavia, including Croatian nationalism, trying to ensure that all minorities had equal status. However, the leaders who succeeded him failed to pursue his policies.⁵⁴

After Tito's death in 1980, Slobodan Milosevic came to power.⁵⁵ Milosevic first of all restricted the autonomy given to Kosovo and Vojvodina with the 1974 constitution prepared in the Tito period and removed them totally from the constitution in 1989.⁵⁶ Kosovo was now

47 Pektaş, p. 90.

48 Momčilo Pavlović, "Yugoslavia – the constitution of 1974 and some political results", <http://www.transconflict.com/2013/04/yugoslavia-the-constitution-of-1974-and-some-political-results-19>, (October 28, 2018).

49 Pektaş, p. 100.

50 Nesrin Kenar, *Yugoslavya Sorununun Ulusal ve Uluslararası Boyutu*, Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık, 2005, p. 239.

51 Nedim Emin "Kosova Siyasetini Anlama Kılavuzu", *SETA*, 2014, p. 17

52 Arslan, p. 52.

53 Şahin, p. 522.

54 Hasan Çomak, İrfan Kaya Ülger, "Balkanlarda Siyasi İstikrar ve Geleceği", <http://www.bilgesam.org/incele/1643/-balkanlarda-siyasi-istikrar-ve-gelecegi/#.W-arIdLzbIU>, p. 290, (November 10, 2018).

55 Alan Thornett, "Slobodan Milosevic: Architect of Yugoslav break-up", 23 August 2006, <http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article1107>, (November 10, 2018).

56 Necmettin Alkan, "Yugoslavya'nın Dağılması", edited by Bilgehan A. Gökdağ ve Osman Karatay, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, Volume: 2, 3rd edition, 2017, p. 40.

connected to Serbia. All the rights granted to the Kosovo Albanians with the previous constitutional arrangements were taken away by Milosevic. As a result of these developments, the situation in Kosovo became worse than in 1946.⁵⁷ As a reaction to the restriction of rights, the Kosovo Albanians started to organize demonstrations, and consequently violence and protest events increased.⁵⁸ Attempts to suppress these demonstrations and protests were made by Serbian police and the army⁵⁹

As a result of the continuation of the events, a state of emergency was declared in February 1988. Demonstrations and gathering in groups were banned⁶⁰ and police organized raids on houses in Kosovo, yet all these measures did not suffice to stop events. The incidents continued in almost all the cities of Kosovo.

In reaction against the protests and demonstrations in Kosovo, Serbs held a rally in Gazimestan on June 28, 1989 with the participation of approximately one million people commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo War. Here Milosevic gave a vehement speech. He openly stated that Serbs would be protected and if necessary weapons would be used.⁶¹ Due to this nationalistic speech full of emotion, Milosevic became a national leader. After he was elected as President of Serbia, the future of Kosovo became a consideration for Milosevic.⁶² The new leader declared that Kosovo was his new target. In one of his speeches he said “Every nation has a love that makes him feel warm in his heart forever. For Serbia this is Kosovo.”⁶³ In fact, this revealed the nature of the events that were about to unfold.

The events in Kosovo continued until 1990. Parallel to this, Milosevic’s aggressive and discriminatory policies continued to be the same.⁶⁴ Milosevic went even further in 1990 and he abolished the parliament of Kosovo. Before deciding to abolish the Assembly, he declared that Kosovo was only a region within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In response, Albanians of Kosovo made a referendum of independence in 1991. As a result of the referendum, the Kosovo parliament in exile declared Kosovo a sovereign and independent

57 Hüseyin Baş, “Dünü ve Bugünüyle Kosova Sorunu II”, *Cumhuriyet University Journal of Dergisi Social Sciences*, Volume: 25, No: 1, 2001, p. 104.

58 Cüneyt Yenigün, “Sırbistan ve AB Kıskaçında Kosova”, *Mostar*, No: 13, 2006, p. 20.

59 Zeynep Selin Acar, “Doktrinleşme Sürecindeki İnsani Müdahale: NATO’nun Kosova Müdahalesi ve Koruma Sorumluluğu Kavramı”, *Ege Strategic Research Journal*, Volume: 6, No: 1, p. 119.

60 Alkan, p. 41.

61 M. Yılmaz, *Kosova Bağımsızlık Yolunda*, İstanbul: İlke Yayıncılık, 2005, p. 41.

62 Pektaş, p. 106.

63 N. Malcolm, *Kosova: A Short History*, translated by Ö. Arıkan, İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1999, p. 40.

64 Oktay and Rrapaj, p. 48.

state.⁶⁵ When he won the presidential elections on May 24, 1992, Ibrahim Rugova became the first president of Kosovo.⁶⁶ Ibrahim Rugova was more in favor of conciliatory and passive resistance rather than conflict to solve the Kosovo issue.⁶⁷ He made efforts to resolve the problem through dialogue and reconciliation between the parties.⁶⁸

Kosovo's declaration of independence could not attract support from the international community⁶⁹ and Kosovo Albanians were almost forgotten in peace talks following the Bosnian war. The Dayton Peace Treaty, signed at the end of the war, did not make any reference to Kosovo. As a result of this treaty, the idea that the majority of Kosovo Albanians could attract the attention of the international community only by increasing the violence began to emerge.⁷⁰ The Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) was established in 1993. This army had extended across more than 50 villages by 1996.⁷¹ The policy that led to the foundation of the UCK was the moderate policies of Rugova, who was the leader in Kosovo in this period.⁷² As the moderate policies of Rugova failed to solve the Kosovo issue, the Albanians began to use violence as a means of legitimizing violence.⁷³

The establishment of the UCK and its activities for independence further increased the existing Serbian pressures. Especially in 1998, Serbian troops launched operations to end the activities of this organization and carried out an ethnic cleansing.⁷⁴ UCK was ineffective against Serbian forces because this organization was very weak against the educated and well-equipped Serbian army. Although at first the UCK was defined as a terrorist organization by the international community, it gained political legitimacy thereafter. The massacres of civilians by Serbian forces played a major role in this legitimacy.⁷⁵ The inadequacy of the

65 Uğur Samancı, "Uluslararası Adalet Divanının Kosova'nın Bağımsızlık ilanına ilişkin Danışma Görüşü", *Dokuz Eylül University Law Review*, Volume: 11, No: 2, 2009, pp. 127-128; İlker Alp, "Balkanlar ve Yugoslavya Olayları", *Journal of Armed Forces*, Year: 111, No: 332, April 1992, p. 25.

66 Kenar, p. 241.

67 Bilgin Çelik, *Dağılan Yugoslavya Sonrası Kosova ve Makedonya Türkleri*, İkinci Basım, İstanbul: Güner Yayınları, 2013, p. 49.

68 Oktay and Rrapaj, p. 48.

69 M. Cem Oğultürk, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlık Süreci Kapsamında ABD Dış Politikasının Analizi", *Journal of Security Strategies*, Year: 10 No: 19, p. 109.

70 Oğultürk, p. 109.

71 Yeniğün, p. 20.

72 MişaGleni, *Balkanite (1804-1999)*, translated by Svetlana Lekova, İzdatelstvo Riva, Sofya, 2004, p. 598.598.

73 İrfan Kaya Ülger, "Kosova'nın Bağımsızlığının Self Determinasyon Çerçevesinde Analizi", *KOSBED*, 2016, p. 45; Kader Özlem, *Türkiye'nin Balkan Türkleri Politikası (1991-2014)*, Bursa: Dora Yayınları, 2016, pp. 288-289.

74 Samancı, p. 128.

75 Oğultürk, p. 110.

Kosovo Liberation Army and the West's remaining distant from the conflict, caused Serbs to increase their attacks and to carry out mass killings. The powerful Serb armies killed Albanians, regardless of whether they were men, women, young or old.⁷⁶

The Serbs' assassination of 45 civilians in the village of Racak in 1999 was the last straw.⁷⁷ After this massacre, international observers widely reported the situation and presented it to the Western powers.⁷⁸ After the UN took action and made some decisions, the process of independence of Kosovo was completed with NATO's intervention.

2. United Nation's Deadlock And NATO Intervention

Clashes between Serbs and Albanians in the 1990s led to the deaths of a large number of civilians in Kosovo and drew the attention of the West to Kosovo.⁷⁹ Even in 1998, the violent attacks and mass killings by Serbian forces continued.⁸⁰ The Albanians did not show much resistance against these attacks. This disproportionate power struggle between the parties was moved by the US and European countries to the UN.

On March 31, 1998, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided to implement an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (YFC) to solve the problem.⁸¹

The purpose of the UN was to resolve the issue through dialogue and negotiation between the parties. First of all, it was necessary to provide a cease-fire between the two sides and to stop the armed conflict. For this reason, the UN began to implement its arms embargo on the parties. The Security Council, with resolution 1160 dated 31 March 1998,⁸² aimed to prevent the use of excessive force against civilians and peaceful demonstrations in Kosovo with the arms embargo.⁸³ This decision also brought measures to prevent the Kosovo Liberation Army and any other groups from engaging in such activities.⁸⁴

The Kosovo Albanians' condemnation of all acts of terrorism and the peaceful pursuit of

76 Baş, p.107.

77 Emir Türkoğlu, "Kosova Arnavutlarının Milliyetçiliği", *Balkan Diplomasisi*, (Der.) Ömer E. Lütem, Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun, Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2001, p. 121.

78 Yenigün, p. 21.

79 Caner Sancaktar, "NATO'nun Kosova Müdahalesi", <http://www.bilgesam.org/incele/1785/-nato%E2%80%99nun-kosova-mudahalesi/#.W08JwdIzbIU>, p. 135, (November 25, 2018).

80 Baş, p. 107.

81 Sancaktar, p. 136.

82 Kenar, s. 244.

83 Pektaş,p. 125.

84 UN Security Council, Resolution1160, March 1998, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1160\(1998\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1160(1998)), (December2, 2018).

their right to achieve are emphasized in Resolution No: 1160.⁸⁵ As it is understood from this decision, the UN tried to make a significant effort to solve the problem through dialogue and peaceful methods. Not only the Serbian side, but also the Kosovo Albanians called on the parties to resolve their requests in a peaceful way. The UN Security Council underlined in Decision No: 1160 that the road leading to an end to the acts of violence and terrorism in Kosovo was passing from provision of a real political process by the authorities in Belgrade to the Albanian community of Kosovo.⁸⁶

The UN Security Council, made resolution No: 1199 concerning the Kosovo conflict on 23 September 1998.⁸⁷ With this decision it was determined that the Kosovo conflict continued to pose a real threat for the peace and security in the region.⁸⁸ It was also stated that a large number of civilians had been killed during the fights in Kosovo. Moreover it was framed that the Security Council was strongly worried about the considerable deterioration in the human situations all over Kosovo and measures should be taken to avoid this and to end the humanitarian calamity and catastrophe which was emerging from the situation in the region.⁸⁹

Following decision 1160, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1199 on 23 September 1998 concerning the Kosovo issue. This decision determined that the situation in Kosovo continued to threaten peace and security in the region. Likewise, a number of civilians were injured in Kosovo due to violent clashes. In addition, it was stated that there was a great concern for the rapid worsening of the humanitarian situation in Kosovo and measures should be taken against the humanitarian catastrophe.⁹⁰

In resolution 1199 made by the UNSC it was stated that the conflict between the parties had broken down the peace and tranquility in the region. However, it was not possible to make decisions on coercive measures in order to stop the factors threatening peace and security. The resolution also called for action to be taken on the grounds of resolution 1160, and condemned any terrorist act between the parties. This resolution allowed the people of the region to leave the area because of the conflicts in the region, and arrangements were made to provide the necessary facilities for the returnees.⁹¹

85 UN Security Council, Resolution 1160, March 1998, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1160\(1998\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1160(1998)), (December 2, 2018).

86 UN Security Council, Resolution 1160, March 1998, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1160\(1998\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1160(1998)), 02 December 2018.

87 Şule Kut, *Balkanlar'da Kimlik ve Egemenlik*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005, p. 145; Pektaş, p. 126.

88 Naim Demirel, *BM Güvenlik Konseyi ve Uluslararası Barışın Korunması*, İstanbul: Derin Yayınları, 2015, p. 296.

89 UN Security Council, Resolution 1199, 23 September 1998, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1199\(1998\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1199(1998)), (December 2, 2018).

90 Çevikbaş, p. 27.

91 Taşdemir and Yürür, p. 147

For the first time, a positive development took place in the Kosovo issue, which the United States and other Western states had had on their agenda since 1998. Milosevic agreed to an agreement between the parties. Milosevic and UN representative Richard Holbrook reached an agreement on 13 October 1998.⁹² In the deal it was agreed that the amount of Yugoslavian and Serbian forces would return to the numbers prior to the conflict and they would be withdrawn and a two thousand strong military unit would be deployed instead of the withdrawn units.⁹³ In addition to this military unit, it was also in the agreement that NATO was able to create an aerial monitoring mission in the region. 12 days after the signing of the agreement, on 24 October 1998, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1203, which stated that the agreement between the parties was welcomed and it had to be implemented as soon as possible. In addition, the implementation of resolutions 1160 and 1199 was demanded.⁹⁴

The UNSC's decision 1203 noted that clashes in Kosovo threatened regional peace and security, and that all states should respect the territorial integrity of YFC.⁹⁵ The OSCE Kosovo Audit Mission for the implementation and follow-up of the decision began in 1998 and 1999 in the region.⁹⁶ However, in January 1999, the conflict between the parties began and the OSCE officials had to leave Kosovo.⁹⁷

A ceasefire was reached between the parties in October 1998. Milosevic broke the ceasefire, saying that the ceasefire strengthened the Kosovo Liberation Army. The Serbs, who took action, then carried out a massacre in the village of Racak on 15 January 1999. After this event, the Contact Group stepped in, requested a conference to solve the problem⁹⁸ and Milosevic was given a serious warning. Milosevic was notified by the NATO forces if he failed to comply with the Security Council resolutions, Serbia would be subjected to aerial bombardments.⁹⁹

At the request of the Contact Group, a series of conferences were held at Rambouillet Castle near Paris on 6-23 February and then again on 5 and 18 March 1999, and documents were submitted with the intention of coercing the Serbian side into submission.¹⁰⁰ During the

92 Kenar, p. 245.

93 Taşdemir and Yürür, p. 147.

94 Çevikbaş, p. 27.

95 UN Security Council, Resolution 1203 (1998), 24 October 1998, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1199\(1998\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1199(1998)), (December 2, 2018).

96 UN Security Council, Resolution 1203 (1998), 24 October 1998, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1199\(1998\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1199(1998)), (December 2, 2018).

97 Çevikbaş, p. 28.

98 Oğultürk, p. 112.

99 Çevikbaş, p. 28.

100 Oğultürk, p. 112.

talks, Javier Solana, the NATO Secretary General at that time, was appointed as the mediator.¹⁰¹ Hashim Thaci, who was inexperienced in diplomacy with respect to Rugova and who was the leader of IKK of the time was called upon. The main reason for making such a choice was Thaci would be easier to persuade to submit to the wishes of Allies.

Considering the decisions taken at the end of the meeting, the following important terms stood out: (a) The integrity of Yugoslavia was emphasized, (b) an immediate cease-fire between the parties was requested, (c) a comprehensive autonomy was emphasized for Kosovo, and (d), the inclusion of an important clause detailing a settlement of NATO and international organizations in the region which the Serbian side would never accept.¹⁰²

Not only Serbs but also Kosovo Albanians accepted these decisions because the future situation of Albanians after the NATO and UN departure was not fully specified in the agreement. Therefore, the meeting, which had to end in February, increased in duration by 3 days. In this process, the establishment of a provisional administration in Kosovo for three years and the holding of a referendum and elections after three years was agreed upon. After this change, the Kosovo side agreed to the agreement. Then the parties tried to convince the Serbian side to sign the agreement but these efforts would not produce any outcome.¹⁰³ In fact, it was no surprise that the Serbian side did not accept the agreement. Given that both the American and British delegations knew very well that the military demands in the agreement would not be accepted by the Serbian side, they did not remove them from the agreement. The main aim here was to put an unacceptable term in front of the Serbian side, and let them refuse these requests and thus prepare the basis of a NATO operation.¹⁰⁴

Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state, was perhaps the one who expressed this approach best while saying the “*Rambouillet document is an excuse to initiate a bombardment*”.¹⁰⁵ Yet in another statement made by Kissinger, he stated that the “*Rambouillet document is a provocation to initiate a bombardment. Rambouillet is a document which even an angel Serb cannot accept. It was a terrible diplomatic document that never should be*”.¹⁰⁶

101 Sancaktar, p. 141.

102 Jülide Karakoç, “ABD’nin Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Hegemonya Çabaları Etkisinde NATO’nun Kosova Müdahalesi, *Gazi University Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences*, 8/1, 2006, pp. 232-233.

103 Karakoç, p. 233.

104 Sancaktar, p. 141.

105 Ian Bancroft, “Serbia’s anniversary is a timely reminder”, 24 March 2009, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/mar/24/serbia-kosovo>, (November 25, 2018).

106 Sancaktar, p. 142.

As a last resort to stop conflicts between the parties and ensure peace and security in the region, the Rambouillet talks did not produce any result except that the Kosovo Albanians signed unilaterally.¹⁰⁷ During the talks, the Serb side continued its massacres in spite of all the warnings from the Western states.¹⁰⁸ In March 1999, when the Serbs increased their attacks on civilians, the US representative R. Holbrooke met with Milosevic to discuss the problem in a diplomatic manner. In this meeting, Milosevic was asked to stop his attacks against civilians. Milosevic was informed that if Serbs would not cease these attacks, a military intervention would be implemented. However, Milosevic continued his attacks and refused Holbrooke's demands.¹⁰⁹

On 24 March 1999, NATO unilaterally launched an airstrike after the Serbian side refused to agree.¹¹⁰ Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the USA participated in the attack.¹¹¹ Countries including Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Turkey contributed aircrafts to the operation.¹¹²

While the bombardment continued, the UN continued its diplomatic and peace efforts.¹¹³ The operation, which was estimated to last for 10 days at the beginning, lasted for 78 days, mainly as a result of resistance from the Serbian side.¹¹⁴ This bombardment made Yugoslavia the first and only country which NATO had fought with.¹¹⁵ This operation was different from the one in Bosnia - while the operation in Bosnia was of a limited nature, this was not the case for Kosovo. The US-led NATO troops bombed all targets in Yugoslavia, not only in areas where the problem was experienced, but in remote cities.¹¹⁶ As a result, the entire infrastructure of Yugoslavia was destroyed.¹¹⁷

107 Demirel, p. 295.

108 Zeynel Levent, "Tarihi Süreçte Kosova", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, No: 52, 2013, p. 862.

109 Ülger, p. 49

110 Demirel, p. 261; Levent, p. 862.

111 Pektaş, p. 129.

112 H. Emiroğlu, *Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Kosova Sorunu*, Ankara: Orient Yayınları, 2006, p. 250.

113 Ural, p. 170.

114 Ali Ayata, "Kosova: Sonun Başlangıcı", *The Academic Elegance*, Volume: 2, No: 3, 2015, p. 137; Pektaş, p. 131.2015, s. 137; Ercan, Pektaş, *Balkan Siyasetinde Kosova'nın*, s. 131.

115 İlhan Uzgel, "Yeni Dünya Düzeni, Yeni Yugoslavya ve Miloseviç Döneminin Sonu", *Mülkiye Dergisi*, Volume: XXIV, No: 225, p. 115.

116 Osman Karatay, "Miloşeviç Dönemi Yugoslav Dış Siyaseti: Başarısız Bir Mirasyedilik Olayı", *Balkan Diplomasisi*, compiled by Ömer E. Lüttem, Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun, Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2001, p. 135.

117 Karakoç, p. 233.

Serbs finally agreed to an agreement. As part of the agreement, an international force under the name of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), including NATO, was deployed in the region to ensure peace and security.¹¹⁸ In addition, the Serbian forces withdrew from the region outside of historical and religious places. It was decided that those Albanians living in the area before the conflict would return to the area.¹¹⁹

The Kosovo Intervention was referred to as the “first war where NATO fired guns”.¹²⁰ The NATO bombardment ended with the UNSC’s resolution 1244.¹²¹ In this resolution, in which the standards of Kosovo were determined¹²² and accepted by Russia, the following points were particularly emphasized: First of all, the cessation of all military conflicts in Kosovo; the withdrawal all armed forces in the region and finally the security of the region would be entrusted to KFOR forces, and the administration of Kosovo would be entrusted to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).¹²³ UNMIK, which was to be formed for the administration of Kosovo, was composed of four main organs, of which the UN was to be responsible for civil administration, the OSCE for institutional recover, the UN Refugees High Commission for the return of refugees and the EU for the reconstruction process.¹²⁴

UNMIK assumed the role of a temporary government until life in Kosovo became normal.¹²⁵ The duties and powers of UNMIK were clearly disclosed in paragraph 11 of Resolution 1244.¹²⁶ The UNSC, which had worked hard to solve the problem through diplomatic means, especially before the NATO intervention, had made important decisions which prevented the resolution of conflict after NATO intervention. Yet even though the UNSC issued a resolution with respect to disarmament of the region and cessation of the conflict, it was seen that the UN was insufficient to solve the Kosovo problem.

118 Didem Ekinci, “Turkey and Kosovo: A Chronicle of Post-Cold War Bilateral Relations”, *Avrasya Dosyası Balkanlar Özel*, Volume: 14, No: 1, 2008, p. 285.

119 Fatma Çoban, “Kosova Meselesi ve Çin’in Tutumu”, *BİLGESAM, Uluslararası Balkan Kongresi*, Kocaeli University, 2014, p. 172.

120 Timothy Garton Ash, “Why Kosova shouldbecomethe33rdmember-andSerbia34th”, *The Guardian*, 15 February 2007.

121 Burak Tangör, *Avrupa Güvenlik Yönetişimi, Bosna, Kosova ve Makedonya Krizleri*, Ankara: Seçkin Yayınları, 2008, p. 127.

122 Venelin Tsaçevski, *Balkanite, Evropeyskiyat İzbor, İzdatelstvo “İztok-Zapad”*, Sofya, 2007, p. 206.

123 Hüseyin Emiroğlu, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Kosova Sorunu ve Birleşmiş Milletler”, *Avrasya Etüdları*, 29-30/2006, p. 92.

124 Kader Özlem, “Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde ABD’nin ve Türkiye’nin Balkanlar Politikalarının Bosna Hersek, Kosova ve Makedonya Krizleri Örneğinde İncelenmesi”, *Trakya Üniversitesi Balkan Araştırma Enstitüsü Dergisi*, C. 1, S. 1, Aralık 2012, ss. 31-32.

125 Erhan Türbedar, “Kosova’nın Bağımsızlık İlanının Sırbistan, Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya’ya Etkileri”, *Avrasya Dosyası Balkanlar Özel*, Volume: 14, No: 1, 2008, p. 25.

126 Ülger, p. 49.

UNMIK settled in the region after the bombing stopped in Kosovo with the UN resolution 1244. It was decided that the powers granted by the UNSC to UNMIK would be used as long as it did not contradict the regulations and statutory rules issued by UNMIK.¹²⁷ After that, discussions between the parties were mostly based on the status of Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs could not agree on the status of Kosovo. While Kosovo Albanians favored full independence, the Serbs on the other hand favored a broad and democratic autonomy for Kosovo.¹²⁸ Discussions about Kosovo's status between parties continued until 2006. Negotiations on the status of Kosovo had begun in Vienna in February 2006. The talks between the Serbian and Albanian representatives were chaired by former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, who was authorized by the UN Secretary-General.¹²⁹ At the end of the 14-month negotiations between the parties, no result was reached and Ahtisaari was asked to prepare a report on this issue.¹³⁰

Ahtisaari, in his report, concluded that “that Serbs and Kosovars will not be able to meet on a common point and that more talks cannot end this impasse, regardless of form.” In other words, it was understood that the problem between parties could not be solved through dialogue.¹³¹ For this reason, Ahtisaari made it clear that the only suitable option for Kosovo was independence, initially under the control of the international community. These theses proposed by Ahtisaari were important steps towards Kosovo's independence.¹³² On 17 February 2008, after Kosovo became independent, it prepared a new constitution on 8 April 2008. This constitution entered into force on 15 January 2009. According to the new constitution, Kosovo was defined as: a multi-ethnic society based on the rule of law. In addition, the principle of separation of powers was included in the constitution. While the territorial integrity of the state was approved, English, Albanian and Serbian were accepted as official languages. In addition, in the constitution, it was stated that Kosovo would be able to participate in international organizations, but would not be able to unite or merge with any other country.¹³³

127 Özgür Mengiler, *Birleşmiş Milletler Çerçevesinde Uluslararası Uyuşmazlıkların Barışçı Çözümü*, Ankara: Platin Yayınları, 2005, p. 333.

128 Sancaktar, p. 144..

129 Ülger, p. 50.

130 Ülger, p. 51.

131 Venelin Tsachevski, *Balkanite, Novata Yugoiztočna Evropa*, Vtoro Dopılнено İzdanie, İzdatelstvo “İztok-Zapad”, Sofya, 2008, pp. 221-223.

132 Levent, p. 865.

133 Sibel Akgün, “Kosova’da Yeniden Yapılandırma Çalışmaları Kapsamında Bugünkü Durum”, *Akademik Bakış*, Volume: 5, No: 10, 2012, p. 258.

3. United Nations Veto Deadlock: China And Russia

Clashes between the parties in Kosovo and the fact that Serbs did not have any limits in their use of violence turned the problem into an *internal armed conflict where the rules of human law must be applied*.¹³⁴ Although the Kosovo issue was recognized by the Contact Group, the issue became a fully international problem, with its inclusion into the agenda of the UNSC. The UN, which wanted to solve the problem through dialogue and peace, issued resolution 1160 and then resolution 1199. With UN Resolution 1160, a comprehensive arms embargo was imposed upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovo was also included in this embargo.¹³⁵ The UN later issued resolution 1199. While this decision was made, China abstained. China stated that it saw the problem as an internal issue for Yugoslavia which is why it had abstained from the vote. China also stated that the problem should be solved through dialogue between the two sides considering the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, China stated that the Kosovo issue was not a threat to international peace.¹³⁶ China later strongly opposed UN resolution 1203. The attitude of China prevented the UN from producing solutions during the Kosovo crisis.

China, as well as Russia caused the UN to become ineffective and unable to act in the Kosovo Crisis since they both had the right of veto in UN and they both exercised this right during the Crisis. The best example for this situation was the NATO intervention in Kosovo. When the Serb massacres in Kosovo increased and all dialogue was blocked, an intervention in Serbia was brought to the agenda with a decree by the UNSC. However, when Russia and China prevented this resolution in the Security Council, other members, including the United States, moved this issue to NATO.¹³⁷ This situation left the UN inadequate to solve the problem in the Kosovo crisis. China and Russia's vetoes were not limited to these two decisions. In the process of Kosovo's independence, both countries blocked various UN resolutions.

To determine the final status of Kosovo, the UNSC launched a process on 24 October 2005. At the end of the process, the international community realized that the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians would not be able to live together any longer. Therefore, Marti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Representative of Kosovo, was asked to prepare a report on the issue. This report was submitted to the UN Secretary General. The report was supported by the European Union and the United States. The report, which evolved into a draft of a possible peace

134 Çoban, p. 173.

135 UN Security Council, Resolution 1160, March 1998, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1160\(1998\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1160(1998)), (December 2, 2018).

136 Çoban, p. 172.

137 Sancaktar, p. 140.

process, was then submitted to the Security Council. Yet here again Russia exercised its right of veto. The reason stated by Russia for its veto was that this report was contrary to decision 1244 and this report paved the way for the independence of Kosovo.¹³⁸

With the veto of Russia, the UN was again in the background on the issue of what Kosovo's status would be in the future. The US, the EU and Russia initiated a negotiation process that was to last about 4 months. There was no result following this process since Kosovo Albanians wanted independence and the Serbians opposed the Ahtisaari Plan, which would grant independence to Kosovo.¹³⁹ Then, after the United States expressed its support for the independence of Kosovo and supported Kosovo in this, the Kosovo parliament assembled on February 17, 2008 and declared independence.¹⁴⁰ Despite this, Russia and China maintained their opposition against independence for Kosovo and did not recognize the independence of Kosovo. For this reason, Kosovo could not be a member of UN.¹⁴¹ While the UN desired to play an active role in the Kosovo Crisis, the continuous vetoes and abstentions expressed by Russia and China, which are permanent members of the UN Security Council, tied Kosovo's hands. The right of veto power of the permanent members of the UN due to the structural nature of the UN, made the UN ineffective in solving of Kosovo crisis.

CONCLUSION

Tito's balanced policy approach which he had tried to implement within different ethnic and religious communities was altered after his death. Slobodan Milosevic, who took power after Tito's death, started to implement pro-Serbian policies. One of the first things Milosevic did was to take back the rights granted to Kosovo under the period of Tito. Milosevic also terminated the autonomy granted to Kosovo and Vojvodina during this period and tied Kosovo to Serbia. The arrangements Milosevic implemented led to riots and protests in Yugoslavia.

Albanians of Kosovo, for the main part, organized various demonstrations and protests to reclaim their rights. Those who participated in the protests were brutally dealt with by Serbian forces. Milosevic also declared a state of emergency but this was not enough to stop the demonstrations and riots.

138 Şahin, p. 525.

139 Numan BAŞ, *Kosova Sorununun Ortaya Çıkışı ve Balkanlar Üzerine Etkileri*, Süleyman Demirel University, Unpublished master's thesis, Isparta, 2009, p. 33.

140 İlker Alp, "1990'larda Yugoslavya ve Bosna Hersek" *Trakya University Journal Of The Faculty Of Letters*, Volume: 1, No: 1, January 2011, p. 3; Baş, p. 34.

141 Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu, "Etno-Federalizm Kosova'daki Siyasal Krizi Çözebilir mi?", *Avrasya Etüdleri*, Ankara, 2014, p. 31.

The turmoil experienced in Kosovo escalated until 1990. Milosevic, meanwhile, dispelled the assembly of Kosovo thus causing further turmoil. In response, Kosovo Albanians organized an independence referendum in 1991, and then unilaterally declared their independence. This bid for independence by Kosovo was met harshly by the Serbs and the declaration did not attract enough support in the international arena.

In the Kosovo issue, attempts were initiated to stop the clashes between the Serbs and Albanians. First, UN Resolution 1160 was issued to ensure a ceasefire and with this decision an embargo was also implemented on both sides. The UN went on to issue resolution 1199, since the conflict between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians posed a threat to regional peace and security. In addition to the various resolutions adopted by the UN, the Contact Group was also established to resolve the Kosovo issue through dialogue and negotiation.

After the attempts to establish peace between the parties failed, despite all the efforts made to resolve the Kosovo problem, NATO intervened with military means. Although the problem was moved to the UN, still a solution could not be reached. The main reasons that a solution could not be reached within the UN are:

1. Congestion of dialogue and negotiation process between the parties
2. Consideration of the Kosovo conflict by Global Powers through their national interests and evaluation of the resolutions related to Kosovo conflict by Global Powers in line with their national interests and relationships.
3. Effectiveness of the Right of Veto held by China and Russia as permanent members of the UN Security Council.

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