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The Deployment of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and the Dynamics of Host States: An Empirical Analysis

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Abstract United Nations (UN) peacekeeping is one of the most effective instruments for mitigating conflict and promoting international stability. It offers both international legitimacy and a framework for shared responsibility. Especially after the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have been deployed in complex and challenging contexts, primarily in civil conflicts within states classified as failed or fragile. However, UN peacekeeping forces have not been deployed in every conflict-affected country. In this study, it is argued that the probability of UN deployment is linked to the characteristics of the host countries. This study focuses on country-level factors that influence the probability of deployment to examine the determinants of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) deployment. Focusing on peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN worldwide between 2000 and 2015, this study estimates a logit panel model with a sample of 17 countries to assess the determinants of probability PKO deployment. The main findings of our study are as follows: An increase in state capacity and GDP per capita correlates with a decreased probability of PKO deployment. Conversely, higher levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and military expenditures are associated with an increased probability of PKO deployment. Additionally, the presence of conflict, political instability, and terrorism significantly increases the probability of PKO deployment.

Keywords UN Peacekeeping · Conflict, State Capacity · ODA · Panel Data Econometrics · Logit model

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Introduction

The United Nations peacekeeping system, invented as an *ad hoc* solution to intervene in conflicts and observe and maintain ceasefires, has undergone significant changes over the decades. Traditional peacekeeping is grounded in the core principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force—often referred to as the "holy trinity"—and was initially deployed in interstate conflicts (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004). However, many operations were deployed in states lacking the capacity to provide basic public services and failing to meet the criteria of a modern state—often categorized as failed or fragile—after the Cold War (World Bank, 2006). These states are unable to perform their fundamental functions, including maintaining security, delivering justice, and ensuring the well-being of their citizens. In most cases, they lack effective territorial control and have experienced prolonged civil wars. In response to emerging challenges and shortcomings, key documents such as *An Agenda for Peace* (Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1992) and the *Brahimi Report* (2000) highlighted the need for more robust and effective operations, marking the early stages of transformation in UN peacekeeping practices. The deployment of UN peacekeeping forces increased once again in the 2000s, driven by enhanced cooperation within the UN Security Council to take decisive action in response to security crises (Yalçınkaya et al. 2018). Moreover, UN peacekeeping has evolved beyond its traditional mandate, expanding to include broader and more complex responsibilities, such as peacebuilding and state-building in conflict-affected states. Consequently, the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations have expanded to include a wide range of tasks, such as delivering humanitarian aid, restoring state functions, overseeing democratic elections, supporting social and economic reforms, rebuilding the security sector, disarming and reintegrating combatants, and reestablishing governmental authority. The expanded mandate of UN peacekeeping has also shaped academic research. Initially, most studies focused on defining and categorizing these new types of operations (Diehl 1993; Fetherston 1994; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004). Later, research shifted toward evaluating the effects of peacekeeping on mitigating conflict severity. Many studies have shown that peacekeeping operations help shorten conflicts, reduce battlefield violence, limit the spread of armed conflict, promote lasting peace, and provide protection to civilians (Fortna 2004; Howard 2008; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015; Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017; Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2021). As an alternative, more recently, a few studies have begun to explore the impact of PKOs across various domains, including environmental effects (Paul F. Diehl 2018; Bakaki and Böhmelt 2021), criminal violence (Salvatore 2019), health outcomes (Gizelis and Cao 2021), overall well-being (Bove, Salvatore, and Elia 2022), and state capacity (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2020; Meiske and Ruggeri 2024). Furthermore, seminal research has focused on post-conflict contexts to conduct comprehensive long-term evaluations of UN peacekeeping efforts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 2006; Sambanis 2008; Fortna 2008; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2019). Numerous studies have examined the factors that influence the likelihood of PKO deployment. These studies share the following common finding: States with robust governments are less likely to receive peacekeeping missions. In contrast, the UN Security Council tends to deploy peacekeepers to countries with weak governments, characterized by higher levels of violence and ongoing conflict (Fortna, 2004; 2008; Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Mullenbach, 2005; Beardsley and Schmidt, 2012; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis, 2018). The literature on peacekeeping deployments follows two distinct trends: one strand focuses on the characteristics of civil wars, while the other examines the interests of the P5 members of the UN Security Council. Most studies either emphasize conflict characteristics—such as duration, nature of war, and scale of casualties—as key determinants of peacekeeping deployment or prioritize the strategic interests of decision-making states. However, these assessments predominantly focus on security-related indicators. To

address this gap in the literature, our study also examines the host state characteristics. Initially, our study focused on 25 countries, covering all UN peacekeeping operations conducted between 2000 and 2015. However, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and Eritrea were excluded from the model due to the absence of a state capacity index. In addition, five other countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Pakistan, Cyprus, and Lebanon) were omitted from the analysis because there were no variations in the PKO variable during the specified period. This constitutes a limitation of our study. Our final analysis was conducted on 17 countries over a span of 16 years. This period was selected because multidimensional PKOs have increasingly been deployed with broader mandates in response to the evolving nature of conflicts and the associated threats to international security. The mandates encompassed a wide range of tasks, including overseeing the peace process, training national police forces, assisting in the creation of a newly restructured military, supporting economic development, and reinforcing law, order, and state authority. This evolution reflects a more integrated approach to peacebuilding, where capacity-building efforts were prioritized alongside traditional security tasks. Consequently, these operations have been recognized as instruments for peacebuilding and state-building in fragile states. For the purposes of this study, the state is defined as having the ability to effectively perform its core functions in a professional manner that responds to the evolving demands of the modern state (Lynn 2008; Bouckaert 2022). Drawing on the neo-Weberian conceptualization of the state, three fundamental capabilities are identified: coercive capacity, which pertains to the monopoly of violence; administrative capacity, which relates to the state's ability to implement policies effectively; and productive capacity, which encompasses the state's role in economic performance. The probability of UN PKO deployment in a given country is expected to be significantly influenced by its own capacities and characteristics. Consequently, this study aims to examine the influence of variables associated with this state conceptualization on the probability of UN PKO deployment. GDP per capita (*gdppc*), official development assistance (*oda*), military expenditures (*military*), conflict (*conflict*), terror attack (*terrorism*), total natural resource rents (*tnr*), State Capacity Index (*sci*), mean years of schooling (*mys*), and worldwide governance indicators (*gef, ps, cc, rq, rl*) and political rights (*pr*) are incorporated as key variables in the model.

Our study focuses on Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Kuwait, Mali, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Liberia, Tajikistan, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Syria, which have hosted UN peacekeeping missions. Data on these missions is obtained from the Peace and Security Data Hub of the United Nations (UN 2023). This study employs panel data incorporating both temporal and cross-country dimensions to examine the factors influencing the probability of PKO deployment in selected countries. Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression analysis is employed to estimate the determinants of PKO deployment. Following Mullenbach's (2005) recommendation for a more comprehensive analysis of country-level factors, this study contributes to the empirical literature by broadening both the scope and methodological rigor of existing research on PKO deployment.

The rest of the study is structured as follows: The literature review examines relevant studies on the factors influencing the deployment of UN PKOs. The following section discusses the main characteristics of states that have received UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The research approach section outlines the model used in the study, dataset, and findings. Finally, the conclusion offers a summary of the key insights and provides policy recommendations.

Literature on UN Peacekeeping Deployment

Peacekeeping operations have been recognized as an effective mechanism for addressing intrastate conflicts; however, peacekeeping assistance is not provided for all conflicts. Since the 1990s, the UN has launched numerous operations in countries struggling with civil wars, political instability, and economic challenges, as these states have increasingly been regarded by the international community as threats to global stability (UN 2004). Most of these countries have been classified as fragile because of their weak state capacity. They face multiple challenges, including colonial-era borders that ignored the historical and social realities of local populations, inadequate public services, and

dysfunctional institutions, all of which contribute to their fragility. The failure of these states has led the international community to view UN peacekeeping operations as crucial tools for conflict prevention and peace building (UN General Assembly 2005; 2000) and for filling the "critical gaps in state capacity" (UN General Assembly 2015). Since 2000, the UN has launched over 50 new peacekeeping missions, reflecting the evolving approach of the international community to addressing conflicts. These missions are typically deployed in deeply divided societies following intense internal conflicts, often driven by ethnic or religious motives.

The literature includes numerous quantitative studies demonstrating the successful outcomes of these operations. Many of these studies have indicated that peacekeeping forces are associated with a reduction in violence against civilians (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020; Kirschner and Miller 2019; Morgan and Morey 2024). Many studies have indicated that robust peacekeeping missions play a crucial role in preventing conflict spillover (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018) and provide a cost-effective approach to managing and mitigating conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; United States Government Accountability Office 2018; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2019). Furthermore, some studies have highlighted the role of UN peacekeeping in sustaining peace and preventing the recurrence of conflict in the aftermath of war (Fortna 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Campbell and Salvatore 2023). However, not all conflicts receive UN peacekeeping assistance. The deployment of peacekeeping forces requires authorization through a resolution of the Security Council. The decision to deploy UN peacekeepers has been extensively analysed in the literature. Studies emphasize the significance of conflict characteristics or the self-interest of Security Council members as crucial determinants in peacekeeping deployment. However, numerous quantitative studies collectively indicate that UN peacekeepers are typically deployed to civil wars that present particularly challenging cases (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Mullenbach 2005; Fortna 2004). Some studies suggest that conflict characteristics, such as the number of casualties (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Frederking and Patane 2017; Holøyen 2024) and the intensity of violence (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018), are key factors influencing the UN's decision to deploy peacekeeping forces. Mullenbach (2005) showed that the UN is less likely to deploy peacekeepers to conflicts directly involving permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) or other major powers. However, when these states are not directly involved but the conflicts align with their interests, research findings yield mixed conclusions. Most studies focus on the relationship between P-5 member states, which make decisions on PKO deployments, and states experiencing civil wars, considering factors such as geographic, economic, and historical ties. Fortna (2008), Gilligan and Stedman (2003), and Beardsley and Schmidt (2012) found that a shared colonial legacy does not lead to a higher frequency of peacekeeping deployments. Moreover, many studies have proven the opposite of the popular suggestion that countries rich in extractable resources, such as oil, are more likely to receive peacekeeping missions (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Fortna 2004; Uta 2024). However, some studies have indicated that the existence of a peace agreement terminating the conflict increases the probability of peacekeeping deployment (Fortna, 2008; Mullenbach 2005; Holøyen 2024). Unlike Beardsley and Schmidt (2012), more studies suggest that the interests of P-5 states are important in determining whether a civil war receives United Nations peacekeepers (Stojek and Tir 2015; Allen and Yuen 2020; Mullenbach 2005; Aydin 2010). While the interests and preferences of the five permanent members are acknowledged as significant determinants of peacekeeping deployment, this argument is extended by emphasizing the characteristics of the host states analysed in this study.

State Characteristics and the Deployment of PKOs

Intrastate conflicts characterized by high civilian casualties and driven by ethnic and religious identity movements have emerged as a significant threat to the stability of the international system following the Cold War. These states typically rank low on various indices, reflecting substantial deficiencies in governance, institutional effectiveness,

and the delivery of essential services and are often labeled as "failed," "collapsed," or "weak" (Rotberg 2003). These shortcomings have contributed to political instability, sustaining a cycle of conflict within these countries. Many of these states find themselves stuck in a "conflict trap" characterized by a vicious cycle of political instability and poor economic performance. Collier et al. (2003) identified that civil war also reflects "failure of development" and that the probability of conflict resurgence rises once states experience civil wars. Research indicates that nearly half of all civil wars relapse into violence within a few years after the conflict has officially ended (Collier et al. 2003; Fortna 2004). Moreover, natural resource wealth can become a source of instability in such countries (Collier and Venables 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2005).

Major powers aiming to share the economic and political costs of intervention have undertaken numerous peacekeeping operations under the UN, particularly in response to these intrastate conflicts. These states have been seen as a threat to international stability (Rotberg 2002) and emblematic of the failure of neoliberal reforms, have amplified re-calls to "bring the state back in" (Skocpol 1985). International organizations, such as the World Bank, have assessed these conflict-affected states as cases of developmental reversal (World Bank 2006; Collier et al., 2003; World Bank, 2004). States lacking sufficient capacity to provide basic public services and failing to fulfill the fundamental functions of a modern state have been associated with weak institutions and poor governance, leading to their classification as fragile or failed. These characteristics are widely regarded as a major development challenge (OECD, 2007; World Bank, 2006). These states are characterized by their inability to control their territories, enforce laws, or provide essential public services. They have endured prolonged civil wars, often accompanied by extreme violence, and face significant developmental challenges. In this context, state capacity has emerged as a key concept for assessing these states' characteristics, emphasizing the link between development and security (Hameiri 2007). Reflecting the Weberian theoretical legacy, the concept of state capacity refers to the extent to which a state effectively performs its essential functions and implements its policies and objectives (Cingolani 2013). This concept implies that states must possess certain fundamental capabilities. In this regard, coercive capacity signifies the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force, a defining characteristic of 'stateness' (Fukuyama 2004; Lindvall and Teorell 2016; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Bäck and Hadenius 2008). Administrative capacity is also crucial for policy implementation. This suggests that state capacity requires the establishment of sovereignty and military control over a given territory and the presence of effective state institutions and professional bureaucrats (Geddes 1994; Fukuyama 2013; Knutsen 2013). Additionally, productive capacity refers to a state's ability to generate and mobilize resources and shape the economy (Evans, 1995; Evans and Rauch, 1999; Rauch and Evans, 2000). However, when a state fails to possess these essential capabilities, the international community has intervened to maintain stability through a range of instruments, from peacekeeping missions to foreign aid. For instance, members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have allocated most their country's net available ODA to fragile states (Desai 2020). Moreover, a positive and significant relationship has been identified between ODA and troop contributions to UN peacekeeping (Malik 2023). However, aid to states trapped in cycles of political instability and poor economic performance may have ambiguous effects, potentially fostering aid dependency, prolonging state failure (Chauvet and Collier 2008), and increasing the risk of civil war (Arcand and Chauvet 2001; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus, these state characteristics have posed potential threats to regional and international security. Such conflicts have created a favorable environment for transnational criminal organizations, particularly terrorism, and have also contributed to the spread of epidemics and poverty (Collier et al. 2003). Not surprisingly, Sub-Saharan Africa continues to have the highest number of conflict-affected countries (IEP 2024) and remains the primary host of UN peacekeeping deployments (SIPRI 2024). Moreover, the region, which has historically hosted the largest number of peacekeeping operations, is characterized by extreme global income and wealth inequality (Gomez-Carrera et al. 2024). The limited capacity of these countries, which constitute the vast majority of our sample, is largely attributed to their colonial history. The enduring effects of colonialism have hindered the modern state's ability to fulfill its fundamental functions.

Colonial rule imposed arbitrary borders and artificial institutions without regard for the local populations' histories and cultures. Consequently, the nation-state model in Africa has struggled with issues of authority and legitimacy (Reid, 2020). Many newly independent states experienced ethnic tensions that had been politicized by colonial rule after the decolonization process. Several studies have highlighted the harmful effects of ethnic divisions on the governance of these states and their role in increasing the likelihood of conflict (Collier 2001; Kalu and Aniche 2024; Posner 2006). These conflicts are intertwined with ethnic tensions, extreme poverty, or are driven by the greed-fueled exploitation of natural resources. Additionally, they often lead to humanitarian crises that governments fail to prevent. Many of them experiencing these conflicts have accepted third-party intervention, and a common characteristic among them is the presence of weak institutions that hinder effective governance. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), the combination of inclusive economic and political institutions serves as a catalyst for sustainable growth. The absence of such institutions is a key factor in explaining why some nations fail. These nations are caught in a "fragility trap," marked by a vicious cycle of conflict and poor governance (Carment and Samy 2019). This dynamic is evident in the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations in certain countries. The lack of government effectiveness, which refers to capacity, and political stability, which pertains to the level of authority and legitimacy, are chronic patterns in these countries.

This study draws on neo-Weberian state insights (Bouckaert 2022) expecting states to possess certain key characteristics. Within this framework, the following independent variables are selected for analysis, based on the assertion that the characteristics of host countries are linked to the probability of UN deployment. Based on Fearon and Laitin's (2003) argument that GDP per capita serves as a general proxy for the military, administrative, and bureaucratic capabilities of the state, *gdppc* is included in the analysis, in line with existing literature (Fortna 2004; Holøyen 2024). Conflict-related proxies serve as key indicators for understanding the underlying drivers of the deployment of UN PKOs (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2008; 2004; Mullenbach 2005; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012). Building on this, the variables *conflict*, political stability (*pc*), and *terrorism* are used to assess the influence of a state's coercive capacity over its own territory on the probability of UN deployment. In addition, total natural resource revenues (*tnr*) are used to gain insights into host states' productive capacity and its effects on third-party intervention. Research on rentier states has already provided valuable context by examining the consequences of a state's dependence on natural resources (Collier and Goderis 2007; Fearon 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Masi, Savoia, and Sen 2024) and the intervention of the UN (Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Aydin 2010). The variable *oda* is included as an indicator of a state's productive capacity to examine whether PKO deployment is linked to the state's fragility (Malik 2023). World Governance indicators (WGI) and political rights (*pr)* are also included as variables reflecting a state's ability to govern effectively, enabling an assessment of whether the deployment of PKOs is linked to administrative capacity. Additionally, the variable state capacity (*sci*) is included in the analysis because it broadly reflects the host state's overall capabilities. Typically, the literature operationalizes a host country's military capacity to assess its influence on the decision to deploy peacekeeping operations (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005). Finally, military expenditure (*military*) is included in the analysis to control for the possibility that a country's military spending level influences UN intervention.

Research Approach

This study aims to provide empirical evidence on the factors influencing the PKO deployment probability. A panel data model was used to incorporate the characteristics of host countries into the analysis to offer a more comprehensive analysis of the country-level factors affecting PKO deployment. A panel dataset covering 17 countries between 2000 and 2015 has been compiled for this purpose. Panel data is preferred in this study because it combines cross-sectional and time-series data, thereby leveraging the advantages of both. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, a panel logit model is estimated.

In panel logit models, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the event occurs at time t, in country i. (i.e., if PKO deployment takes place), and 0 if the event does not occur (i.e., if PKO deployment does not take place) ($Y_{it} = 1$, if the event occurs, $Y_{it} = 0$ if it does not). A logistic regression model is estimated using this panel dataset to explain the deployment of PKO. For this model, a binary dependent variable is constructed as in Gilligan and Stedman (2003). Coded as 1 if the UN deployed an observer mission, a traditional peacekeeping mission, or an enforcement mission in a given country between 2000 and 2015, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable data were obtained from the Peace and Security Data Hub of the United Nations (UN 2023).

The following country-level factors have been selected as independent variables for analysis in relation to the literature. First, the *gdppc* -GDP per capita, constant 2015 US$, variable is included in the model as an indicator of development. Additionally, the variables of *military* expenditure (% of GDP), *unemployment* (total % of the labor force), *inflation* (inflation, GDP deflator, annual %), and *tnr* (total natural resource rents, % of GDP) were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI).[1] *sci-State* Capacity Index measures state capacity through three key dimensions: extraction, coercive, and administrative capacities. Higher values indicate greater capacity of the state (Hanson and Sigman 2021). *Conflict* - represents a country's involvement in an international or domestic conflict. The variable is coded as 1 if country *i* participated in a conflict in year *t*, and 0 otherwise. Data are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute (UCDP).[2] *terrorism*- represents the number of terrorist attacks, obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).[3] The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threat or use of violence by a non-state actor to intimidate or coerce in pursuit of political, economic, religious, or social objectives.

ps, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; *gef,* Government Effectiveness; *cc*, Control of Corruption; *rq*, Regulatory Quality; and *rl*, Rule of Law, which reflect a state's ability to govern effectively. These variables are obtained from the WGI,[4] with country scores ranging approximately from –2.5 to 2.5. In addition to these indicators, the *Political* Rights variable was obtained from Freedom House.[5] *Pr* is measured on a one-to-seven scale, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. *mys*-Mean Years of Schooling represents the average number of years of education received by individuals aged 25 years. The country scores for this indicator were obtained from the UNDP-HDI database.[6] *oda*- Official Development Assistance, which is obtained from the OECD database and refers to official development assistance aimed at promoting economic development and welfare in developing countries.[7]

Findings

The logistic regression results are presented in Table 1. Panel logit estimates are the results obtained from a fixed-effects panel data model that estimates the factors influencing the probability of PKO deployment across multiple countries over time. First, when examining Table 1, the results of Model 1, which includes the independent variables *gdppc, oda, military, unemploy, inflation*, and *tnr*. In Model 1, the independent variable *inflation* and *tnr* are statistically insignificant. Model 2 was estimated to determine the effect of the *sci* variable on the probability of PKO deployment. It can be observed that the *sci* variable is significant in all three subsequent models. Subsequently, the predictions of Models 3 and 4, in which the *terrorism* and *conflict* variables are added sequentially, show that these variables are significant for PKO deployment. Finally, to determine the effect of governance indicators on the probability of PKO deployment, we estimated Model 5. The results from these sequentially estimated models show that *gdppc* (insignificant

[1](WDI, https://data.worldbank.org/)
[2](UCDP, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/)
[3](GTD, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)
[4](WGI, https://www.govindicators.org/)
[5](Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org)
[6](UNDP, https://hdr.undp.org/)
[7](OECD, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/)

only in Model 3), *oda*, *military*, *sci*, *conflict*, and *terrorism* have a consistent and significant effect on PKO deployment probability. Our findings are robust in this regard.

According to the panel logit estimation results, the estimated coefficient for *gdppc* (per capita real GDP) is negative in almost all models. This indicates that higher levels of GDP per capita are associated with lower odds of PKO deployment (OR < 1). The negative and statistically significant effect of *gdppc* across most models highlights a robust relationship between *gdppc* and PKO deployment probability. This finding is consistent with Holøyen (2024), who observed that lower GDP per capita levels are associated with a slightly higher probability of UN PKO deployment.

Table 1

Panel Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Deployment.

PKO= (1 yes, 0 no ref.)	*Model (1)*		*Model (2)*		*Model (3)*		*Model (4)*		*Model (5)*	
Variables	**Coef.**	**OR**	**Coef.**	**OR**	**Coef.**	**OR**	**Coef.**	**OR**	**Coef.**	**OR**
gdppc	−8.195	0.0002	−5.550	0.003	−4.078		−5.326	0.004	−5.972	0.002
	(0.000) ***		**(0.013) ***		(0.107)		**(0.022) ****		**(0.041) ****	
oda	0.004	1.003	0.004	1.004	0.003	1.003	0.003	1.003	0.005	1.005
	(0.003) **		**(0.005) ****		**(0.027) ****		**(0.004) ****		**(0.008) ****	
military	1.059	2.885	1.143	3.138	1.026	2.792	1.140	3.127	1.645	5.183
	(0.000) ***		**(0.000) *****		**(0.000) *****		**(0.000) *****		**(0.000) *****	
unemploy	0.394	1.483	0.633	1.884	0.785	2.193	0.699	2.013	0.753	2.125
	(0.029) **		**(0.003) ****		**(0.003) *****		**(0.003) ****		**(0.008) ****	
inflation	0.001									
	(0.949)									
tnr	0.070									
	(0.181)									
sci			−4.816	0.008	−6.510	0.001	−5.904	0.002		
			(0.005) **		**(0.002) ****		**(0.003) ****			
conflict					2.658	14.279				
					(0.005) **					
terrorism							0.035	1.036		
							(0.0011) *			
mys									−3.203	0.040
									(0.050) *	
gef									−2.189	
									(0.394)	
ps									−5.330	0.004
									(0.000) ***	
cc									−0.917	
									(0.67)	
rq									−8.1794	0.0002
									(0.013) **	
rl									4.516	
									(0.164)	

PKO= (1 yes, 0 no ref.)	*Model (1)*	*Model (2)*	*Model (3)*	*Model (4)*	*Model (5)*
pr					−1.559 0.210
					(0.010) **
Hausman chi2(6): 68.83		Hausman chi2(5): 20.94	Hausman chi2(6):23.7	Hausman chi2(6): 16.86	Hausman chi2(11): 46.93
Prob> chi2: 0.000***		Prob> chi2: 0.002***	Prob> chi2: 0.0005**	Prob> chi2: 0.002***	Prob> chi2: 0.000***
LR chi2(6) = 69.11		LR chi2(5) = 76.08	LR chi2(5) = 86.90	LR chi2(6) = 82.07	LR chi2(11) = 93.78
Log likelihood = −43.217		Log likelihood = −39.732	Log likelihood = −34.325	Log likelihood = −36.740	Log likelihood = −24.460

Note: (1) Values in parentheses represent p-values. Based on the critical values, ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. (2) The results of the Hausman test indicate that the fixed-effects model is preferred over the random-effects model, as the test is statistically significant. (3) The likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square statistics and log-likelihood values indicate overall model fit. The statistically significant LR test suggests that the model provides a better fit than the null model. (4) A negative (positive) coefficient indicates that the odds of the PKO deployment decrease (increase) as the value of the independent variable increases. (5) The p-values of statistically significant variables are shown in bold in the table, and only the odds ratios (OR) for the significant variables are presented. (6) An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that a one-unit increase in the independent variable increases the odds of PKO deployment, whereas an odds ratio less than 1 indicates a decrease in the odds.

The foreign aid, *oda* variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on PKO deployment in all model specifications. The estimated coefficients are consistently positive, and the corresponding odds ratios are slightly above 1. This indicates that increases in *oda* are associated with higher odds of PKO deployment, although the substantive magnitude of the effect is modest. This finding is also consistent with Malik's (2023) finding that foreign aid to a country is positively associated with an increase in the deployment of PKOs. Moreover, our results align with the broader literature suggesting that aid may have ambiguous effects, potentially prolonging a state's fragility (Guillaumont and Chauvet 2001; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Chauvet and Collier 2008). The literature suggests an inverse relationship between a country's military size and the probability of UN deployment (Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Fortna 2004). However, our findings show that the *military* variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on PKO deployment across all model specifications. The estimated coefficients are positive, and the odds ratios are all greater than 1. Substantively, this suggests that higher military expenditure is associated with higher odds of PKO deployment. Existing research linking elevated military expenditures to corruption, patronage, and internal conflict provides indirect support for our results (Henderson and David Singer 2000; Gupta, De Mello, and Sharan 2001; Aziz and Asadullah 2017). The *sci* variable shows a consistently negative and statistically significant effect on PKO deployment across all model specifications. The estimated coefficients are negative, and the corresponding odds ratios are well below 1. This result implies that higher state capacity is associated with lower odds of PKO deployment. Our findings align with the literature suggesting that states with strong governments and substantial military and economic capacity are less likely to be targeted for peacekeeping deployments (Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Mullenbach 2005). The total natural resource revenues *tnr* variable yielded an insignificant result, aligning with Gilligan and Stedman (2003), Fortna (2004), and Uta (2024), who found no evidence of a relationship between natural resource revenues and the probability of deployment. In our model, the *conflict* variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on PKO deployment. In other words, the odds of PKO deployment are substantially higher in a country experiencing conflict than in a country without conflict. Additionally, the *terrorism* variable is statistically significant, with an odds ratio greater than 1, indicating that higher levels of terrorism are associated with increased odds of PKO deployment. This result indicates that an increase in terrorist activity is associated with a slight increase in the odds of PKO deployment, though the effect is less pronounced than that of the conflict variable. Meanwhile, the *ps* variable, which represents political stability and the absence of

violence/terrorism, has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant. This suggests that higher political stability and the absence of violence or terrorism in a country are associated with a lower odd of PKO deployment. Taken together, the coefficients on *conflict, terrorism,* and *ps* show that lower coercive capacity is associated with higher odds of PKO deployment. Our findings align with multiple studies indicating that UN PKOs are more likely to be deployed in countries experiencing higher levels of violence and ongoing conflict (Bove and Elia 2011; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018; Mullenbach 2005; Holøyen 2024). Finally, the World Governance Indicators model yields mixed results. While government effectiveness *gef*, control of corruption *cc*, and rule of law *rl* are insignificant, regulatory quality *rq* and political stability *ps* are statistically significant and negatively signed. Given that *pr* -Political Rights is measured on a one-to-seven scale, where 1 represents the highest degree of freedom and 7 represents the lowest, the negative coefficient of –1.56 (OR<1) indicates that the odds of PKO deployment decreases as political rights worsen (i.e., as the *pr* score increases). In other words, the probability of PKO deployment decreases as a country's political rights score approaches 7 (indicating a lower level of political freedom). This complex finding aligns with Gilligan and Stedman (2003) and Fortna (2004), who found no significant relationship between democracy and peacekeeping force deployment.

Conclusion

Since 1948, UN peacekeeping has been one of the most significant instruments for mitigating conflict and promoting global peace and security. Over this period, the UN has conducted 71 peacekeeping operations worldwide. Following the Cold War, peacekeeping forces have been increasingly deployed under the authority of the UN, involving regional states and their allies to intervene in conflicts driven by ethnic and religious motivations and areas of instability across various regions of the world. However, since not all conflicts receive UN peacekeeping operations, a key question arises: which states receive assistance and what factors determine UN deployment? Given that a UN Security Council decision is a prerequisite for PKO deployment, we argue that the host state's characteristics also play a decisive role in this decision. Particularly since 2000, UN peacekeeping operations have been increasingly deployed to ongoing conflicts marked by intense violence within fragile or failed states, which are often unable to maintain stability through their own military, economic, and administrative capacities. Building on this, our study aims to reveal the potential impact of specific variables associated with a host state's characteristics on the probability of UN peacekeeping deployment. Overall, this study's findings indicate that various country-level factors influenced the probability of UN peacekeeping deployments across 17 countries during the period 2000–2015. Our findings indicate that higher state capacity, GDP, and regulatory quality are associated with a lower probability of peacekeeping force deployment in these countries. Additionally, a positive relationship was identified between foreign aid and the probability of deployment. This aligns with our suggestion that administrative and productive capacities play a crucial role in determining the deployment probability. Furthermore, the probability of deployment increases as military expenditure, terrorism, conflict, and political instability increase, thus confirming our assumption that the lack of coercive capacity increases the probability of receiving PKOs. Based on our findings, which demonstrate that the probability of deployment in a country is linked to coercive, productive, and administrative capacity, we recommend that policymakers develop policies incorporating peacebuilding initiatives to enhance these areas, thereby ensuring the success of peacekeeping operations. Our study primarily focuses on country-level factors that influence deployment probability. However, future research could yield more comprehensive findings by examining the impact of these factors on the consequences of peacekeeping operations.

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