You Only Get What You Give? A New Radical Durkheimian Political Economy of Sacrifice*

Ronjon Paul Datta1

Abstract
Recognizing the convergence of renewed scholarly interest in the sacred, and debates about fiscal sacrifices in recent economic history, this rethinking of Durkheim develops a symptomatic reading of his theory of sacrifice in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. The paper argues that Durkheim's suppression of political economic sensibilities in The Forms leads him to generate a fetishistic account of sacrifice as a moral activity that renews existing bases of rule. His analysis does so because it inadequately accounts for the role of structured inequalities in the production of the rite. A radical Durkheimian political economy of sacrifice is reclaimed by critically synthesizing it with the Foucauldian concept of dispositifs, one better able to account for the combined impact of knowledge control, inequality, and exclusion on moral life. The critical theoretical work is then applied to the axiological implications of neoliberal individualism, highlighting that it depends on and disavows sacrifice, specifically the sacrificing of people's capacity for altruism (or, the sacrifice of sacrifice). Finally, Durkheim's heterological sensibilities about the constitutive potential of the sacred in moments of collective effervescence are used to put the politics back in this political economy of sacrifice.

Keywords
Radical Durkheimianism • Sacrifice • Neoliberalism • Dispositif • Morality • Heterology

*“You Get What You Give” is the title of the 1998 hit song by the American pop music group The New Radicals.
1 Correspondence to: Ronjon Paul Datta (PhD, MA, BAH, BTh), Sociology, Anthropology & Criminology, The University of Windsor, Rm. 164 Chrysler Hall South 401 Sunset Avenue, Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4 Canada. Email: rpdatta@uwindsor.ca ORCID: 0000-0002-6439-9749

©The Authors. Published by the Istanbul University under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.
When I began 15 years ago, I too thought that I would find an answer to the questions that preoccupied me in political economy. I spent several years on it, and got nothing out of it, or only what one can learn from a negative experience (Durkheim [1896] as cited in Fournier, 2013, p. 219)

Sacrifice and offerings do not go unaccompanied by privations that exact a price from the worshipper (Durkheim, 1995, p. 320).

Sacrifice, and the willingness to give sacrificially—joyously even—is a nodal point in Durkheim’s sociological enterprise. In rethinking Durkheim, this paper argues for a radical Durkheimian political economy of sacrifice to redress theoretical discrepancies in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (Durkheim, 1995, hereafter cited as EFRL, or *The Forms*). For Durkheim, people’s dependence on society and on others obliges them to regularly sacrifice, laying aside self-interest and bodily appetites as guides to conduct to act in the interests of a group to which a person belongs and from which empowering benefits accrue. In many respects, reconciling the austere dimensions of the Kantian imperatives of duty with a Saint-Simonian love of humanity lay at the core of Durkheim’s sociological project of explaining morality and how life with others was possible. Contemporary scholarship by Melissa Ptacek (2017), Phillip Steiner (2017; 2012/2013; 2011), Ivan Strenski (2006), Alexander Riley (2015), Frank Pearce (2010) and Willie Watts Miller (2012) among others, has drawn new attention to Durkheim’s account of sacrifice. These contributions are extended here by exploring the potentials and limitations of discrepancies in Durkheim’s account of sacrifice in *The Forms*, especially those stemming from his equivocal use of political economy. Durkheim’s model is critically inspected through the theoretical methodology of “symptomatic readings” developed by Althusser (1970; cf. Pearce, 2001). I contend that Durkheim’s suppression of a political economy of sacrifice, elements of which are present in *The Forms*, leads him to generate a fetishistic account of sacrifice as a moral activity, one that typically renews existing mechanisms of rule. His analysis does so because it fails to adequately account for the role of structured inequalities in the production of the rite and the inherent volatility and political potentiality subtending it. This theoretical work is then applied to the axiological content of neoliberal individualism, highlighting that it depends on, and disavows, the *sacrifice of sacrifice*, i.e., the sacrificing of people’s capacity for altruism. A radical Durkheimian political economy of sacrifice is reclaimed by considering both mechanisms of “rule” (i.e., the reproduction of the *status quo*) and those of “politics” (i.e., how the existential reference points of collective life are contingently and creatively constituted) (Datta, 2008). The rule side is developed by critically synthesizing Durkheim’s model with a neo-Foucauldian concept of a *dispositif* (Datta, 2007; Foucault, 1980; Hardy, 2015) to better account for the impact

---

To my knowledge, a Durkheimian political economy of sacrifice does not exist, the closest contribution in my view being Georges Bataille’s analysis of Aztec sacrifice in *The Accursed Share, Volume I* (1995a).
of knowledge control, inequality, and exclusion on sacrifice. Finally, Durkheim’s heterological sensibilities about the constitutive potential of the sacred in moments of collective effervescence are used to put the politics back in this political economy of sacrifice.

**Sacrifices Proliferating? The Current Conjuncture**

Philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s *Homo Sacer* (1998) began a new period of theorizing the sacred and sacrifice. It displaced scholarly attention to Georges Bataille’s analyses of the sacred that had arisen from interest in studies of poststructuralist thinkers such as Baudrillard (Pawlett, 1997) and Kristeva (1982), indebted to his conceptions of the sacred, ecstasy, abjection, heterology, communication, sacrifice, and economics. Bataille’s heterological sensibilities refer to the ambivalent nature of the sacred as a source of both attraction and repulsion in social life (Pawlett, 2018). There was also renewed interest in the “sacred sociology” of *Collège de Sociologie* in which Bataille was a key member along with Roger Caillois and Michel Leiris (Richman, 2002; Riley, 2010). This spurred a return to Durkheimian sociology, the touchstone for the *Collège*, and to the radical potential of Durkheim’s sociology of religion in particular. Sacrifice was a central concern for Bataille since, in his view, it touched the depths of individual existence and its limits. The tragic identification with the sacrificial victim is the closest we can get to knowledge of our own death (Bataille, 1990). Sacrifice was also a great social display of what Bataille called the non-utilitarian “general economy” in motion, illustrating one modality of the movement and exchange of excesses of energy across the earth creating the need for the consumption of this fecundity through war or religion, for instance (Bataille, 1995a). Agamben disarticulated “the sacred” from religious studies and sociology and placed it at the centre of a post-humanist existential political philosophy. For him, the sovereign power of sacral exclusion is the constitutive socio-political paradigm of domination in the west (Agamben, 1998) and “profanation,” returning the stuffs of social existence to unrestricted use, is key to the abolition of sacral dominance (Agamben, 2007). Alas, Agamben is dismissive of Durkheimian sociology (1998, p. 51), unfortunately neglecting Durkheim’s attention to sacral exclusion in his studies of incest (1963) and property (1992), among others.

**From Scholastic to Political Economic Events**

The aleatory convergence of renewed scholarly interest in the sacred and sacrifice (cf. Martel, 2006) and the recent history of the global political economy, having got its footing after the Global Financial Crisis (hereafter, GFC), spawned academic discussion about sacrifice, morality and the economy (Brown, 2015; Fourcade, Steiner, Streek, & Woll, 2013; Sandel, 2010; Steiner, 2017). For the advanced
capitalist societies, economic health became more than a matter of sluggish growth, inequality, working-class incredulity towards liberal capitalist metanarratives, or general economic malaise. Rather, pronounced anxieties about persistent and massive debts on the part of governments, pensioners, students, or municipalities dealing with accumulating infrastructure debts, raised issues about the morality of indebtedness itself. The genesis of conditions described as “zombie capitalism” (Datta, 2018; Quiggin, 2010) in which people and governments find themselves reliant on various credit facilities to enable participation in social life (e.g., obtain education and training) and sustain themselves (e.g., housing), also drew attention. Politicians’ and pundits’ repeated calls for austerity and fiscal sacrifices in the wake of massive borrowing for economic stimulus, gained traction, repeating characteristic themes of neoliberal governmentality (Brown, 2015; Panitch & Gindin, 2012). This hegemonizing discourse set the terms of debate about how economic sacrifices would be in the best interest of the country and “our children.” In this style of moral reasoning how can it be just to saddle our children and grandchildren with our debts? If it isn’t, we need to rein in our borrowing and cut current government spending to repair balance sheets. That such cuts adversely affect “our children and grandchildren” in the present with diminished public capacity for education, healthcare, the arts and sports, affordable housing, clean air and water, and transportation, is revealing of this economic morality. The theoretical traditions contributing to this new critical assessment of sacrifice, morality, and the economy are quite varied, ranging from the radical Maussian anarchism of David Graeber (2012), to the poststructuralist Italian Marxsims of Mauricio Lazzarato (2015) and Christian Marazzi (2011), to noted political theorist Wendy Brown (2015). Closer to sociological home is the work of the Regulation School economists Michel Aglietta and André Oréleans that has drawn on French conceptions of the sacred and sacrifice to generate an account of money (Grahl, 2000; cf. Steiner, 2011, p. 147, 197). Marazzi, echoing radical Durkheimian tropes, distills his account of the current conjuncture as follows: “The demands of profitability imposed by financial capitalism on the entire society reinforce social regression under the pressure of a growth model that, in order to distribute wealth, voluntarily sacrifices social cohesion and the quality of life itself” (2011, p. 44).

Anglo-American neoliberal morality has a soteriology promising self-actualization and a vibrant citizenry constituted through individual initiative, innovation, and work, facilitated by the state constitution of competitive and largely self-regulating markets of various kinds (Brown, 2015; Rose, 1999). Neoliberal salvation though, is predicated on the “demands of sacrifice [to be made by workers], in the imposition of austerity and the authoritarianism of permanent crisis” (Lazzarato, 2015, p. 248). Arguably then, sacrifice lies at the moral core of capitalist political economy: “Since the dawn of humanity, the generations that have sacrificed the most time at work
are those that have had the misfortune of being born under capital” (Lazzarato, 2015, p. 249). In contrast to the Regulation School, Lazzarato rejects Rene Girard’s universalistic conception of sacrifice (2015, p. 80). He also finds Marcel Mauss’ Durkheimian model of sacrifice unpersuasive because of its purported holism and inability to explain some empirical cases, instead preferring Deleuze and Guattari’s Nietzschean conception of morals and debts as his guide (Lazzarato, 2015, p. 84).

From Economics to the Ubiquity of Economic Sacrifices

The dominance of neoliberal ideas (and crucially, normative ideals for a vibrant society) supported by the hegemony of atomistic, rational-actor based economics (Brown, 2015; Quiggin, 2010), has unwittingly contributed to the appropriateness of applying the sacrificial trope to economic life. In some respects, this should come as no surprise given that main figures in economics from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman took morality seriously. As Marx astutely points out, for Adam Smith, “Labour [is] regarded merely as a sacrifice” and “the capitalist too brings a sacrifice, the sacrifice of abstinence, in that he grows wealthy instead of eating up his product directly” (1973, p. 612). Central to neoliberalism is that idea that governments, when they have properly constituted markets, can generate “the good” of inoculating people against unresponsive, costly bureaucratic bloat in the state to be replaced by a nimble, dynamic private sector. In turn, this dynamism offers an alternative to, and cure for, the sclerosis of socialist welfarism that breeds and rewards apathy for recipients while discouraging innovators and risks-takers offended by the morality of public support for slackers. The logic of resentment on the part of entrepreneurs goes something like this: “We’re the ones taking the risks, making the sacrifices, working long hours, and missing our families to ensure the wealth of the nation –we make the value, not the parasitical government workers and welfare ‘takers’. Our sacrifices lend moral authority to our approach to governing the body politic.” Such logic has less is common with the noble salvific ethos of the individual entrepreneur described by Max Weber and more with the ressentiment conceptualized by Nietzsche. This “marketization of morals” (Datta, 2018, pp. 90–91) rests on a theoretical belief in a profoundly individualized basis of social causality, agency, and ethical responsibility. But such moral logics of sacrificing for the economy, combined with the promulgation of a market-inspired ethics, have sown the seeds for the proliferation of sacrificial discourse: all and each have a price to pay to obtain “the good.”

Rousseau, and Durkheim following him (1960; 1961), recognized that modern civilization increases the possibilities for individual freedom and flourishing. This happens as social complexity, the division of labour, and a sophisticated education system develop. Suitable modern education provides opportunities for children to explore their interests and natural talents while also providing for the disciplined
cultivation of those talents and interests. The growth in the division of labour also encourages the emergence of new occupations and social niches as solutions to problems arising from competition (Durkheim, 1984; Plouin, 2010). The dynamics of the division of labour and modern pedagogy means that the diversity of individuals in society can increasingly harmonize with the diversity of occupations. People thus become freer since able to find an occupation better suited to their individual talents, inclinations, and specialized training: talent, training, and job align in a normal and healthy organic division of labour. As opportunities multiply, and as people are increasingly aware of a diversity of occupations and ways of life, so too multiply concerns with “opportunity costs”: what is likely lost by pursuing one path as opposed to another? This is the ethical sting of civilizational growth: sacrifice or suffer with the existential impasses and disappointments of anomie, lacking criteria for choosing among an infinity of desires (Durkheim, 2006, p. 269ff). Mutatis mutandis, economics has thus reintroduced a mid-twentieth century existentialist theme: when one realizes that one’s life, time, and resources are limited, one must choose, and the paths not taken are sacrificed. We thus have a current situation in which new academic theorizing about sacrifice has encountered circumstances in which economic sacrifices affect broad publics. The radical Durkheimian commitment to analyzing power, inequality, exclusion and moral irrationality, makes it a useful resource for considering this convergence (Gane, 1992; Pearce, 2001; Stedman Jones, 2001).

Re-Reading Durkheim Symptomatically

There are a variety of approaches to reading theory rigorously to generate pertinent contemporary explanations of the social world. These include the influential humanities approach to reading Durkheim developed by Robert Alun Jones and continued by Ivan Strenski, geared toward understanding Durkheim’s own intentions in the context of his broader milieu (Strenski, 2006, p. 9). Others include critical-rationalist reconstructions of Durkheim’s work (e.g., Stedman Jones, 2001) and the reflexive sociology of intellectual production developed by Alexander Riley (2010). The approach to rethinking “Durkheim” taken here is located in the poststructuralist Althusserian methodology of “symptomatic” readings (Althusser, 1970; Pearce, 2001). Symptomatic readings recognize that knowledge is a language dependent enterprise (but not entirely so), and that “theory” is constitutive of knowledge production not least since social scientists make knowledge claims and develop research programmes in light of existing social scientific discourses (Pearce, 2001).

Althusser distinguishes between “symptomatic” readings and “dogmatic” ones in which already existing criteria or theories, implicitly or explicitly assumed to be correct, are used to judge other accounts of the world (1970). Dogmatic readings however, leave the foundation of those knowledge claims beyond the reach of
explicit rational scrutiny. They are also limited in their critical capacity because dependent on metatheoretical assertions about knowledge production. Empiricists, for instance, assume that through sense experience one can read the truth of the world (Althusser, 1970, p. 35). Or, as one finds in Marx’s early works, political economy is read and criticized through a humanist materialism that Marx deemed correct. In contrast, a “symptomatic” reading tries first to grasp the terrain of the problematic in a text that aims to explain the world. A “problematic” is fundamentally organized by the questions it poses that render existing knowledge about the world a problem to be considered and transformed, questions intelligible because of the surrounding discursive terrain in which they occur (Althusser, 1970, p. 25). Both the knowing subject and the object of knowledge are constituted within this same discursive terrain. A theory is obliged to offer coherent answers to the questions it poses, drawing on the criteria immanent in the theoretical work itself. Here, Althusser aligns himself with Spinoza’s rationalism: “verum index sui et falsi” (“what is true is the sign of itself and what is false”). Thus, one aims to read and assess theoretical works on their own terms for their questions, perspicacity, and coherence (Althusser, 1976, p. 122).

Althusser illustrates the symptomatic methodology by drawing on examples from Marx’s reading of Adam Smith. Smith “naively borrowed from everyday life the category of ‘price of labour’ without any prior verification, and then asked the question, how is this price determined?” (Marx as cited in Althusser, 1970, p. 20). Smith fails to answer the question and unwittingly answers one he hadn’t posed concerning the value of labour power. Smith’s terrain is thus shown to be incoherent because combining two different incompatible discourses with different knowledge production criteria, one of his political economy, the other an everyday discourse geared toward the practicalities of life rather than rational scientific accounts. The irony is that Smith cannot see what his own theoretical terrain had unwittingly rendered visible, namely the need as an economist to conceptualize the determination of the value of labour power. Marx’s theoretical revolution starts with posing the question of the determination of the value of labour power as the basis for transforming the terrain of classical political economy. He does so by decentring the economy as the central unit of analysis to conceptualize the totality of the material and practical social relations through which human life is produced and reproduced in definite forms. To (re-)read Durkheim symptomatically then, requires attending to the questions Durkheim poses and the “answers” rendered visible in his text, whether they be objects discussed (e.g., rituals and myths), or engagements with other theories.

The Elementary Forms of Religious Life & Sacrifice: A Distillation

The Forms offers a sociological account of the basic components of religious life, how they are put together, and the effects they generate, including the framework
of human existence itself (Datta, 2008). The focus on religion was a way to analyze the basic components of social institutions (e.g., kinship, marriage, and knowledge) to show how these components remain foundations in even very complex forms of societal organization. Deciding for methodological reasons to focus on the least complicated example of religious life for which there was ample data, he focused on Central Australian totemism. His analysis led to the following conclusion: “A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them” (EFRL, 1995, p. 44). Here I focus on the “practices relative to sacred things” and to issues of the “moral community” since most pertinent to sacrifice.

The Forms attends to the emergence of what Durkheim in his earlier work called “solidarity” (forms of moral rationality constitutive of enduring forms of social relations) to account for the causes of a sentiment of obligation to others (Fournier, 2013, p. 604). The book depicts social forces like solidarity that come from outside of the individual while also bringing individuals into (social) existence, flowing through them and linking them to others and their broader world. In this way, The Forms repeats a central problematic of Durkheim’s entire corpus, stressing that the sociological analysis of human social life, in this case religion, was the path to understanding and cultivating new forms of morality in the present (Fournier 2013, p. 607; Watts Miller, 2012). For him, sociology must be capable of accounting for the constitution of persons as empowered moral agents able and willing to lay aside egotistic orientations and animalistic appetites to act in the interest of others and the greater good; altruism, as a valued and exercised concern for the other, cannot be assumed.

The basis of this real force capable of constituting the moral ordering of the social world practically, emotionally, epistemically, and aesthetically, lies in the “indefinite powers and anonymous force” (EFRL, 1995, p. 202) of society as it exists, is experienced, and is communicated between individuals. Durkheim’s conception of the “the sacred” tends to refer to this basic but impersonal and anonymous force noting that belief in such powerful forces shaping people’s lives and the fate of the group is found in quite a variety of different societies (EFRL, 1995, p. 196). Counter-intuitively then, neither religion nor altruism require belief in a deity per se. In Durkheim’s account, a belief in such power is grounded in people’s immersion in periodic moments of “collective effervescence” (EFRL, 1995, p. 217–218), when the assembled group engages in excessive behaviours including spontaneous dancing, music-making, intoxication, and transgressive sexual practices. This energizes participants as they are spurred by others’ ecstatic conduct. All individuals thus feel and witness a transformative power radically
different from what governs everyday life, one greater than themselves and the group. When expressed, written, and commemorated as the collective representation of the totem symbol, this energy becomes attached to the totem, an object representing the transformational power witnessed, to become a shared reference point for belief in the sacred. Collective effervescence is thus a manifestation of a constitutive political potential in the group, one capable of renewing or completely reordering the social world by contingently attaching different collective representations (“words”) to “things” (e.g., people, places, animals, practices, etc. [Datta, 2008]). In this respect, Durkheim is aiming to reframe both theological and philosophical conceptions of “transcendence” (that which exists prior to and independent of experience) with that of socio-historical “generality” (Ramp, 2008; Riley, 2010), but one that is immanent to all human groups.

Through religion, the sacred comes to be separated from the profane world (corporeal, empirical, and individualized) by forms of symbolic and practical exclusion applied to the profane world. Such divisions are a form of cosmological prophylaxis. Contact between the sacred and profane unregulated by religious administration is forbidden. Tattoos, like membership badges, illustrate how symbolic inclusion and exclusion work. Tattooing the body with a representation of the totemic species (EFRL, 1995, pp. 116–117) is exclusive to members of the clan, transforming the individual from a profane thing into a kind of sacred being, providing privileged access to that which belongs to the clan. The organization of time into a calendar of holy days is another example of symbolic exclusion: on certain days the regular or profane rules and tasks of daily life are suspended, and all are obliged to follow religious practices. Among practical exclusions are the interdictions about engaging with certain sacred objects like churingas or sacred places (e.g., ertnatulunga where churingas are kept). Human, social existence then, is thus characterised by an irresolvable but constitutive radical heterogeneity between the sacred and the profane (EFRL, 1995, p. 36), lending a certain dynamic volatility, both creative and destructive, to social life.

Sacred powers can be intentionally and beneficially administered in religious life and “spread” to individuals through initiation rites for priests and kings (Pearce, 2003). When such rites are not respected, sacral contagion becomes baneful, requiring the group to treat the entity polluted by the sacred with various interdictions up to expulsion and destruction. Sacrality can be “superadded” (EFRL, 1995, p. 349) to any person, place, thing, etc., in either regulated ways for benefit, or in unregulated ways portending harm. The obligation to respect the division between the sacred and profane, while also respecting and following the mechanisms of their intermingling, distinguishes religion from magic. As Durkheim states, “There is no Church of magic” (EFRL, 1995, p. 42) because magic, while referring to and drawing on the
same cosmology about the sacred found in religion, does not depend on the moral and reciprocal obligations pertinent to a group to which the practitioners belong (i.e., a “church”). Magic then, is more like commerce, driven by the contingent alignment of the interests of individuals; magicians have clients, not parishioners (EFRL, 1995, p. 42; Steiner, 2012/13 p. XI).

The always potentially volatile division between the sacred and the profane, between religion and individual economic activity, is not something peculiar to religion: it is the result of how social reality, that exists prior to and independently of any particular individual, regulates, shapes, and constitutes the haecceity of an individual body with its appetites, needs, feelings and potentials (including for language and reason) to make “it” a person, an individual social being, a member of a group capable of minimally organized, and maximally harmonious and expansive, life with others. As Durkheim stressed, humans are dual beings containing both a sacred-soul and a profane-body (EFRL, 1995, pp. 265–267). The radical heterogeneity of the sacred and profane, of (animalistic-empirical) individuality and (representational-transcendental) society, is thus ontogenic, being perpetually constituted and reconstituted in human societies. Finally, while religion “is a system of ideas by means of which individuals imagine the society of which they are members” (EFRL, 1995, pp. 226–227) it is also a misrecognition of social forces (Lacroix, 1979). Durkheim’s problematic can thus be distilled as a concern with the degrees of crystallization of collective representations that express real social forces external to individuals while also being constituted by the assembled group, in as much as social forces contribute to the moral forces at work inside of people (e.g., the fear and respect of the sacred, or feeling obliged), making it possible to live together and not be ruled by animalistic appetites or purely self-interested egotism, which if universalized would undermine the conditions of possibility of society itself. The basis of this real social power is constitutive since it can either reproduce and stabilize an existing ordo rerum, or be creative and revolutionary, expressing new totems that will then serve as new existential reference points for life with others.

**Durkheim’s Theory of Sacrifice in The Forms**

Durkheim’s theory of sacrifice is found in Book III of *The Forms*, “The Principle Modes of Religious Conduct,” where he analyses “negative” and “positive” rites, emphasizing the obligatory character of both and their role in social reproduction. (Book II details the emergence of beliefs, especially those pertaining to the power of the totem symbol as an expression of the power of collective effervescence). Durkheim deems sacrifice a “great institution” (EFRL, 1995, p. 344) because it specifies how the sacred and the profane can and should be brought together, providing benefit to both domains, the world of the gods (and the group), and embodied human individuals.
Durkheim takes sacrifice to be a positive rite concerned with ensuring “the well-being of the [totemic] plant or animal species” (ERFL, p. 332). Rites are the practical result of myths that narrate the order of the world and the impact of the “totemic principle” in particular since it is the source that empowers the group. Durkheim’s analysis of ritual conduct begins with “negative rites” that refer to prohibited or taboo actions, and those that are ascetic in nature. The purpose of negative rites is to maintain an enduring and beneficial separation between the sacred and the profane. In ascetic rites, the frequently painful renunciation of the body prepares the person for openness to transcendence through a practiced neglect of corporeal experience (EFRL, 1995, pp. 347, 320–321). The period surrounding a sacrifice is one of intensified religious prohibitions (EFRL, 1995, p. 338), serving as a reminder of the power of the group over the (profane) individual.

Initiation rites that renew both the sacred and profane are punishing ordeals designed to negate the influence of the profane in the novice while also demonstrating the power of a transcendental force. Initiation involves practices of periodic exclusion from the community, the initiate being sent away into the forest for instance, and then prepared for return, not just into the community, but into its exclusive sacred spheres (EFRL, 1995, p. 291ff). Sacrilege in contrast, involves a failure to maintain the separation of the sacred from the profane, resulting in serious harms to the offender and potentially the community as a whole. This movement between sacred and profane domains can be volatile. As Durkheim states, “There is no positive rite that does not fundamentally constitute a veritable sacrilege. Man can have no dealings with sacred beings without crossing the barrier that must ordinarily keep him separate from them. All that matters is that the sacrilege be carried out with mitigating precautions” (EFRL, 1995, p. 342).

Durkheim’s analysis focuses on the practices of the tribal Intichiuma rite celebrated by all Arunta. The Intichiuma has two main parts: the first concerns the well-being of the totem species and the second seeks to protect and enhance the power of the totem. The ceremony is concluded with the ritual preparation of a collective feast in which the group consumes the totem species. The other examples Durkheim discusses, a consequence of his commentary on William Robertson Smith, are taken from the Old Testament in which sacrifices are occasionally depicted as “a meal prepared before Yahweh” (EFRL, 1995, p. 341). Offering the “[f]irst products of the harvest” in the paschal meal for instance, illustrates that “food” is the sacrifice in the shared meal. For Robertson Smith, sacrifice is about communion and thus “not (essentially) renunciation” (EFRL, 1995, p. 342). Accepting part of this argument, Durkheim concedes that sacrifice characteristically involves a shared meal in which the group consumes some of the totem species in a reproductive act for securing the fecundity.

---

3 In Durkheim’s day writing conventions were not gender inclusive. To avoid misleading corrections of his masculinist language, I have retained his usages and acknowledge that gender inclusive language today is a social right to be respected.
of the species as indicated by “abundant lizard births” in the face of uncertainty, for example (EFRL, 1995, p. 335, 342)

Durkheim departs from Robertson Smith’s view that sacrifice is only a communal meal however, and instead advances an argument developed by his collaborators, Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss (Ptacek, 2017). He formulates his position as follows: “Sacrifice is certainly a process of communion in part. But it is also, and no less fundamentally, a gift, an act of renunciation. It always presupposed that the worshipper relinquishes to the gods some part of his substance or his goods. Any attempt to reduce one of these elements to the other is pointless. Indeed, the offering may have more lasting effect than the communion” (EFRL, 1995, p. 347). Characteristically, Durkheim stresses the relational moral element of obligatory renunciation rather than focusing on the exchange. Gifts to the gods/totem principle must be of high value. They thus reproduce representations of the group’s ideals (e.g., of “perfection”). In the case of animal sacrifice and the shedding of blood, the life-principle/power in the organism is freed so that the gods or “impersonal energies” (EFRL, 1995, p. 320, 325) receive the food on which they also depend (EFRL, 1995, p. 346, 349). For instance, the old men ask the young to offer their blood to “infuse” the clan with new life.

Reflecting his rejection of sociological materialism Durkheim notes that “[w]hat the worshipper in reality gives his god is not the food he places on the altar or the blood that he causes to flow from his veins: It is his thought” (EFRL, 1995, p. 350). “Thought” here is important because of the role of collective representations in sacrifice that focus consciousness on the transcendental (EFRL, 1995, p. 232ff). The transcendental realm is but the enduring reality of the group’s life and its superior worth relative to the individual members whose value is derived from the group. Sacrifice reminds the individual that they are dependent on something greater than themselves but in which they also participate (EFRL, 1995, p. 351). Durkheim concludes that, “The true raison d’être of even those cults that are most materialist in their appearance is not to be sought in the actions they prescribe but in the inward and moral renewal that the actions help to bring about” (EFRL, 1995, p. 350). The consequence of the renunciative exchange is that each donor receives “the best part of himself from society […] Let language, sciences, arts, and moral belief be taken from man, and he falls to the rank of animality” (EFRL, 1995, p. 351) – you get more than you give. But this exchange works in both directions since “it is man who makes his gods, one can say, or at least, it is man who makes them endure; but at the same time, it is through them that he himself endures” (EFRL, 1995, p. 345). Sacrifice then, is an elementary ritual because it perpetually constitutes and recreates “moral being” (EFRL, 1995, p. 352) and hence a condition of possibility for society, but at the “price of pain” (EFRL, 1995, p. 320).
Rethinking Durkheim’s Attenuated Political Economy of Sacrifice

Durkheim distanced his sociological approach from liberal political economy, because of its reduction of sociality to the voluntary actions of human individuals (see Steiner, 2011), and from Marxist political economy, because of its neglect of the cultural and moral dimensions of social life (Durkheim, 2004; cf. Steiner, 2011, p. 57). After all, according to Durkheim, the real substance of the gift that the worshipper gives god is “thought” and the gods “can only live in human consciousnesses” (EFRL, 1995, p. 350, 351). Durkheim does not, however, go clear over into ontological idealism and he qualifies his position by stating that “the material interests that the great religious ceremonies satisfy are public and social. The whole society has an interest in an abundant harvest” (EFRL, 1995, p. 352). But, as shown below, he relies on an economic idiom while tellingly stating in a footnote near the end of the book that he was unable to link economic activity to religion (EFLR, p. 421; Steiner, 2011, p. 58). So, when read symptomatically, the text renders visible a political economy at work in sacrifice, something hidden in plain view if one accepts Durkheim’s rejection of both political economy and ontologically reductionistic materialism. There are though, good reasons for inspecting this attenuated political economy of the sacred and sacrifice because it draws attention to the power relations and production conditions in which sacrifice as a rite is imbricated. The argument developed here to resolve the discrepancy between Durkheim’s master discourse and his attenuated political economy is that sacrifice is a dispositif that has hegemonizing effects. These emerge from a regime of valorization and production conditions that involve monopolistic powers exercised by a small, dominant group with its own exclusive authoritative discourse.

A Regime of Valorization and the Four Moments of Production

Marx’s comprehensive analysis of the terrain of classical economics in the Grundrisse will serve as a heuristic guide for identifying consonance between Durkheim’s account of sacrifice and political economy. Marx identified four dialectically related moments in capitalist economies: production, distribution, exchange, and consumption (Marx, 1973, pp. 81–88), and famously elaborated a theory of value. Each of the moments are connected by the practical commonality of production-reproduction (e.g., the means of consumption must be produced and reproduced, etc.) but are dominated by the primacy of production, broadly understood as the synthetic combination of transformative human work on the material world. On the face of it, The Forms speaks most directly to value even if not referring to “the economy.” Still we can note that sacrifice superadds the power of the social, as manifested in obligatory guides to conduct, to mundane objects, impressing on them a social/moral value to be respected by the group in exchange processes, much like money (cf. Grahl, 2000; Steiner 2011, p. 29, 35). In this respect, that “fetish” and
“totem” were synonyms in nineteenth century social science (Pietz, 1993) is telling for as Zizek notes, fetishizing something like money is a “condensation, a materialization of a network of social relations” (1989, p. 31). The sacred is also “ranked” (EFRL, 1995, p. 313) revealing the extent to which some things are deemed more valuable to the vitality of the group than others. Evaluative processes extend to humans as initiation rites test the “worth of the novice” (EFLR, p. 318). Other practices also reflect a relationship between domination and the moral criteria by which conduct is evaluated. For example, when it comes to the assessment of religious purity and what “ordinarily impassions men,” the “elite set the goal too high” to counteract the baser inclinations of the masses (EFRL, 1995, p. 321). Given Durkheim’s remarks then, it appears that we are dealing in a system of valuation controlled by an elite—a regime of valorization. The regime of valorization shapes morality through a dominant small group that assesses and regulates what is deemed acceptable for sacrificial exchange and doing the same for access to sacred spheres.

Concerning the production circuit of sacrifice, Durkheim remains true to the etymology of the word; the Latin phrase “sacere facere,” from which “sacrifice” is derived, means “to make sacred” (Shilling & Mellor, 2013). As a rite, sacrifice is a production, a transformation of nature generated by assembling and synthesizing the profane stuff of individualized everyday life, and the collective sacred. As a form of renunciative giving, sacrifice also involves an exchange of something deemed of value (e.g., the “first fruits”). Moreover, Durkheim sees sacrifice as a form of reciprocal tribute as the worshipper “gives to sacred beings a little of what he receives from them and he receives from them, all that he gives them” (EFRL, 1995, p. 347). This is no simple form of exchange but one complicated by a debt concerning the “maintenance and repair of [one’s] spiritual being” (EFRL, 1995, p. 345). Further, the moral obligation to engage in sacrificial exchange itself specifies the nature of the social relations involved as found the Latin formula, “‘do ut des’ I give in order that you might give” (EFRL, 1995, p. 350). Gift exchange produces and reproduces the exchange relationship by providing the recipient with an example to follow and the wherewithal to reciprocate. Sacrifice also has a form of distribution in space and time for group members, designating the circulation and frequency of access to the sacred power of the totem principle. Finally, the rite is completed with communal consumption that serves a reproductive function transferring value from the offering to communal members. Thus, we find each of the four moments of production, but only analytically because Durkheim fails to theorize their combination and preconditions. Granted, one could say that the above is a “dogmatic” reading since imposing a Marxist model on Durkheim’s text but the intent is only to show how Durkheim’s own economistic idiom can be theorized systematically.
Exclusivity and the Exercise of Monopoly Power

The most significant indicators of Durkheim’s attenuated political economy of sacrifice concern the *exclusivity* surrounding the production of the rite, and the *monopoly power exercised*. Durkheim notes that access to sacred objects is restricted to those who are initiated (EFRL, 1995, p. 309), a sub-group that excludes women and children, and those who don’t belong to the clan. Furthermore, initiated persons have an exclusive sacred language and others are forbidden to speak it: religious discourse, by which the moral ordering and re-ordering of the world is conducted, is a “rare” exclusive discourse (EFRL, 1995, p. 310; Foucault, 1972; cf. Gane, 1983). In short, we find a political economy of discourse in which the sacred language, the repository of dominant collective representations shaping how the group perceives itself and governs its conduct, is restricted in its deployment to a minority but dominant group.

Most tellingly, Durkheim describes how authoritative sacred persons (chiefs and elders) in part exercise their dominance: they use their sacred status “to monopolize the things they choose” (EFRL, 1995, p. 312), making what they want “set apart and forbidden” to non-sacred persons by means of sacral contagion. “In this way, religious prohibition becomes property right and administrative regulation” (EFRL, 1995, p. 312, n. 47; cf. Durkheim, 1992, p. 147ff; cf. Steiner, 2011, pp. 117–119). As Pearce notes “[g]iven that generally speaking, sacred objects are scarcer than profane ones it is likely that a normal pre-condition for the sacred is scarcity of some kind” (2014, p. 621) to which we must add that this scarcity can itself be the effect of this exercise of monopoly power in restricting supply via sacral contagion. So, while Durkheim distanced his sociology from political economy, his use of it suppresses its theoretical potential: the political economic discourse is there, with descriptive effect. A symptomatic reading thus indicates that we are dealing with two different discourses on sacrifice in *The Forms*: Durkheim’s own sociological account of sacrifice as a moral mechanism mediating the cosmologically volatile but inescapable relations between the sacred and the profane, and a *descriptive (undertheorized) political economy of sacrifice*. The latter appears as descriptive *symptomatically* because of Durkheim’s insistence on his own sociological problematic concerning the “moral community” and what belonging to a religious group existentially entails for the individual member and the group. Arguably, his failure to link economic activity to religion stems from this discrepancy, blinding him to the question of the economy in religious life itself. Durkheim’s focus on morality abstracts sacrifice from the structural assemblage marginally described in political economic terms and instead fetishizes it as a preeminently social act.

From Institution to Dispositif

Durkheim’s definition of sacrifice as an institution helpfully shows how the cult sustains collective representations about obligatory practices for group members, but
this obscures the extent to which broader relations of domination are conditions of the rite. Sacrifice cannot thus be treated in isolation as an institution without engaging in false abstractions. An established but arbitrary combination of the monopoly powers of sacred persons, how knowledge affects subjective orientations, the sacral regime of valorization, a system of inclusion and exclusion, the dominance of a minority group to which benefits accrue, and the role of authoritative persons in moments of social crisis, has the hallmarks of what Foucault calls a dispositif. The political economy of sacrifice is thus better conceptualized as a dispositif than an institution. Doing so facilitates attention to the contingencies surrounding the maintenance of societal rule. Here, I draw on some of my earlier work on dispositifs, totems, rule, and politics (Datta, 2008).

Foucault’s concept of “dispositif” refers to an assemblage or “set-up” (Veyne, 2010) of elements combined from existing social materials to constitute modes of experience and existence in a civilization (Datta, 2007, 2008; Hardy, 2015). They shape how people assess themselves and their world, affecting what people do, and how people’s activities and events are problematized, coordinated and subjected to policy remedies applied to populations to solve problems deemed “urgent” by experts (Foucault, 1980). Dispositifs like sexuality or government, consist of “[authoritative] discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decision, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 194–195). The effect of these contingent assemblages is to “dispose of” people’s actions, putting them toward a tactical use typically in the support of some broader aim or goal postulated by experts. The term “dispositif” also captures the sense of “disposal toward” a set of values concerning what is worth doing in life.

A dispositif constantly depends on the discursive rendering of what is to be known (“veridiction”) and what is to be done (“jurisdiction”), linking the “is” and the “ought,” “words” and “things,” through relations of domination (Foucault, 2003a). Veridiction is produced by dominant “truth regimes” that combine knowledge and power. Typically, agonistic power relations produce demands for knowledge, sustaining a will to know (Foucault, 2003b). Dispositifs also involve the formation of subjectivities that make veridical and juridical judgments. The overall effect of a dispositif is a pervasive social hegemony over what are deemed the “real problems” deserving both expert and societal attention in which the implementation of solutions unintentionally benefits already dominant groups, regardless of their effectiveness. For instance, the bourgeoisie are able to use the failures of the prison, like delinquents, in the service of their own illegalities (strike-breaking, prostitution, trafficking, etc.) (Foucault, 1979, pp. 278–282). Such assemblages of knowledge, power, and social institutions produce the generalized if contingent effects of class
domination in a society (Foucault, 1994, pp. 92–94). Sacrifice depends on much the same. An exclusive authorititative veridical discourse is used by an already dominant group of priests and elders to assess value and worth in the group. They decide on the deployment of the totem mark and how rites are to be conducted. This group uses institutionalized religion to secure and extend property rights through expropriative sacral contagion; once they touch something, their sacrality passes to the object and others can’t touch or use it without going through the religious administration they control. And this dominance, combined with sacrificial rites that repeatedly combine these elements together, hegemonizes the problematization of well-being and fecundity for the group. The concept of *dispositif* thus helps one resolve the analytical discrepancy between Durkheim’s moral and political economic accounts of sacrifice since the former refers to the inequalities described in the latter.

**Durkheim’s Heterological Realism: The Politics in the Political Economy of Sacrifice**

Rethinking Durkheim’s treatment of sacrifice this way provides a critical basis for assessing neoliberal morality today (cf. Steiner, 2017, p. 901). Durkheim understood that liberal political economy valorized a “utilitarian egoism,” giving causal and normative priority to individual preferences (Durkheim & Lukes, 1969 p. 20; Steiner, 2017). Such egotism is characteristic of industrial societies with an advanced division of labour. Liberal political economy however, failed to adequately theorize the constitution of morality in society i.e., “the interests superior to the interests of the individual,” rather assuming their existence (Durkheim & Lukes, 1969 p. 20). Foucault (2008) similarly recognized that the economics informing neoliberalism was a moral technology because providing marketized solutions to the problem of relating “all and each” (Foucault, 2003c) in which *individuals* are held responsible for the quality of their lives. Purportedly, the economy, through exchanges, becomes the clearing house of the “goodness” and “badness” of actions derived from the choices of individuals. In this respect, the economy is a biopolitical domain in which markets enact the minor utopianism of “police,” generating information from exchanges and using it “to supply [people] with a little extra life” (Foucault, 2003c, p. 197). Financial value thus becomes the proxy for efficiently surveying moral values in a population but without thereby deontologically judging the absolute value of individuals’ preferences.

Durkheim though, aids the consideration of the societal implications of the ascendance of the atomized utility maximizing individual that embodies an *ethos* necessary to making actual societies correspond more closely to an idealized image of one with “efficient markets” (Quiggin, 2010). In contrast to the neoliberal marketization of morals, altruism morally obliges individuals to value others and
the groups to which one belongs (including humanity) because they make possible one’s constitution as an individual person and group member capable of deliberate moral action (cf. Steiner, 2017, p. 900). This raises the question of what happens to personhood (implying moral agency as it does) and society when one is implored by experts to be to be selfish and morally obliged to pursue self-interest? What happens to the pertinence of transcendental moral reasoning when one universalizes this obligation to be selfish, recognizing that others are in the same boat, with everyone doing what they must in order to survive? Moreover, feeling the social pressure to be selfish in accordance with a neoliberal ideal of the entrepreneurial self, exacerbates the sting of fiscal sacrifices. In neoliberal terms, fiscal sacrifices are tied to tax burdens and user fees, cuts in public services (education, healthcare, pensions, etc.) and infrastructure spending, threatening what one wishes one could otherwise spend on individual utility maximization.

The denigration of individual concern for the group’s well-being suggests that neoliberal sacrificial dispositifs have a sordid, abjected dimension too. Bataille (1995, pp. 80–81) and Caillois (1959) both understood that social institutions constantly generate abjects like excrement and garbage that must be radically excluded from institutions to ensure their functioning. The obligatory neoliberal valorization of egotism thus abjests its axiological counter-part of individuals acting in the interest of the group to constitute neoliberal unreason (not rational but neither madness, nor art [cf. Foucault, 2006]). As noted political philosopher Michael Sandel incisively states, “Economists don’t like gifts. Or to be more precise, they have a hard time making sense of gifts as a rational social practice” (2010, p. 99). Economistic axiology is far from the Durkheimian conception that altruism is morally rational and a truly social sensibility. Apart from wealthy philanthropists (i.e., those who have well paid themselves first!), today, the committed altruist risks playing the part of fool, chump, or easy prey for the utilitarian egoist. Furthermore, labour market precarity increases the necessity of having to spend one’s time at work and preparing for work. But this concretely and practically means sacrificing the capacity for sacrifice for want of human time and energy for altruistic activities and actualizing one’s potential as an active moral and political agent (cf. Brown, 2015; Datta & MacDonald, 2011, p. 91). The triumph of homo economicus over homo politicus in neoliberal axiology (Brown, 2015) has thus made a virtue of necessity, the necessity of focusing on one’s own struggles for existence (cf. Plouin, 2010). Sacrifice then, is not a minor or arcane issue; it remains central to neoliberal axiology. In a performative contradiction, neoliberalism is thus dependent on sacrifice while disavowing it. The price and pain of this sacrifice of sacrifice, a sacrificing of altruism, is the abjection of the social virtue that lay at the heart of Durkheim’s politics and pedagogy. The ideal of fostering virtuous subjects capable of puzzling through the balance of cultivating the self and participating in gestures of sacrificial giving, returning some portion of what we
receive from society, is thus reduced to the offal of our offerings to a now totemic capitalism. Altruism remains as an abjected virtuality, possible, but reviled, “set apart and forbidden” from a hegemonic morality.

The fiscal sacrifices required for the massive bailouts of firms whose activities precipitated the GFC poignantly illustrate the contemporary perversion of the value of sacrificing for the good of the group. Ostensibly, the benefit of bailouts is protection from a breakdown of civil society if institutions deemed “too big to fail” actually do (Datta, 2018). But bailouts highlight the failures of markets as effective bases of morality. Markets believed to be self-regulating, given that rational self-interest motivates socio-economic actors to assess and price risk, failed on a global scale. This new political economy of sacrifice constitutive of the tension between workers’ sacrifices and obligatory taxation, illustrates the marginalized status of an adequate democratic and contestatory political economy (cf. Datta, 2017). Instead, excused by urgency, we had financial technocrats in central banks providing hegemonic advice for states pragmatically engaging in a political economy while disavowing the value of expressly political economic discourse itself (Streeck, 2017).

And yet, altruistic sacrifice haunted the GFC even if as something Unheimlich, the neoliberal “uncanny,” something familiar yet that isn’t supposed to be there and for that, horrifying (cf. Kristeva, 1982, p. 59). The autumn of 2008 saw a flurry of collective representations of the GFC. Screens around the world displayed volatile index fluctuations, stock prices and charts (Cosgrave, 2014), mass layoffs, and intense lobbying. The world was exposed to the elite, sacred language of finance and central banks (e.g., “swaps,” ABS, Asset Backed Securities; CDOs, Collateralized Debt Obligations; QE, Quantitative Easing, etc). Effervescence was found in the rapid pace of deal-making and breaking, frantic calls between G8 finance ministers, analyses and prognostications from a cast of characters from Alan Greenspan to “Hank” Paulson, to leading economists such as Paul Krugman, and NYU’s “Dr. Doom,” Nouriel Roubini. As typical of collective effervescence, the normal rules were suspended. In an uncanny way, the quintessential neoliberal taboo against “nationalization” was repeatedly transgressed in massive governmental interventions on the side of capital, whether with Northern Rock and the Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK, General Motors and Chrysler in the US and Canada, or US mortgage lenders “Fannie Mae” and “Freddie Mac.” Something else, politically, was being done and ostensibly in the interest of the greater good of securing global banking. These events are indicators of the power of creative collective effervescence—collective intervention in the interest of group fecundity was imperative. They revealed the doing of an inventive, transgressive politics in economic life even if partial to capital over labour.
An account of the contemporary political economy of sacrifice must thus include reference to the constitutive political potential of such moments of creative collective effervescence (Datta, 2008). While Foucault’s concept of “dispositif” is limited by its concern with already established relations of domination, Durkheim’s model of totemism inherently refers to the political potential of an effervescent assembly to constitute and reconstitute the central reference point for its existence. Since sacrifice involves an assembly, it also depends on the same social forces at work in creative collective effervescence: the potential to constitute a different ordo rerum is always present. The sacrificial festival then is different from a carnivalesque inversion of rule in which the system of social “places” remains while the “holders” change. Rather, the radical Durkheimian point is that the effervescence can break loose the structure of those places. This is not a question of the liberal agonic “political” versus a totalitarianism wrought by prioritizing the group above all else (Falasca-Zamponi, 2011). Rather, sacrificial rituals are a reminder that their success is not a given but must be assembled in the face of cosmological volatility, the rite perpetually flirting with the danger of sacrilege that undoes the status quo (cf. Pearce, 2003). Analytical then, the political economy of sacrifice requires incorporating both the “rule” and “creative politics” sides of the matter, attending to a “parallax” produced by The Forms itself. As Kojin Karatani (2005) explains, a parallax refers to a shift between opposing perspectives that are the effect of a work itself, oppositions that cannot be sublated dialectically. In this respect, Durkheim’s conception of the sacred and social causality implies a heterological realism appropriate to the political economy of sacrifice. These heterological sensibilities are found both in the radical differences between the sacred and profane, and the difference between an existing ordo rerum and the potential of the group to constitute a new politics in moments of creative collective effervescence (Datta, 2008; cf. Pawlett, 2018). This indicates that there is a reality in excess of priests, elders, rituals, and group members, one none other than the potentiality of creative collective effervescence that lies at the core of sociality, a potential held in reserve by the group whether members know it or not, actualize it or not. Today, the ubiquitous pop culture depictions of zombie hordes well signify this latent potential of the demos as a massive and potentially revolutionary force, if tellingly portrayed as inarticulate, denied constitutive political symbols and rational discourse. The zombie hordes as the contemporary neoliberal residue of altruism? Maybe … at least they tend to stick together!

**Conclusion**

Above, I have argued for the contemporary relevance of Durkheim’s approach to sacrifice in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life given both the scholarly context and recent economic history. Drawing on the theoretical methodology of symptomatic readings, I explicated discrepancies in Durkheim’s account of sacrifice and retheorized
them to elucidate a radical Durkheimian political economy of sacrifice better attuned to social inequalities and their effects on the group. Foucault’s concept of dispositif was used to provide a more comprehensive model of sacrifice than can be got by reliance on Durkheim’s description of sacrifice as an institution. The results of this critical theoretical work were then applied to the axiological content of neoliberal individualism, highlighting that it depends on the sacrificing of people’s capacity for altruistic sacrifices. In this respect, a radical Durkheimianism of this stripe returns one to the political economy of sacrifice, to questions of the values for which people make sacrifices, and the real basis through which those values can be collectively transformed in effervescent moments.

Acknowledgements
I am very grateful for receiving the honour of being the 2018-2019 Research Fellow of the Humanities Research Group under the Directorship of Professor Kim Nelson at the University of Windsor—their support (both moral and financial) has been crucial to the research. I also wish to thank my good friends Frank Pearce and François Pizarro Noël for sharing their many insights about Durkheim and sacrifice, and Ariane Hanemaayer and Niamh Mulcahy for their comments on an earlier draft. I refined the formulations about altruism and neoliberalism in a number of lively conversations with my wife Dana. Finally, I thank the anonymous peer reviewers for their insightful suggestions, and Dr. Aynur Erdoğan Coşkun for her editorial guidance. The usual disclaimer applies.

Grant Support: The author received no financial support for this work.

References


