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Chapter 7

Weaponisation of Migration in the Context of Hybrid Warfare Strategies: The Case of Russia-Ukraine War

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Abstract

Hybrid warfare is defined as the utilisation of a combination of conventional and unconventional methods. Among the various forms of unconventional hybrid warfare, international migration is employed as an effective strategy, rather than as a means of exerting military power or imposing economic sanctions. To forcible relocation of individuals from their place of residence to a designated location is undertaken by a state or actor for the pursuit of its own interests. This study concentrates on the deployment of migration as a weapon, which represents a pivotal element of hybrid warfare strategies. This study will examine the weaponisation of migration in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war as a case study. The objective of this study is to determine on which variants of weaponisation of migration are applied by Russia in the context of Ukrainian asylum seekers. The findings of this analysis indicate that Russia has employed a range of variants in the case of the Ukrainian asylum seekers including coercive, dispossessive, exportive and political variants, as well as passportisation and international propaganda.

Keywords Hybrid Warfare · International Security · International Migration · International Politics · Russia · Ukraine

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Introduction

In February 2022, Russian President Putin announced his recognition of the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions from Ukraine. Following the authorisation of the Russian Parliament to deploy troops beyond the boundaries of the Russian Federation, Putin dispatched Russian troops with the objective of establishing peace in the two regions in question. Consequently, Ukraine was placed under a state of emergency, marking the commencement of the Russian occupation on 24 February 2022. Russia deployed a similar strategy of hybrid warfare against Ukraine as it had previously in the occupation and illegal annexation of Ossetia and Crimea. A result of the bombing of infrastructure in residential areas and the transformation of cities into battlegrounds, a mass influx of Ukrainian immigrants occurred. The EU announced the openning of its borders to the Ukrainians. On the second day of the conflict in Ukraine, approximately 50,000 Ukrainians were admitted by neighbouring countries. The influx of Ukrainians asylum seekers has recently emerged as a significant challenge for the European countries (Özçelik, 2020a; Işığıçok & Kariman, 2022; Özçelik, 2020b).

This study focuses on the utilisation of migration as a weapon, which represents a crucial element of hybrid warfare strategies. This study will examine the weaponisation of migration in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Firstly, it will begin by providing an overview of the literature on hybrid warfare, followed by a comprehensive examination of the instruments in which migration is employed as a weapon in a hybrid warfare context. It will then proceed to analyse the Russian-Ukrainian war in detail, with a view to illustrating the weaponisation of migration.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

The Concept of Hybrid Warfare

The concept of hybrid warfare was articulated by Frank Hoffman in 2007. This concept, which introduces a new perspective to the field of war studies, is defined as the usage of both conventional and unconventional methods simultaneously or in conjunction with one another (Fairclough, 2018). Hoffmann (2007: 29) asserted that "*hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder*". Such warfare may be conducted by a variety of non-state actors as well as states. Another scholar, Peter R. Mansoor, offers a similar definition, defining hybrid warfare as "*conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (such as terrorists, insurgents) which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose*" (Wither, 2016: 74).

The conceptual framework of hybrid warfare was explained by Gerasimov, the former chief of the Russian General Staff. In his 2013 speech, he asserted that the nature of warfare in the modern world has undergone a transformation, and that unmilitary instruments can be employed in political conflicts. He further observed that, as result of technological developments, unmilitary instruments confer greater superiority on states than military instruments. Consequently, unmilitary instruments, including media and information warfare, cyber warfare and psychological warfare was utilized in Crimea, Ukraine and the Donbas region as well as by ununiformed little green men (Bingöl, 2023).

This concept was also discussed in the master's thesis by William J. Nemeth who presents the case of a non-state actor employing hybrid warfare techniques against a superior state. In 1999 two Chinese Generals attempted to provide a definition of hybrid warfare in their studies. They defined it as a model of warfare that includes both of all military and non-military tools used to impose the demands of a state on its enemy. According to Russian General Mahmud Akhmetovich Gareyev, an advocate of hybrid

warfare integration through political, economic and psychological tools, asserts that a hybrid warfare should be regarded as an integration of all instruments including military and non-military tools. The use of military tools in isolation from other instruments represents only a partical aspect of warfare, rather than a comprehensive approach (Muradov, 2022).

The objective of hybrid warfare is to weaken and damage the enemy through the implementation of intimidation strategies and the sustained maintenance of a low-intensity conflict. Hybrid warfare is characterized by a number of key attributes, including continuity, low-intensity conflict and manageable chaos. The deployment of disinformation, economic manipulation and other analogous tactics is undertaken with the objective of undermining and ultimately destroying the adversary (Özcan, 2022). The aforementioned tools and strategies encompass a range of techniques, including the potential for influencing public perception through bot accounts in social media, the involvement of non-governmental organisations and trade unions on behalf of the opposing side, the creation and support of non-violent popular uprisings and the utilisation of opposition policies (Karabulut, 2016).

It is argued that the concept of hybrid warfare is not a novel phenomeon; therefore, it is not possible to distinguish between traditional and hybrid warfare. However, hybrid warfare allows for the utilization of a combination of both traditional forces and unconventional forces, while conventional methods such as guns, tanks, missiles and regular armies are employed in a traditional manner within the context of a conventional military operation. In the context of the 2008 Georgian War, Russia deployed a combination of both conventional and unconventional troops, including South Ossetian and Abkhazian militias and Russian special operations forces, which were presented as local defence troops. Another illustrative example is that of Hezbollah, which effectively utilized the internet, other social media platforms and information technologies as a strategic instrument to disseminates its propaganda against its adversaries. The example of Hezbollah proved more effective than Israeli propaganda in influencing global public opinion. The unconventional instruments of hybrid warfare are diverse. Colourful revolutions can be seen as unmilitary instruments to threaten and destabilise Russia in the near neighbourhood. In response to these, Russia operated defensive campaigns in the eastern Ukraine and occupied Crimea to counter the American hybrid tactics (Wither, 2016).

International Migration and Hybrid Warfare

In its official documents of 2011, NATO defined the concept of hybrid warfare, which it subsequently expanding it to include terrorism, ethnic conflict, piracy and migration. The definition of hybrid warfare has been proposed by encompassing the aforementioned categories. NATO also highlighted the role of propoganda in destabilising countries and demoralising the adversary's population, identifying migration as a potential tactic in hybrid warfare. The document asserted that mass migration instils feelings of fear and insecurity in European countries because of undermining their security, political and economic stability. In addition, it is acknowledged that such mass migration can also be deliberately created by a state with the intention of placing hostile states in a difficult position (Krishnan, 2022).

The international migration is currently a prominent topic of European public debate, frequently discussed in conjunction with a range of related issues, including the erosion of national identity, social deterioration, xenophobia and Islamophobia. Irregular migration, perceived as a national threat, has been mostly subjected to a process of securitisation by the receiving countries. The process of securitisation is initiated when decision-makers categorise a political issue within the security domain. This addresses an issue that could be resolved by political means, through the utilisation of security measures and the persuasion of the opposing side to perceive this issue as a security concern. To illustrate, while irregular migration is a political issue, it has been reframed by policymakers as a national security concern. Decision makers have transformed asylum-seekers and immigrants into a

security issue, thereby creating the perception that international migration can be addressed through security measures (İrdem & Raychev, 2021; Demirtaş, 2019).

It would be reasonable to suggest that the fear of immigration is a genuine concern for a majority of people. Research indicates that people feel some concerns on the issue that immigrants and asylum seekers may find challenging to adapt to the receiving country's national identity, norms and rules, and to fully integrate into such country's society. Furthermore, some economic considerations can be added to these concerns as well. It is frequently claimed that asylum seekers impose a financial burden on the EU members. Due to unwilling of paying for this burden, this situation has resulted in a solidarity crisis among the members. Those countries on the eastern and southern borders have expressed the feeling of concern that they are bearing the brunt of the costs associated with the refugee crisis without adequate support from the Union and its core members. In conclusion, it has been proposed that the affluence of prosperous Europe could be exploited by irregular immigrants, that the democratic, secular and liberal fabric of the European society would be disrupted, and that the Union could even dissolve if the wave of irregular migration could not be stopped (Heisler& Layton-Henry, 1993; İrdem & Raychev, 2021; Bostan 2021; Bostan 2023). This illustrates how international migration can destabilise receiving countries from a political, economic and social perspective, due to the creation of an irregular migration flow.

In this sense, it is discussed that international migration could be represented as an unconventional hybrid war including pervasive attrition strategy. There is also a perception that the deployment of mass migration is more efficacious strategy than an exertion of military power or imposition of economic sanctions. To forcely provide people to immigrate from their local inhabitats to a specific location is driven by a state or an actor which implement its own military and political objectives. Some activities such as population reduction or increase can be used as a means of manipulation for interests of a state or an actor (Greenhill, 2016).

The use of migration as a weapon was first introduced to the literature by Kelly Greenhill (Başer, 2022). In his book, namely Weapons of Mass Migration, Greenhill provides a comprehensive analysis of coercively designed migration. He posits that a state or an actor can be used it as a coercive action against its hostile state. If a state which is relatively weak and employs it as a strategic instrument of foreign policy, it may be regarded as a decisive factor that could be used to prevail over its stronger adversary. It is relatively not costly method for a weak state by forcibly displacing people and subjugating its adversary in accordance with its own interest and desire. In 1995 Myron Weiner was the first to highlight its significant implications for international security studies, although Greenhill was the first scholar to introduce this concept to the literature. According to Weiner, the international migration is politically and financially expedient for a weak state, thereby enabling utilisation of the migration wave to its own advantage/interest (Salehyan, 2010).

Greenhill (2008: 7, 8) who refers it as strategic engineered migration, defines migration as "*are deliberately induced or manipulated by state or non-state actors, in ways designed to augment, reduce, or change the composition of the population residing within a particular territory, for political or military ends*". He describes how a weak actor can use forced migration as a coercive tool in interest of itself. Some strategies highlighted by Greenhill, show how an actor can use political discord created by a forced migration in another country for its interests.

Greenhill categories actors who use forced migration under three typologies: generators, agents provocateurs and opportunists. Although agents provocateurs are mainly non-state actors who intentionally provoke refugee-generating government repression to attract international attention, even generators consciously cause displacement of people. On the other hand, opportunists have not responsbility for causing mass displacement. However, they just try to take advantage. For instances,

Macedonia could obtain concessions from NATO members during the Kosovo campaign in exchange for accepting Albanian refugees (Salehyan, 2010).

The first example for the utilisation of migration as a strategic instrument, namely weapon, in the international arena was undertaken by the former Libyan leader, Gaddafi. Gaddafi employed migration as a weapon when his demands were not met by the EU. In 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010, he was responsible for initiating a significant migration flow Libya to Europe (Tsourapas, 2017). Gaddafi, who characterised this tactic as '*painting Europe black*', deploy it as a weapon against the EU. Another example can be seen in the case of used by Milosevic, who attempted to prevent the NATO air campaign against Serbia during the Kosovo intervention in 1999. Milosevic pursued a policy of aggression against Kosovo Albanians, declaring that he could '*evacuate Kosovo in a week*' and attempted to impede NATO's intervention by concentrating Kosovo Albanians along the border. It could be asserted that the influx of displaced refugees is more effective deterrent than military action (Greenhill, 2016).

The weaponisation of migration creates a disadvantageous situation for states governed by liberal democracies, which are targeted. This is because countries governed by liberal democracies have undertaken certain commitments in international agreements and have responsibilities towards both their own people and the international community due to their normative values. The obligation to comply with the principle of non-refoulement and to facilitate the integration of hosted asylum seekers and immigrants with the host society imposes an economic, political and sociocultural burden/cost on these countries, which may in turn lead to national security weaknesses. Democratic countries are therefore more vulnerable than other countries (Greenhill, 2016).

Weaponisation of Migration

The use of migration by actors is categorised into seven instruments. In his study, Greenhill (2008) identified the method of using migration by four instruments. However, Steger (2017) conducted a study in which fifty samples were analysed and concluded that actors utilise the influx of migration by seven instruments. This study will apply these seven instruments to ascertain whether Russian has used the influx of migration during the Ukrainian war.

These seven variants are *dispossessive, exportive, militarized, coercive, economic, political and fifth column*. The varian of *dispossessive* refers to a category of events, which compass both external and internal immigrants, wherein the primary aim is the acquisition of another group's property and territory. In addition, it is used to describe the removal of this group as a perceived threat to the ethnic-political status quo and economic interests. This is generally known as a ethnic-cleasing. In terms of *exportive,* this displacement is a strategic action undertaken with the purpose of consolidating its own political position and expelling its political adversary or domestic adversary in a region/country. Furthermore, this strategy seeks to also aims to undermine and/or destabilise the adversary's government (Greenhill, 2008).

The variant of *militarized* can be defined as a strategic displacement of populations during a conflict, with the objective of gaining a military advantage over the adversary. The aim is to disrupt and destroy the adversary's mobility, command-control and logistics capabilities, while simultaneously acquiring additional resources and manpower from the displaced individuals. Such actions thus serve to enhance the military capabilities. The most common strategy of this variant is to recruit their own military personnel. As regards of the variant of *coercive,* the events in which outflows are employed as a foreign policy instrument to impede or prompt alterations in political conduct and to secure additional payments from the adversary. The coercive deployment of outflows encompasses a propagandistic utilisation (Greenhill, 2008; Steger, 2017).

The variant of *economic* is the encouragement and/or facilitation of forced or economic migration for economic gains. The variant of *fifth column* is defined as a long-term strategy designed to ensure or facilitate the migration of a significant number of individuals towards the territory of an adversary state. The objective of this strategy is to undermine the adversary state's legitimacy and activities within its bordes by abusing the displaced citizens and sympathisers. The *political* variant is employed by the state for the purpose of legitimizing future actions, countering enemy political moves, and increasing the state's own political legitimacy. The instruments of passportisation and international propaganda are associated with the polical variant (Steger, 2017; Başer, 2022).

Case Study

The Russian-Ukrainian War

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a military operation against Ukraine. Prior to this operation, in June 2017, the Ukrainian parliament voted on the goal of NATO membership. A few months later, Zelenski declared that NATO membership represents a national objective for Ukraine. Putin then sent Russian troops to the Ukrainian border. In the last month of 2021, Putin demanded guarantees that Ukraine would not accept NATO membership. However, Western diplomats were unable to assuage the tensions along the Ukrainian-Russian border. In response, Russia augmented the number of its troops stationed along the border of Ukraine. In response to the US sending military assistance to the Eastern European member states of the NATO, Russia and Belarus held a joint military exercise along the border of Ukraine. In recognition of the separatist movements in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, the Russian government instructed its military units to enter these areas and ensure the safety of ethnic Russians. Ultimately, in February 2022, Moscow launched a military operation against Ukraine (Karasoy, 2022).

Russia's approach towards Ukraine, characterised as hybrid warfare, has evolved in the following manner. First, the objective was to render Ukraine interventionist by creating an environment of turmoil in the country. The Russian government sought to maintain pressure on Ukraine by imposing political and economic sanctions on Kyiv. In parallel with this strategy of attrition, the uprising of the Ukrainian Russians and the mobilisation of the Green Men on the ground were employed with the objective of creating an environment conducive to civil war in Ukraine. To create a legitimate ground for Moscow's potential military intervention, the information component of hybrid warfare has been initiated. To protect its interests, Moscow has tried to reduce the intensity of the conflict and de-escalate tensions (Özdemir & Eminoğlu, 2022).

The Ukrainian Asylum Seekers

The war strategy employed by Russia against Ukraine has resulted in the forced displacement of Ukrainian citizens. The destruction of the infrastructure, which is necessary to meet the basic needs of the civilian population, and the creation of a perception of vulnerability to violence by the Russians have been identified as key factors in this displacement. After the Syrian refugee crisis, it is one of the largest migrations (Işığıçok & Kariman, 2022) and the fastest migration wave that European countries have been exposed to. As a result of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation and the threat to life, a migration flow from the country of origin to the country of destination began. The EU stated that it would welcome Ukrainian asylum seekers. On the second day of the war, 50.000 Ukrainian citizens were compelled to flee their homeland. To guarantee the dafety of those migrating from Ukraine to other countries, a few humanitarian corridors have been set up. The humanitarian corridor witnessed a significant influx of Ukrainian immigrants seeking asylum in Europe, with Poland receiving approximately two million asylum seekers. In addition to Poland, other countries that were favoured

by Ukrainians included Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Moldova, Belarus and Russia (Başçıllar, Karataş & Güre, 2022).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has reported that nearly 6.5 million Ukrainians are currently classified as refugees in neighbouring countries, while a further 3.7 million are internally displaced persons. Poland has accepted 60 % of the Ukrainian asylum seekers. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has resulted in a number of significant challenges. In particular, the damage to energy infrastructures has resulted in significant disruptions to healthcare, water, heating, education and electricity. As a consequence, the majority of the Ukranians are experiencing these difficulties. International organisations are striving to address the humanitarian needs of those displaced due to the destruction of infrastructure and the threat to life safety resulting from rocket attacks. According to the 2024 dataset, nearly 14.6 million Ukrainians are in need of humanitarian assistance (UNHCR, 2024).

The Case Analysis

The employment of air and artillery attacks, long-rane missiles, and warplanes in the Ukrainian-Russian war, and the transformation of the conflict into an urban war, constitute the most significant factors that have precipitated a mass migration. The strategic targeting of the city's infrastructure by the Russian military resulted in the inability of Ukrainian civilians residing in the city to meet their essential needs, including access to electricity, gas and heating. Furthermore, the destruction of the settlements that changed hands prevented Ukrainians from returning to their own homes. In this conflict, in which all factors of hybrid warfare were employed, Ukrainian citizens were compelled to migrate to secure areas and reside there for an extended period. These strategic actions enable Putin to launch, orientate and benefit from the migration of the Ukrainians in manner that served Russia's interests (Kononov, 2024).

The coercive variant, which seeks to intimidate the enemy by encouraging the migration flow towards hostile countries, has been one of the Russia's most effective tools in its strategy against the West in the case of Ukrainian asylum seekers. In 2021, Belarus sought to exert pressure on the EU by allowing illegal immigrants to cross its borders into Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. In response to this action, the EU members, facing a challenging situation due to the influx of illegal immigrants, negotiated a solution with Belarus (Miholjcic, 2022).

Similarly, the curren influx of Ukrainian migration, which was deliberately initiated by targeting Ukrainian civilians and destroying urban infrastructure, has resulted in certain advantages for the Russian government. This has resulted in the forced removal of Ukrainian civilians who are opposed to the Russian government, thereby externalising the pro-Ukrainian supporters. It was estimated that 90 % of the Ukranian immigrants to the Europe belong to the dissident, urban and highly educated class (Kronov, 2024). The exodus of this demographic has arguably served to weaken the Zelensky's position and strengthening that of Putin by the expulsion of those who live in cities. This demonstrates the use of dispossession as a tool by Russia against Ukraine.

Furthermore, international migration can be utilized as a foreign policy instrument to obtain concessions and isolate an adversary. Following the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, the Ukrainian immigrants which has been considered the most traumatic crisis, was exploited by Putin as a bargaining chip against the EU. As reported by Reuters, Russia government sought to initiate a new wave of Ukrainian migration towards the EU by deliberately targeting the city's electricity infrastructure (Reuters, October 20, 2022).

International migration has constituted a significant challenge for the member states of the EU. The ability of asylum seekers to reside in secure locations and to be employed to meet their essential needs represents a significant challenge for the members. Furthermore, the capacity fof the EU members to protect their identities and the ability of immigrants to integrate into the host society represent

additional challenges confronting the members. The articulation of racist and exclusionary discourses against asylum seekers and immigrants by the leaders of far-right and far-left political parties has the potential to undermine social cohesion and the foundations of Western democracies at the national level. The Western states are bound by international agreements and commitments and are thus obliged to respect the principle of non-refoulement, which places a significant burden on them. As a result of their inability to assume these, the EU members may be compelled to deport illegal asylum seekers to third countries designated as safety countries for asylum seekers. The Western states that adhere to principles of human rights and the rule of law are subjected to criticism from the international community. They damage their international prestige as well. So, it helps Russia a trump card to use against the members that support Ukraine (Charlish & Florkiewicz, 16 October 2024; Aljazeera, October 11, 2022). This may prove that Russia is applying the coercive variant of the weaponisation of migration to Europe.

Furthermore, tle lack of coherence in the Union's common migration and asylum policy has resulted in an unequal distribution of asylum seekers among its member states. This distribution has had the effect of undermining the process of integration and causing the erosion of solidarity within the Union. In the academic literature, there are also some comments on the fact that the Union is on the verge of disintegration. These comments were initially precipitated by the 2015 Syrian asylum seeker crisis and have recently been echoed in the context of the Ukrainian asylum seekers (Reuters, June 27, 2024).

In the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia has employed both the strategy of passportisation and internal propaganda with considerable efficacy. In his statements, Putin explicitly referenced to the concept of the "Russkiy Mir" (Russian world), defining it as an idealised vision of the Russian language and culture. Furthermore, he asserted that Russia is a protector of the interests of ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking minorities. This concept has become a key element of Russian state policy, with the Moscow government assuming a responsibility to protect any Russian speaking minority or individuals identifying as Russian. The Russian govervenment has developed a foreign policy based on the premise that it has a moral obligation to safeguard and provide assistance Russian-speaking minorities around the world. In the contemporary era, this strategy is manifested as a means of safeguarding Russian speaking minority groups residing in the former Soviet countries. This demonstrates that Russia does not perceive its borders to be finite, and that it is prepared to justify any intervention or action taken by Russia with the objective of safeguarding the Russian diaspora (Veebel & Ploom, 2023).

In the case of Ukraine, Putin highlighted the historical connection with the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which are predominantly inhabited by Russian minorities. The conferral of Russian citizenship upon the inhabitants of these regions serves to provide Russia with a legitimate basis for any future intervention or action in these regions. This policy of the Russian government is not in contravention of international norms, given that each state is entitled to determine its own citizens in accordance with the Hague Convention (Natoli, 2010). In this sense, the practice of passportisation has been a prevalent strategy, particularly employed by the Russian government within the political variant.

International propaganda represents a second pillar of the political variant in the context of weaponisation of migration. Being a former member of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been influenced by Russia in social and political spheres. In Ukraine, Russia actively uses mass communication channels that stem from the socialist propaganda tradition. While Ukrainian-language channels are broadcast in the western regions of Ukraine, the Russian-language channels such as Rossiya 24, RTR, ORT (Channel 1) and NTV are broadcast in the eastern and southern regions. The Russian-language broadcasts provide the Russian government with soft power to provoke and orient to the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. In this sense, since 2014, the pro-Western Ukrainian leader has introduced a number of media reforms in the legal framework to curb the Russian government's mass propaganda. Ukrainian President Zelensky has officially suspended the broadcasting of some pro-Russian media channels (İlbasmış, 2022).

The reforms implemented by Zelenskyy proved ineffective in preventing the dissemination of disinformation by the Russia media. Throughout the course of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Russian media has presented Ukrainians as neo-Nazi soldiers and Russian soldiers as heroes engaged in the rescue of the Russian minority in Ukraine. The Russian media agents has disseminated content to the masses, portraying the conflict as a war against neo-Nazis and implying that NATO was on the brink of the Russian borders. The dissemination of disinformation by the Russia seeks to legitimate its military actions in the eyes of both the international community and Russians, thereby rendering the Ukrainian government defenceless (Gölcü & Nurlanova, 2022).

An additional illustration of international propaganda is the data rovided by the UN regarding Ukrainian immigrants. The number of Ukrainian asylum seekers in Russia is not determined by any international organisations; rather, the data provided by the Russian government is to be regarded as the definitive source. The prohibition by Russian government on access to the refugee camps impedes the international community's capacity to ascertain any data. The statistical data disseminated by the Russian government is employed by international new outlets. Conversely, the Russian government cites these numerical figures, which are reflected in the reports of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as the primary source from the UNHCR in its own reports (Steger, 2017). This situation exemplifies the capacity of migration-related data to influence international public opinion through the dissemination of information. International propaganda deployed as a political instrument in the weaponisation of migration is associated with the concept of hybrid warfare.

Conclusion

Hybrid warfare is defined as the utilization of a combination of conventional and unconventional methods. The objective of hybrid warfare is to weaken and damage the enemy through the implementation of intimidation strategies and the sustained maintenance of a low-intensity conflict, with the intention of ultimately undermining the adversary's ability to defend itself effectively. Hybrid warfare is characterized by a number of key attributes, including continuity, low-intensity conflict and manageable chaos. In the context of unconventional hybrid warfare, international migration is represented as an efficacious strategy rather than an exertion of military power or imposition of economic sanctions. To forcible relocation of people from their local inhabitats to a specific location is driven by a state or an actor because of its own interests. This study concentrated on the utilisation of migration as a weapon, which represents a crucial aspect of hybrid warfare strategies. In his study, an examination was conducted to ascertain the variants of the weaponisation of migration that Russia employed in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war as a case study. The findings indicated that Russia employed a range of variants, including coercive, dispossessive, exportive and political as well as passportisation and international propaganda.

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