

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY – RUSSIAN FEDERATION RELATIONS IN THE NEW ERA

Giray Saynur DERMAN*

*Prof. Dr. Marmara University, Faculty of Communication-Department of Public Relations and Publicity,
Department of Interpersonal Communication, Istanbul, Turkey

E-mail:saynurb@marmara.edu.tr

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ABSTRACT

In this research bilateral relations between Federation of Russia and Turkey in the fields of military, economy and diplomacy are evaluated in the time period beginning from the end of the Cold War to present. In this new time period of 2000-2019, in which the era of two charismatic leaders, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is taken as a basis, a balanced and effective foreign policy was followed and a series of cooperation areas were established. A new active period between the Turkey-Russia relations has started with the beginning of Vladimir Putin's governance and both Putin and Erdoğan carried out corresponding visits and senior summit meetings were held. Though the main determinant of the bilateral relations was to enhance the security weaknesses of Turkey that appeared in the Syria issue, by developing and reinforcing the Turkish defense industry, the progress of the friendly relations between the two countries after the July 15 FETÖ coup attempt in Turkey were also examined. The shooting down of Russian warplane on November 24, 2015 was a milestone and breaking point between the two countries, however, with the normalization of relations, parties were able to reestablish political and economic cooperation in a short time.

This review aims to reveal major effects of strategic partnership, security issues and energy policies of the two countries in Eurasia. After the post-Cold War era the international conjuncture was reshaped hence the Russian foreign policy decision makers changed economy, security and governmental policies to a Eurasianist approach. The consequent effects of these changes to the bilateral relations with Turkey are evaluated in this study. Relations in the context of diplomacy, economy and security of the two regional powers forms the focus point of the debate. Despite the former rivalry, the strategic relations and the vision of partnership between Turkey and Russia have developed through a win-win understanding and thus the analysis are carried out within the framework of regional cooperation in this survey. The major problems in relations and cooperation areas were also highlighted. Qualitative data analysis and induction methods were used in the analysis.

Keywords: Turkey, Federation of Russia, Erdoğan, Putin, Partnership

Introduction

Relations between Turkey and Russia is based on a long tradition. Turkey and Russia are different demographics, and the two countries have economic and military potential. This potential difference affects the relations between the two countries and their regional policies in the post-Soviet period.

Throughout history many bloody battles have occurred between Russians and Turks. Although the long-lasting bilateral relations are based on mostly conflicts and competition, there are also experienced periodic cooperation processes. In addition, in some certain milestones of history the two nations shared a similar fate. The relations between Russian Federation and Turkey are far more than the relations between the two young states built in the early 1900s. These relations are the interaction of two ancient nations with centuries of empire, confederation, and nation-state experiences.

After the First World War, both of the Ottoman and the Russian Empires lost their properties of being an empire. For internal reasons such as revolution and the change of the political system, the Soviet Union, a new independent state, whose political doctrine was the idea of communism, replaced the Russian Empire (Adamçik, 2002). At that time most of the Ottoman Empire's territories were occupied by European countries and the Empire was divided (Aleksandrov, 1989). Because of this the political and economic situations were very harsh for the Ottoman Empire. In such unfavorable conditions, a liberation movement led by Mustafa Kemal was established. Despite political differences Mustafa Kemal sought the assistance of Soviet Union in order to fight the foreign invaders. The USSR was also interested in cooperation due to mutual benefits. Thus, Mustafa Kemal and Lenin became allies. This was a new beginning. The Republic of Turkey was established and cooperation with the Soviet Union helped the success in the War of Independence. In 1925, the two states signed an important treaty of friendship and neutrality (Rubinstein 1997).

Relations between Turkey and Soviets progressed within the framework of the friendship and neutrality treaty until Atatürk's death in 1938. For the first time in the history of Turkish-Russian relations, countries started to cooperate in the military-technical field and commercial relations started to develop. However, the events of 1939, the beginning of the Second World War, made major changes both in the foreign policy process of states and in the international order as a whole. During the Second World War, Turkey had tried to maintain neutrality till the end of the war and took part on the side of the USSR, US, UK only a few months before the end of it. This was done to protect the benefits of the nation in the post war restructuring era.

A new international order was established and the three great powers, the USSR, US and UK became the main actors of this era (Easter, 2000). In post-war conditions, the world consisted of two poles: A US-led capitalist and a Soviet-led communist. The Soviets claiming Turkey's eastern territories and also the control of the straits emerged as a new problem and because of these ongoing issues Soviet-Turkey relations became rather complex. In the first decade after the war relations were almost frozen. After Stalin's death, USSR's territorial claims were abolished however the negative impact of it over relations continued. Thus, Turkey chose to monitor the path of capitalist development and was more eager to cooperate with Western countries. Nevertheless the USSR has never lost its interest in developing cooperation with Turkey. Turkey is a bridge between Asia and Europe due to its unique geographical location and straits and this made it a point of interest for the USSR. In fact, Turkey was the only capitalist camp state where the USSR continued to develop its relationship. During the 1960s-1970s, Turkey took loans from the USSR and the trade relations between countries began to flourish. With the signing of the first agreement relating to the supply of Soviet gas to Turkey in 1987, a new stage in Soviet-Turkey relations began. This was the beginning of the emergence of strong trade ties between countries that had a positive impact on bilateral political relations (Derman, 2003). During these years, a modern model of Russian-Turkish relations began to emerge, where bilateral economic dependence was an important factor in the foreign policy of the two countries. Although Turkey is a NATO member and an ally of the US, leaders of Turkey did not want to sacrifice the benefits of economic cooperation with the USSR and tried to keep a balance between the two blocs in its implemented policies. In modern times USSR was perceived as "the red threat" by NATO and, as a member of it, Turkey was in the position of protecting the southern border of the bloc against the threat. Quiet years have passed Turkey under the protection of NATO and Russians in the Iron Curtain (Rubinstein 1997). "Untrustworthy Russians" is a concept that has become a common phrase used in Turkey. Meanwhile Russia described Turks as the nation that occupied Tsargrad (Istanbul), the holy city of Orthodoxy. Bilateral relations, which date back 500 years, have inevitably followed a fluctuating course.

Disintegration of the USSR was an important event in Russia-Turkey relations. Since the collapse of communism, Russia has seen new countries formed by the disintegration of the Soviets within its sphere of influence (Kurban and Derman, 2015). Russia wants to preserve its sphere of influence and to monopolize the control of energy and raw material transfer from Central Asia (Romanova, 2008). Meanwhile Russia prevents the relations of its near abroad with the West. Turkey aims to reach the status of a regional power in the regions

of Black Sea, Caucasia and the Middle East with its newly implemented foreign policies (Winrow, 2015). Localized at the junction of the energy-rich Middle East and the former Soviet Union territory, Turkey became a natural gas transit center and achieved the unique advantage of having a coercive force. Due to its strategic and geopolitical features Turkey is an indispensable country for Russia. Russia wants to keep its position as the main oil and gas supplier of the EU and for this is in need of Turkey's support (Monaghan and Jakovski 2006). On the other hand Turkey is in need of Russia in order to solve the conflicts in the Caucasus and to realize its targets in its new foreign policies. Besides the alternating historical memory of the relations, the bipolar nature of the Cold War era has been much influential in shaping the perception of threat on both sides. Over time, Turkey has changed perceptions of Russia as a potential threat, while Russia has begun to pursue a more open foreign policy for the Western allies (Warhola, 2006). Russian-Turkish relations approached the process of multilateral cooperation, which distanced itself from the perception of old relations within the framework of historical competition and distanced itself from the conditions of struggle between capitalist and communist blocs.

After the end of the Cold War period, new cooperation opportunities and perspectives emerged. After the signing of the friendship and neutrality treaty with the USSR in 1925, Turkey and Russia continued their military-technical cooperation. In 1994, the countries signed an agreement on military cooperation, and in 1998 an agreement was reached between the Turkish and Russian General Staff of the Armed Forces determining the security zones. The creation of the Joint of Russian-Turkish Military Commission was established in 2001 (Steen 2003). These progresses began to form the legal component of cooperation between the two countries. Moreover, cooperation in the energy sector between Russia and Turkey has dynamically developed (Stulberg, 2005).

Following the rapid development of economic cooperation in the 1990s, bilateral relations entered a new era with the close dialogue established between the political leadership of the two countries and in the early 2000s settled on an institutional basis especially with the establishment of the Senior Cooperation Council (SCC) in 2010 (Caşın & Derman, 2016).

The Turkey-Russia relations which were based on cooperation and mutual benefits, have been exposed to a serious test due to military activities related to the crisis in Syria. With the help of common sense and the joint desire of the two nations the normalization process has been initiated. Within this framework, since the second half of 2016, an intense bilateral dialogue has been reestablished. Today, Turkey's and Russia's foreign policies with regard to the conflict in Syria, has been one of the most crucial and discussed topics. Despite

the negative impact of some political disagreements, bilateral Turkish-Russian relations continue to develop in a positive vector. This study focuses on areas that contribute to the rapprochement of the two countries. In this context, the development of political, economic, cultural relations between the two countries has been reviewed and the role of these recent developments to the foreign policies of both countries in the XXI. Century has been analyzed.

This research is based on analytical and descriptive methodology. Among the main research questions of the study are “How relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation changed during the AK Party governance?” and “What are the basic factors of this change?”. The hypothesis of the article is that the multi-faceted strategic rapprochement of leaders has caused the intensification of bilateral economic dependence in Turkey Russian Federation relations during the AK Party governance period. The development of relations between Turkey and Russia is in accordance with the national interests of both states. Within the context of new political realities in its foreign policy Turkey became more independent from the influence of Europe and the US which makes it possible to see Russia as a strategic ally. In the study, on one hand the historical background of Turkey-Russia relations are taken into account and on the other hand recent developments and tendencies are analyzed. Besides the large projects such as Akkuyu nuclear power plant and Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline, the creation and implementation of new industries, the development of military-technical cooperation like in the S400 missile systems, the opportunities and problems in relations were also examined. The use of English, Russian and Turkish literature provides a comparative and objective perspective for both Russian and Turkish researchers. In order to avoid evaluating Turkish-Russian relations through ideological stereotypes, foreign sources such as foreign policy documents, official agreements and decisions, correspondence among politicians, as well as newspapers were utilized. It is not possible to analyze contemporary Turkish-Russian relations without considering their historical background. For this purpose, the period from the First World War to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the first decade of the post-Soviet period were also analyzed. Thus the main subject of the study covers the time period beginning from the creation of Turkey-Russia strategic alliance during AK Party governance until the shooting down of the Russian SU-24 military aircraft in November 2015, which significantly deteriorated the relations. Official web sites of official institutions, in particular the web site of the Russian president, the web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the web site of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, the web site of the Russian Federal State Statistics Service, the web site of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and similarly corresponding relevant official

websites of Turkey, Gazprom, State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom website and the Russian export center are among the internet resources made used of in this study.

1. Old Rivals New Partners -A New Era in Turkey and Russian Federation Relations

Turkey has done its first international natural gas supply agreement with the Soviet Union on September 18, 1984 and has begun to import approximately 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year since 1987. With this treaty, which foresees the purchase of natural gas for cash for 25 years starting from 1987, the energy dimension has added to the bilateral relations. After the natural gas exit from Russia it is transported to Turkey via Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria and this pipeline is known as the West Line. This treaty has resulted in both an increase in exports and a diversification in exports after 1987 (Horelick 1987). In 1989, the volume of foreign trade between the two countries increased twice. Many problems, difficulties and contradictions in the Turkish-Russian relations in the 1990s are mostly reflections of some of the great new global dynamics that shaped the post-Cold War international order (Arbatov, 1994). Globalization, the shift of power from the center to the periphery, the proliferation of regional conflicts, the West's tendency to promote democracy and human rights, and the increasing international demand for fossil fuels which remain the main energy source, have been some of the developments affecting Turkish-Russian relations (Derman 2016).

When the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union's break occurred in 1991, there was no serious dispute in relations between Turkey and Russia (Bogaturov 1993). This period has been a new beginning for legal and political subjects. With the establishment of the Russian Federation, Turkish-Russian relations entered a vibrant period (Kınıklıoğlu, 2006). While economic relations are advancing rapidly, the progress in politics and security have been much slower and uncertain. Russia saw the Caucasus and Central Asia, the former Soviet territories, as its special domain of influence and this was the main reason why relations did not develop at the same pace in the areas of politics and security as they did in the field of economy (Dugin, 2005).

As the Russian Federation strengthened economically and had a more robust domestic authority, a more competitive understanding began to prevail in its foreign policy. The period 1992-1999 was characterized as a period of controlled tension and competition in the areas of geopolitical influence and bilateral relations (Munçaev & Ustinov, 1999). Because of the conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia and between Russia and Chechnya, the atmosphere

of friendship in bilateral relations has quickly been replaced by undesirable tension. On January 11, 1995, a statement condemning the military operation of Russia in Chechnya was published in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In addition to this, Russia's attitude towards the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the Commonwealth of Integrated States' establishment of customs union, Russia's objection to the Straits Regulation dated July 1, 1994, the attempt to prevent the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project, Russia's agreement with the Greek Cyprus on January 4, 1997 concerning a deal for the sale of S-300 missiles, have been the major issues elevating tension between Turkey and Russia relations (Pamir, 2005). In this period, the relations that were formerly exhibiting a completely competitive nature, in time attained a line predicting cooperation in many areas though has not lost its antecedent aggressive character (Steen, 2003). While the parties maintain geopolitical competition, they have entered into an intensive process of economic cooperation. Both sides showed a clear attitude towards the development of economic cooperation as much as possible, the Russian side was especially keen on this issue. Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian Prime Minister of the period, visited Turkey on December 15, 1997 and the parties signed many agreements concerning energy, legal, technology, mutual investment, commercial and educational cooperation (Arbatov, 1997). Among them the Blue Stream gas agreement had particular importance that would provide Turkey 16 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas. Mikhail Kasyanov, Russian Prime Minister of the period, expressed the "strategic partnership" demand of the Russian side during his visit to Turkey in October 2000 (Derman 2016). He also proposed an increase in the trade volume between the two countries from 3 billion dollars to 10 billion dollars. As of 2003, this objective has been achieved and the trade volume target was reset to reach 100 billion dollars. The flourishing successful trade relationships paved the way for a transition in the security and policy fields from rivalry and controlled tension to cooperation.

It is possible to say that, in the new era, Turkey-Russia relations which were previously based on an understanding of competition, peeled off slowly from this historical burden and a multi-dimensional cooperation process began. Indeed, Vladimir Putin, the elected Russian President in 2000 visited Ankara in December 2004 and was the very first Russian head of state to visit Turkey since the collapse of the USSR. The signing of a deeper multidimensional cooperation framework agreement between the parties during this visit may also be seen as the most important indicator of the evolving multidimensional cooperation process. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Prime Minister of Turkey at the time visited Moscow in January 2005 which was an important step in deepening the economic relations between the two countries

(Derman, 2017). These reciprocal visits provided a remarkable increase in high-level talks and bilateral relations reached a new stage. During these visits, significant consensus was reached on extending and maintaining the energy cooperation and increasing trade volume between the two countries (Romanova, 2008).

One of the most important pillars of this established cooperation between Turkey and Russia has undoubtedly been in energy trade. Indeed, Turkey was importing approximately 58% of its annual natural gas demand and 29% of its annual oil demand from Russia. Unilateral gain was not the target of this cooperation understanding and with reciprocal trade the main intention was to develop a network of cooperation in which both parties benefit.

In this sense it is notable that Turkey made 5.9 billion dollars of export to Russia in 2014 which is 3.8% of its total export of 157.6 billion dollars and in the first nine months of 2015 from January until the end of September, Turkey made 2.7 billion dollars of export which is 2.5% of its total export of 107.3 billion dollars (<https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/exports>).

2. Economic Relations

Economic and commercial relations are the driving force of our relations with the Russian Federation. Russia is one of our most important foreign trade partners. The mutual investments between the two countries amounted to 10 billion dollars and the Turkish contractors have implemented nearly 2000 projects worth more than 60 billion dollars in Russia.

In order to fully demonstrate the progress, we can group the economic relations between the two countries under four headings:

1. Trade and investment
2. Energy and new projects
3. Tourism
4. Building contractor projects




Figure 1: Export Quotas of Russia and Turkey

A high share of export quotas reflects the openness of an economy and the importance of exports in the national economy. As a result of foreign trade liberalization and policies, investment increased between the years 1995 and 2016 (Masumova, 2016).

Years	Russia		Turkey			
	GDP in current prices, USD billions	Exports	GDP in current prices, USD billions	Exports		
		USD billions	% of GDP	USD billions	% of GDP	
1995	395.5	115.8	29.3	169.5	33.7	19.9
2000	259.7	114.4	44.1	273.0	53.1	19.5
2005	764.0	269.0	35.2	501.4	105.4	21.0
2010	1,524.9	445.5	29.2	771.9	157.8	20.4
2015	1,365.9	391.6	28.7	859.4	200.5	23.3
2016	1,283.2	329.9	25.7	857.8	189.2	22.1

Source: World Bank Data. Retrieved from <http://databank.worldbank.org> (last visited 26 March 2018).

2.1. Trade and Investment

After Germany, Russia is Turkey's second largest trading partner. The trade volume between the two countries was approximately 31 billion dollars in 2014. In the case of import, Russia is Turkey's largest partner. According to reports compiled by Bloomberg News, Russia with \$ 25 billion in 2014, surpassing China, has become the largest source of imports for Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey's 7th largest export address is Russia. Turkish companies have investments in Russia chiefly in sectors of food, beverages, bottles, glass, household appliances and other durables and banking.

As of 2014, the total number of projects undertaken by Turkish companies in Russia since 1989 is 1,923. The total value of these projects is more than \$ 61.7 billion. Therefore, after the 2015 airplane crisis, the explanation of Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev “Turkish companies may lose their shares in the Russian market. The shooting down of the warplane could result in the ending of the joint projects” created apprehension and discomfort (Masumova, 2015).

Years	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
USD billion	21.0	28.2	37.9	22.6	26.2	30.0	33.3	32.0	31.2	24.0	16.9	22.3

Source: TÜİK, at <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr> (last visited 24 March 2018).




Figure 2: Bilateral Trade Between Russia and Turkey

Source: <http://turkstream.info/project/>

2.2. Energy

The Energy subject represents one of the most important aspects of relations between Russia and Turkey. Turkey supplies 58% of its natural gas and 29% of its oil from Russia (Derman 2003). There are important projects connecting the two countries. Our cooperation with Russia, which is one of our main partners in energy supply, is being carried to a further stage with the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant and Turk Current projects. On 12.05.2010,

the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Turkey, signed an agreement on cooperation concerning the construction and operation of Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in the Republic of Turkey. This was the beginning of one of the largest and most debated nuclear energy projects. Turkey's first nuclear power plant Akkuyu project is being carried out with an investment of \$ 20 billion by Russia. Akkuyu NPP Project consists of 4 units. The output power of each unit will be 1200 Megawatts electric (MWe). The technical reference plant of the Akkuyu NPP Project is the Novovoronejskaya-2 Nuclear Power Plant with AES-2006 project in Russia. The operational life of Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant will be 60 years. Slightly enriched uranium dioxide is the planned fuel to be used in this NPP (Masumova, 2015).

Turkish Stream project consists of the construction of a natural gas pipeline that will traverse along the Black Sea starting from the Russian borders and extending to the European coast of Turkey to Turkey's border with Greece. The length of the pipeline's sea portion will be about 910 km and the length of Turkey's territorial land section will be 180 km. The cost of the project is estimated to be approximately EUR 11.4 billion. With this Turkish Movement Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Turkey is going to buy 15.75 billion cubic meters of natural gas per annum from Russia and the remaining gas will be exported to Europe (<http://turkstream.info/project/>)

Turkish Stream Project was first announced by Vladimir Putin, the President of Russian Federation of the period, during his visit to Turkey in December 2014. However the uprising crisis with the shooting down of the Russian military aircraft on November 24, 2015, halted the progress of the planned projects. The President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan clarified the situation as "If the Russians don't come and build Akkuyu NPP, then inevitably someone else will come and do it." Thus both the future of the Turkish Stream Project and the Akkuyu NPP Project became uncertain in this period (Derman 2016). Only after the end of the plane crisis, Alexei Miller, CEO of the Russian energy company Gazprom, announced that the Turkish Stream project would be put into practice as soon as possible and both projects were re-launched (<https://www.gazprom.com/projects/turk-stream/>).




Figure 3: Electricity Generation and Shares by Energy Resources

Source: TÜİK. Çevre ve Enerji, at <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr> (last visited 12 April 2018).

According to 2014 data of Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) of Turkey, natural gas imports were mostly made from Russia with a share of 54.76 percent. The amount of natural gas imports from Russia in 2014 was 27 billion cubic meters. Even in the EMRA report, it is stated that “our country is significantly dependent on natural gas import and a great deal of this dependence is on Russia”. In gas imports, Iran follows Russia and takes second place with 18.78 percent (<https://erranet.org/member/emra-turkey/>). After the aircraft crisis, the Russian Energy Minister of the period, Anatoly Yanovsky explained that under the ongoing contracts gas supply to Turkey would continue. However, the question of where the alternative addresses for energy could be if relations with Russia were shaken, was raised. John Roberts, the energy security expert of Methinks Ltd. spoke to Bloomberg broadcasting, expressing that Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) supplied either from Iran or the US could be an alternative to Turkey’s situation. However, it should not be forgotten that Iran is also a supporter of the Assad regime of Syria. Trade and other mutual relations began to normalize by 2017 and the declines in 2015 and 2016 have been left behind (Caşın and Derman, 2016).

2.3. Tourism

The existing cooperation between Turkey and the Russian Federation in the field of tourism constitutes another important aspect of bilateral relations. In 2019, the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey approached 6 million. After Germany, Russia sends the most tourists to Turkey. After the aircraft crisis, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s warning “Due to the terrorist threat do not go to Turkey” caused a significant reduction in the number of tourists coming to Turkey. Nevertheless, the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey increased with the resolution of the crisis. According to Renaissance Capital’s research, about

12 percent of tourists visiting Turkey were from Russia. again Russian people's choice of Turkey as a travel destination makes it the country sending the most tourists after Germany (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-russian-federation.en.mfa>).

NATIONALITY	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
GERMANY	1.6	2.2	4.1	4.4	4.8	5.0	5.0	5.3	5.6	3.9	3.6
TOTAL EUROPE	4.5	6.7	14.0	16.6	18.2	18.3	18.8	19.5	19.2	13.3	13.2
RUSSIA	-	0.7	1.9	3.1	3.5	3.6	4.3	4.5	3.7	0.9	4.7
TOTAL C.I.S.	1.2	1.3	3.4	6.0	6.6	7.2	8.6	8.8	8.1	5.6	10.5
TOTAL	7.2	10.0	20.5	28.5	31.3	31.3	33.8	35.9	35.6	25.3	32.1

Source: Balance of Payments, 2017, at www.tomb.gov.tr (last visited 22 April 2018).

Figure 4: Number of Tourists Visiting Turkey (in million)

2.4. Contracting Services in Russia

Contracting services supplied by Turkish freelance entrepreneurs in Russia play a great role in the commercial relations between the two countries. Entrepreneurs have the opportunity to take part in the Russian market for the first time in 1980. Since then over 1.900 contracting service projects have been undertaken and the total value of these projects has been calculated as approximately 61.3 billion dollars. When the business undertaken by the Turkish building contractors abroad is evaluated during the time period between 1972-2015 June, it is seen that a total of 8.606 projects were undertaken, reaching a great income of 311 billion 861 million dollars (Derman 2006). During this phase the analysis of the distribution of the projects among the countries uncovers the fact that Russia having a 19,6%, is in the leader position (<http://kesz.ru/en/>).

3. Russian-Turkish military-technical cooperation

Military-technical industry is a relatively new area of cooperation between Russia and Turkey. The first steps in this area were taken during the Lenin and Atatürk era, when both countries underwent a period of reform and restoration (Derman, 2016: p.79). After the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian Empire was presented to the world society as a completely different state: the USSR, a new ideology, a new political system and new priorities in foreign policy. Turkey was in a similar position. Republic of Turkey was the successor of the Ottoman Empire, however, the new state was very different from the previous format of the Ottoman Empire. Under the new political realities, both states were in search of allies and were open to cooperation. Thus, at that time, the signed friendship and cooperation agreement between Turkey and the USSR was the beginning of the active interaction between the two countries.

After the collapse of the USSR, Turkey-Russia relations made a new beginning. Though as a member of NATO, Turkey has good cooperation with the NATO countries especially in military necessities. So far history has proved that it is better to have more than one option. In this sense Turkey was seeking alternative options in the modernization of the military complexes. Russia, producing high quality and competitive technical military products, became a good alternative option for Turkey and got the role of an alternative arms supplier for Turkey (Caşın & Derman, 2016).

3.1. The Proposal of ATAK Helicopters

Atak helicopters tender has been another segment in the Turkish-Russian military cooperation. In 1995, Turkey opened a tender for the purchase of attack and tactical reconnaissance helicopters. Many countries offered their choppers in this tender. An Italian firm with “Augusta”, German-French joint venture with “EuroCopter”, an American firm with “Bell Textron’s AH-1Z Viper model” and the Russian army with “Kamov Ka-50 series” have participated in the tender. At first agreements were made with the US firm Bell Textron’s AH-1Z Viper model however after ten years there was no helicopter delivery and it was understood that the USA’s intention was not to give any helicopters to Turkey but to delay Turkish army owning attack choppers. By 2007 the Joint venture of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and Italian Agusta Westland began the creation of ATAK T-129 helicopter which was based on Agusta A129-Mangusta. The first ATAKs were delivered to the Turkish army in 2014. In 1997, the Russian Kamov company was also interested in Turkey’s helicopter tender. At that time Ka-50 was in production which was only a single seated helicopter. However two crew in tandem position was one of the set specifications of the tender, so the company introduced a double tandem crew version of the Russian military helicopter Ka-50-2, Erdogan. However the tender was later on cancelled and Turkey had chosen to produce its own chopper by joint venture. The tactical and technical parameters for the attack and tactical reconnaissance helicopters set by the Ministry of Defense of Turkey are well met by ATAK helicopters and the Russian Ka-50-2 series helicopters. According to some authorities the Russian Ka-52 choppers, a newer version of Ka-50 series, were found to be more superior than the American competitor attack helicopter AH-1Z-Vipers. In the ATAK program, events such as demonstration flights of Russian and Russian-Turkish crews and Ka-52 warfire were organized. In addition, Turkish experts found the opportunity to analyze the construction technology of Russian helicopters (<https://www.tusas.com.tr/en/product/t129-atak>).

3.2. Air Defense Systems Tenders

Turkey declared a tender for the purchase of air defense systems in 2009. The current Turkish air defense system was based on Nike-Hercules missiles. These missiles were made by US Western Electric firm with the outdated technology of the 1950s and were brought to Turkey between 1959-1964. This old technology missile systems became ineffective in modern warfare and modernization of them also appeared to be another problem. Thus, Turkey has wanted to purchase US Patriot PAC-2 missiles since 1994. However, many inhibitor situations like the economic crisis, increased conflicts with PKK terror organization, the inconsistency of the coalition governments and the reluctant intention of the US forced Turkey's air defense modernization project to be postponed for a while. As the AK party came to power and the situation in the country stabilized, the air defense subject arose again. In 2009 Turkey Long Range Air and Missile Defense System (T-LORAMIDS) declared a tender. The tender attracted the attention of the US, China, Russia and joint Franco-Italian companies. In addition to negotiations with other tender participants, Turkish-Russian negotiations on the possible procurement of Russian military systems intensified. Turkey was interested in Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile system used by Greece. The S-300 missile systems were in fact the property of Southern Cyprus however due to legal opposition of Ankara, these systems couldn't be placed in Cyprus, so they were deployed to Rhodes Island and are under the control of the Greek army. Greece is also a member of NATO and the presence of the S-300 systems proves that Russian air defense systems can be integrated into the NATO army. Nowadays, Turkey is more interested in the S-400 Russian air defence missile systems which are a modernized version of the S-300 systems. However, Turkey's interest in Russian S-400 systems became a new issue getting harsh reactions from US and NATO countries. Mainly, objections arise on the topic of integrating a non-NATO weapon system into a NATO country. From Turkey's point of view, this was a Janus-faced policy of US and NATO, as integration of the S-300 to Greece had never been a problem and moreover it was the USA's reluctance to sell Patriot PAC-2 air defense missile systems forcing Turkey to seek an alternative. The Turkish government, however, did not give up the idea of modernizing the air defense system (<http://turkishpolicy.com/blog/32/turkeys-purchase-and-the-path-to-a-post-american-alliance-architecture>).

4. Black Sea Security Cooperation

In 1998, at the meeting of Chiefs of the Black Sea Navies (CBSN) in Varna, "The Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group-BLACKSEAFOR" was initiated by Turkey with the idea of establishing a multinational naval on-call peace task force. The purpose of this initiation was to enhance peace and stability in the Black Sea area by increasing regional co-operation

and improving good relationships. On April 2, 2001 in İstanbul the BLACKSEAFOR establishment agreement was signed by Bulgaria Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine (Derman, 2013).

In November 2004, Turkey officially invited the Black Sea countries to the operation “Black Sea Harmony”. The aim of this operation was to monitor the southwestern region of the Black Sea for suspicious ships, to identify possible terrorist acts and weapons of mass destruction. Russia was the first country to respond to the invitation. On December 27, the Russian Federation’s agreement to participate in the Black Sea Harmony operation was put into effect. The main forms of Russian participation in the operation were to exchange information about suspicious ships and, if necessary, to use Russian ships and aircraft in the northeastern Black Sea (Derman, 2013). The Black Sea Harmony operation which is an effective action of the Blackseafor group, is important in ensuring security in the region. It should also be noted that the developing dialogue between the Turkish and Russian military representatives plays a major role in strengthening the mutual trust between the countries.

5. The main problems between Russia and Turkey

Albeit the relations between Turkey and Russia are progressing in a good manner, this doesn’t mean that there are no controversial situations. Particularly since the beginning of the 1990s, the wave of regional ethnic conflicts and separatism movements, which have been seriously spreading, have influenced the course of Turkish-Russian relations from time to time. In this context, the Karabakh conflict in the South Caucasus (in fact, the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijan), the Chechen issue and the PKK issue have gained importance. The Chechen problem increased the tension of Turkish-Russian relations particularly during the first war of 1994–1996. Turkey’s official policy had been the resolution of the Chechen problem by peaceful means within the territorial integrity of Russia. However, occasional organizational and individual activities of Chechen descent diaspora in Turkey have increased the tension in relations. In this era, the Russian ambassador of the time, Albert Chernyshev, indirectly stressing the PKK problem of Turkey, said “One should not throw a stone to the window of his neighbor if his house is also made of glass”. Later on, Turkey managed to restrict the activities of the Chechen diaspora significantly in the country and Russia frequently repeated in its discourses that Russia is acting cooperatively against terrorism and took actions accordingly (Derman 2013). Thus, it is possible to say that the Chechen problem did not affect the tension of relations much during the hot conflicts that restarted in 1999. Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK terrorist organization, escaped to Russia to evade the pursuit of Turkey in 1997. However, Russia deported Öcalan within a very short period of time and the PKK issue of

Turkey has never become such a great problem in bilateral relations. In fact, there are a diverse group of subjects that are ongoing issues, carrying the potential to increase tension. Russia's support to Assad's regime in the Syria conflict, Russia's denial to accept PKK, PYD, YPG as terror organizations, presence of YPG's official office in Moscow, the deployed Patriot missiles in the Turkey-Syria border by NATO, the Ukrainian crisis and Russia's Crimea annexation, the pressure exerted on the Crimean Tatars and Aircraft crisis are some examples of the disagreements and ongoing issues (Derman, 2017, 111). Among these problems, the aircraft crisis was the sharpest bend and the breaking point in bilateral relations. In spite of regional and global disagreements such as Russia's evaluation of the 1915 Armenian issue as "genocide" and giving support to Southern Cyprus, it is possible to see that the two countries maintain their cooperation and strategic relations in the context of "win-win" rather than being in rivalry. Energy trade constitutes one of the important pillars of cooperation between Turkey and Russia. With the new pipeline agreements signed between the two countries, relations have reached a level that they have never been before. Oil and natural gas are the major subjects of trade between the two countries. Russia reliably continues to supply Turkey's oil and natural gas demands. Turkey's energy dependence on Russia is annoyingly increasing. No matter how friendly the relations between the two countries are, such dependence is not desirable. Despite the annual visit of 2-3 million Russian tourists to Turkey, the presence of border neighborhoods and 50 thousand international weddings, cultural relations between the two countries are quite weak. There is unfulfilled interest in Turkey's history and culture in Russia as there aren't enough Russian publications on this subject. Cooperation of the Universities and common publications would help cultural integration and development of social empathy, aiding the resolution of the conflicts and flourishing of the relations.

6. Special Crisis in Turkey and Russia Relations

On November 24, 2015, an unwanted event took place. Two fighter jets entered the territory of Turkey. These military aircrafts were later understood to be Russian Su-24, performing operations to land targets on northern Syrian territories (Caşın and Derman, 2016). One of these planes, violating the Turkish airspace, returned to Syrian airspace. However, the other Russian Su-24 fighter was shot down within the Turkish airspace. Turkey announced that although the aircraft had received warnings about territorial intrusion, it resisted leaving Turkish airspace so it was shot down according to the engagement rules. Formerly, in 2014 the Turkish airspace was again breached for about 15 minutes by Russian planes in the Black Sea, and in the following G 20 meeting this subject was discussed with Russian leader Putin and he confirmed that it would not happen again. Thereafter, Turkey declared that it would

not tolerate the violation of sovereignty rights ever since. During the G-20 meeting in Ankara, Putin pointing to Turkey declared “Some members give their support to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (DAESH- terror organization formerly known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS))”. Because of the ongoing issues in Crimea and Syria, an ongoing tension had already existed. Putin accused Turkey of backstabbing. The Russian press also depicted Turkey as cowards, backstabbers, terrorist collaborators and traitors. “I think the shooting down of the Russian plane was previously planned. First of all, Ankara fears that Syrian Kurds will inevitably grow strong if DAESH is defeated. In such a case the idea of establishing a great Kurdistan will be possible. Secondly, Tayyip Erdoğan is trying to strengthen his political position through military rhetoric and he has just partly succeeded (Derman and Oba, 2017). Finally smuggling traffic made through the Syria-Turkey border brings significant revenue to Turkey.” were the remarkable comments of Dmitri Abzalov, Deputy Prime Minister of the Center for Strategic Communications (Prime agency). The well-known Pravda newspaper was pressed with a very ugly title. “Fu..... cowards hiding on the outskirts of NATO...” (<https://www.pravda.ru>). According to a news article in Sputnik, Russian leader Putin said in a statement: “The problem is not only about the tragedy that we had yesterday, but much deeper. Not only we the Russians but also the whole world see that the existing governance of Turkey is deliberately pursuing domestic policies for Islamization of the country for many years.” (<https://news.sputnik.ru>) The increased tension was a major blow to bilateral relations (Dyomkin, 2015). In the near past Russian Federation had entered Georgia and tore the two regions of the country, occupied Crimea, kept Eastern Ukraine within its sphere of influence, and sent warplanes to Syria to support Assad (Derman, 2015, 37). Therefore the leader of such a powerful country was expected to act in response. Russia’s response to the downfall of Russian fighter jets by Turkish jets was strong.

6.1. Measures taken by Russia

Shooting down the plane had already increased the tension and evaluation of this topic harshly in the international media and contributed to the fiery atmosphere. On November 28 sanctions planned to be put into force against Turkey were announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin. As soon as the plane was dropped Russian Federation Foreign Minister Lavrov canceled his visit to Turkey. The State Duma and Federal Council, the two houses of parliament of the Russian Federation demanded the cancellation of scheduled flights to Turkey. A package of tough measures were revealed. Travel tours to Turkey were canceled, trucks from Turkey were kept waiting at the customs entry, entrance of Turkish goods from the Russian customs were stopped, food products checks increased, at the airports Turks were

forced to have extra security checks and were humiliated as potential criminals, businessmen were arrested unnecessarily for simple reasons. According to reports from the Russian Interfax news agency, Russian Prime Minister Medvedev, said that the important joint projects of Turkey and Russia may be canceled. Medvedev declared that Turkish companies could lose their shares in the Russian market. Economic measures also began to take effect quite soon. Russia announced that white meat intake from Turkey would stop by December 1, 2015. The first cut flowers of the season that were planned to be sent to Russia from Antalya remained at the airport. According to the RIA Novosti agency, the Russian General Staff spokesman Lt. Gen. Sergei Rudskoy reported as “One of the two greatest air defense warships of the Russian Navy, Moscow, the flagship of the Russian Black Sea fleet will be stationed at the junction of Turkey’s and Syria’s territorial waters”. Furthermore, Russia deployed S-400 missiles to Syria after the crisis, which had a range of 350 km approximately against airborne targets. Without doubt, these modern and effective missiles would be a direct threat to Turkish and allied aircrafts (<http://s400.tass.ru>).

The particular explanations from the senior names of Russia’s management staff made it clear that the economy of Turkey will be forced to suffer seriously as punishment. Following these developments, Gazprom PJSC, Rosneft, Lukoil, Magnitogorsk Iron & Steel OJSC, Turkish Airlines, Sberbank PJSC, Yandex NV, Anadolu Efes and Enka Construction came out to be the most vulnerable companies(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/74663/000175272419048349/NPORT_828700853642636.htm).

In comparison to the former years’ first six months period, the trade volume between the two countries, in the first six months of 2016 had decreased by 35 percent. Similarly, the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey dropped by 87 percent (Derman, 2019).

All of Russia’s sanctions against Turkey, but especially the ones that were related to the economy, had a smashing effect on Turkey’s tender financial balance.

7. New Period in Post-Crisis Relations

Relations between the two countries have changed its pathway after the November 24 aircraft crisis (Kurban & Cabbarlı, 2019). It can be derived that the political developments and international relations are variable dependent and fragile and this has a direct effect on economic relations between Turkey and Russia Federation. The beginning of the progress in relations between Turkey and Russia was not long ago but its route became tense and painful with the crisis.

The coldness between the two countries lasted until 27 May 2016. On this date, the first signs for positive steps in bilateral relations began to appear. In this context, in a conversation in Athens, with Alexis Tsipras, the Prime Minister of Greece of the period, the Russian leader Putin expressed their desire to improve relations with Turkey if the first step came from Turkey. In another time, during his meeting with Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel of the period, in early June 2016, Putin expressed that he would support negotiations for the normalization of relations with Turkey and would support negotiations for the improvement of relations between Turkey and Israel and renormalization of the relations with Turkey (Derman 2017).

On June 14, 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sent a congratulatory message to Putin and Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım sent a congratulatory message to Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev on the Russian National Day celebrated on June 12. On June 27, President Erdoğan sent a letter to Putin and expressed his condolences about the downfall of the Russian plane and the deceased Russian pilot. On June 29, Russian President Putin called President Erdoğan and thanked him. The two leaders agreed to act jointly to improve relations and restore their former state (Derman, 2019).

After the July 15 coup attempt, President Erdoğan made his first foreign visit to Russia on August 9, 2016 and the leaders of the two countries accompanied by a large delegation met in St. Petersburg (Derman, 2019).

All these developments can be described as positive developments after the aircraft crisis. However, on December 19, 2016, there was another sad event between the two countries that could lead to a new crisis. Russian Ambassador to Ankara Andrey Gennadiyevich Karlov was assassinated at the opening of a photo exhibition organized by the Russian Embassy at the Center for Contemporary Arts. “Do not forget Aleppo, do not forget Syria,” said the assassin and was shot by security forces. Putin was fully aware of the events in Turkey during the 15 July coup attempt and did not blame Turkey for the assassination and evaluated the incident as a plan to make mischief and sabotage the scheduled tripartite summit in Moscow. In a similar way President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a statement regarding the assassination as “a provocation aimed at disrupting the normalization process”. Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed the same views (Derman & Oba, 2017:35).

Despite the assassination of Russian ambassador Karlov creating anxiety of a second peak of the crisis concerning the Syria issue in Astana process, Turkey, Iran and Russia became important players acting in cooperation. Relations on trade, the fight against terrorism, the

Cyprus issue, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Turkish Straits and energy transmission lines have sometimes been positive and in some other periods and have been strained (Derman 2016). Considering the positive steps taken in the resolution of the Syrian issue within the framework of Astana spirit and the purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, relations with Iran and the Russian Federation have improved considerably. The Number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey reached 6.5 million and a target trade volume of \$ 100 billion is aimed for. S-400 purchases took place and the Turkish Stream project was implemented. However, it must be notified that Russia also has economic problems. Russia has been achieving half of its budget from exported oil and gas. The sharp drop in oil and gas prices, stagnation of capital flow to the country and the sanctions imposed by the US and the European Union (EU) on account of the Ukraine crisis, have caused economic turbulence in Russia. According to data released by the Russian Federal Bureau of Statistics, the Russian economy contracted by 2.2 percent in the first quarter of 2015, contracted by 4.6 percent in the second quarter and by 4.1 percent in the third quarter compared to the same periods of previous year (Özer, 2016).

Conclusions

Despite the coexistence and similarity of the historical fate of both countries, and consequently the existence of common interests, relations have been established on the basis of mutual distrust and necessitated the maintenance of deep-seated stereotypes that limit the possibilities of good neighborliness in both communities. Nevertheless, the question arises considering the evolving cooperation between Turkey and Russia. Is this cooperation a result of a strategic transformation in the Russian Federation foreign policy or is it a mere periodic necessity? Regarding the wars between Russia and Turkey, rivalry, expansion policies, spheres of influences, ideological differences, public competition, Russia's historical demands on Turkish territories, it can be claimed that there is no strategic transformation in Federation of Russia's foreign policy but the current cooperation is the process of periodic necessity. In this case, as the recent developments creates many opportunities for Turkey, this also embodies serious risks. Though Russia had been a global rival of the US after the Second World War in the context of global leadership, it has lost its struggle in the 1990s, but has not abandoned its claims. It still sees the US as the other pole. Therefore, the tension between the US and Turkey is seen as an opportunity. By establishing military and strategic relations with Turkey, one of the main actors of NATO which is founded against the Soviet threat, Russia not only keeps Turkey close to its influence sphere but also prepares grounds for the breakage of the security structure of NATO and the West. Thus, gains are obtained in the context of splitting the opposite front.

Russia, as a lucrative market for military products, has never lost its interest in Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey's armed forces actively would modernize the country not only with NATO, but also with other countries that can offer high quality products, are also open to cooperation in this field. However, due to the political orientation towards the West of Turkey it is not easy to enter the Turkish military technical market. Therefore, the Turkish-Russian military-technical cooperation largely depends on how independent foreign policy works for Turkey's NATO allies. Moreover, in recent years the priority of the Turkish government is not to purchase military equipment abroad but to develop its own military production. Considering these factors, the Russian joint military developments and technologies can be an important partner for Turkey in the shopping area. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, "the AK party came to power and after Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkish-Russian relations have gained a stable character in the fight against terrorism.

Russia is an important partner for Turkey. Having many years of experience in the production of military technical equipment, Russia manufactures high quality and competitive products with advanced technologies. Russia is interested in entering the Turkish military-technical market and is ready to make big concessions. As stated earlier, Turkey's new policy over the modernization of military technical systems is aiming not only at the purchase of equipment from other countries but also the creation of its own products. Russia seems to be ready to cooperate with Turkey in this area and not just for purchases, but also to make contracts for the joint production of military technical equipment. Currently, Russia and Turkey have already realized some major joint projects. A Russian company won the tender for the production of Medium Range Anti-Tank Weapon System in 2009, and in 2015 Turkey and Russia began to work on the joint project for a short-range missile system known as "Igla" which is in the category of Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), a Russian version of well-known Stinger missiles. Furthermore Turkey has also launched the purchase of S-400 missiles (<https://www.igla.ru>). Despite the two countries' military demands, it should be noted that some political factors complicated cooperation of the two countries in the military-technical field. Primarily it should be taken into account that Turkey is a NATO ally and the military-technical priorities in the modernization of the system should follow certain standards (Derman, 2017). The rapprochement between Turkey and Russia in this area can complicate Turkey's relations with European countries and the US. Therefore, the Turkish government needs to pursue a balanced policy between East and West. Despite the existing restrictions of NATO and the US, in recent years Turkey has increasingly pursued a more independent foreign policy and tried to keep Russia as an important strategic partner. The economy sector and the energy sector have

become major fields of cooperation. During the AK Party's administration, a dynamic trade turnover growth was observed among the countries. Agreements for the projects of Akkuyu NPP and Turkey natural gas pipeline are the two important agreements signed between Turkey and Russia in the last decade, which are also believed to determine the quality of bilateral relations for many years.

The Moscow administration feels the necessity to have good relations with Turkey in order to be effective in both the Turkish and the Islamic world. Problem-free relations with Turkey means that it would be much easier for Russia to consolidate its position in the Turkish world. In terms of the Islamic world, there is a dual policy for Russia as Moscow evaluates the Muslim world in two axes, the Shiites and the Sunnis. Hence, Russia wants to expand its area of influence over Shiites via Iran and over Sunnis via Turkey. Besides, Russia seeks support of Turkey in the ongoing Syria issue. Turkey taking its position near the Russia-Iran axis becomes an argument to be used against the West. Furthermore, this also has a buffering and balancing effect against other actors and threats. When Idlib territory is considered as a special case, Putin begin to follow policies concordant with Turkey and by doing so escaped being cornered in the context of human rights, has tried to achieve a positive image in the international community, has reduced costs in Idlib projection and has escaped responsibility in case of a terrorist act. Syria, which is considered as the last stop of the Arab Spring and dominated by instability and chaos for approximately seven years, eventually has managed to seize its supremacy over the terrorist groups and ensured control over the majority of the country. On the road to success, the Damascus regime made a joint decision in the Idlib projection with Russia and Iran. The option of performing an extensive military operation in the region had been a major debate subject in the Tehran Summit on September 7, 2018. At the summit Iran, Russia and Syria shared the same opinion of executing the military operation, however Turkey underlined the drawbacks of such an action. Thus, the common point of the analyzes and evaluations after the summit was that the expected result could not be achieved and the "Astana Spirit" was damaged. Recep Tayyip Erdogan's explanations after his return from Tehran were in the sense of confirming the dissidence. However, only ten days later, the Putin-Erdogan meeting in Sochi disintegrated the negatives of the Tehran Summit. The most important outcome of the Sochi interview is that the Russian Federation began to exhibit a posture close to the thesis of Turkey and has been more affirmative to Ankara's demands. The flexible foreign policy of Russia towards Turkey cannot be attributed only to the result of an understanding set forth in the Sochi Interview. After the "Airplane Crisis" between the two countries, initiation of letter diplomacy enhanced normalization of the relations and later on the failed coup attempt on

15 July 2016 started a new phase . This new phase is based on a friendly relationship system in which both parties pay maximum attention to relations, respond to each other's demands, maintain soft-tone explanations even in crisis situations or in case of political discrepancies.

From the perspective of the Russian Federation, it can be stated that four important points come into prominence in determining, shaping and conducting the foreign policy. The Eurasia Cooperation Action Plan signed on 16 November 2001 between Russia and Turkey is the first one of these. The second point is Russia's new strategic vision that goes beyond being an expansionist and regional power and evolving into multipolarity in the international system. In this respect, the Moscow administration led by Putin has come a long way primarily by confronting its internal structural problems. In this process, separatist movements were liquidated, economic strides were made and serious improvements were achieved in military capacity. Russian decision-makers then began to test the international system. In this context, there have been military, political and economic initiatives. The third point is that with the questioning of the US global leadership, the effectiveness and population of the Moscow administration has been opened up according to Russian decision-makers. Thus, rapprochement policy is aimed towards players that have periodical or traditional tension with the US and in this context particularly towards Iran and Turkey. Finally the fourth point is that Russia has to care for the Turkish world and Islamic world as one of the main determinant parameters in its strategic projections due to geographical and socioeconomic conditions. Thus, it can have the opportunity to control a large geography and population with economic and natural resources. According to these four mentioned points effective in the foreign policy of Russian Federation, it can be emphasized that Russia needs Turkey in the realization of its global objectives. First of all Russian expansionism in the Caucasus-Caspian-Persian Gulf axis or Black Sea-Aegean Sea-Mediterranean axis cannot be realized against the presence or opposition of Turkey. Therefore, Russia's rapprochement policy with Turkey is a tactical stance that coincides with the interests of Russia and in a sense aims to neutralize Ankara. It is of particular interest that Turkey is surrounded by Russia in the Balkans, Black Sea, Middle East axis. During the problematic process with the EU and US, Turkey has comprehended that there are many other options in the world. As it will be recalled, Erdogan made this very clear during his prime ministry, saying, "If necessary, we will say goodbye to the EU and turn to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization".

Turkey is the second country where the demand for electricity and natural gas increased most in the world. In the forthcoming period, consistent with its economic and social development targets, it is expected that Turkey will continue to be one of the most dynamic

economies in the world sustaining the increase in the energy demand. As a result of this increasing energy demand, Turkey becomes more and more dependent on energy imports, primarily oil and natural gas. Currently Turkey supplies about 26% of its total energy demand from the domestic sources. The rest of its energy demand is supplied from the imported resources mainly from the Federation of Russia. Relations with Russia have gained importance in many ways, including the S-400 acquisition in the defense industry and the Turkish current. In a sense Russia and Turkey have become strategic partners cooperating mainly in energy and military. Despite this interdependence of Russia and Turkey, it should not be ignored that there is serious conflict of interest between the two in the regions of the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Based on these conflicts, the economic rapprochement between the two countries may not easily turn into political rapprochement and it is also not easy for Turkey to abandon the US and EU at its own will.

It can be concluded that during the AK Party governance relations with Turkey and Russian Federation have reached a new level. The implementation of long-term huge projects illustrates the mutual trust between Turkey and Russia. Strong economic interdependence between countries has become a factor that helps overcome some political disagreements between countries. Although there are political disagreements in some issues, recently both countries share their common views related with regional problems and also pursue coordinated policies at the international dialogue level. So far the running process demonstrates that mutual cooperation meets the national interests of the two states and continues to develop in the context of a tactical partnership.

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